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The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages

A Study in Moral Thought from the Fourth
to the Fourteenth Century

By

István P. Bejczy



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Cover illustration: Table of the cardinal virtues and their four degrees (*virtus politica, purgatoria, animi purgati and exemplaris*) according to Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*. Inner Temple Library, Petyt MS 511.10 f. 21^r (early 12th century). Photographer: Ian Jones © The Masters of the Bench of the Inner Temple.

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CONTENTS

Introduction	1
1. Patristic Era and Early Middle Ages (c. 400–c. 1100)	11
Christianizing the Cardinal Virtues: The Three Great Fathers of the West	11
Ambrose	12
Jerome	18
Augustine.....	22
Christianized Cardinal Virtues: The Early Middle Ages.....	28
Moral and Spiritual Literature	30
Exegesis and Hagiography	47
Philosophy and Politics	54
Conclusion	65
2. The Twelfth Century	69
The Renewal of Moral Thought	69
Classicizing Tendencies.....	71
Classicizing Moral Literature	71
Twelfth-Century Humanism	76
Canon and Civil Law.....	81
Early Moral Theology.....	83
The School of Laon.....	84
The School of Peter Abelard	87
Religious Moral Thought	92
Benedictine Voices	92
Virtue and the Inner Self: The Victorines	101
Virtue and the Inner Self: The Cistercians.....	105
Other Religious Authors	115
Parisian Theology: Peter Lombard and After	119
Peter Lombard	119
Peter the Chanter's Circle	123
Conclusion	132
3. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries.....	135
Moral Discourse: Aristotle and Beyond	135

The Cardinal Virtues: Text and Context	137
Treatises Devoted to the Cardinal Virtues	137
The Cardinal Virtues in Other Sources.....	143
Saving the Fourfold Scheme	153
Four Virtues?	154
Four Moral Virtues?.....	163
Four Principal Virtues?	168
Cardinal Virtues and Secular Ethics.....	182
Acquired and Gratuitous Virtues	184
Moral Virtues and the Final Destination of Man	200
Political Virtues	208
Conclusion	218
 4. Fallen Man in Search of Virtue	 223
Virtue and the Fall	223
The Cardinal Virtues and the Vices	224
The Capital Vices and the Virtues	225
The Principal Virtues and the Vices	238
Cardinal Virtues and Cardinal Vices	243
Subverting Aristotle.....	252
Voluntarism and Intentionalism.....	253
Egalitarianism	262
Individualism	275
A Quodlibetal Question of Thomas of Sutton	280
Conclusion	283
 Conclusion	 285
 Appendix I. Some Current Classifications of the Moral Virtues	 291
I.1. Prudence and the Moral Virtues According to Aristotle's <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>	291
I.2. The Subdivisions of the Cardinal Virtues According to Some Classical and Medieval Writings.....	291
I.3. The Classification of the Moral Virtues According to Giles of Rome, Gerald of Odo, and John Buridan	293
 Appendix II. Some Unedited Medieval Texts on the Cardinal Virtues.....	297
II.1. <i>De quatuor principalibus uirtutibus et diffinitionibus</i>	297
II.2. <i>De quatuor principalibus uirtutibus</i>	299

II.3. Peter the Chanter, <i>Summa Abel</i> , lemma <i>Virtus</i>	299
II.4. Hugh of Saint Cher, Commentary on Peter Lombard, <i>Sententiae</i> III.33	301
II.5. <i>Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus</i>	307
II.6. Robert Holcot, <i>Super Sapientiam Salomonis</i> , lectio 108 (on Sap. 8:7)	309
Bibliography	315
Index of Manuscripts	353
Index of Ancient and Medieval Authors and Major Anonymous Works	357

INTRODUCTION

The scheme of the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance; their order may vary) counts among the most celebrated philosophical concepts that the Latin Middle Ages borrowed from the ancient world. The first known mention of the scheme occurs in Plato's *Republic*. After Plato, the scheme found a wide diffusion in the ethical systems of antiquity, notably in Neoplatonism as well as in Greek and Roman Stoicism. Latin Christian authors adopted the scheme from the late fourth century and even coined the name of the cardinal virtues, which is absent from classical sources. During the Middle Ages, the idea that prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance constitute the four prime moral virtues went nearly unchallenged.

Most classical authors considered the four virtues as attitudes to be developed through study and practice, either in public life or in the retired existence of the wise. The virtues thus conceived were essentially of human making and reflected the secular values of the leisure classes providing leadership in politics and philosophy. Christian authors might therefore well have left the scheme of the cardinal virtues aside, the more so as the Bible—which briefly mentions the virtues at Sap. 8:7—contains numerous alternative sets of moral concepts of a more religious nature, such as the theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity), the Ten Commandments, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the eight beatitudes. Yet this is not what happened. During the Middle Ages, the cardinal virtues became fully integrated into Christian moral thought. They not only made their way into moral theology and philosophy, but also into didactic writing, political literature, preaching, exegesis, hagiography, and the visual arts. In early modern times, the “heroic” observation of the cardinal virtues even became an official criterion for confessors to be canonized as saints.

Although in 1929 the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga already designated the virtues and vices as privileged objects of cultural history,¹ the

¹ Huizinga, *De taak der cultuurgeschiedenis*, 83–84. Huizinga argues that forms and functions of civilization crystallized to figures, motifs, themes, symbols, ideas, ideals, styles, and sentiments constitute the proper object of cultural history. By way of examples, Huizinga mentions “functions of civilization such as service, honour, loyalty, obedience,

history of the cardinal virtues in the Middle Ages has never been written. Much relevant source material has been examined in a number of valuable studies composed in the middle of the twentieth century by learned Francophone clerics such as Philippe Delhay, René-Antoine Gauthier, and especially Odon Lottin, who between 1948 and 1960 published his monumental six-volume work *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*.² Unfortunately, their work does not seem to have been systematically carried on by following generations of scholars. Only for the early medieval era do a couple of survey studies exist.³ Also, the iconography of the cardinal virtues has received sustained attention during the last two decades,⁴ while some recent publications mark a renewed interest in later medieval virtue ethics.⁵ By contrast, the study of the capital vices in the Middle Ages has flourished ever since Morton Bloomfield published his classical work *The Seven Deadly Sins* in 1952. In the wake of this work, a constant stream of publications on authors, texts, and themes related to the vices has followed, while some capital vices even received their own monographs.⁶ Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio recently summarized the research of the second half of the twentieth century into a new and useful synthesis.⁷

Naturally, I should not wish to deny that the vices are often more fun than the virtues, but concentrating on the vices while neglecting the virtues may unduly blacken our idea of medieval moral consciousness. A moral tale written in Anselm of Canterbury's environment may serve

imitation, resistance, the pursuit of liberty" (my translation)—functions which can at least partly be understood as virtues—and the seven capital vices.

² Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 97–326 and 4: 549–663 contains extensive discussions of the cardinal virtues in academic theology; religious authors such as Bernard of Clairvaux and William Peraldus as well as philosophers such as John Buridan fall outside Lottin's scope. For Delhay's bibliography, see Renard, "*In caritate non ficta*". Gauthier's main contribution is *Magnanimité*. See also Graf, *De subiecto psychico*, an elaborate study on the relation of the cardinal virtues to the faculties of the soul.

³ Mähl, *Quadriga virtutum*; Bovendeert, *Kardinale deugden gekerstend*. The latter study should be used with caution.

⁴ See e.g. O'Reilly, *Studies in the Iconography*; Bautz, *Virtutes*; Hourihane, *Virtue and Vice*.

⁵ See e.g. Kent, *Virtues of the Will*; *Les philosophies morales et politiques au moyen âge*; Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues*; and three volumes ensuing from my research project on medieval moral thought: *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century*, *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages*, and *Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages*.

⁶ See Wenzel, *The Sin of Sloth*; Newhauser, *The Early History of Greed*.

⁷ Casagrande and Vecchio, *I sette vizi capitale*. I will use the French translation: *Histoire des péchés capitaux*. See also, more recently, *In the Garden of Evil*; *The Seven Deadly Sins*; Newhauser, *Sin*.

to illustrate the point. In this tale, allegories of the cardinal virtues enter into a discussion on morality with two messengers, one from hell, the other from heaven. After duly comparing the reports from both messengers, the virtues finally decide that it is better to be guided by a joyful desire for beatitude than by fear of infernal punishment, a view to which the unknown author adheres in an epilogue.⁸ I adhere to this view, too. Medieval man did not live in a constant fear of evil things, as even some medievalists suggest.⁹ There is also a more positive story to be told, relating to the medieval efforts to make the best (in a moral sense) of human life. This book attempts to tell this story. The cardinal virtues suggested, precisely because of their non-Christian origin, that a certain degree of goodness was attainable on earth through human endeavour, possibly even outside the strict sphere of religion. Patristic and early medieval attempts to Christianize the four virtues never completely silenced this suggestion, which was taken up and explored in different contexts from the twelfth century onward.

The principal aim of this study is to examine the significance of the cardinal virtues in the moral thought of Western Christendom from its patristic beginnings until the Renaissance era, most notably in relation to the differentiation of secularized and religious conceptions of morality which developed from the twelfth century. Specific doctrines regarding the four virtues such as their interconnection, their internal hierarchy, their relation to other virtues and to the vices, their connection with the faculties of the soul, etcetera, receive attention in as far as they help to achieve this aim. My main interest lies with the ways in which the cardinal virtues were considered important, or even essential, for the moral formation of the human being, both as a subject of the world and as a citizen of heaven.

The first three chapters of this study present a detailed chronological survey of the history of the cardinal virtues in the Middle Ages. Chapter One is devoted to the virtues in Latin Christian writing from patristic times to the late eleventh century. The chapter shows how in this period the scheme of the four virtues became firmly incorporated into Christian thought and literature. The patristic approach to the cardinal virtues can be qualified in terms of appropriation. Virtue and moral goodness

⁸ Pseudo-Anselm of Canterbury, *De custodia interioris hominis*.

⁹ See e.g. Delumeau, *Le péché et la peur*, a work introducing such notions as *mentalité obsidionale*, *surculpabilisation*, and *maladie du scrupule*.

were only conceivable for the Latin church fathers as religious categories. Taking issue with Roman Stoicism in particular, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine redefined the cardinal virtues as divine gifts, and hence as the exclusive property of Christian believers. By the virtues, God permitted his followers to participate in divine goodness to some extent in their earthly existence and completely in heaven, where the virtues would survive, according to Augustine, as the modes whereby the elect would experience God's everlasting love. Later patristic writers, notably Julian Pomerius and Gregory the Great, corroborated the Christian character of the virtues while stressing their importance for the active life. Enabling Christians to achieve moral acts and thereby to gain heaven, the virtues served in their view as divine instruments which secure morality in the here and now and salvation in the hereafter. Until the twelfth century, this line of interpretation dominated in moral and spiritual literature. The virtues were assimilated in various genres of religious writing, including exhortative treatises, exegesis, preaching, and hagiography. References to ancient teachings on the virtues, often mediated by patristic sources, occasionally arise in these writings, but never in order to question the authors' prevailing religious outlook. Only a small number of texts reveal a philosophical interest in the virtues or discuss them as features of political morality. Yet at the same time, Carolingian authors in particular emphasized the need for Christians to live in accordance with the virtues, thereby implying that virtue, notwithstanding its gratuitous character, required conscious human effort. Even if the concept of humanly acquired virtue was absent in the early medieval period, the virtues figured from Carolingian times as central tenets in moral education.

The twelfth century, which constitutes a pivotal period in the history of the virtues, is examined in Chapter Two. The interest in moral theology and philosophy took a sudden upsurge in this century. For the first time since the patristic age, the cardinal virtues gave rise to intense debate. Many intellectuals active in the schools admired classical moral philosophy and considered its teachings on the virtues highly instructive for Christian society. Most religious authors, however, refused to recognize the existence of moral goodness outside the faith and took efforts to vindicate the Christian character of virtue, sometimes engaging in fierce polemic against the philosophers of antiquity and their contemporary adepts. The chapter analyzes these developments and argues that on a doctrinal level, the rediscovery of the classical origins of the virtues forced theologians to reflect on the interaction of nature and grace in matters of morality. Most theological writers stuck to the idea that even

if humans possess a natural inclination to goodness, the formation of virtue is dependent on grace and charity. In the second half of the century, however, Parisian theologians not only came to accept the idea that non-Christians are capable of moral goodness, but also acknowledged the existence of humanly acquired virtues that enable a moral order in the present life next to the salvific virtues informed, or infused, by divine grace. Devised in order to bridge the gap between philosophical and religious conceptions of virtue, the theory of the Parisian masters put an effective end to the unity of morality and religion instituted by the church fathers.

The doctrines developed in twelfth-century Parisian theology determined to a considerable extent the virtue theory of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, which is the subject of Chapter Three. In these centuries, a scholastic debate on the virtues, now dominated by Aristotelian ideas, coexisted with an extensive religious and didactic literature in which the virtues figure as basic catechetical elements and practical instruments of moral improvement. Thanks to the groundbreaking work of the twelfth-century Parisian masters, Aristotle's conception of virtue as a *habitus* formed by the repeated exercise of inborn human abilities was accepted with relative ease in scholastic theology and philosophy as well as, to a lesser extent, in pastoral and educational literature. Aristotle, however, gave no privileged position in his *Nicomachean Ethics* to the four virtues known as cardinal to his medieval readers. The chapter demonstrates how prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance nevertheless survived in the scholastic era as the four principal moral virtues, both in moral theology and in philosophical ethics. Many late medieval theologians and philosophers took pains to integrate the scheme of the cardinal virtues with Aristotle's system, while the theological and cardinal virtues were taken together in academic and pastoral theology as the seven main virtues of Christendom. Expanding on the theories introduced in the late twelfth century, most thirteenth-century masters acknowledged moral virtues, including the cardinal quartet, on three different levels: as humanly acquired virtues; as acquired virtues informed, or acted upon, by divine grace; and as divinely infused virtues. Around 1300, however, the existence of infused moral virtues was questioned in theology. Some masters claimed that moral virtue was a purely human affair, while grace mattered only to salvation, not to morals. This development encountered growing resistance in the fourteenth century, most notably among a group of theologians belonging to the Augustinian order of hermits who claimed that virtue and morality could only exist

thanks to the special assistance of God. The chapter argues that neither position gained the upper hand in late medieval moral thought. Despite the increasing independence of philosophical ethics and political morality from theological speculation, late medieval authors were generally unwilling to cut the ties between morality and religion. The majority of scholastic and popularizing moral authors conceived the moral virtues, even if acquired by natural means and primarily relating to man's temporal concerns, as having their first origin and ultimate end in God and conducive to a life of contemplation. For a large part, late medieval moral thought revolves around a continuous attempt to define the natural and the supernatural dimensions of the human journey to perfect virtue.

Chapter Four involves an anthropological perspective. The argument takes its point of departure in the conviction that medieval moral thought, notwithstanding its manifest indebtedness to classical moral philosophy, centres around the conception of fallen human nature which is absent from the ethical systems of antiquity. The chapter examines some major consequences of this conception for medieval virtue theory, not so much on the level of formal doctrine as on the level of the assumptions which guided medieval authors in their reflections on virtue and morality. To begin with, virtue had its place in the permanent struggle of man against his evil inclinations. The chapter sets forth a detailed analysis of the correlations between the cardinal virtues and the vices in medieval moral literature. This analysis reveals that two different ways to approach the moral subject prevailed in the Middle Ages, one concentrating on the human proneness to sin, the other on the human capacity for virtue. The latter approach, which dominates in intellectual discourse, agrees much better with classical moral philosophy than the first one, which is prominent in pastoral literature. Yet even if primarily approached in its capacity for virtue, the moral subject was not conceived by medieval theorists in the same terms as used by their ancient predecessors. The chapter attempts to demonstrate that the conception of fallen human nature entailed a set of specific premises—defined as voluntarism and intentionalism, egalitarianism, and individualism—which limited the medieval receptivity to Aristotelian virtue ethics in particular, even among authors who aimed at developing a philosophical outlook on morality. My final claim is that not only the religious ethic of the Western world has medieval roots, but also the process whereby religiously inspired notions of morality determine the formation of a seemingly secularized ethic regarded as culturally unbiased and hence valid for the entire human race.

Some preliminary remarks ought to be made regarding the selection of sources used in this study. I have concentrated on Latin Christian texts. Vernacular literatures have not been taken into account, while references to the visual arts remain incidental. Moreover, I have mainly drawn my evidence from texts in which the cardinal virtues appear as a fourfold scheme; texts discussing prudence, justice, fortitude, or temperance individually have mostly been left aside. Even within these limits, it has not been possible to treat every single text of interest to the theme. Heinrich Seuse was probably right in observing, by 1334, that more treatises on the virtues and vices existed than could be read in an entire lifetime.¹⁰ Many of these treatises, moreover, lie hidden in manuscripts, and most of them are insufficiently catalogued.¹¹ Over the past years I have had the opportunity to see quite a few of these, and I am happy to include much unedited material in this study. Meanwhile, numerous possibly interesting sources still wait to be explored.

Treatises on the virtues and vices, a genre for which Richard Newhauser composed a most useful research tool,¹² naturally receive particular attention in this study. One should realize, however, that many of these treatises—which may vary from brief sets of definitions to laboured *summae*—are the offspring of other genres such as academic and pastoral theology. Thus, William of Auvergne's *De virtutibus* is in fact an independently circulating segment of its author's commentary on the *Sententiae* of Peter Lombard. Chapters on the virtues and vices extracted from theological compendia likewise survive as independent treatises;¹³ the same is true for the *Secunda secundae* of Thomas Aquinas, the part of the *Summa theologiae* that deals with the theological and cardinal virtues and the vices opposed to them. The question of whether treatises on the virtues and vices form a coherent genre need not occupy us here, but what we must bear in mind is that it is difficult to delineate these treatises from other genres, and that an exclusive concentration on them would result in an artificial limitation of scope. Celebrated medieval writings which discuss the virtues and vices along with many other subjects may

¹⁰ Heinrich Seuse, *Horologium sapientie* 2.3, pp. 540–541.

¹¹ Despite its many defects, Bloomfield et al., *Incipits* (quoted below as Bloomfield) is still indispensable as a repertorium of medieval moral literature. Without it, this study could probably not have been written. For corrections and additions, see Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement*.

¹² Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues*.

¹³ For examples see below, p. 231.

actually have been more important for the development of moral thought than little known treatises confined to the virtues. I will therefore refer without discrimination to works in which expositions on the cardinal virtues only fill minor parts, in particular when these works survive in large numbers of manuscripts or early editions. The use of sources from a variety of genres enhances, moreover, the representative character of this study. Throughout my work I will combine texts of a distinctly academic scope with pastoral and educational writings. Giving attention to intellectual and popularizing discourse alike may give insight into a morality which had a place not only in learned discussions, but also in the formation of human society, and thus bridge the divide between academic theory and educational practice.

In one sense, however, the sources used in this study are rather one-sided. Up to the fourteenth century, Latin moral literature of any kind was but for few exceptions written by clerics. Lay authorship on moral issues was somewhat less unusual in vernacular literatures and in Italian humanism, but my concentration on Latin texts until the year 1400 largely excludes these fields. In my period of research, the only lay authors capable of writing in Latin on moral issues on an equal level with learned churchmen were civil lawyers, some of whom actually reached a broader audience (Albertanus of Brescia, John of Legnano). I will refer to these authors whenever appropriate, even though their work does not strike me as having been designed as an alternative to clerical moral writing. Within clerical moral writing, however, one may encounter widely diverging perspectives, varying from the religious fundamentalism of Bernard of Clairvaux to the brazenly secular views of the Benedictine abbot Engelbert of Admont. In effect, no lay revolution could have made the debate on the cardinal virtues in the Middle Ages more diversified than it actually was.

It should be noted that in every period under discussion texts from earlier centuries were still being read, extracted (in florilegia¹⁴ as well as in original compositions), and sometimes elaborated upon. Martin of Braga's *Formula vitae honestae* (570/79), for instance, was hardly ever quoted before the twelfth century, but became immensely popular in the Later Middle Ages. The original writings from the various periods, on

¹⁴ The genre, consisting of systematic (alphabetical, thematic, etc.) arrangements of citations, was much used for moral instruction. See Rochais, "Florilèges spirituels: Florilèges latins"; Delhay, "Florilèges spirituels: Florilèges médiévaux"; Rouse and Rouse, *Preachers, Florilegia, and Sermons*.

which the following chapters concentrate, do not therefore fully represent these periods' actual reading. They are, however, indicative of the periods' principal moral concerns.

CHAPTER ONE

PATRISTIC ERA AND EARLY MIDDLE AGES (C. 400–C. 1100)*

Christianizing the Cardinal Virtues: The Three Great Fathers of the West

Long before entering Latin Christian literature, the cardinal virtues of antiquity found acceptance in Greek exegesis. In the first century Philo of Alexandria introduced the scheme in his biblical commentaries; in the second and third centuries, notably Clement of Alexandria and Origen followed in his footsteps.¹ The Greek fathers took their knowledge of the virtues chiefly from Platonic and Stoic sources² and associated the scheme with a wide range of passages from the Old and New Testaments, even though the only literal reference to the four virtues in the Bible occurs in the Book of Wisdom (Sap. 8:7), composed in Hellenized Jewish circles and probably dating from the first century AD.³ Since its canonicity was mostly rejected, Greeks exegetes rarely referred to it. Of the three Greek fathers mentioned here, only Clement of Alexandria quoted the verse, inferring from it that the ancient Greeks took the scheme of the cardinal virtues from the Hebrews.⁴

In contrast to their contemporaries in the Eastern Church, the first generations of Latin fathers passed the cardinal virtues under silence. The only reference to the scheme in Latin Christian writing before the age of Ambrose is found in the *Epitome divinarum institutionum* of

* Manuscripts cited in this study have been inspected by myself or by others on my behalf, unless their sigla are preceded by an asterisk (*).

¹ See Mähl, *Quadrigena virtutum*, 10–11.

² For Clement's mixed Platonic and Stoic conception of the virtues, see Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, 72–84; for parallels between Origen's views and Neo-Platonism, see Crouzel, *Origène et Plotin*, 321–332.

³ The four virtues also occur at 4Macc. 1:18, but 4Macc., likewise written in the first century AD by a Hellenized Jew, was generally considered apocryphal. Eusebius and Jerome attributed it to Flavius Josephus.

⁴ See Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 6.95.4, pp. 250–252.

Lactantius (ca. 240–ca. 320). Refuting those who believe that evil stands outside the divine order of the universe, Lactantius quotes the view of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus that the four virtues are inconceivable without their negative counterparts (*iniustitia, ignavia, intemperantia, imprudentia*).⁵ References to the scheme of the four virtues appear on a more regular basis in the work of the three most celebrated Latin church fathers of the late fourth and early fifth centuries: Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. Having received a Roman education, the three fathers knew the virtues directly from Stoicism and Neoplatonism. In addition, they underwent the influence of Greek exegesis.⁶

Ambrose

The process of Christianizing the cardinal virtues in the Latin West sets in with Ambrose of Milan (340–397). Notably in *De officiis*, Ambrose gives a Christian turn to Cicero's teaching on the virtues, while the funeral oration he composed for his brother Satyrus is the first biographical account in Latin Christendom in which the four virtues appear as characteristics of the protagonist. Ambrose's oration is sometimes reckoned to medieval hagiography, a genre in which the cardinal virtues were to have a similar function.⁷ In addition, Ambrose is known to have coined the term *virtutes cardinales*.⁸ Less well known is the fact that he was also the first Latin author to refer to the four virtues as *virtutes principales*,⁹ a designation which until the twelfth century was actually more customary than the phrase *virtutes cardinales*.¹⁰

⁵ Lactantius, *Epitome divinarum institutionum* 24.8, CSEL 19: 698: "Quo enim pacto iustitiae sensus esse posset, nisi essent iniuriae, aut quid aliud iustitia est quam iniustitiae priuatio? Quid item fortitudo intelligi potest nisi ex ignaviae adpositione, quid continentia nisi ex intemperantia? Quo item modo prudentia esset, nisi foret contraria imprudentia?" Chrysippus is quoted from Aulus Gellius, *Noctes atticae* 7.1.4, p. 282. Also, Ammianus Marcellinus († after 378), *Res gestae* 4–11, pp. 360–362, discusses the cardinal virtues at some length, but it is uncertain whether Ammianus was a Christian.

⁶ For a survey of references to the four virtues in the exegetical works of the three fathers, see Mähl, *Quadrigena virtutum*, 11–19.

⁷ See Bejczy, "Les vertus cardinales dans l'hagiographie". Ambrose's oration is catalogued as no. 7509 in the *Bibliotheca hagiographica latina*.

⁸ See Ambrose, *Expositio in Lucam* 5.49 and 5.62, CCSL 14: 152, 156; *De excessu fratris* 1.57, CSEL 73: 239.

⁹ See *De paradiso* 3.18, CSEL 32.1: 277; *De Cain et Abel* 2.6.21, CSEL 32.1: 396; *Expositio Psalmi CXVIII* 11, CSEL 62: 239; *De officiis* 1.24.115 and 1.50.252, CCSL 15: 41, 93.

¹⁰ See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 154–155.

Ambrose's pioneering role in the history of Christian virtue ethics must be put into perspective. To begin with, Ambrose did not consistently use the expressions *virtutes cardinales* and *virtutes principales*. Both phrases sometimes refer in his work to other virtues or to the gifts of the Holy Ghost,¹¹ while the term *virtutes cardinales* is altogether absent from *De officiis*. Moreover, the four virtues do not invariably appear in Ambrose's writings as an exclusive scheme. In two instances he adds the virtues of patience and chastity to the classical quartet.¹² As regards contents, it should be noted that neither Ambrose nor any other Latin father developed, or intended to develop, a coherent virtue theory. Only from the twelfth century did the virtues become the object of systematic ethical reflection. What we see in the work of Ambrose are frequent references to the virtues, mostly of an incidental nature, which betray a tendency to invest the four virtues of classical antiquity with a Christian meaning.

In Ambrose's earliest works this tendency already becomes apparent. In *De paradiso*, probably written in 375, Ambrose interprets the four rivers of Paradise as the cardinal virtues which spring from the fountain of wisdom and lead to the eternal life.¹³ This exegesis, borrowed from Philo of Alexandria, recurs in two more works of Ambrose¹⁴ and became famous in the versions of Augustine and Gregory the Great which by 1100 entered into the *Glossa ordinaria* on the Bible. Ambrose even goes so far in *De paradiso* as to contend (without, however, referring to Sap. 8:7) that the ancients borrowed the scheme of the cardinal virtues from biblical sources.¹⁵ Shortly after 375, Ambrose composed *De Cain et Abel* as a sequel to *De paradiso*. In it, Ambrose exhorts his readers, again in emulation of Philo, to endow their prayers with prudence in order to recognize the religious truth, with temperance in accordance with Paul's command to remain chaste and pray instead (1 Cor. 7:5), with fortitude in order to remain steadfast in praying, and with justice in order to be free from unrighteous preoccupations when imploring God's justice.¹⁶

¹¹ Gifts: *De sacramentis* 3.2.9, CSEL 73: 42 (both phrases); *Ep.* 31.3, CSEL 82.1: 217 (*virtutes principales*). See also *De Abraham* 2.11.85, CSEL 32.1: 636: "quae autem prudentia generaliter dicitur, quae castimonia, quae fortitudo ceteraeque uirtutes principales ..."; *castimonia* may stand for temperance, but if there are several other principal virtues in addition to the three mentioned here, there must be more than four.

¹² See *De Cain et Abel* 1.10.47, CSEL 32.1: 377; *De Abraham* 2.10.68, CSEL 32: 624.

¹³ *De paradiso* 3.14–18, CSEL 32.1: 273–277.

¹⁴ *De Abraham* 2.10.68, CSEL 32: 624; *Explanatio Psalmorum XII*, (35:21 and 45:12), CSEL 64: 64, 337–338.

¹⁵ Ambrose only quotes the verse at *De officiis* 2.13.65, CCSL 15: 120.

¹⁶ *De Cain et Abel* 2.6.21, CSEL 32.1: 396–397.

Moreover, Ambrose associates the cardinal virtues throughout his writings with biblical quartets, such as the four ages of the history of salvation,¹⁷ the four creatures appearing in the first book of Ezekiel,¹⁸ and the four men who carried the lame to Jesus (Mark 2:3–4); for Ambrose, these men represent the cardinal virtues who lay down the holy to Christ's feet.¹⁹ In *De Isaac vel anima* he introduces the powerful image of the chariot of the soul driven by Christ and drawn by four good horses (the virtues of the soul) which, though hindered by four bad horses (the passions of the body), manage to carry the soul into heaven.²⁰ Finally, in his *Expositio in Lucam* Ambrose connects each cardinal virtue with one of the four beatitudes mentioned by Luke. According to Ambrose, temperance and poorness of spirit (Luke 6:20, Matt. 5:3) consist in refraining from sin; justice and thirsting for justice (Luke 6:21, Matt. 5:6) in compassion and charitable behaviour; prudence and weeping (Luke 6:21, Matt. 5:5) in deploring earthly reality and striving for eternal things; fortitude and suffering hatred for Christ's sake (Luke 6:22, Matt. 5:10) in following God's will until the end.²¹

What these passages demonstrate is a continuous effort on Ambrose's part to appropriate the cardinal virtues in the name of Christ, even to the point of disputing their non-biblical origin. His associations of the virtues with diverse biblical quartets may sometimes make an artificial impression, but the message they convey is important enough: the cardinal virtues of classical antiquity, ignored until then in the Latin Church, are not only acceptable for Christians but actually lead to heaven. It is worth noting that in elaborating this message, Ambrose makes use of

¹⁷ *De paradiso* 3.19–22, CSEL 32.1: 277–279, associating the era from the Creation to the Flood with prudence, the era of the patriarchs with temperance, the era of the Law with fortitude, and the Christian era with justice.

¹⁸ *De virginitate* 18.114–115, p. 90 (the man stands for prudence, the lion for fortitude, the ox for temperance, the eagle for justice); *De Abraham* 2.8.54, CSEL 32.1: 608 (relating the virtues to the four wings of every creature rather than to each of the creatures).

¹⁹ *Expositio in Lucam* 8.40, CCSL 14: 312.

²⁰ *De Isaac vel anima* 8.65, CSEL 32.1: 688. The chariot (of Aminadab) is introduced in Cant. 6:11.

²¹ *Expositio in Lucam* 5.65–68, CCSL 14: 157–158. In his concluding sentence, Ambrose relates the four virtues to the four remaining beatitudes in Matthew which do not appear in Luke: “Ergo temperantia cordis habet animique munditiam, iustitia misericordiam, pacem prudentiam, mansuetudinem fortitudo”. If *mansuetudo* stands for *mititas* (Matt. 5:4), Ambrose's catalogue eventually consists of four virtues connected each with two beatitudes: temperance, *munditia*, *paupertas spiritu*; justice, *miserericordia*, *esurritio iustitiae*; prudence, *pax*, *luctus*; fortitude, *mansuetudo/mititas*, *patientia*.

Stoic ideas. His opposing the virtues to the passions in *De Isaac* is a distinctly Stoic feature, while in several exegetical works (and likewise in the oration for Satyrus and in *De officiis*) he adopts the Stoic theory of the necessary connection of the four virtues.²² Also, before presenting the virtues under a Christian aspect in *De virginitate* he refers to the belief of Greek philosophers that the cardinal virtues are present in every wise man.²³

In the funeral oration for his brother Satyrus, Ambrose takes a particularly subtle approach to the classical teachings on the virtues. Seemingly following ancient, notably Stoic, conceptions, Ambrose readjusts the meaning of the virtues in order to present his brother as a true believer and a holy man. He credits Satyrus with a “natural” gratitude to God, in accordance with the Stoic principle of *secundum naturam vivere*.²⁴ Connecting this gratitude with the virtue of prudence, Ambrose points out that “the wise” define prudence as recognizing and embracing God as the highest good, but paraphrases their opinion in such a way as to equate prudence with loving God and one’s neighbour, in conformity with the double precept of charity (Matt. 22:37–38).²⁵ Indeed, all examples of Satyrus’s prudence relate to his love of God. Justice, the prime social virtue of antiquity, is explained as giving everything one has to one’s neighbours and to God, but its primary function according to Ambrose is the care of others,²⁶ notably manifested by Satyrus in his assistance of the poor. The two elements of evangelical love are thus divided by Ambrose over the ancient virtues of prudence (love of God) and

²² Connection: *De paradiso* 3.18, CSEL 32.1: 276–277; *Expositio in Lucam* 5.49 (on 6:21–22), CCSL 14: 152; *De Abraham* 2.10.68, CSEL 32: 624; *De excessu fratris* 1.57, CSEL 73: 239; *De officiis* 1.27.129, CCSL 15: 47. For Ambrose’s attitude to Stoicism, see Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 48–70.

²³ *De virginitate* 18.115, p. 90. Thanks to charity and the contemplation of celestial secrets, continues Ambrose, temperance is capable of ignoring the passions of the flesh, while justice gives itself to contemplation in order to gain heaven.

²⁴ *De excessu fratris* 1.45, CSEL 73: 234.

²⁵ Ibid. 1.42, p. 232: “Non mediocris igitur prudentiae testimonium, quae ita a sapientibus definitur: bonorum primum esse deum scire et verum illud atque divinum pia mente venerari, illam amabilem et concupiscendam aeternae pulchritudinem veritatis tota mentis caritate diligere, secundum autem in proximos a divino illo atque caelestis naturae derivare pietatem”.

²⁶ Ibid. 1.57–58, p. 239: “Ea enim sibi parciore, foris tota est, et quicquid habet, quadam inclementia sui, dum rapitur amore communi, transfundit in proximos. Sed huius multiplex species, alia erga propinquos, alia erga universos, alia erga dei cultum vel adiumentum inopum”.

justice (love of others). In circumscribing the remaining virtues of fortitude and temperance, Ambrose follows Stoic conceptions more closely. Still, he associates fortitude with trust in God, and *simplicitas* (which replaces temperance and consists of *morum temperantia mentisque sobrietas*) with poorness of spirit, the first beatitude, in conformity with his commentary on Luke.²⁷

Stoic and Christian teachings also converge in Ambrose's *De officiis*, a work on religious duties addressed to an audience of young priests in need of moral guidance. The main subject of the first book is the cardinal virtues from which, in Ambrose's view, the duties proceed.²⁸ Scholars disagree as to whether Ambrose conceived *De officiis* as a Christian alternative to Cicero's work of the same title, on which it is obviously modelled,²⁹ but as far as Ambrose's definitions of the cardinal virtues are concerned, there can be little doubt that a Christian outlook prevails. As in the funeral oration for Satyrus, prudence and justice each comprise one precept of charity: prudence consists in devotion to God, while justice (now explicitly associated with *caritas*) prefers the interests of others to its own.³⁰ Resuming the ancient notion of justice as a virtue in service of the community, Ambrose rejects the elements of it which serve private interests, such as revenge and the protection of private property. True justice coincides with *beneficentia*, composed of *benevolentia* and *liberalitas* according to Cicero and therefore best understood, argues Ambrose, as giving freely and generously to others.³¹ Christian virtue here presents itself in Stoic disguise. Again, fortitude and temperance retain a more Stoic character, but Ambrose strongly suggests that Chris-

²⁷ Ibid. 1.44 and 1.56, pp. 233, 239. Ambrose interprets Satyrus's fortitude mainly as strength in adversity. His temperance is illustrated with his refraining from revenge when suffering injuries, his chastity, his indifference to property, and his moderation in food and drink. See also Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 52. Given Ambrose's subtle adaptations of ancient teachings, I cannot agree with Biermann, *Die Leichenreden*, 60–81, that the cardinal virtues appear in his oration as mere classroom commonplaces.

²⁸ *De officiis* 1.25.116, CCL 15: 42.

²⁹ For recent discussions of the work with summaries of earlier debate, see Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 58–70; Becker, *Die Kardinaltugenden bei Cicero und Ambrosius*; Davidson, "A Tale of Two Approaches"; id., "Introduction". Colish shows that Ambrose borrows much of Cicero's conceptual framework but invests it with Christian content, notably as far as the cardinal virtues are concerned. Becker's central thesis is that Ambrose wished to make the valuable elements of pagan culture serviceable to Christians, while Davidson argues that Ambrose intends to replace Cicero's work, vindicating the superiority of biblical over classical standards of morality.

³⁰ *De officiis* 1.27.126–127, CCL 15: 45–46.

³¹ Ibid. 1.28.130 ff. and 1.30.143 ff., pp. 47 ff., 51 ff.; cf. Cicero, *De officiis* 2.9.32, p. 165.

tians exemplify these virtues best. Fortitude comprises not only physical strength in war, as displayed by many Old Testament leaders, but especially mental vigour, which priests must observe in their daily discipline and which martyrs possess in a perfect degree.³² Temperance means ordering one's life in accordance with the *decorum* and *honestum*, especially through moderating the passions (most notably anger, as required by charity) and renouncing the riches of the world.³³ Ambrose's most recurrent examples of virtue are characters of the Old Testament (Noah, Abraham, Jacob, Joseph, Job, David) who in his view knew and practised the virtues long before the ancient philosophers discovered them.³⁴ Even if *De officiis* does not contain a systematic virtue ethics—thus, it remains unclear what cardinal virtue comes first³⁵—Ambrose's tendency to invest the Stoic virtues with Christian content is manifest.

Perhaps one may say that Ambrose's attitude to the classical theme of the cardinal virtues is not so much receptive³⁶ as acquisitive. Until the late fourth century, the cardinal virtues were merely known in Latin literature as ingredients of classical moral philosophy. Ambrose was the first Latin author who felt the need to take possession of the scheme in the name of Christ, and he addressed this need very well. Eagerly picking up Stoic teachings and adapting their meaning to his religious preoccupations, Ambrose not only elaborated a Christian interpretation of the cardinal virtues but deprived the ancients of their intellectual authorship of the scheme. Seen from this perspective, the Christian appropriation of the scheme was a matter of taking back one's legitimate property rather than usurpation. Moreover, Ambrose taught his Christian audience that the cardinal virtues, if interpreted in accordance with the faith, were not just useful for believers and pleasing to God, but secured the salvation of the soul—a message unheard in the Latin Church until then.

³² *De officiis* 1.35.175 ff., CCSL 15: 64 ff.

³³ *Ibid.* 1.43.210 ff., p. 78 ff.

³⁴ See *ibid.* 1.21.94 and 1.25.118, pp. 35, 42–43.

³⁵ Prudence is the source of the other virtues (*ibid.* 1.27.126, p. 45), justice is the connecting element between the virtues (1.27.129, p. 47), fortitude is “*excelsior ceteris*” (1.35.176, p. 65). Meanwhile, temperance receives much more attention than the other virtues; Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 62, gives temperance the first place. Moreover, Ambrose refers to *pietas* as *fundamentum omnium virtutum* (1.27.126, p. 46)—in fact, a quotation of Cicero, *Pro Plancio* 29—and to *fides* as *fundamentum* of justice (1.29.142, p. 51). Becker, *Die Kardinaltugenden bei Cicero und Ambrosius*, 166, thinks that *verecundia* underlies the cardinal virtues.

³⁶ As argued notably by Becker, *Die Kardinaltugenden bei Cicero und Ambrosius*.

Jerome

Jerome (347/48–419/20) is reputed among his modern commentators as an exegete without a genuine interest in philosophy.³⁷ Notably his ideas on morality are believed to lack a philosophical coherence, while his references to the cardinal virtues have been qualified as “misapplications” and “exegetical whims” devoid of real meaning.³⁸ True enough, Jerome’s numerous references to the virtues in his biblical commentaries do not chiefly stem from philosophical concerns but are rather modelled on the Greek fathers, most notably Origen, whose work Jerome translated for a great part. In fact, some of Origen’s references to the virtues are only preserved in Jerome’s Latin version.³⁹ Possibly, Jerome was also influenced by Ambrose, who by 375 first introduced the virtues in *De paradiso*; Jerome’s earliest references appear in his commentaries on the Pauline Epistles, probably written in 387 and 388. Apart from his exegetical work, only four of Jerome’s letters mention the cardinal virtues,⁴⁰ while the scheme is absent from his treatises.

In order to assess Jerome’s contribution to the Christianization of the cardinal virtues in the Latin West, a comparison of his statements with those of Ambrose may be useful. A first observation is that whereas Ambrose in his exegesis usually associates the cardinal virtues with biblical quartets, the majority of Jerome’s references occur in a different context, although he does connect the virtues with the four creatures of Ez. 1 (like Ambrose), the four horses of the chariot of Ninive (Nah. 3:2), the four smiths mentioned in Zach. 1:20–21, and the four gates of heavenly Jerusalem.⁴¹ Usually, however, the virtues appear in his exegetical work as spiritual qualities which are fully contained in God and bestowed by him on his followers. Time and again Jerome insists that all virtues reside in God,⁴² a view that is not found in the work of Ambrose but which

³⁷ See Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 70–72.

³⁸ See Hagendahl, *Latin Fathers and the Classics*, 378.

³⁹ See, e.g., below, p. 263.

⁴⁰ Jerome, *Epp.* 52.13, 64.20, and 66.3, CSEL 54: 437, 611, 649–650; 121.3, CSEL 56.1: 14.

⁴¹ *Commentarii in Hiezechielem* 1 (on 1:6–8), CCSL 75: 14; *Commentarii in Naum* (on 3:1–4), CCSL 76A: 557; *Commentarii in Zachariam* 1 (on 1:18–21), CCSL 76A: 762; addition to Victorinus of Poetevio, *In Apocalypsin* (21:13, 21), p. 128. At *Ep.* 52.13, CSEL 54: 437, Jerome mentions the chariot pulled to heaven by the four virtues, perhaps borrowing this image from Ambrose (see above, p. 14).

⁴² See *Commentarii in Ad Ephesios* 1 (on 1:6 and 1:15–18), PL 26: 450B/480A, 458C/488C; 3 (on 4:32 and 6:17), 517D–518A/550B–C, 552B/586B; *Commentarii in Ad Galatas* 2 (on 5:5), PL 26: 397C/424C–D; etc.

Origen endorsed.⁴³ *Prudentia/sapientia, iustitia, fortitudo, and temperantia* are even included among the names of Christ, as Jerome repeats in three different writings.⁴⁴ In agreement with Origen, Jerome suggests that Christian believers enjoy these virtues in as much as they participate in Christ's being. Living in Christ implies having all the virtues, while living without him forecloses the possibility of possessing any real virtue.⁴⁵ Elaborating on Paul's saying that the just lives by faith (Gal. 3:11), Jerome maintains that without Christ all virtues, especially the cardinal virtues in which the unbelievers take pride, amount to vice.⁴⁶ Yet even believers only partly live the virtues in the present life. Most of them display one virtue in particular and even saints rarely observe all virtues to a perfect degree, but in the afterlife, when all is filled in all (Eph. 1:23), God will have the elect partake in his fullness of the virtues.⁴⁷ It is true, then, that the virtues do not primarily bear a philosophical or even a moral character in Jerome's exegetical writings. They rather appear as conditional elements of living in a state of grace: by conforming to the virtues, believers conform to God, and vice versa. Meanwhile, however, Jerome cautiously avoids philosophical pitfalls. When stating that the virtues reside in God and count among the names of Christ, he never says that God actually *has* or *possesses* the virtues, in tacit deference to the Neoplatonic view, accepted by Augustine, that the virtues are inherent to the divine being rather than contingent attributes of God.⁴⁸

Remarkably, Jerome's divinization of the cardinal virtues goes together with an apparent carelessness about the integrity of the scheme itself. As we have seen, Ambrose occasionally added other virtues to the quartet, but in these cases the cardinal virtues still appear together. In contrast,

⁴³ See Crouzel, *Origène et Plotin*, 326: "Le Christ est donc la 'substance' des vertus, elles se confondent avec lui: avoir une vertu est participer en quelque sorte à la substance du Christ"; see also Pieri, "Mit und nach Origenes".

⁴⁴ *Commentarii in Ad Ephesios* 2 (on 4:20), PL 26: 506A/538B; *Commentarii in Esaiam* 6 (on 14: 31–32), CCSL 73: 254; *Commentarii in Abacuc* 2 (on 3:4), CCSL 76A: 625.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., *Commentarii in Ad Galatas* 1 (on 1:15–16, 2:20), PL 26: 326B/351A–B, 345C/370D.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 2 (on 3:11–12), 359B/385A.

⁴⁷ *Commentarii in Ad Ephesios* 1 (on 1:22–23), PL 26: 464A–B/494B: "Nunc enim Deus per partes in singulis est, in alio iustitia, in alio castitas, in alio temperantia, in alio sapientia, in alio fortitudo: et difficile est etiam in sanctis viris atque perfectis omnes pariter esse virtutes. Cum autem in finem rerum, et consummatione mundi, ei fuerint universa subjecta, adimplebitur omnia in omnibus: ut juxta id quod Deus est cunctis virtutibus plenus, omnia in omnibus adimpleatur, et sint universi habentes omnia, quae ante singula singuli possidebant".

⁴⁸ See Augustine, *De Trinitate* 6.4, CSEL 50: 233–234.

Jerome often breaks up the scheme, mixing in other virtues or mentioning only three cardinal virtues together with some others.⁴⁹ I find it hard to believe that he did so unintentionally, especially since Jerome knew, and repeatedly approved (like Ambrose), the Stoic doctrine of the necessary connection of all four virtues.⁵⁰ My surmise is that Jerome occasionally left his catalogues of the virtues incomplete in order to stress the idea that the fullness of the virtues is only found in God. By his seemingly inattentive use of the fourfold scheme, he may have wished to remind his readers that divine goodness transcends human categorizing.

None the less, the doctrine of the connection of the virtues structures Jerome's famous letter written to Pammachius on the occasion of the departure of his wife Paulina. Jerome points out that according to the Stoics, the four virtues are interrelated in such a way that whoever lacks one of them, lacks all. The four members of Pammachius's family are just as closely connected, argues Jerome. All of them possess the cardinal virtues, but each excels in one virtue in particular. The prime virtue of Pammachius himself is prudence, since he abandoned the world after the death of his wife and now lives for Christ. Justice is represented by his mother Paula, who, refraining from riches, divided her possessions among her children and exhorted them to give God his due. Pammachius's sister Eustochium demonstrates fortitude by her steadfast decision to preserve her virginity. Finally, Paulina was a champion of temperance, as is apparent from her modesty and the continence she observed within her marriage.⁵¹ The letter to Pammachius is one of Jerome's few writings in which the four virtues of Stoicism receive an interpretation as moral guidelines of the Christian life.⁵² This, as well as

⁴⁹ Mixing: see, e.g., *Commentarii in Ad Galatas* 1 (on 1:2), PL 26: 313C/337D: "fortis et prudens, pius, castus, iustus, et temperans"; *Commentarii in Ad Ephesios* 1 (on 1:22–23), PL 26: 464A–B/494B (see n. 47). Three cardinal virtues with others: see, e.g., *Commentarii in Ad Philemonem* (on 1:20), PL 26: 615B/651C: "totum quod Christus dicitur pro varietate causarum: sapientiam videlicet, iustitiam, continentiam, mansuetudinem, temperantiam, castitatem"; *Commentarii in Ad Ephesios* 1 (on 1:15–18), PL 26: 458C/488C: "Iesus Christus ipse est sermo, sapientia, veritas, pax, iustitia, fortitudo".

⁵⁰ See *Commentarii in Esaiam* 15 (on 56:1), CCSL 73A: 629; *Commentarii in Hieremiam* 5.63 (on 29:1–7), CCSL 74: 277; *Commentarii in Amos* 3 (on 4:12–15), CCSL 76: 311.

⁵¹ *Ep.* 66.3, CSEL 54: 649–650; see also Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 88.

⁵² For a similar interpretation, see *Ep.* 52.13, CSEL 54: 437: "Vis scire, quales dominus quaerat ornatus? Habeto prudentiam, iustitiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem. His plagis caeli includere, haec te quadriga uelut aurigam Christi ad metam concitum ferat. Nihil hoc monili pretiosius, nihil hac gemmarum varietate distinctius. Ex omni parte decoraris, cingis atque protegeris; et ornamento tibi sunt et tutamini: gemmae vertuntur in scuta".

the rhetorical use of the virtues when mourning the deceased, remind one of Ambrose's funeral oration for Satyrus. But what makes the letter particular to Jerome is that it confirms the theory of the connection of the virtues while suggesting at the same time that even exemplary believers fully realize only one particular virtue in their earthly existence.

In spite of his alleged lack of interest in moral philosophy, Jerome repeatedly discusses two more classical views on the cardinal virtues which likewise appear in the work of Ambrose. First, Jerome adopts in several commentaries the "Stoic" (in fact rather Platonic)⁵³ distinction between wisdom as relating to the eternal and the divine, and prudence as relating to earthly reality. According to Jerome, wisdom and prudence are both necessary in life. In fact, human prudence is meaningless without divine wisdom, while the wisdom that is given by God includes prudence.⁵⁴ The classical distinction between wisdom and prudence thus loses much of its significance in the light of the faith. Second, Jerome opposes on two occasions the cardinal virtues to the four basic passions (desire or hope, fear, sadness, joy), in accordance with Stoic doctrine.⁵⁵ In one other instance, however, he presents the passions as morally neutral and rather contrasts the cardinal virtues with four evil counterparts (*stultitia, iniquitas, luxuria, formido*);⁵⁶ the same contrast recurs in two other writings, without a reference to the passions.⁵⁷ Jerome's latter view alludes to the criticism of the Stoic opposition of the virtues to the passions as formulated by Lactantius, Augustine, and later patristic writers. According to these writers, the passions are no evils, as the Stoics taught, but neutral psychic forces which humans may transform into either virtues or vices.⁵⁸

Cf. *Commentarii in Hieremiam* 5 (on 63:10), CCSL 74: 183; faith and good works are the sons and daughters, respectively, of our marriage with the four virtues.

⁵³ See Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 75.

⁵⁴ *Commentarii in Ad Ephesios* 1 (on 1:9), PL 26: 452A–453A/482A–483A; *Commentarii in Esaiam* 2 (on 5:21), CCSL 73: 78. See also *Ep.* 66.3, CSEL 54: 649. For the connection of prudence and wisdom in Ambrose, see, e.g., *De paradiso* 3.15, CSEL 32.1: 274–275; *De officiis* 1.50.252–253, CCSL 15: 93. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 76–78, argues that Jerome was generally supportive of the Stoic teaching on the virtues.

⁵⁵ *Commentarii in Zachariam* 1 (on 1:18–21), CCSL 76A: 762; *Commentarii in Hiezechielem* 1 (on 1:6–8), CCSL 75: 13–14. Jerome refers to Virgil, *Aeneis* 6.733 and (in the second work) to Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes* as his source texts for the four passions; for the four virtues, he refers to Cicero's *De officiis*. See also Canellis, "Saint Jérôme et les passions".

⁵⁶ *Commentarii in Naum* (on 3:1–4), CCSL 76A: 557.

⁵⁷ *Commentarii in Esaiam* 15 (on 55:12–13), CCSL 73A: 628, replacing *formido* with *temeritas*; *Ep.* 121.3, CSEL 56.1: 14.

⁵⁸ See below, p. 244.

All in all, Jerome added an important dimension to the Christianization of the cardinal virtues that was initiated in the Latin West in the work of Ambrose. Apart from interpreting the cardinal virtues in biblical terms, Jerome conceived of them, like Origen, as belonging to the divine essence. In his view, humans live in virtue in as far as they live in Christ and will fully enjoy the virtues in the afterlife, when God will communicate his essence to the blessed. Rather than instruments of salvation, the virtues appear in Jerome's work as categories by which believers experience God's presence in themselves, both in their present and in their future lives. This spiritual perspective may explain Jerome's relative indifference to classical moral philosophy and even to the scheme of the cardinal virtues as such. Yet Jerome's sensitivity to the philosophical implications of his views is apparent from his work, while his discussions of the connection of the virtues, the opposition between wisdom and prudence, and the opposition between the virtues and the passions demonstrate that he was just as capable as Ambrose to adapt Stoic concepts to Christian ideas. Unlike Ambrose, however, Jerome was not primarily interested in appropriating the moral philosophy of the classics. In his view, Christian virtue enabled humans not so much to do the good as to live in the divine source of goodness. That was much more than ancient moral philosophy could offer.

Augustine

Even if Augustine (354–430) may not have developed a coherent ethical doctrine any more than Ambrose or Jerome,⁵⁹ he definitely secured a place for the cardinal virtues in the context of Christian morality. His views set a standard to later generations and would exercise an overwhelming influence on moral theology from the twelfth century onward.

In contrast to Ambrose and Jerome, Augustine rarely employs the four virtues as an exegetical motif but frequently reflects on them in his treatises. In a number of early works, he views the cardinal virtues more or less in Neoplatonic terms as dispositions by which the soul frees itself from the bonds of earthly existence in order to embrace God. Thus in *De musica*, the virtues have the function of purging the soul

⁵⁹ Thus Chadwick, "The Influence of St. Augustine on Ethics", 10. But see *The Ethics of St. Augustine*.

in its ascent to the divine. Prudence does not merely discern between good and evil, but makes the soul understand that temporal goods are inferior and only eternal affairs worth pursuing. Temperance enables the soul to detach itself with God's help from inferior beauty and to love God instead; as *conversio amoris in Deum*, temperance equates charity. It is accompanied by fortitude, defined as not fearing adversity or death when progressing toward God, and justice as the desire to serve God in spiritual purity and domestication of the body.⁶⁰ *De vera religione* contains similar statements, although here justice is the central virtue. Justice consists in being moved by divine clemency to turn away from inferior desires and direct oneself to the eternal truth. The other virtues have auxiliary functions: prudence copes with the temptations of earthly life, fortitude with hardship, temperance with prosperity.⁶¹ Finally, Augustine interprets all four virtues as instances of the love of God in *De moribus ecclesiae*. Virtue resides in the perfect love of God and comprises four parts: temperance, the love that preserves its purity for God; fortitude, the love that sustains everything for God's sake; justice, the love that serves God exclusively; and prudence, the love that chooses the means to help it ascend to God.⁶² In the Middle Ages, these observations appear to have circulated as a separate treatise.⁶³

Augustine wrote the three aforementioned works between 386 and 395 in Cassiciacum, in a phase of his life marked according to Peter Brown by Neoplatonic idealism and an optimistic belief in the capacity of the soul to achieve perfection on earth. Later in his life, Augustine became less confident and postponed the fulfilment of his spiritual desires beyond the present life.⁶⁴ This transition appears to have influenced Augustine's conception of the cardinal virtues, too. While his early work suggests that thanks to their proficiency in the virtues, believers can "apprehend and

⁶⁰ Augustine, *De musica* 6.13.37 and 6.15.50–52, pp. 80–82, 100–102 (PL 32: 1183, 1189).

⁶¹ *De vera religione* 15.29, CCSL 32: 205.

⁶² *De moribus ecclesiae* 1.15.25, CSEL 90: 29–30.

⁶³ See *Augustinus de quattuor virtutibus*, MS Paris, BnF n.a. lat. 1544, ff. 24^r–26^v (15th century; Bloomfield 2395 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2395), summarizing *De moribus ecclesiae* 1.14–26.

⁶⁴ Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, 146–157. Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue*, 55–76, stresses the Stoic accent in Augustine's ethics in the works written in this period, notably in *De beata vita* and *De libero arbitrio*, but also in *De moribus*, parting company with those scholars (including Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 213–220) who believe that Augustine's appropriation of Stoicism is mediated to a decisive degree by Neo-Platonism.

almost grasp eternal bliss” in their temporal existence,⁶⁵ Augustine in his writings composed after 400 relativizes the use of the virtues in the transient world, stressing instead that the virtues guarantee the soul’s loving adherence to God only in the afterlife. In fact, Augustine already discusses the heavenly existence of the virtues in *De musica*, stating that prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, which serve believers as working tools in their temporal lives, will be “perfected and consummated” in heaven to *contemplatio*, *sanctificatio*, *impassibilitas*, and *ordinatio*, the four potencies by which the soul is absorbed in enjoying God.⁶⁶ In his later works, Augustine draws a much sharper distinction between the imperfect virtues of the present life, occupied with the containment of evil but incapable of extinguishing it, and the perfect virtues in heaven as modes of the soul’s undisturbed adherence to God. Especially in *De Trinitate*, the different functions of the virtues here and in the afterlife receive strong emphasis.⁶⁷ In the twelfth century, Peter Lombard would excerpt the passage in question into his *Sententiae*.

Central to Augustine’s idea of virtue in either phase of his life is the conception of Christian love. The love of God is the only proper motivation of virtue, while it is also virtue’s only proper end; hence, Augustine’s definition of virtue in *De civitate Dei* as *ordo amoris*.⁶⁸ Even if Augustine’s idea has obvious Neoplatonic antecedents, it is new in two important respects.⁶⁹ First, it involves the Christian conception of the will as the seat of virtue. Charity and virtue spring from the good will, that is, a will sub-

⁶⁵ *De musica* 6.15.50, p. 102 (PL 32: 1189): “Quid porro, cum in hoc itinere proficit, iam aeterna gaudia praesentientem ac paene prehendentem ...”.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 6.15.55, p. 108 (PL 32: 1191): “Haec ergo contemplatio, sanctificatio, impassibilitas, ordinatio eius, aut illae quattuor uirtutes perfectae atque consummatae ... tales quaedam potentiae in aeterna ei uita sperandae sunt”.

⁶⁷ *De Trinitate* 14.9.12, CCSL 50A: 438–440; see also *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 83.11, CCSL 39: 1157–1158; *De Genesi ad litteram* 12.26, CSEL 28.1: 419; *Ep.* 155.12, CSEL 44: 442–443. See also Becker, “Augustinus über die Tugenden”.

⁶⁸ *De civitate Dei* 15.22, CCSL 48: 488. See also *Ep.* 155.13, CSEL 44: 443: “in hac uita uirtus non est nisi diligere, quod diligendum est; id eligere prudentia est, nullis inde auerti molestiis fortitudo est, nullis inlecebris temperantia est, nulla superbia iustitia est”.

⁶⁹ For discussions on the extent to which Augustine introduced a novel, Christian idea of virtue, see Hök, “Augustin und die antike Tugendlehre”; Horn, “Augustinus über Tugend”; Becker, “Augustinus über die Tugenden”. Dodaro, “Political and Theological Virtues in Augustine”, argues that according to Augustine in *Ep.* 155, the cardinal virtues find their proper destination if interpreted in the light of faith, hope, and charity. However, nowhere in the letter are the cardinal virtues actually connected with all three theological virtues. Establishing such a connection is rather a medieval feature; see below, pp. 44–46, 100, 227–228.

jected to God.⁷⁰ Second, it involves the conception of divine grace, since in Augustine's conception the human will, corrupted through the Fall, is too frail to subject itself to God without divine assistance. Virtue is hence impossible without the Christian faith.⁷¹ These tenets, which would set a norm for moral theology from the twelfth century onward, provided Augustine with suitable criteria to distinguish true, Christian virtues from the false virtues of unbelievers. Especially Augustine's later works are marked by a critical attitude to classical teachings on the virtues, probably as a result of the reconsideration of his ideas on virtue's potential in the present life.⁷² Although in one letter written in 412 Augustine values the "civil virtues" of the ancient Romans as a first step toward religious virtue,⁷³ he usually dismisses virtues unmotivated by charity and the faith as being little better than vices.⁷⁴ His most vehement disapproval concerns the restriction of virtue to human and terrestrial reality as found in Stoic and Epicurean philosophy. In several writings he rejects the Stoic notion of the cardinal virtues as human properties (although he sympathized with this notion in his early work *Contra academicos*) and instead depicts the virtues as divine gifts which help believers in their pilgrimage to heaven.⁷⁵ Neither does Augustine accept the Stoic idea of human virtue as an end in itself.⁷⁶ If virtue subsists when being detached from its proper goal, argues Augustine in *Contra Iulianum*, one might as well praise niggards for "prudently" making money, "strongly" bearing the

⁷⁰ See, e.g., *De libero arbitrio* 1.13.27.90–93, CCSL 29: 228–229.

⁷¹ See, e.g., *De Trinitate* 13.20.26, CCSL 50A: 419–420: "*iustus ex fide uiuit, quae fides per dilectionem operatur ita ut uirtutes quoque ipsae quibus prudenter, fortiter, temperanter, iusteque uiuitur omnes ad eandem referantur fidem; non enim aliter uerae poterunt esse uirtutes*"; cf. *Contra Iulianum* 4.19, PL 44: 747: "*Ideo iustus ex fide Christi uiuit. Ex hac enim fide prudenter, fortiter, temperanter, et iuste, ac per hoc his omnibus ueris uirtutibus recte sapienterque uiuit, quia fideliter uiuit*".

⁷² Thus Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 213–220.

⁷³ See *Ep.* 138.3, CSEL 44: 144: "*Deus enim sic ostendit in opulentissimo et praeclaro imperio Romanorum, quantum ualerent ciuiles etiam sine uera religione uirtutes, ut intellegeretur hac addita fieri homines ciues alterius ciuitatis, cuius rex ueritas, cuius lex caritas, cuius modus aeternitas*".

⁷⁴ Literally in *De ciuitate Dei* 19.25, CCSL 48: 696; see also *Contra Iulianum* 4.3.15–27, PL 44: 751, arguing that those who act from "virtute civili, non uera" cannot please God and suffer damnation; *Ep.* 155.10, CSEL 44: 440.

⁷⁵ See *Ep.* 155.12, CSEL 44: 441–442; *Sermo* 150.7, PL 38: 812; *De ciuitate Dei* 22.24, CCSL 48: 848. Cf. *Contra academicos* 1.7.20, CCSL 29: 14: "*Illa est humanarum rerum scientia, quae nouit lumen prudentiae, temperantiae decus, fortitudinis robor, iustitiae sanctitatem. Haec enim sunt, quae nullam fortunam metuentes uere nostra dicere audemus*".

⁷⁶ See Bejczy, "Virtue as an End in Itself".

difficulties involved in the pursuit of wealth, curbing their expenses with “temperance”, and “justly” respecting the laws of property. Likewise, one might praise Catilina for his justice because he shared everything with his friends, or for his fortitude because his ambition made him endure hardship.⁷⁷ Augustine’s point, broadly developed in the religious moral literature of the Middle Ages, is that virtues turn into vices without a charitable intent. Under the cloak of the cardinal and other virtues, selfish desires may find refuge; shrewdness may disguise itself as prudence, stinginess as temperance, revenge as justice, rashness as fortitude.⁷⁸ In *De civitate Dei* Augustine moreover ridicules the Epicurean view of pleasure as the proper motive for moral action, quoting with delight the Stoic caricature of pleasure as a touchy queen with the cardinal virtues serving her whims. Yet the Stoics who (as Augustine sees it) accept fame as a motive of virtue are hardly any better, since true virtue must come from genuine piety and love of God.⁷⁹ Using the virtues for increasing earthly happiness is a vain project in any case, asserts Augustine, since evil is inherent to the notion of virtue in the transient world. Without evil, one would need no prudence to discern evil from good; without adversity and temptations, fortitude and temperance would be useless; finally, justice would be idle without the possible rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, and of the spirit against God.⁸⁰

Toward other classical teachings Augustine shows more benevolence. Thus, his frequently recurring descriptions of prudence as distinguishing between good and evil, of justice as giving everyone his due, of fortitude as bearing adversity, and of temperance as withstanding worldly enticements depend on Cicero’s definitions in *De inventione*, which Augustine copied word for word in *De diversis quaestionibus*.⁸¹ Yet in the *Retracta-*

⁷⁷ See *Contra Iulianum* 4.3.19, PL 44: 747–748.

⁷⁸ See *ibid.* 4.20, 748–749 (prudence); *Ep.* 167.6, CSEL 44: 593–594 (temperance, justice, fortitude). For medieval theories of vices disguised as virtues, see Newhauser, “Zur Zweideutigkeit in der Moralthologie”.

⁷⁹ *De civitate Dei* 5.20, CCSL 47: 156–157. For attacks on the Epicureans’ view of fame as a motive of virtue, see also *Contra Iulianum* 4.3.21, PL 44: 749; *Sermo* 150.7, PL 38: 812. For the rejection of fame as a proper motive of the (cardinal) virtues, see also *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 118 sermo 12.2, CCSL 40: 1701.

⁸⁰ *De civitate Dei* 19.4, CCSL 48: 665–669. Cf. Lactantius, quoted above, p. 12, and Ambrose, *De paradiso* 3.18, CSEL 32.1: 277: “ubi prudentia ibi et malitia, ubi fortitudo ibi iracundia, ubi temperantia ibi intemperantia plerumque est et alia uitia, ubi autem iustitia ibi concordia uirtutum est ceterarum”.

⁸¹ Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53.160–2.54.164, pp. 147–149; Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus* 31.1, CCSL 44A: 41–43 (but see *ibid.* 61, p. 127, for the equation of justice with *dilectio Dei et proximi*). For Augustine’s descriptions, see, e.g., *De libero arbitrio*

tiones Augustine repeats Clement of Alexandria's claim that the ancients copied the scheme of the four virtues from Sap. 8:7 (*sobrietatem enim et sapientiam docet et iustitiam et virtutem*).⁸² Also, Augustine normally accepts the Stoic doctrine of the connection of the four virtues, but occasionally uses it against the classics. Thus in *De Trinitate*, he infers from it that Cicero was wrong to believe that only justice was immortal,⁸³ while he argues in *Contra Iulianum* that since justice requires faith (Gal. 3:11), the infidels cannot possess any true virtues, given the fact that the cardinal virtues always go together.⁸⁴ In a letter written to Jerome, Augustine confirms the connection theory in principle, but allows for the existence of various degrees of different virtues in the same person, for the coexistence of virtues and vices in the same person, and for the existence of some virtues (not the cardinal ones) unaccompanied by some others.⁸⁵ Moreover, he concurs in the same letter with the Aristotelian idea that virtue is situated between two vices. While these vices are usually interpreted as a lack and an excess of the virtuous quality, Augustine distinguishes between a really contrasting vice and a vice assuming a false similarity to the virtue in question.⁸⁶ To the latter sorts of vices, argues Augustine in *Contra Iulianum*, belong virtues motivated by a wrong intention—that is, by anything other than longing for a celestial reward.⁸⁷

Comparing Augustine's dealings with the cardinal virtues to those of Ambrose and Jerome, one can observe a few parallels. Augustine shares, at least in his later works, Ambrose's avidity in claiming the cardinal virtues as Christendom's legitimate property. Instead of subtly

1.13.27.89–90, CCSL 29: 228; *De Genesi ad litteram* 12.26, CSEL 28.1: 419; *De civitate Dei* 19.4, CCSL 48: 665–667. For an assessment of the Stoic and other elements in these descriptions, see Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 215–216.

⁸² Augustine, *Retractationes* 1.7.3, CCSL 57: 18–19, comparing different redactions of the verse. In the oldest Latin manuscripts we already find attempts to replace *sapientia* with *prudentia*. See *Biblia sacra: Sapientia Salomonis*, 52; for the reluctant acceptance of the Book in the Latin Church, see *ibid.*, pp. ix–x. Jerome excluded it from his Bible translation.

⁸³ *De Trinitate* 14.9.12, CCSL 50A: 438–439. Augustine discusses the Stoic rejection of the mortality of the virtues with respect in *De musica* 6.16.51–52, p. 104 (PL 32: 1189).

⁸⁴ *Contra Iulianum* 4.17, PL 44: 745–746; see also *De Trinitate* 13.20.26, cited above, n. 71.

⁸⁵ *Ep.* 167.10–14, CSEL 44: 596–602; for an analysis, see Langan, “Augustine on the Unity and the Interconnection of the Virtues”. In *De Trinitate* 6.4.6, CCSL 50: 233–234, Augustine argues that the four cardinal virtues are necessarily present to the same degree in any person.

⁸⁶ *Ep.* 167.6, CSEL 44: 593–594.

⁸⁷ *Contra Iulianum* 4.3.19, PL 44: 747–748.

assimilating classical teachings to the revealed truth, however, Augustine seeks confrontation. Opposing true, Christian virtue to the false virtues of unbelievers, he drives a wedge between religion and moral philosophy, despite his own indebtedness to Stoic and Neoplatonic doctrine. Also, Augustine shares, up to an extent, Jerome's conception of the virtues as categories of the blessed life, but here again his ideas bear a more intransigent character. For Jerome, living in the virtue of Christ was a possibility realized partly on earth and completely in heaven. For the young Augustine, the virtues enable believers to have a nearly full experience of blessedness in their earthly existence; for the elderly Augustine, the virtues chiefly serve to check the evil of the world and only become modes of living God's presence in the hereafter.

The main difference with the views of Ambrose and Jerome is that virtue becomes crucial to Augustine's theology thanks to its intimate connection with Christian love. Augustine's theology centres around the believer yearning to transcend the bounds of earthly existence so as to enter into a loving unity with God. In Augustine's early works, the cardinal virtues, identified with love itself, accomplish these desires all but completely on earth and do so completely in heaven. In his later works, the four virtues, incapable to deliver us from evil, can only help us to contain vice in expectation of the celestial kingdom. But the virtues are still motivated by the love of God and make it possible to fully enjoy this love in the afterlife. In this sense, they are everything worth living for.

Christianized Cardinal Virtues: The Early Middle Ages

The attempts of Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine to secure a place for the cardinal virtues in Christendom rapidly gained success, as the references to the scheme by other patristic authors of the fourth and fifth centuries demonstrate. Only some two decades after Ambrose's first introduction of the virtues in a religious context, Victricius of Rouen († before 410) called the four virtues the road to heaven (*via caelestis*) and included them among the armament of the Christian soldier as well as the jewels on the crown of the blessed.⁸⁸ The first to adopt Ambrose's designation of the "four principal virtues" was Claudian Mamertus († ca. 474),

⁸⁸ Victricius of Rouen, *De laude sanctorum* 6 and 12, CCSL 64: 77 ("Prudentia, iustitia, fortitudo, temperantia via caelestis est"), 89–90. The work has been dated to 396.

who observes in his *De statu animae* that without these virtues, the soul suffers from vice.⁸⁹ Philippus Presbyter († 455/56), a friend and pupil of Jerome, attributes the four virtues to Job, while John Cassian († 432/35) subscribes in his *Collationes* to Augustine's view of the cardinal virtues as goods which no one can use badly; moreover, an anonymous fifth-century treatise *Contra philosophos* contains two passages on the cardinal virtues taken from Augustine's *De civitate Dei*.⁹⁰ Finally, the cardinal virtues made their entry in hagiography as biographical features of a saint—perhaps in emulation of Ambrose's funeral oration for Satyrus—in the *vita* of Hilarius of Arles written ca. 470/80 by Honoratus of Marseille.⁹¹ Pseudo-Augustine's *Categoriae* is the only possibly fifth-century Latin Christian text known today which rather expresses a philosophical interest in the virtues. Explicitly following Aristotle, the author situates each cardinal virtue between two opposed defects.⁹²

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the dealings with the cardinal virtues in Latin Christian literature from the sixth to the eleventh centuries. The cardinal virtues were mostly considered in this period as genuine Christian concepts. Few early medieval authors evoked, or indeed seem to have remembered, the classical origin of the quartet. The work of Christianizing the virtues having been done and ancient moral philosophy being dead and buried, most authors further assimilated the virtues to the faith in the diverse genres of religious writing where the fathers introduced them—moral and spiritual literature, exegesis, preaching, and hagiography. Their attempts did not usually result in

⁸⁹ Claudian Mamertus, *De statu animae* Epil., CSEL 11: 195–196 (see also 2.5, p. 117, for a reference to the connection of the four virtues).

⁹⁰ Philippus Presbyter, *Commentarius in Iob* 1 (on 1:1–5), PL 26: 620C–621A; John Cassian, *Conlationes* 23.12.4 and 23.13.2, CSEL 13: 586, 587 (cf. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 2.18, CCSL 29: 271); *Contra philosophos* 2 and 5, CSEL 58A: 128–129 (= *De civitate Dei* 5.19–20, against the view of the ancients that virtue is an end in itself or is properly motivated by pleasure or fame), 316–317 (= *ibid.* 19.4, on the cardinal virtues implying the notion of evil).

⁹¹ See Bejczy, “Les vertus cardinales dans l'hagiographie”, esp. 326. Another possible reference to the virtues in patristic literature before 500 AD is Philastrius of Brescia, *Diversarum hereseon liber* 111.2–3, CCL 9: 303: “sanctorum populorum quattuor diversae virtutes”.

⁹² Pseudo-Augustine, *Decem categoriae* 18, PL 32: 1438: “His enim duobus malis sibi oppositis, mediocritas media reperitur. Hanc rationem Peripatetici secuti, virtutes medias esse dixerunt, ut plus justo πλεονεξίαν, minus justo μειονεξίαν dicerent: inter quae mala, mediam justitiam locaverunt. Similiter inter versutiam et hebetudinem, prudentiam posuerunt; inter libidinem insensibilitatemque, quam Graeci ἀναισθησίαν vocant, temperantia constituta est; inter timiditatem et audaciam, fortitudo”.

systematic ethical debate, but rather tended to confirm the idea, laid down with authority by Julian Pomerius around the year 500, that the four virtues enable Christian believers to gain heaven by regulating their conduct on earth. Only a small number of texts display an interest in the four virtues that one may call philosophically oriented, or at least not primarily determined by religious concerns. Below, I will consider the “religious” dealings with the virtues in the early medieval period in two separate sections, one devoted to moral and spiritual literature, the other to exegesis and hagiography. A third section examines the scarce use of the cardinal virtues in the context of philosophy and political ethics.

Moral and Spiritual Literature

De vita contemplativa, written around 500 by Julian Pomerius, presents a clear and peremptory attempt to define the cardinal virtues, in the wake of Augustine,⁹³ as the prime instruments of morality and salvation given to Christian believers. According to Pomerius, the contemplative life motivates the active life, in which progress is brought about by growth in virtue. The “four principal virtues”, which guarantee the presence of all other virtues and repel all vices, have a key role in the process. Temperance, fortitude, and justice perfect the active life by steering “spiritual action” in accordance with the commands of prudence; together, the four virtues help to accomplish perfect acts and thus to gain knowledge of hidden things. Pomerius sustains these views with a theory of the soul. The soul consists of reason, which provides insight, and the appetite, which moves us to act. When reason, enlightened by prudence, governs the appetite, the other three virtues produce moral acts. More precisely, the cardinal virtues effectuate three things which according to the *veteres* are inherent to every virtue: prudence examines in each case what is true and sincere; fortitude and temperance check the movements of the passions; justice, the social virtue, secures goodness and salvation for others and ourselves.⁹⁴

Although Pomerius displays some knowledge of ancient virtue theory—thus, he points out that the philosophers agree with *nostri* that the principal virtues are four in number, while he disputes the Stoic view of the four passions as the virtues’ counterparts⁹⁵—he radically

⁹³ Near the end of his work (*De vita contemplativa* 3.31.6, PL 59: 516C–517A), Pomerius states that he followed Augustine to the best of his abilities.

⁹⁴ Julian Pomerius, *De vita contemplativa* 3.27–28.1, PL 59: 509A–C.

⁹⁵ Ibid. 3.18.1 and 3.31.1–2, 501B, 514A–515C; see also below, p. 244.

limits the realm of virtue to Christendom. Every virtue is a gift of God, insists Pomerius; virtues are either born from the faith and hence true, or without faith and hence vices rather than virtues, for “all that is not of faith is sin” (Rom. 14:23).⁹⁶ This holds for the cardinal virtues in particular:

But this we should know and believe in the first place: these four virtues and all the virtues that spring from them are gifts of God, and no one possesses them, did possess them, or will possess them unless God, who is the principle and source of all the virtues, has conferred them on him. For anyone who at any time in any nation lived by faith, believing in God, could surely by His gift become temperate and prudent, just and strong. On the contrary, those who ... have lived without faith are to be considered as not having the ability to receive any of these virtues from God or to possess them.⁹⁷

The perfection of the Christian soul, then, consists according to Pomerius in the four principal virtues which justify man before God.⁹⁸ Pomerius associates the scheme with several biblical fours,⁹⁹ but only justice receives a specifically Christian interpretation in his treatise: justice, to which charity belongs, “conciliates us to God” and “inspires us with the hope of a future reward”.¹⁰⁰ In obvious analogy to Augustine, Pomerius moreover defends the view that the four virtues, permanently engaged in a struggle with the vices on earth, will survive in heaven as modes by which the blessed experience beatitude.¹⁰¹

By relating the virtues to the active life while simultaneously stressing their importance for the human ascent to God, *De vita contemplativa* is almost paradigmatic for the early medieval understanding of the cardinal virtues. Pomerius’s discussion of the virtues notably displays some striking parallels with the work of Gregory the Great († 604). In his *Homiliae in Hiezechihelam*, Gregory argues that prudence considers the acts which are executed by fortitude and result in justice, which in turn is moderated by temperance; together, the “four principal virtues” engender

⁹⁶ Ibid. 3.1.2, 474A–B.

⁹⁷ Ibid. 3.18.3, 502A; trans. *The Contemplative Life*, p. 144.

⁹⁸ Ibid. 3.18.2, 501C: “et ideo virtutes istae quae tantum continent perfectionis in numero, sollicitè considerare debemus, quantam sanctitatem conferant animo Christiano, et quam nihil perfectionis usquam sit, quod in istis virtutibus non sit”.

⁹⁹ Ibid. 3.18.1–2, 501B–C: the letters of Adam’s name, the rivers from Paradise, the gospels, the wheels of the divine chariot, the wings and faces of the four animals.

¹⁰⁰ See ibid. 3.21 and 3.25, 505A–B, 507C–508B.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 3.33, 518A–C.

all others.¹⁰² A slightly different view appears in Gregory's commentary on the first Book of Kings, a work which may only be partly authentic: prudence provides knowledge of moral acts, justice inspires us with the will or desire to perform them, fortitude puts this will into practice, temperance brings the acts to completion in an appropriate manner.¹⁰³ The cooperation of the four virtues in the accomplishment of moral deeds is thus emphasized by Gregory and Pomerius alike. In his *Moralia*, Gregory accordingly affirms that the four virtues uphold the edifice of every good work in the same way as the solidity of Job's house depended on its four corners.¹⁰⁴ Also, Gregory repeatedly distinguishes *fides*, symbolized by the Trinity or the three theological virtues, from *operatio* as exemplified by the four cardinal virtues.¹⁰⁵

Despite his establishing a strong connection of the four virtues with moral action and good works, Gregory subscribes to the Augustinian view that virtues principally reside in inner human motives—doing the *iustum* without acting *iuste* amounts to injustice¹⁰⁶—and that these motives are right if grounded in Christ.¹⁰⁷ The four virtues have their origin in the faith, claims Gregory; it is actually by faith that we reach the virtues rather than vice versa.¹⁰⁸ More precisely, the Holy Ghost is the source of the cardinal virtues from which all other virtues derive.¹⁰⁹ Gregory thus limits the range of the virtues to Christian believers, while he also assigns an important role to the virtues in the economy of salvation. The God-

¹⁰² See Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Hiezechihelam* 1.3.8, CCSL 142: 37.

¹⁰³ See id. (?), *In librum primum Regum* 1.6, CCSL 144: 59. The authenticity of the work was questioned by De Vogüé, "L'auteur du Commentaire des Rois". For a summary of the debate elicited by this article, see Guevin, "A New Gregorian Controversy".

¹⁰⁴ See Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* 2.49.76, CCSL 143: 105: "In quattuor vero angulis domus ista consistit quia nimirum solidum mentis nostrae aedificium prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia sustinet. In quattuor angulis domus ista subsistit quia in his quattuor virtutibus tota boni operis structura consurgit". The connection of the four virtues is also emphasized at *ibid.* 22.1.2–3, p. 1093, and *Homiliae in Hiezechihelam* 2.10.18, CCSL 142: 393.

¹⁰⁵ See *Moralia in Iob* 29.31.72 and 35.8.15, CCSL 143B: 1481, 1783–1784 (Trinity); *Homiliae in Hiezechihelam* 2.10.17, CCSL 142: 392–393 (theological virtues). See also Mähl, *Quadrige virtutum*, 25.

¹⁰⁶ See *Moralia in Iob* 9.25.38, CCSL 143: 482.

¹⁰⁷ See *ibid.* 28.12.31, CCSL 143B: 1419: "Nam sicut fabrica columnis, columnae autem basibus innituntur, ita uita nostra in uirtutibus, uirtutes uero in intima intentione subsistunt. Et ... tunc bases in fundamento sunt, cum intentiones nostrae in Christo roborantur".

¹⁰⁸ See *Homiliae in Hiezechihelam* 2.7.9, CCSL 142: 1419: "Non enim uirtutibus uenitur ad fidem, sed per fidem pertingitur ad uirtutes".

¹⁰⁹ *Moralia in Iob* 2.49.76, CCSL 143: 105–106.

given cardinal virtues drench the hearts of men like the rivers of Paradise and elevate their minds to the high summit of rightness,¹¹⁰ making them fit in the present life for God's blessings in the next.

Gregory's views on the virtues were credited with great authority in the early medieval period.¹¹¹ His connection of faith with good works as conditioned by the cardinal virtues recurs twice in the work of Isidore of Seville († 630), who moreover associates the four virtues with the Paradise rivers which irrigate the beatific life.¹¹² Isidore's most influential discussion of the virtues is found in two encyclopedic works, *De differentiis* and the *Etymologiae*. In both works Isidore adopts a philosophical perspective, which is the reason for discussing them in a later section.

Bede (673–735) not only emulates Gregory by repeatedly correlating faith and good works with the Trinity and the cardinal virtues,¹¹³ but also by interpreting the virtues as the foundation of the *structura* of moral acts. The insights of prudence are executed by fortitude and temperance, explains Bede in this context, with justice as a result.¹¹⁴ Moreover,

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 105 (rivers); 2.49.77, p. 106: "[mens] principaliter his quatuor uirtutibus ad summae rectitudinis culmen erigitur".

¹¹¹ Anthologies of Gregory's writings were composed from his own lifetime; see Boven-deert, *Kardinale deugden gekerstend*, 164–166 (listing the passages on the cardinal virtues appearing in the anthologies of Paterius of Brescia, Taio of Saragossa, Lathcen, and Pseudo-Odo of Cluny; Alulfus of Tournai, who is likewise mentioned in this context, is a 12th-century author). Passages on the cardinal virtues excerpted from Gregory's writings survive as a separate text titled *De quatuor uirtutibus cardinalibus* in MS Avranches, BM 109, ff. 133^v–134^r (9th century; Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 5781a). Ironically, Licinianus of Carthage wrote to Gregory in reference to Gregory's *Regula pastoralis*: "Liber hic tuus omnium est aula uirtutum. Illic prudentia inter bonum et malum discretionem limitis figit; iustitia unicuique sua tribuit, dum Deo animam corpus que animae subdit. Illic fortitudo etiam in aduersis et in prosperis reperitur semper aequalis, quae nec in contrariis frangitur, nec in prosperis exaltatur. Illic temperantia furorem libidinis frangit, discreteque uoluptatibus modum imponit" (Gregory the Great, *Registrum epistolarum* 2.54, PL 77: 599B–C). In the *Regula pastoralis*, however, the four virtues are not mentioned.

¹¹² Good works: Isidore of Seville, *De natura rerum* 26.4, pp. 264–265; *Liber numerorum* 8.35, PL 83: 186B. Rivers: *Quaestiones in Vetus Testamentum* 1.17 (on Gen.), PL 83: 212C.

¹¹³ Bede, *In primam partem Samuelis* 2 (on 13:15), CCSL 119: 109; *In Ezram et Neemiam* 2 (on 1 Ez. 6:14–15), CCSL 119A: 299; *De tabernaculo* 3, CCSL 119A: 104 (connecting faith with the Trinity as well as the theological virtues).

¹¹⁴ *De templo* 1, CCSL 119A: 188–189: "Vnde apte postes huius introitus quadrangulati sunt facti propter quatuor sancti euangelii libros ... seu propter totidem quatuor uirtutes principales, prudentiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam, iustitiam, quarum ueluti fundamine quodam firmissimo omnis bonorum actuum structura innititur; prudentia namque qua discimus quid nos agere qualiter uiuere debeat; fortitudo per quam ea quae agenda didicimus implemus ...; temperantia qua discernimus ne plus aut minus

following Augustine's *De Trinitate*, Bede affirms that the four virtues are the guardians of charity and determine our adherence to God in heaven.¹¹⁵ Particular to Bede is his insistence on the need to divulge the four virtues among the entire Christian community. Being an essential support for the faith, the four virtues should be known by every believer and practiced by the clergy in particular, as he repeats in several of his writings.¹¹⁶ Yet Bede surprisingly leaves some room for the idea of virtue outside the realm of faith. Whereas Gregory denied that Cornelius the Centurion (Act. 10–11) possessed any virtues before his conversion,¹¹⁷ Bede concedes that in the apostolic era, many were driven to the faith on account of their natural virtues (*virtutes naturales*), with Cornelius as a prime example.¹¹⁸ It is conceivable that Bede was influenced by the legends about “virtuous pagans” which started to circulate in his lifetime.¹¹⁹

A full recognition of the classical roots of the cardinal virtues is found in the work of Alcuin (735–804). In his *De rhetorica* Alcuin acknowledges that the philosophers of antiquity perceived virtue, which consists of the four cardinal virtues, in human nature, together with knowledge, truth, and the love of the good.¹²⁰ Strikingly, he expresses his surprise that the pagan philosophers cultivated the four virtues with great care whereas many Christians neglect them, despite the prospect of a celestial

iusto prudentiae siue fortitudini operam dare inueniamur; et quoniam quisquis prudentia fortitudine temperantia utitur absque ulla contradictione iustus esse probabitur uirtus quarta post prudentiam fortitudinem temperantiam iustitia sequitur”. Cf. *ibid.* 2, p. 215: “Quattuor autem sunt principales uirtutes quibus cetera uirtutum structura imminet”; *In primam partem Samuhelis* 2 (on 13:15), CCSL 119: 109: “quibus quattuor quasi angulis tota uirtutum spiritalium structura firmatur”.

¹¹⁵ *De tabernaculo* 2, CCSL 119A: 46 (guardians), 71 (heavenly function).

¹¹⁶ *In Tobiam* (on 8:22), CCSL 119B: 12 (support); *De templo* 2, CCSL 119A: 215 (“sancti praedicatores ... semper operam dare uirtutibus curant, prudenter uidelicet inter bona et mala discernentes, fortiter aduersa sustinentes, cor ab appetitu uoluptatum temperantes, iustitiam in operatione tenentes”), 221 (“quattuor cardinales uirtutes quibus quisque fidelis, si non frustra fidelis est, debet institui”); *In primam partem Samuhelis* 2 (on 25:13), CCSL 119: 235; *De tabernaculo* 3, CCSL 119A: 104.

¹¹⁷ See Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Hiezechielem* 2.7.9, CCSL 142: 1419.

¹¹⁸ *In Lucam* 2 (on 7:8), CCSL 120: 156.

¹¹⁹ An anonymous monk writing ca. 704/14 launched the legend that Gregory the Great prayed Trajan out of hell on account of the Emperor's justice. See Colish, “The Virtuous Pagan”, 46ff.

¹²⁰ See Alcuin, *De rhetorica* 43, p. 144: “KARLUS. Quid philosophis cum his [sc. virtus, scientia, veritas, amor bonus]? ALBINUS. Has intellexerunt in natura humana et summo studio coluerunt”.

reward.¹²¹ Nevertheless, Alcuin leaves no doubt that the four virtues have their proper place in Christian religion. Each of the virtues is defined twice in *De rhetorica*, first in accordance with Cicero's *De inventione* and second in relation to the religious duties of Christian believers, with prudence being related to the knowledge of God, justice to charity, and fortitude to resisting the devil. Moreover, Alcuin mentions the love of God as the end to which observing the cardinal virtues should lead¹²² and concludes his work with the wish that God may grant the ascent to heaven of the present generation, "propelled by the twin wings of love and carried in the chariot of the four virtues".¹²³ The double definitions of the cardinal virtues and the observations on their importance for salvation recur in adapted form in the final chapter of Alcuin's *De vitiis et virtutibus*, one of most widely diffused moral treatises of the Carolingian age,¹²⁴ as well as in his *De ratione animae*. In the first work, Alcuin moreover introduces the cardinal virtues as the chief opponents of the capital vices, while he associates fortitude even in its first definition with the struggle against sin.¹²⁵ Also, he concludes his first series of definitions with the remark that Christ promised eternal glory to those who observe the four virtues in faith and charity.¹²⁶ In *De ratione animae* Alcuin presents the virtues not only as perfections of the rational soul, but also, following Augustine's *De moribus ecclesiae*, as four aspects of the human love of God.¹²⁷ Indeed,

¹²¹ Ibid. 47, p. 150: "Sed miror nos christianos, si illi philosophi has virtutes ob illarum tantum dignitatem vel laudem vitae servaverunt, cur nos ab his in multis devio errore declinamus, cum haec nunc in fide et caritate observantibus aeternae gloriae ab ipsa veritate, Christo Iesu, praemia pollicentur".

¹²² Ibid. 45–46, pp. 146–150.

¹²³ Ibid. 47, pp. 152–154: "Deus ... in hac virtutum quadriga, de qua paulo ante egimus, ad caelestis regni arcem geminis dilectionis pennis saeculum hoc nequam transvolare concedat"; translation taken from the edition, with modifications. Cf. id., *Hymnus vespertinus* 14, p. 157: "Sit vi prudens, acta fortis, arta, / Iusta seu sollers bene temperata, / Huius ut cursus peragamus aevi / Tramite recto"; see also Mähl, *Quadruga virtutum*, 114.

¹²⁴ *De vitiis et virtutibus* 35, PL 101: 637B–638A; see also Bullough, "Alcuin and Lay Virtue", 82–90. For the transmission of *De vitiis et virtutibus*, see Szarmach, "The Latin Tradition"; *Clavis scriptorum latinorum* 2: 153–159.

¹²⁵ *De vitiis et virtutibus* 34, PL 101: 636D–637A: "Hi sunt octo totius impietatis duces cum exercitibus suis, et fortissimi contra humanum genus diabolicae fraudis bellatores ... Igitur ex his Christianae religionis ductoribus, quos opposuimus diabolicae impietatis bellatoribus, quatuor praesunt duces gloriosissimi, [quorum nomina haec sunt]: prudentia, iustitia, fortitudo, temperantia" (see also below, p. 226); ibid. 35, 637C: "Fortitudo est magna animi patientia et longanimitas, et perseverantia in bonis operibus, et victoria contra omnium vitiorum genera".

¹²⁶ Ibid. 35, 637C: "Haec vero in fide et caritate observantibus aeternae gloriae ab ipsa Veritate Christo Iesu praemia pollicentur".

¹²⁷ *De ratione animae* 3–4 and 14, PL 101: 639D–640B, 646D.

the unconditional love of God coincides in the perspective of this work with living in accordance with the cardinal virtues:

And if these four [virtues] come into existence in the soul with perfect charity, they bring the soul close to God. For the greatest good of man, adhering to which involves blessedness, is nothing else than God, and it is only through love that we are worthy of adhering to him. These four virtues are therefore crowned by the one diadem of charity. What else is true wisdom than understanding that God must be loved? What is justice if not venerating the One from whom justice proceeds and takes every good she has? What is temperance if she does not sustain her purity in a perfect life on behalf of the One she loves? What is fortitude if not courageously bearing all hardship out of love of God? If God, then, is the highest good of man, which cannot be denied, it follows—since striving for the highest good is living rightly—that living rightly is nothing else than that man loves God, to whom he owes his existence, with his whole heart, his whole soul, his whole mind.¹²⁸

Despite, then, his borrowings of classical definitions and teachings regarding the virtues (virtue as *habitus*, virtue as a middle road between two extremes)¹²⁹ and his audience of secular rulers—*De rhetorica* is written in the form of a dialogue with Charlemagne; *De vitiis et virtutibus* is dedicated to Margrave Wido of Brittany, and *De ratione animae* to Charlemagne's cousin Gundrada or Eulalia—Alcuin's interpretations of the cardinal virtues centre around their religious rather than their philosophical or political purport. Much like Julian Pomerius and Gregory the Great, Alcuin sustains the idea that God enables us by the virtues to live morally in the world and thereby to gain heaven. What he adds to their views is the perspective of moral instruction, introduced one century earlier in the work of Bede. Virtue is not just given to every believer (many believers actually neglect them), but requires conscious human

¹²⁸ Ibid. 4, 639A–B: “Et haec quatuor, si charitate perfecta in anima fiunt, efficiunt eam Deo proximam. Quia nihil [aliud] est optimum hominis, cui haerere beatissimum sit, nisi Deus: cui haerere certe non valemus, nisi dilectione. Proinde hae quatuor virtutes uno charitatis diademate ornantur. Quae est vera sapientia, nisi Deum intelligere amandum? Quae est iustitia, nisi eum colere, a quo est, et quidquid habet boni, ab eo habet? Quid temperantia, nisi integrum se praebeat in perfectione vitae ei, quem amat? Quid fortitudo, nisi pro amore Dei fortiter omnia tolerare adversa? Si enim Deus est summum hominis bonum, quod negari non potest, sequitur quoniam summum bonum appetere est bene vivere, ut nihil sit aliud bene vivere, quam toto corde, tota anima, tota mente diligere Deum, a quo existit”.

¹²⁹ See *De rhetorica* 43, pp. 144 (medium), 146 (*habitus*); *De vitiis et virtutibus* 35, PL 101: 637B (*habitus*); *De dialectica* 11, PL 101: 963C–D (medium, applied to the cardinal virtues in particular, following Pseudo-Augustine, *Decem categoriae* 18, PL 32: 1438).

effort. Christian society as a whole must make sure to accept the virtues in order to live by God's standards, rule out sin, and find its final destination in heaven. The cardinal virtues thus become central elements of an educational programme directed at the moral and religious formation of the Christian world.

Alcuin's educational perspective dominates the moral writing of the Carolingian period. His three treatises were read and excerpted on a large scale, with particular attention for his teachings on the virtues. The chapters on the cardinal virtues from *De vitiis et virtutibus* and *De ratione animae* survive independently in a number of high and late medieval manuscripts,¹³⁰ while the subdivisions of the virtues from *De rhetorica* recur in the famous *schemata* added to the work shortly after its completion.¹³¹ Several Carolingian authors borrowed their definitions and subdivisions of the four virtues from the *schemata*,¹³² but many more of them employed Alcuin's authentic observations on the cardinal virtues, often in combination with the views of earlier Christian writers. Thus, the chapters on the cardinal virtues in Halitgar of Cambrai's penitential (817/31), which likewise came to circulate as a separate treatise,¹³³ entirely consist of passages borrowed from Julian Pomerius's *De vita contemplativa* and Alcuin's *De virtutibus et vitiis*. For every virtue, Halitgar quotes the definitions of both authors (double definitions, philosophical and

¹³⁰ *De vitiis et virtutibus*: see Bloomfield 4145 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4145, 6043a; add (?) MS *Sankt Pölten, DB 83, ff. 94–95^v (15th century). The chapter (35) is also incorporated into *Collatio de septem vitiis et quatuor virtutibus*, MS Oxford, Magdalen 109, ff. 61^{vb}–63^{ra} (ca. 1400; Bloomfield 4010 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4010). See also Bejczy, "A Medieval Treatise", 241 n. 10. An extract from *De ratione animae* 3–4 survives as *De quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus* in two MSS from the 9th and 10th century (see Bloomfield 4441 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4441).

¹³¹ The *schemata* are printed in PL 101: 945–950. The definitions of the cardinal virtues are adapted from Isidore of Seville's *Differentiae*, but their subdivisions correspond with *De rhetorica*. Modern scholars reject Alcuin's authorship, although the *schemata* already appear in the oldest manuscript containing both the *De rhetorica* and Alcuin's *Dialectica*. See Wallach, *Alcuin and Charlemagne*, 86–89; *Clavis scriptorum latinorum* 2: 159–162, esp. 160.

¹³² See Hrabanus Maurus, *De rerum naturis* 15.1, PL 111: 414A–B; Angelomus of Luxueil, *Commentarius in Genesin* (on 2:4), PL 115: 132B; Ermenrich of Ellwangen, *Epistola ad Grimaldum* 7, p. 541.

¹³³ See MSS *Freiburg im Breisgau, UB 392a, f. 87^v (15th century); *Paris, BnF lat. 242, ff. 69^v–71^r (9th/10th century). The chapter on temperance survives independently in MS Rouen, BM 26 (A 292), ff. 123^v–124^r (12th century; Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 5978b).

religious, in Alcuin's case).¹³⁴ In his concluding remarks, Halitgar affirms that the four virtues are gifts of God which together regulate the moral life. In agreement with Bede and Alcuin, he encourages priests to frequently preach about these virtues in order to withhold their flocks from sin.¹³⁵

The pastoral care of the cardinal virtues and their instrumental use in the suppression of vice likewise receive emphasis in the work of Hrabanus Maurus (†856). In his *De institutione clericorum*, a work modeled on Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*, Hrabanus insists on the need for every Christian to observe the cardinal virtues, described here in accordance with Alcuin's *De rhetorica*, since it is by these virtues that heaven is reached. Priests must therefore set examples of the virtues in both word and deed.¹³⁶ The section on the cardinal virtues from *De institutione clericorum* reappears in its entirety in the first book of *De ecclesiastica disciplina*, a work of religious instruction for catechumens.¹³⁷ In its third book, Hrabanus presents the cardinal virtues, from which all other virtues derive, as the remedies of the eight capital sins which engender all other vices. Every Christian needs the four virtues—known to ancient philosophers and Christian authorities alike, as Hrabanus notes—in order not to fall prone to sin.¹³⁸ Thereupon, Hrabanus expands on the virtues by compiling and slightly adapting relevant quotations from Alcuin's *De rhetorica* and Julian Pomerius's *De contemplativa vita*.¹³⁹ Hrabanus recycled the material drawn from these sources in sev-

¹³⁴ Mähl, *Quadrige virtutum*, 148–149, argues that Halitgar intentionally adapts Alcuin's definition of virtue ("Virtus est animi habitus, naturae decus, vitae ratio, morum pietas, cultus divinitatis, honor hominis, aeternae beatitudinis meritum", *De vitiis et virtutibus* 35, PL 101: 637B) by omitting the clause "honor hominis". The omission may be due, however, to variations in the transmission of Alcuin's text; see Bovendeert, *Kardinale deugden gekerstend*, 224–225.

¹³⁵ Halitgar of Cambrai, *Liber poenitentialis* 2.6–10, PL 105: 673C–678A ("Hae ... virtutes ... sacerdotes Domini ... intende debent intelligere et fraequentius praedicare, ut populus careat vitiis", 2.10, 677A). See also Mähl, *Quadrige virtutum*, 146–149; Kottje, *Die Bussbücher*, 173–174.

¹³⁶ Hrabanus Maurus, *De institutione clericorum* 3.27, p. 488; cf. id., *Commentaria in libros Regum* 3.7 (on 1 Chron. 7:27), PL 109: 174A–B = 444D, repeating after Bede, *De templo* 2 (see above, n. 116), that preachers must always devote themselves to the four virtues.

¹³⁷ Id., *De ecclesiastica disciplina* 1, PL 112: 1193B.

¹³⁸ Ibid. 3, 1240B–C, 1253C–1257A. Cf. id., *Commentaria in libros Regum* 3.7 (on 1 Chron. 7:27 and 7:38), PL 109: 174A, 177A = 443D, 446C–D, repeating after Bede, *De templo* 2 (see above, nn. 114, 116) that the cardinal virtues determine the *structura* of the virtues, and that every believer needs instruction in them.

¹³⁹ See Mähl, *Quadrige virtutum*, 139, for a detailed survey Hrabanus's borrowings.

eral other works, including a still unedited sermon apparently devoted to the cardinal virtues.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, the work of Pomerius determines Hrabanus's exegesis of Sap. 8:7,¹⁴¹ while the chapter on the four virtues in his *De rerum naturis* mainly consists of extracts from Alcuin's *De dialectica*, *De rhetorica*, and the *schemata* attached to the latter work;¹⁴² only the observation that God reforms the souls of the elect through the four virtues is really Hrabanus's own.¹⁴³ In *In honorem sanctae crucis*, Hrabanus associates the virtues with the four arms of the Cross, an original device which recurs in eleventh- and twelfth-century literature and art. Moreover, he draws a distinction in Augustinian vein between the celestial function of the virtues, absorbed in the veneration of God, and their function on earth, where they help believers to perceive the truth (prudence), lay the base for faith and give everyone his due (justice), overcome adversity (fortitude), and check the passions (temperance). His subdivision of the virtues ("from which all other virtues spring forth, and in which the *ratio bonae vitae* consists") again follows Alcuin's *De rhetorica*.¹⁴⁴ Finally, about one third of Hrabanus's *De anima*, written for King Lothar II, is devoted to a discussion of the cardinal virtues that depends on writings of Pomerius, Gregory, and Alcuin. According to Hrabanus, the four virtues are the cornerstones of the human soul and provide a stable foundation for its actions (an interpretation which goes back to Gregory and recurs in Hrabanus's exegetical work as well).¹⁴⁵ Hrabanus affirms that the four virtues are necessary for

¹⁴⁰ See Woods, "Six New Sermons by Hrabanus Maurus", esp. p. 294, on the *Omelia de institutione iiii or uirtutum et de obseruantia iustitie et ueritatis*.

¹⁴¹ *Commentarii in librum Sapientiae* 2.5, PL 109: 706C–707B.

¹⁴² *De rerum naturis* 15.1, PL 111: 413B–419A. See also Mähl, *Quadrige virtutum*, 141, for a detailed survey Hrabanus's borrowings.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* 18.3, 490C: "Item quatuor ad quatuor sanctorum virtutes mysticam significationem ducunt, hoc est, prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem et temperantiam; quibus animae sanctorum, Doino largiente, reficiuntur".

¹⁴⁴ *In honorem sanctae crucis* C.6, CCCM 100: 65, 67 (citation p. 67: "ex quibus omnis uirtutum series procedit, et in quibus ratio bonae uitae consistit"); see also Mähl, *Quadrige virtutum*, 128–132. For the association of the Cross with the virtues, see Peter Damian, *Ep.* 158, 4: 87–89, and below, pp. 99 (Gerhoh of Reichersberg), 117, 190.

¹⁴⁵ *De anima* 6, PL 110: 1115B–D, esp. 1115C–D: "Si ergo hae quatuor virtutes animum hominis obtinuerint, quasi quatuor angulis domus sustinebitur, ne ulla vi tempestatum corruiat: sed potius quidquid aedificare uoluerit, quasi firmissimo fundamento superponet"; cf. *Commentarii in Genesim* 1.12 (on 2:14), PL 107: 497C–D, and *Liber duodecimus* 3, PL 111: 334C–D, quoting Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* 2.49.76 (see above, n. 104).

everyone, but for kings in particular, as they guarantee royal dignity and honour as well as good government.¹⁴⁶

The list of Carolingian texts which discuss the cardinal virtues in like manner as necessary instruments of morality and salvation can be easily extended. Two more examples may suffice here. The first is Ermenrich of Ellwangen's famous letter to Abbot Grimald of St. Gall (849). Following Alcuin's *De rhetorica* with the *schemata*, Ermenrich puts strong emphasis on the love of God and one's fellow human beings as the final aim of the cardinal virtues and repeats Alcuin's pious view of charity and the four virtues carrying the soul into heaven. Moreover, Ermenrich presents each of the four virtues as a shield against two opposing vices, thereby transforming the philosophical doctrine of virtue as a medium between two defects (known to him from Alcuin's *De dialectica*) into a religious lesson of morality.¹⁴⁷ The second example is a short, anonymous treatise on the virtues and vices which has its origins in the ninth or tenth centuries and reached a remarkable popularity in the late medieval period. Borrowing heavily from Alcuin's *De rhetorica* with the *schemata* as well as from Augustine's *De Trinitate*, the treatise affirms that the cardinal virtues "embellish morals, produce merit, defeat the devil, and open heaven" (*mores ornant, merita prebent, diabolum uincunt, celum aperiunt*), notably by suppressing the capital vices.¹⁴⁸

With the possible exception of this last treatise, few moral and spiritual writings from the tenth century are known that give substantial attention to the cardinal virtues. Only Rather of Verona discusses the virtues at some length in his *Praeloquia*, a work that is examined below because of Rather's atypical interpretation of the virtues as political qualities. The tradition of interpreting the virtues as means of right living resulting in salvation mainly continued in the tenth century in hagiography, a genre which is discussed in the next section. Quite apart from moral writing, Bishop Wibold of Cambrai (†971/72) invented a game of dice for his clerics with the numbers of pips referring to the virtues. In

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. 10, 1118B–D; see below, pp. 60–61, for Hrabanus's application of the virtues to royal government.

¹⁴⁷ Ermenrich of Ellwangen, *Epistola ad Grimaldum abbatem* 1 and 6–8, pp. 537, 541–542. See also Mähl, *Quadriga virtutum*, 149–156; Contreni, "The Carolingian School", 105.

¹⁴⁸ See Bejczy and Verweij, "An Early Medieval Treatise". The text survives in eighteen known manuscripts, only one of which antedates the 12th century. The first section of the text appears in adapted form as the opening paragraph of Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas, *De vitiis et virtutibus*.

his directions for use, the theological virtues come first, the cardinal virtues next, some dozens of other virtues follow.¹⁴⁹

In the eleventh century, the theme of the cardinal virtues was taken up again in moral and spiritual literature. As in Carolingian moral writing, the element of instruction and exhortation prevails. The *Liber de villico iniquitatis* of Odo of Tournai († 1113), for instance, presents a moral tale that centres around the scheme of the cardinal virtues. Repeatedly contrasting the four elements of corruptible physical existence with the four virtues which lead to the eternal life, Odo interprets the parable of the unjust steward (Luc. 16:1–8) as a process of repentance and spiritual transformation guided by the cardinal virtues by which sinners attain justification before God.¹⁵⁰

One of the most intriguing authors of the eleventh century is Peter Damian (1007–1072), also as far as his treatment of the cardinal virtues is concerned. Strikingly, Peter twice identifies human reason as the source of the four virtues and moreover claims that virtues must be transformed through human effort into stable attitudes.¹⁵¹ Taken superficially, these statements could be interpreted as lending support to the Aristotelian conception of virtue as a fixed habit formed through rational choice and constant application. There can be no doubt, however, that Peter views the virtues as salvific qualities which Christian believers develop in their attempt to restore the human union with God. Reason does not so much produce the virtues by its natural powers as under the influence of divine

¹⁴⁹ See Wibold of Cambrai, *Ludus clericalis*, PL 134: 1007C; cf. *Gesta pontificum Cameracensium* 1.89(88), p. 434 (written shortly before 1051).

¹⁵⁰ Odo of Tournai, *Liber de villico iniquitatis* esp. 25–28, PL 160: 1144A–1146D; Bejczy, “Prudence chrétienne”, esp. 290, 297–298.

¹⁵¹ See Peter Damian, *Ep.* 23, 1: 219 (= *De vera felicitate et sapientia* 2, PL 145: 832C–D; *Expositio mystica historiarum libri Geneseos* 19, PL 145: 850A; *Collectanea in Vetus Testamentum* Gen. 19, PL 145: 1001B): “illae quattuor virtutes velut ex originali matris suae rationis scilicet fonte procedunt”; *Ep.* 49, 2: 70–71 (= *Expositio mystica historiarum libri Geneseos* 7, PL 145: 844C–D; *Collectanea in Vetus Testamentum* Gen. 7, PL 145: 995C–D): “mens sive rationalis anima iure dicitur paradisus ... Fons enim ille sive fluvius, qui illic dicitur egredi de loco voluptatis ad irrigandum paradisum, quique dividitur in quattuor capita, ratio mentis est, ex qua velut originali fonte quattuor virtutes, iusticia videlicet, fortitudo, prudentia simul ac temperantia quasi totidem salutiferi gurgites profluunt, qui terram nostri cordis fertilem reddunt”; *Ep.* 160, 4: 106–107 (= *De quadregesima et quadraginta dua mansionibus Hebraeorum* 3, PL 145: 548B = *Collectanea in Vetus Testamentum* Num. 19, PL 145: 1052D–1053A): “Post haec iam si proficere et ad singulos quosque fidei et virtutum gradus ascendere nitimur, tandiu debemus immorari, donec valeant virtutes in consuetudinem verti”.

grace. Peter makes it very clear that God is the ultimate source of virtue and of the good will underlying it, while he insists that all virtues have their foundation in faith.¹⁵² The proper school of the virtues, then, is the Church.¹⁵³

Another captivating aspect of Peter's treatment of the virtues is his ambiguity as to which virtue, or set of virtues, comes first. Being convinced that the Bible calls prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance the principal virtues,¹⁵⁴ Peter claims in one letter that all other virtues derive from them. The same letter, however, contains a similar claim regarding faith, hope, and charity,¹⁵⁵ while other writings of Peter alternately assign the role of the most important individual virtue to patience, charity, and *miser cordia*.¹⁵⁶ Perhaps the exact hierarchy of the virtues did not strike Peter as being particularly important, given the fact that all virtues accompany each other in any case. In one of his writings he consequently advises his audience to concentrate on one virtue in

¹⁵² See *Ep.* 1, 1: 66 (= *Antilogus contra Iudaeos* Praef., PL 145: 41B): "fides autem omnium virtutum sit proculdubio fundamentum"; *Ep.* 17, 1: 159 (= *De horis canonicis* 3, PL 145: 224D–225A): "fides fundamentum est et origo virtutum"; *Ep.* 18, 1:168 (= *De ordine eremitarum*, PL 145: 329A): "Ille enim [sc. Deus] fons est et origo virtutis, ille bonae inspirator est voluntatis"; *Ep.* 78, 2: 390 (= *De decem Aegypti plagis et decalogo* 3, PL 145: 689A = *Collectanea in Vetus Testamentum* Ex. 7, PL 145: 1016D): "ex fide spiritalia proferuntur alimenta virtutum"; *Ep.* 81, 2: 418 (= *De fide catholica* Praef., PL 145: 21B): "Fides est origo virtutum, fides bonorum operum fundamentum, fides est totius humanae salutis exordium"; cf. *Sermones* 48, CCCM 57: 298: "Crux denique mors est uitiorum et omnium fons ac uita uirtutum". See also *Ep.* 87, 2: 512, and *Sermones* 3, CCCM 57: 13 (quoted below, n. 156) for the view of virtue as a divine gift.

¹⁵³ See *Contra clericos aulicos*, PL 145: 470C: "Ecclesia, quae est virtutum omnium schola". For Peter's views on the development of the inner self, see Van 't Spijker, *Fictions of the Inner Life*, 19–57.

¹⁵⁴ See *Ep.* 23, 1: 219: "quattuor virtutes, quas scriptura sacra nominat principales".

¹⁵⁵ See *Ep.* 158, 4: 88: "ex quibus [sc. principales virtutes] utique tanquam seminibus omnium virtutum segetes germinantur"; *ibid.* pp. 87–88: "Nam cum in his tribus virtutibus, fide videlicet, spe, simul et caritate, omnis lex divina consistat, atque ex his omnium virtutum multitudo procedat".

¹⁵⁶ See *Ep.* 44, 2: 30 (= *De vita eremitica* 13, PL 145: 762C): patience as "virtutum nutrix"; *Ep.* 76, 2: 378 (= *De patientia* 1, 791B): patience as "regina virtutum"; *Ep.* 87, 2: 512: "Inter omnes sane virtutum gemmas, quas saluator noster de caelo veniens attulit, duas insignius atque praeclarius rutilare monstravit, quas et in se prius expressit, et ut nobis imprimerentur, edocuit: karitatem scilicet et patientiam"; *Ep.* 110, 3: 232 (= *De elemosyna* 3, PL 145: 214C): "miser cordia ceteris virtutibus antecellat"; *Sermones* 3, CCCM 57: 13: "inter cetera spiritalium dona uirtutum, quaerentibus Deum duae propensius necessariae probantur esse uirtutes, caritas uidelicet ac patientia"; *ibid.* 20, p. 133: *miser cordia* "uidetur uelut praepotens regina inter ceteras eminere uirtutes"; *ibid.* 63, p. 373: charity "mater est omnium [sc. uirtutum]".

particular. Exercising oneself in all virtues at the same time is impossible, but humans may participate at all virtues by fully developing one of them.¹⁵⁷

The cardinal virtues likewise recur in the *Moralia in Genesin* of Guibert of Nogent (1055–1125/26), first completed in 1084 and revised until 1113. The main theme of the work, modelled on Gregory's *Moralia in Iob* and written with the explicit aim to offer useful moral instruction,¹⁵⁸ is the battle between the vices and the virtues. Guibert presents the four principal virtues as spiritual qualities that destroy sin and make humans similar to Christ.¹⁵⁹ Associating the four virtues, from which all other virtues proceed, with the rivers of Paradise, Guibert notably interprets fortitude and temperance as being engaged in a struggle against vice, in particular the temptations of the flesh, while he equates justice with the love of God and one's neighbour, of the remaining three virtues, of the life of the spirit, and of human society.¹⁶⁰ Also, following Gregory, Guibert frequently interprets the biblical numbers seven and twelve as being composed of the numbers three, which stands for the faith, and four, which stands for the gospels and the cardinal virtues. The four virtues produce the good works without which the faith is dead, while faith produces the love that guides the observation of the virtues.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ Ep. 110, 3: 225 (= *De eleemosyna* 1, PL 145: 209D): "Quamvis ergo unusquisque sanctus omnibus florere virtutibus necessario debeat, neque enim singula queque vere virtus est, si mixta aliis virtutibus non est, una tamen virtus cuique est prae ceteris eligenda, cui mens familiarius inherendo deserviat, atque ab eius, ut ita loquar, obsequio non recedat. In cunctis quippe virtutibus aequae nos exercere non possumus, sed dum unam artius custodimus, in hac, quod ex reliquis minus est, adimplemus, et dum hanc indesinenter amplectendo constringimus, quasi totum virtutum corpus unius membri participatione tenemus".

¹⁵⁸ See Guibert of Nogent, *Quo ordine sermo fieri debeat* (= *Moralia in Genesin* Prooem., completed 1108/09), CM 127: 54: "facilius enim et securius de virtutum natura disserimus quam de fidei sacramentis, de quibus valde moderate aliquibus loquendum est, disputamus. Error nanque minus intelligentibus ex nimis profunda predicatione generari potest, ex morali autem institutione maxime solet acquiri discretionis utilitas".

¹⁵⁹ *Moralia in Genesin* 1, PL 156: 33C: "quatuor spiritualibus, principalibusque virtutibus, prudentia scilicet, iustitia, fortitudine, temperantia quidquid vitiosi est humoris, quasi cujusdam aurae potentis impulsu abstergit et siccatur"; 4, 113D: "quidquid virtutis habemus, ad Christi conformitatem inhiat"; cf. 10, 317D: "Si enim saeculum perfecte rejicias, et frugi bonorum operum Deum diligendo prorsus insistas, virtus est quidquid demum inter istas intentiones attexas"; 10, 330B: "Virtutes enim corruptae fiunt vitia; reparate, sunt spolia quibusque mentis statibus victoriose dispertienda".

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. 2, 64D–67B.

¹⁶¹ See ibid. 5, 138D: "fides in ternario, mortua est sine operibus, id est sine evan-

A phenomenon that is significant in the light of later medieval developments is the customary association in eleventh-century moral writing of the cardinal with the theological virtues. The association is absent in the work of Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine and remained rare in the following centuries, even in the work of exegetes who delighted in numerical allegory,¹⁶² but eleventh-century authors appear to have appreciated it. Following a prayer book which may date from Carolingian times, Peter Damian and John of Fécamp (ca. 990–1078)—who designates God as *largitor et conseruator uirtutum*¹⁶³—implore God to confer the cardinal as well as the theological virtues upon them.¹⁶⁴ Sev-

geliorum, seu quatuor virtutum principalium quaternario”; 5, 145C: “septenarius vero ex quatuor et tribus [sc. constat], corpus nostrum quaternario figuratum, animamque ternario per quatuor Evangeliorum custodiam, aut quatuor principalium virtutum observantiam ad Trinitatis inducimus notitiam, quam nil aliud dicimus, nisi corpore, et anima Deo observandi diligentiam”; 10, 286C: “Quia, per Trinitatis amorem, quatuor Evangeliorum, vel quatuor principalium virtutum perfectiones germana pariter devotione prosequimur”; 10, 330B–C: “Tribus ad fidei spei et charitatis ternionem referimus, et duodecim constant ex quatuor tribus. Quem quaternarium ad Evangelium, vel quatuor principales virtutes reducimus, quas per Trinitatis amorem, et trium praemis-sarum necessitudinum executionem pertinere facimus”; cf. 10, 314D: “*Quatuor reliquas, quibus secundum quatuor evangelia vivitur, vel secundum quatuor principales virtutes, in sementem, qua corda fecundetis, assumite*”. In other instances, Guibert interprets seven as a compound of the four virtues and three mental powers. See *ibid.* 7, 194B (*ratio, voluntas, affectus*); 9, 278A–B (*intellectus, ratio, imaginatio*).

¹⁶² The first to take the seven virtues together appears to have been Primasius of Hadrumetum († after 552), *Commentarius in Apocalypsin* 2.5, CCSL 92: 81; see also Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Hiezechielem* 2.10.17. Carolingian examples include Halitgar of Cambrai’s *Liber poenitentialis* 2 (with chapters on the active and the contemplative life, the theological virtues, virtue, and the cardinal virtues); *Epistola nomine Ludovici imperatoris ad pontificem Romanum*, PL 98: 1336B; Pseudo-Alcuin, *De Psalmorum usu* 4, PL 101: 473B: “Dona mihi prudentiam, justitiam, fortitudinem, sive temperantiam. Largire mihi fidem rectam, spem inconcussam, charitatem perfectam. Infunde cordi meo spiritum sapientiae et intellectus, consilii et fortitudinis, scientiae et pietatis, atque timoris tui”; Ermenrich of Ellwangen, *Epistola ad Grimaldum* 6, p. 541. For exegesis, see below, p. 50.

¹⁶³ John of Fécamp, *Confessio theologica* 3.32, pp. 179–180.

¹⁶⁴ Peter Damian, *Carmine et preces* 4, PL 145: 924B: “Da mihi justitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et prudentiam. Da mihi perfectam fidem, spem et charitatem. Concede mihi Spiritum sapientiae, et intellectus, consilii, et fortitudinis, scientiae, et pietatis, et timoris tui”; *ibid.* 28, 928C: “Tribue mihi veram fidem, spem firmam, charitatem non fictam. Sit in me fixa humilitas, sobria vita, vera scientia, fortitudo, prudentia, justitia, temperantia, cursus rectus, finis perfectus, te praestante, Deus noster, qui cum Patre, etc.” (Lucchesi, “Clavis S. Petri Damiani”, considers the first passage as probably authentic, the second as spurious); John of Fécamp (Pseudo-Anselm of Canterbury), *Meditatio* 18, PL 158: 799A: “Cunctarum fons et origo, largitor et conservator virtutum, Deus, auge, quaeso, in me fidem rectam, spem inconcussam, charitatem perfectam, humilitatem

eral contemporary authors likewise mention the seven virtues in one breath,¹⁶⁵ while two writings in particular take the cardinal and theological virtues together as the principal virtues of Christian believers. The first is a treatise of the Hungarian missionary Gerard of Csanád († 1046) on the miracle of the three children thrown in the furnace by Nabuchodonodor (Dan. 3). Although Gerard states, following Isidore of Seville's *Etymologiae*, that Socrates first devised the scheme of the four virtues, he explicitly presents prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice as spiritual virtues which protect Christ's undefiled Church together with faith, hope, and charity.¹⁶⁶ The second work is *De ordine vitae*, once ascribed to Bernard of Clairvaux but now attributed to John of Frutuaria († 1049), who is better known as Iohannes Homo Dei. Iohannes designates the four virtues as the primary tenets of moral instruction which are first imbibed in adolescence, augmented in young adulthood, and perfected at a mature age.¹⁶⁷ After presenting his definitions of the virtues and their subdivisions, rearranged in their entirety (without acknowledgment) from Isidore of Seville's *De differentiis*,¹⁶⁸ Iohannes explains the importance of the four virtues for man's spiritual development:

profundam, patientiam invictissimam, corporis et animae castitatem perpetuam. Da mihi prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem et temperantiam, discretionem in omnibus, et sensum pervigilem, ut possim inter bona et mala, inter dextram et sinistram prudenter discernere"; cf. Pseudo-Alcuin, *De Psalmorum usu* 4, cited above, n. 162.

¹⁶⁵ See above, n. 161 (Guibert of Nogent); see also Odilo of Cluny, *Sermo* 9, PL 142: 1018D; Peter Damian, *Ep.* 31, 1: 310 (= *Liber gomorrhianus* 16, PL 145: 176C–D); *Meditatio in orationem dominicam*, PL 149: 576D–577A (Bloomfield 8892; connecting the seven petitions of the Lord's prayer with the theological and cardinal virtues).

¹⁶⁶ See Gerard of Csanád, *Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum* 4 and 8, CCCM 49: 69 (Socrates; for Isidore see below, p. 57), 175–177. See esp. 175: "Ecclesiae itaque spiritus incontaminate arbitrande uirtutes, quarum principales dicit doctissimorum deliberatio perfectissima uirorum quattuor, nimirum prudentiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et iusticiam. Paulus, doctorum illuminatio, tres: Fidem, spem et caritatem, quarum mentio ex propinquo facta est; que quidem in unum complexe efficiuntur septem uirtutum spiritualium arcem continentes"; 177 (on the cardinal virtues): "His nimirum uentis, id est spiritualibus uirtutibus, Christi ecclesia maculam non habens neque rugam circumagitur".

¹⁶⁷ Iohannes Homo Dei, *De ordine vitae* 6.21–7.22, PL 184: 574B–D. The observation "per eas maxime instruuntur mores, et bene vivendi magisterium docetur" (7.22, 574C–D) is adapted from Isidore of Seville, *Differentiae* 2.32.154, PL 83: 94C: "Post logicam sequitur ethica, quae ad institutionem pertinet morum. Haec enim bene vivendi magistra est, dividiturque in quatuor principales virtutes".

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 7.22, 574C–575B; cf. Isidore of Seville, *De differentiis* 2.32.154–158, PL 83: 94C–95B.

Take possession of these heavenly regions, man of God. Gird on these weapons, warrior of Christ, protect and adorn yourself with them. This fiery chariot will carry you, brave soldier, to the heavenly palace at the end of your journey in order for you to abide with your King, on whose behalf you fought an honourable struggle and served the faith. Steer this chariot of the four virtues well, and be firmly seated in it, so that you may move upward and be worthy to enter the three-roomed house located on the highest peak of the mountain. By this house, that flings out all servile fear and to which the road of God's precepts leads you with a broad heart, I mean firm faith, unshakable hope, and perfect charity.¹⁶⁹

Using the metaphors of the fiery chariot and the *quadriga virtutum* introduced by Ambrose and frequently employed in Carolingian literature in order to illustrate the virtues' salvific effect,¹⁷⁰ Iohannes teaches a surprising lesson. The cardinal virtues do not bring us directly in heaven (although the first half of the citation suggests otherwise), but elevate us to the point where we are able to embrace the theological virtues. It is actually the theological virtues, continues Iohannes, in particular faith and charity, that perfect the human being as far as possible in the present life. According to Iohannes, faith, hope, and charity are the highest virtues, while the others (he does not explicitly mention the cardinal virtues in this context) are *virtutes mediae* that can be used either well or badly.¹⁷¹

Compared with the dealings with the cardinal virtues of the three great fathers of the West, one may characterize the late patristic and early medieval conception of the virtues as more pragmatic in orientation.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. 7.23, 575B: "His tu plagis coeli includere, homo Dei. His tu armis, bellator Christi, accingere, protegere, et ornare. Iste currus igneus te fortem militem gestabit consummato cursu ad coeli palatium, ut assistas Regi tuo, cui certasti bonum certamen, fidem servasti. Bene rege hanc quadrigam virtutum, et sede in ea firmus, ut isto vehiculo vehi altius, et introduci valeas ad tricameratam domum in summo montis vertice collocatam. Hanc enim dico firmam fidem, spem inconcussam, perfectam charitatem, quae omnem servilem foras mittit timorem, ubi via mandatorum Dei dilatato corde curritur".

¹⁷⁰ See Mähl, *Quadriga virtutum*, 12–13.

¹⁷¹ Asking himself "quae est in christiana anima fundamentum omnium virtutum?" (*De ordine vitae* 7.23, PL 184: 575C), Iohannes answers: faith, which grows "continua ... operatione virtutum" (575C–D) and "per dilectionem operatur"; hence, "fides firma, et charitas plena, fideles comites, et inseparabiles sorores, cuncta in se genera virtutum continentes, virum perfectum efficiunt, quantum possibile est eum perfici in hac vita plena miseriis et erroribus" (576A); *ibid.* 8.26, 577A: "Sed sciendum est quod quaedam summae virtutes sunt, quaedam vero mediae. Summae virtutes sunt spes, fides, charitas. Nam a quibus habentur, utique veraciter habentur. Doctrina, jejunium, castitas, scientia, et caetera his similia, mediae virtutes sunt; quia et ad utilitatem, et ad perniciem possunt haberi".

From the sixth century, the virtues served as instruments which enabled believers to live in accordance with God's precepts in their active lives and thereby to obtain a celestial reward. From the eighth century, the virtues moreover became the object of moral education. While Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine assumed that Christians possessed the virtues by having accepted the faith, early medieval authors stressed the need for Christians to live by the virtues in order to fulfil their religious duties and to resist the temptation of sin. Accepting a responsibility in the moral formation of Christian society, clerical authors upheld the cardinal virtues to their audience as sustaining elements of the faith and expected priests and confessors to do likewise. As a consequence, the aspect of human effort was reinstalled in the Christianized conception of virtue. Though still being universally conceived as divine gifts, the virtues required conscious application on the part of believers in order to be known, obtained, and practiced. The later medieval notion of virtue as resulting from the cooperation of man and God has hence significant early medieval antecedents.

Exegesis and Hagiography

After their introduction in the biblical commentaries of the fathers, the cardinal virtues continued to be used as an exegetical motif in Western Christian literature.¹⁷² Apart from Gregory the Great, whose *Moralia* and *Homiliae in Hiezechielem* may be regarded as exegetical works, the most important author before Carolingian times to explore the cardinal virtues in his biblical commentaries is Bede. Several of Ambrose's exegetical associations involving the four virtues recur in his commentaries¹⁷³—it is in fact thanks to Bede's use of Ambrose that the term *virtutes cardinales*

¹⁷² For sixth-century examples, see Caesarius of Arles († 543), *Sermo* 163.1, CCSL 104: 668, interpreting the prodigal son's share of his inheritance as the cardinal virtues accepted from God the Father; Cassiodorus, *Expositio psalmorum* 4.10, CSEL 97: 62, associating the virtues with the four seasons and the four winds, referring to the Pythagoreans who already considered four a sacred number; Cassiodori discipulus (Pseudo-Primasius of Hadrumetum), *Commentaria in epistolas Pauli* (1 Cor. 12:8), PL 68: 536A–B, quoting Augustine, *Contra academicos* 1.7.20 (cited above, n. 75).

¹⁷³ See, e.g., Bede, *In primam partem Samuhelis* 2 (on 8:11), CCSL 119: 73 (the chariot of Aminadab); *In Lucam* 2 (on 5:18), CCSL 120: 119–120, and *In Marcum* 1 (on 2:3), CCSL 120: 453 (the four carriers of the lame); *In Lucam* 2 (on 6:23), CCSL 120: 140 (the four beatitudes). Occasionally, Bede introduces new associations: see, e.g., *Expositio Actuum apostolorum* (on 27:33), CCSL 121: 95 (the four anchors of Act. 27:29).

gradually came into use again¹⁷⁴—while Bede is also the first Latin author since Augustine to connect the scheme with the one biblical verse that actually mentions it (Sap. 8:7).¹⁷⁵

The vast majority of references to the cardinal virtues in Carolingian literature occur in an exegetical context, not only in connection with Sap. 8:7¹⁷⁶ but also, following patristic examples, in association with other quaternities, such as—to mention the most common instances—the four Paradise rivers, the four gospels or evangelists, the four carriers of the lame (Mark 2:3–4), and, without a precedent in patristic writing, the first four disciples of Christ (Peter, Andrew, John, and James).¹⁷⁷ In many cases, Carolingian exegetes just include the four virtues without further comment in chains of associations of biblical and other quartets (the four elements, the four parts of the world), as a mere motif of numerical allegory. Yet these associations at least confirm that the scheme of the cardinal virtues forms part of the sacred order of Creation.

In other cases, the use of the virtues as exegetical motives stimulated religious interpretations of the quartet. The four virtues figure in biblical commentaries as the foundation of the human heart moved by Christ (Paschasius Radbertus) and as the prime qualities of the preachers who built the Church (Angelomus of Luxeuil).¹⁷⁸ The fountain of paradise from which the virtues flow usually stands for divine wisdom, but also for charity, Christ, or the Holy Ghost, with the virtues irrigating the beatific life (Hrabanus Maurus) or fertilizing human nature and leading all deeds

¹⁷⁴ See *id.*, *In Lucam* 2 (on 6:23), CCSL 120: 140 (adapted from Ambrose, *Expositio in Lucam* 5.62); *id.*, *De templo* 2, CCSL 119A: 221 (Bede's own use of the term). The term is also found in two exegetical works written in or around Bede's lifetime: *Expositio evangelii secundum Marcum* 1 (on 1:7), CCSL 82: 16 (7th century); *Expositio quatuor evangeliorum* (on Luc. 6), PL 30: 571A = PL 114: 898B (7th/8th century). Carolingian references to the term, adopted from Bede's *De templo*, include Hrabanus Maurus, *Commentaria in libros Regum* 3.7 (on 1 Chron. 7:38), PL 109: 177A = 446C–D; Hincmar of Rheims, *Explanatio in ferulum Salomonis*, PL 125: 830D; Angelomus of Luxeuil, *Enarrationes in libros Regum* 3.7 (on 7:38), PL 115: 448C. Not until the twelfth century did *virtutes cardinales* become the standard designation of the four virtues; see below, pp. 85–86.

¹⁷⁵ Bede, *De tabernaculo* 2, CCSL 119A: 77; *In Ezram et Neemiam* 2 (on 1 Ez. 6:14–15), CCSL 119A: 299; *In Lucam* 2 (on 5:18), CCSL 120: 119–120; *In Marcum* 1 (on 2:3), CCSL 120: 453.

¹⁷⁶ Augustine's and Bede's associations of Sap. 8:7 with the virtues reappear in the work of Hrabanus Maurus; the verse is also connected with the virtues in writings of Smaragdus of Saint Mihiel, Haymo of Auxerre, Heiric of Auxerre, and Atto of Vercelli. See Bovendeert, *Kardinale deugden gekerstend*, 248–249, 275 n. 128.

¹⁷⁷ See *ibid.*, 267–288.

¹⁷⁸ Paschasius Radbertus, *Expositio in Psalmum XLIV* (44:1), CCCM 94: 7; Angelomus of Luxeuil, *Enarrationes in libros Regum* 2 (on 2 Sam. 5:11), PL 115: 346C–D.

elicited by them back to their divine source (John Scot Eriugena).¹⁷⁹ The lame symbolizes the human soul caught in the illness of sin and carried back to God by the four virtues in which the soul's health resides (Heiric of Auxerre).¹⁸⁰ The association of the first four disciples with the virtues occasioned several exegetes to explain the cooperation of the virtues in developing a moral attitude, or producing moral deeds: prudence makes one avoid sin, temperance resist temptation, fortitude subdue vice, justice fulfil God's precepts and thus live in grace (Hrabanus Maurus);¹⁸¹ prudence, which discerns good from evil, needs fortitude to execute her precepts, while fortitude needs justice to do everything right and justice needs temperance to avoid extremes (Haymo of Auxerre, in obvious analogy to Gregory the Great).¹⁸² The connection of justice with charity, frequently found in other genres, is common in Carolingian exegesis as well,¹⁸³ while even classical views recur in biblical commentaries, such as the idea of the cardinal virtues as middle grounds between two defects.¹⁸⁴ Remigius of Auxerre († 908), who deals philosophically with the virtues in his commentaries on works of Boethius and Martianus Capella, develops an interesting perspective on the heavenly state of the virtues in his commentary on the Psalms. Combining views of Augustine and Gregory the Great, Remigius describes the celestial conversion of the four virtues

¹⁷⁹ See Alcuin, *Epp.* 19 and 81, pp. 53 (charity), 124 (Christ); cf also *Ep.* 139, p. 220; Wigbod, *Explanatio sex dierum*, PL 93: 219B–C, and Hrabanus Maurus, *Commentarii in Genesim* 1.10, PL 107: 469A (Wisdom, irrigating the beatific life); John Scot Eriugena, *Periphyseon (De divisione naturae)* 2 and 4, CCCM 162: 108, CCCM 164: 115 (Holy Ghost, Wisdom, fertilizing human nature).

¹⁸⁰ See Heiric of Auxerre, *Homiliae* 2.40, CCCM 116B: 392.

¹⁸¹ Hrabanus Maurus, *Expositio in Matthaum* 2 (on 4:22), CCCM 74: 116; cf. Smaragdus of Saint-Mihiel, *Collectiones in epistula et evangelia* (on Matt. 4:21), PL 102: 511D–512A; Otfrid of Weissenburg, *Glossae in Matthaum* (on 4:22), CCCM 200: 83–84; Pseudo-Bede, *In Matthaevi evangelium expositio* 1 (on 4:22) (9th century), PL 92: 22D–23B; variants in Haymo of Auxerre, *Homiliae de sanctis* 1, PL 118: 754C–755C; Heiric of Auxerre, *Homiliae* 2.46, CCCM 116B: 450.

¹⁸² Haymo of Auxerre, *Homiliae de tempore* 134, PL 118: 713A–C; cf. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Hiezechihelam* 1.3.8 (see above, pp. 31–32). The passage on the virtues from Haymo's sermon is separately transmitted in MS Kremsmünster 293, f. 160^{r-v} (12th century; Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4444b), with an added opening sentence: "Quatuor sunt principales virtutes, prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iusticia, sine quibus nullus poterit diabolo resistere, aut ad regnum celorum pervenire".

¹⁸³ See, e.g., *Expositio quattuor evangeliorum* (on Marc. 1:45) (8th century?), PL 30: 561A–B; Heiric of Auxerre, *Homiliae* 2.26, CCCM 116B: 245; Hrabanus Maurus, *Expositio in Matthaum* 5 (on 15:38), CCCM 174: 454.

¹⁸⁴ See, e.g., Hrabanus Maurus, *Enarrationes in epistolas Pauli* (on Rom. 7:12), PL 111: 1545B–1546A.

in terms of a transition from their *operatio* on earth to the *contemplatio* of God in the hereafter.¹⁸⁵ Surprisingly, Carolingian exegetes regularly connect the scheme of the four virtues with the Ten Commandments¹⁸⁶ but not with the beatitudes, despite the precedents of Ambrose and Bede.¹⁸⁷ Neither do they usually take the theological and cardinal virtues together. Authors who involve the cardinal virtues in allegories on the numbers seven or twelve more often combine the quartet with other triads, notably with the Trinity, than with the theological virtues.¹⁸⁸

Although associating the cardinal virtues with biblical fours remained a common procedure in the tenth and eleventh centuries,¹⁸⁹ few exegetes in this period laboured on the virtues with similar intensity as their Car-

¹⁸⁵ Remigius of Auxerre, *Enarratio in Psalmos* (on 83:5), PL 131: 586A. For the philosophical dealings of Remigius, see below, pp. 54 and 58–59.

¹⁸⁶ See *Expositio quattuor evangeliorum* (8th century?) (on Matt. 1:1), PL 30: 543C: “Quid per XIV, nisi per X verba Legis, et per quatuor virtutes: prima prudentia, servire Deo, non idolis: secunda temperantia, non concupiscere: tertia iustitia, non adulterare: quarta fortitudo, dimittere, non occidere”, repeated in Hrabanus Maurus, *Homiliae* 2.163, PL 110: 465B–C; Hincmar of Rheims, *Explanatio in ferculum Salomonis*, PL 125: 830D; id., *Expositio in Apocalypsin* 4 (on 13:5 and 14:1), PL 117: 1095D, 1105A.

¹⁸⁷ See above, p. 14 and n. 173; see also *Commentarium in Lucam* (on 2:37) (8th century), CCSL 108C: 20.

¹⁸⁸ See above, pp. 32 (Gregory the Great) and 33 (Bede). Carolingian examples include Alcuin, *Commentaria in Apocalypsin* 1 (on 1:4), PL 100: 1092B–C (also the theological virtues: “spes, fides et charitas quatuor principalium virtutum summam perficiunt”; copied by Ambrose Autpertus, *Expositio in Apocalypsin* 1, CCCM 27A: 34–35); ibid. 4 (on 7:4), 1130A–B; Hrabanus Maurus, *Commentarii in Ecclesiasticum* 8.4 (on 35:12), PL 109: 1015B–C (copying Gregory the Great, *Moralia* 35.8.15); Haymo of Auxerre, *Expositio in Apocalypsin* 2 (on 7:4), PL 117: 1035C–D; *Liber Quare* (9th/11th century) 197, CCCM 60: 79. See also below, p. 100 n. 145, for the continuation of this tradition in the 12th century.

¹⁸⁹ See, e.g., Leo of Atina, *Sermo in octava S. Marci*, PL 143: 1429A–B: “In quarto vero numero accipimus figuram quatuor animalium, et quatuor rotarum, ac quatuor annulos arcae; et quatuor principales virtutes, prudentiam scilicet et iustitiam, fortitudinem et temperantiam; vel quatuor mundi partes; aut hominem ex quatuor elementis creatum; et quatuor flumina ex uno paradiso manantia. In quarto etiam loco scribitur illud quod Deus dixit: ‘Fiat lux, et facta est lux’: in quarto quoque loco hominis ponitur iuventus, et tempus a Moyse usque ad transmigrationem Babylonis”; Otloh of St. Emmeram, *De tribus quaestionibus* 39, PL 146: 113D: “Possunt etiam per eundem quaternarium quatuor Evangelia, nec non quatuor virtutes, id est iustitia, prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo congrue designari”; Peter Damian, *Epp.* 23 and 49, 1: 219, 2: 70–71 (Paradise rivers); Bruno the Carthusian, *Expositio in Psalmos* (on 14:2–5 and 118:66), PL 152: 688A–B, 1278B–C; *Expositiones Pauli epistularum* (on Eph. 1:22–23), CCCM 151: 221, quoting Jerome, *Commentarii in Ad Ephesios* 1 (on 1:22–23). Peter Damian also associates the virtues with the four arms of the Cross, perhaps following Hrabanus Maurus (*Ep.* 158, 4: 87–89), and with the four Psalms sung by monks during vespers (*Ep.* 17, 1: 161 = *De horis canonicis* 4, PL 145: 226B–C).

olingian predecessors. Exceptions are Guibert of Nogent, whose *Moralia in Genesin* has been discussed above, and Raoul Glaber (ca. 980–ca. 1046/47). In Raoul's *Historiae* the idea that the virtues have a moral as well as a cosmological significance finds a most articulate expression. Following the Greek fathers who discovered the quaternities which connect the *mundus infimus* with the *mundus supernus*, Raoul associates the four virtues which govern all others (*quae ceterarum gerunt principatum*) with the gospels, the elements, the senses, the Paradise rivers, and the four ages of history, arguing that by the correspondences between them "God is proclaimed most plainly, beautifully, and silently". The four virtues thus have a place in the sacred, quaternary order of the universe, which is reflected according to Raoul in the human microcosmos. On a moral level, Raoul interprets the virtues as qualities by which humans, aided by God, are able to combat sin and regain Paradise. Man lost Paradise through negligence and can win it back by following prudence; temperance, the nurse of chastity, uproots the vices; fortitude rejects the vices and leads men with God's help to the eternal life; finally, justice reforms every soul that loves it. Moreover, the cardinal virtues each govern one of the four epochs of the history of salvation. Justice, "the end and foundation of the other virtues", nourishes the final epoch which began with the Incarnation, in accordance with Christ's saying "For so it becometh us to fulfil all justice" (Matt. 3:15).¹⁹⁰ Raoul's view strongly suggests that the completion of history coincides with the realization of the cardinal virtues. Acting through the four virtues, God not only elevates individual believers to heaven, but also brings human history as a whole to its final destination.

Another early medieval genre in which the cardinal virtues flourished as a motif is hagiography. At least thirty-five *vitae* written between the seventh and the tenth centuries allude to the quartet, while twenty-six examples are known from the eleventh century alone.¹⁹¹ Usually the virtues figure among the characteristics of the saints, mostly in connection with other virtues but sometimes standing on their own. Early

¹⁹⁰ Raoul Glaber, *Historiae* 1.1.2–3, pp. 4–8; translations taken from the edition, with modifications.

¹⁹¹ I found three *vitae* mentioning the virtues from the 7th century, eight from each the 8th and 9th centuries, and sixteen from the 10th, while the dates of three other relevant *vitae* of early medieval saints remain uncertain. See Bejczy, "Les vertus cardinales dans l'hagiographie", 317–318; add Odilo of Soissons, *Sermo 2 de SS. Metardo et Gildardo* (10th century), PL 132: 639B–C.

medieval hagiographers associate the four virtues with male as well as female saints, and with bishops and monks as well as with hermits, virgins, and martyrs.

As in moral and exegetical literature, the virtues frequently appear in the *vitae* as ingredients of the moral and spiritual life which offer protection against sin and provide a road to heaven. In some instances, however, the virtues receive a more specific interpretation. Thus, fortitude may be associated with the inner combat against vice and temptation, but also with the attitude of hero-saints who bravely impose the faith on a hostile outer world; prudence and justice sometimes reside in recognizing one's obligations to God, but sometimes rather in rational command and political expertise.¹⁹² Also, several *vitae* contain classical elements such as the doctrine of the connection of the four virtues,¹⁹³ while the anonymous biographer of Eusebia (ca. 1000) even states in so many words that the four virtues, which include all others, are highly valued since antiquity.¹⁹⁴ Remarkably, two tenth-century *vitae* nevertheless take distance from ancient moral philosophy. The author (Hugh of Angoulême?) of the life of Amantius of Boixe quotes a passage from Isidore of Seville's *De differentiis* on the Stoic view of the four basic passions as counterparts of the cardinal virtues. Although "the philosophers" consider the passions as the four principal vices, our hagiographer agrees with "the saints" that the passions are morally neutral and can be transformed by the free will into either vices or virtues.¹⁹⁵ The *passio* of the African martyr Restituta authored by Peter of Naples offers another example. During Restituta's trial, her Roman judge tells her that the sacred laws of the Empire oblige him to observe the cardinal virtues, lest he could be taken away by anger. Restituta reacts with indignation: how can the judge pride himself of respecting the cardinal virtues (defined by her in accordance with Stoic philosophy) if he ignores the fountain of true wisdom and prefers the world to heaven and the devil to the angels? The judge should better accept the faith immediately, for his entire wisdom and culture are mere diabolical constructions which will entail his eter-

¹⁹² Bejczy, "Les vertus cardinales dans l'hagiographie", 326–330; for the "political" interpretation of the virtues in hagiography, see below, p. 62.

¹⁹³ See Audoenus of Rouen's vita of Eligius (8th century) and the anonymous vita of Bononius (11th century), which both appear to borrow the doctrine from Jerome, *Ep.* 66.3; see Bejczy, "Les vertus cardinales dans l'hagiographie", 317.

¹⁹⁴ Bejczy, "Les vertus cardinales dans l'hagiographie", 324.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 330; see also below, p. 244.

nal damnation.¹⁹⁶ The polemical stance offered by this text presents a unique case in early medieval literature. I know of only one other text written between the sixth and eleventh centuries that deprecates the cardinal virtues as features of a pagan ethic: the Latin translation of Proclus of Constantinople's *Epistula de fide ad Armenos*, composed before 544 by Dionysius Exiguus. Proclus classifies the cardinal virtues as inferior goods related to man's terrestrial existence and opposes them to the Pauline virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which make Christians similar to God.¹⁹⁷

The use of the cardinal virtues in early medieval exegesis and hagiography obviously confirms the religious interpretation of the virtues as elaborated in contemporary moral and spiritual writing. The association of countless biblical passages with the quartet suggests that the virtues are an integral part of God's message, while the attribution of the cardinal virtues to saints accentuates the idea that the virtues are divine gifts which elevate believers to God. Moreover, seeing the virtues displayed in the Bible and the lives of exemplary Christians must have worked as an incentive to early medieval readers and listeners and thus served the goal of moral instruction as formulated by Bede, Alcuin, and numerous later authors. But the exegetical and hagiographical use of the virtues also has the wider effect of imbedding the virtues in the divine order of the universe. Acting through the virtues, God manifests himself in his Word, his Creation, and the workings of his saints, as biblical commentators and hagiographers make clear. It is not without significance that the term *virtus* may refer in medieval Latin sources to divine power, virtue, and miracles alike. The cardinal virtues are among the many works by which God submits the visible world to his rule.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 330–331.

¹⁹⁷ Proclus of Constantinople, *Epistula de fide ad Armenos*, trans. Dionysius Exiguus, PL 67: 410C–411C, esp. 410C–D: "Aiunt enim quatuor species esse virtutis, id est, iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam; quae licet bonae sint, humi tamen repunt, et erga terrena projectae sunt, dum inferiora coelesti fastigio comprobantur. Fortitudinem namque dixerunt, luctam adversus carnem; temperantiam, quae de affectuum sumit subjugatione victoriam; prudentiam, quae in conversatione civili optata continet instituta; iustitiam optimam aequiportionem. Hunc autem, ut putabantur, vitae ordinem lege sanxerunt, immoderatum atque illicitum reprimentes huiusmodi definitionibus appetitum. Altum vero et praesenti vita sublimius, neque cogitare, neque depromere valuerunt, sed insipienti et obscurato corde nixi sunt virtutem, quantum ad se, visibilibus tantummodo rebus includere, nihil ei tribuentes eximium, et coelesti habitatione condignum".

Philosophy and Politics

A relatively small number of texts dating from the sixth to the eleventh centuries discuss the cardinal virtues not primarily from a religious perspective but continue ancient traditions of either philosophically defining the virtues, relating them to the public life, or both.¹⁹⁸

A philosophical interest in virtue theory notably prevails in the work of Boethius (ca. 480–542). In his *Philosophiae consolatio, persona* Boethius addresses Lady Philosophy as the mistress and nurse of all virtues (*omnium magistra virtutum, virtutum omnium nutrix*).¹⁹⁹ Philosophy urges Boethius always to pursue virtue, insisting that vice never goes unpunished while virtue always has its reward.²⁰⁰ Philosophy does not seem to refer here to a celestial reward, but rather to happiness in the present life, clouded though it may be through the vicissitudes of fortune. Neither does she present virtue as a gift of God. Her observation that good men seek the highest good “by the natural function of the virtues” (*naturali officio virtutum*) might even suggest the contrary.²⁰¹ Significantly, two Carolingian commentators of the *Consolatio*, Remigius of Auxerre and John Scot Eriugena, play down the naturalistic aspects of Boethius’s views. Instead, Remigius briefly designates the virtues as divine gifts, while Eriugena presents them as roads to Paradise.²⁰²

In the *Consolatio* Boethius does not mention the cardinal virtues, but in *De differentiis topicis* he identifies justice, fortitude, *modestia*, and prudence as the four species of *virtus*, defined here as *habitus mentis bene*

¹⁹⁸ Mähl, *Quadrige virtutum*, discusses the dealings with the virtues from Julian Pomerius to Bede (pp. 19–49), in Carolingian exegesis (pp. 35–49), and in Carolingian “moral philosophy” (pp. 83–160).

¹⁹⁹ Boethius, *Philosophiae consolatio* 1 pr. 3.5 and 2 pr. 4.1, CCSL 94: 5, 23.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. 4 pr. 1.7, p. 65: “sine poena umquam esse uitia nec sine praemio uirtutes”.

²⁰¹ Ibid. 4 pr. 2.23, p. 67: “summum bonum ... boni quidem naturali officio uirtutum petunt”.

²⁰² See Remigius of Auxerre, *Expositio in libro Boetii* 3 pr. 9, p. 30, referring to God as “omnia uirtutum dona in se continens”; John Scot Eriugena, *In Boetii consolationem philosophiae* 4 pr. 1, pp. 221–222: “ET QUONIAM ostensa est tibi forma VERAE BEATITUDINIS qualis sit et quanta et ubi, id est in quo loco SITA SIT scilicet in Deo ... monstrabo tibi VIAM QUAE te reducat ad domum, id est tuam conscientiam mentisque secretum uel ad paradisum ... per PENNAS accipit hic uirtutes quibus iter est ad astra”; cf. the neutral comment on 4 pr. 2, p. 227: “sed SUMMUM BONUM est utrisque, bonis scilicet et malis, PROPOSITUM, ad quod ut perueniant boni VIRTUTUM NATURALI OFFICIO utuntur mali uero non naturali, scilicet per uitia ...”.

constitutae.²⁰³ Apart from being excerpted by an early medieval interpolator of the *Institutiones* of Cassiodorus (ca. 485–580), Boethius's definition does not appear to have been quoted before the eleventh century,²⁰⁴ even though the idea that virtue is divided into the four principal virtues regularly occurs in Carolingian literature.²⁰⁵ Carolingian authors appear to have taken the idea from Cicero's *De inventione* (possibly as transmitted by Augustine's *De diversis quaestionibus*) or Augustine's *De moribus ecclesiae*.²⁰⁶

The only other reference to the cardinal virtues in the work of Boethius occurs in his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*. In it, Boethius divides "practical" or "active" philosophy into three branches, the second of which takes care of the common good "through its concern for providence, balance of justice, stability of fortitude, and patience of temperance".²⁰⁷ The importance of this passage is that it is not only philosophical in character, but explicitly connects the cardinal virtues with secular government. Again, no author appears to have quoted the passage before the eleventh century,²⁰⁸ not even Cassiodorus, who may nevertheless have been responsible for attributing the four virtues to two Christian emperors in the *Historia ecclesiastica tripartita* (Theodosius II, to whom the work is dedicated, and Valentinian I).²⁰⁹ In the late sixth century, however, a small treatise appeared which evaluates the four virtues as the constituents of good kingship: Martin of Braga's *Formula vitae honestae* (572/79), dedicated to King Miro of the Sueves. The treatise is entirely

²⁰³ Boethius, *De differentiis topicis* 2, PL 64: 1188C–D.

²⁰⁴ Pseudo-Cassiodorus, *Institutiones* 2.3, PL 70: 1183C; cf. the introduction of Mynors to Cassiodorus, *Institutiones*, xxiv–xxx. The interpolation survives in manuscripts from the 9th century and may be composed as early as in Cassiodorus's lifetime. For the 11th century, see below, p. 63 (Papias).

²⁰⁵ See, e.g., Alcuin, *De rhetorica* 44, p. 146; id., *De vitiis et virtutibus* 35, PL 101: 637B; Hrabanus Maurus, *De anima* 6, PL 110: 1115C; Remigius of Auxerre, *Commentum in Martianum Capellam* (1.7.8) and (1.8.2), 1: 78, 81.

²⁰⁶ See Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53.159, p. 147; cf. id., *De officiis* 1.18.61, 1.43.152, and 3.25.96, pp. 21, 52, 115 (the four virtues as the species of *honestas*). For Augustine, see above, pp. 23, 26. Mähl, *Quadriga virtutum*, 93–94, argues that Alcuin probably used *De diversis quaestionibus* on behalf of his classification of the virtues.

²⁰⁷ Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta* 1.3, CSEL 48: 9: "Secunda vero est quae rei publicae curam suscipiens cunctorum saluti suae providentiae sollertia et iustitiae libra et fortitudinis stabilitate et temperantiae patientia medetur".

²⁰⁸ The earliest quotation that I found occurs in the *Excerpta Isagogarum* 2, CCCM 120: 6 (early 11th century).

²⁰⁹ *Historia ecclesiastica tripartita* 1.1.15 and 7.7.3, CSEL 71: 8, 393; cf. ibid. 8.1.29, p. 460, for a passage on the cardinal virtues in reference to Gregory of Nazianze.

devoted to the cardinal virtues, which Martin strikingly avoids to present as ingredients of Christian morality. His explicit aim is to give “advice which, even without the precepts of the divine Scriptures, may be fulfilled under the natural law of human intelligence, even by the laity”.²¹⁰ Indeed, Martin sets forth an entirely Stoic treatment of the virtues as moral guidelines of the public life. God is only mentioned as an abstract entity, not as a Redeemer,²¹¹ while references to the Bible and to the life in the hereafter are absent. Accordingly, Martin does not associate justice with charity, as many early medieval authors do, but defines it as “a tacit agreement of nature devised for the aid of many”,²¹² while he contrasts all four virtues with shameful behaviour rather than sin. Also, he presents the four virtues as rational means between two opposed excesses. Quite surprising is Martin’s remark “Thus, as though you were fashioned after a divine model, withdraw as much as possible from the body to the spirit”.²¹³ What strikes here is the term “as though” (*quasi*); for Christians, the human being is *really* made in God’s image and likeness. Most modern commentators assume that the *Formula* goes back to a lost work of Seneca.²¹⁴ From the tenth century, the work was usually attributed to Seneca himself (the prologue, in which Martin reveals his identity, is missing in most manuscripts), a circumstance which may have fostered the extraordinary popularity of the work in the Later Middle Ages. It survives in over seven hundred manuscripts and reached at

²¹⁰ Martin of Braga, *Formula vitae honestae* 1, p. 237; trans. *Rules for an Honest Life*, 88.

²¹¹ Kuttner, “A Forgotten Definition of Justice”, 100–107, declines the assumption that Martin’s work goes back to a lost work of Seneca, at least as far as his view of justice is concerned, and assumes that “the God of whom Martin speaks is not the abstract deity of the philosophers but the loving God of the Christian dispensation” (p. 106). Kuttner infers this from the phrase “time prius Deum et ama Deum, ut ameris a Deo” (*Formula vitae honestae* 5, p. 246). But Martin goes on to say: “Amabis enim deum, si illum in hoc imitaberis, ut velis omnibus prodesse, nulli nocere et tunc te iustum virum appellabunt omnes, sequentur, venerabuntur et diligunt” (ibid.). In my view, these lines lack a spiritual dimension and reduce the love of God to sheer sociability.

²¹² *Formula vitae honestae* 5, p. 246: “naturae tacita conventio in adiutorium multorum inventa”. Kuttner, “A Forgotten Definition”, 79–94, documents the resonance of this definition in 12th-century canonist writings, which invariably attribute it to Gregory the Great.

²¹³ *Formula vitae honestae* 4, p. 242; trans. *Rules for an Honest Life*, 92.

²¹⁴ Martin did certainly not present Christian ideas in Stoic disguise, as believes De Lourdes Sirgado de Sousa Ganho, “Le stoïcisme de Saint Martin de Braga”. A better assessment is Liefvooghe, “Les idées morales de Saint Martin de Braga”. For a survey of scholarship on Martin and his works, see Bodelón, “Martin of Braga and John of Biclaro”.

least forty printed editions in the fifteenth century, being thus not only the first, but also the most widely diffused medieval treatise confined to the cardinal virtues. Yet it appears to have passed largely unnoticed in the early medieval period. The manuscript transmission sets in from Carolingian times, but references to the work antedating the twelfth century are hard to find.²¹⁵

Few early medieval authors so exclusively concentrated on the philosophical and political significance of the cardinal virtues as Boethius and Martin of Braga. Authors who took recourse to philosophical views on the virtues usually added some observations on their religious significance. In his *De anima*, for instance, Cassiodorus introduces the virtues under reference to the Greeks and adopts their definitions from Cicero's *De inventione*, explicating for each virtue the evils against which it offers protection (justice: *prava* and *iniqua*; prudence: *confusa* and *incerta*; fortitude: *adversa* and *prospera*; temperance: *delectationes illicitae* and *voluptates fervidae*). In a more religious vein, he concludes that the virtues are a fourfold harness given by God which makes the soul immune against the vices in this mortal world.²¹⁶ A similar philosophical-religious interest in the virtues is found in the work of Isidore of Seville. In *De differentiis* as well as in the *Etymologiae*, Isidore divides not virtue itself, but the discipline of ethics into the four cardinal virtues and presents this division as a philosophical fact (actually ascribing it to Socrates in the *Etymologiae*) rather than a religious truth.²¹⁷ His brief definitions of the virtues in the *Etymologiae* are purely Stoic in character.²¹⁸ The definitions in *De differentiis* likewise betray Stoic inspiration—they partly derive from Ambrose's *De officiis* and thus indirectly from Cicero—but prudence and justice bear obvious Christian connotations: prudence resides in

²¹⁵ The earliest manuscripts date from the 9th and 10th centuries, with three and nine copies, respectively; see Barlow's introduction to his edition, pp. 210–214. Mähl, *Quadrigena virtutum*, 61 n. 26, suggests that Martin's work influenced the passage on justice in Isidore of Seville, *Differentiae* 2.39.156, PL 83: 95A. The correspondence between Isidore's and Martin's words does not strike me as cogent.

²¹⁶ Cassiodorus, *De anima* 6–7, CCSL 96: 548–549.

²¹⁷ See Isidore of Seville, *De differentiis* 2.39.154–158, PL 83: 94C–95B; *Etymologiae* 2.24.5: "Ethicam Socrates primus ad corrigendos componendosque mores instituit, atque omnium studium eius ad bene vivendi disputationem perduxit, dividens eam in quattuor virtutibus animae, id est prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam"; see also Mähl, *Quadrigena virtutum*, 53–63.

²¹⁸ See Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae* 2.24.6: "Prudentia est in rebus, qua discernuntur a bonis mala. Fortitudo, qua adversa aequanimiter tolerantur. Temperantia, qua libido concupiscentiaque rerum frenatur. Iustitia, qua recte iudicando sua cuique distribuunt".

recognizing the true faith and scriptural knowledge, while the main element of justice is charity.²¹⁹ Moreover, Isidore rejects the Stoic notion of the four passions as negative counterparts of the four virtues and argues that the free will transforms the passions into either virtues or vices.²²⁰ Isidore's division of ethics into the four virtues is frequently quoted in early medieval writings,²²¹ while his definitions of the virtues exercised considerable influence, too.

In Carolingian times, notably Alcuin took recourse to Stoic teachings on the virtues, but his attempt to assimilate these teachings into a religious conception of morality is manifest.²²² A genuine interest in classical moral philosophy is rather found in the commentaries on Boethius's *Philosophiae consolatio* by Remigius of Auxerre and John Scot Eriugena, although these works contain Christianizing elements, too. Both commentators illustrate Boethius's suggestion that virtue is a medium between two excesses with philosophical expositions on the cardinal virtues in particular.²²³ In addition, Remigius repeatedly mentions the

²¹⁹ See id., *De differentiis* 2.39.154, PL 83: 94C: "Prudentia est agnitio verae fidei, et scientia Scripturarum, in qua intueri oportet illud trimodum intelligentiae genus" (i.e., historical, tropological, and spiritual); ibid. 156, 95A: "nunc partes iustitiae subijciamus, cujus primum est Deum timere, religionem venerari, honorem referre parentibus, patriam diligere, cunctis prodesse, nocere nulli, fraterna charitatis vincula amplecti, pericula aliena suscipere, opem ferre miseris, boni accepti vicissitudinem rependere, aequitatem in judiciis conservare"; ibid. 158, 95B: "Sed ex his prudentia agnitione veri delectatur, iustitia dilectionem Dei et proximi servat, fortitudo vim virtutis habet metumque mortis contemnit, temperantia affectiones carnis moderatur, et restinguit appetitum. Prima credit et intelligit, secunda diligit, tertia appetitum cohibet, quarta modum imponit". See also Mähl, *Quadriga virtutum*, 61–62. An extract from *De differentiis* 2.39.154–2.40.170, PL 83:94C–98A, survives as a separate text titled *De quattuor uirtutes* (!) in MS Paris, BnF lat. 4841, ff. 52^r–54^v (9th century; Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1364a).

²²⁰ See ibid. 2.40.159–160, PL 83: 95C–96A; see also above, p. 52, and below, p. 244.

²²¹ It was quoted from *De differentiis* by Anonymus ad Cuimnanum, *Expositio latinis* 1.7, CCSL 133D: 9–10; *Paenitentiale Bigotianum* 50–54, p. 210; *schemata* added to Alcuin, *De rhetorica*, PL 101: 949 (quoted in turn by Hrabanus Maurus, *De universo* 15.1, PL 111: 414A–B); from the *Etymologiae* by Theodulf of Orléans, *Carmina* 46 (*De septem liberalibus artibus*), p. 545; Gerard of Csanád, *Deliberatio supra hymnum trium puerorum* 4, CCCM 49: 69; Bernard of Utrecht, *Commentum in Theodolum*, 68; and from either work by Alcuin, *De dialectica* 1, PL 101: 952B; Sedulius Scotus, *In Priscianum* 1.1, CCCM 40C: 57; Christian of Stavelot, *Expositio in Matthaeum* 1, PL 106: 1266C.

²²² See however Alcuin's incidental support for the Stoic idea of virtue as procuring its own reward in *De rhetorica* 43, p. 144: "quaedam res tam clarae et tam nobiles sunt, ut non propter aliud emolumentum expetendae sint, sed propter suam solummodo dignitatem amandae sunt et exsequendae ... Hae sunt: virtus, scientia, veritas, amor bonus".

²²³ See Boethius, *Philosophiae consolatio* 4 pr. 7.19–21, CCSL 94: 86–87 (cf. id., *Contra*

scheme of the four virtues in his commentary on *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* of Martianus Capella, revealing in one passage even their Greek names but also associating justice with charity and presenting the four virtues as offering protection against every possible vice.²²⁴

What we do regularly find in Carolingian sources are associations of the cardinal virtues with secular rule. Many Carolingian authors recommend the virtues to kings and nobles as necessary ingredients of good government and gentle behaviour,²²⁵ mostly in brief passages but sometimes in a more extended form, specifically relating the virtues to the demands of political life. Thus in his *vita* of Adelard of Corbie, governor of Italy on behalf of his cousin Charlemagne, Paschasius Radbertus (†853) primarily relates the cardinal virtues to Adelard's exercise of his public functions. Adelard's prudence allowed him always to govern with supreme political insight, relates Paschasius, while his rule was characterized by an almost superhuman justice. Incorruptible, impartial, and without respect of persons, Adelard broke the illegitimate power of

Etytychen et Nestorium 7, p. 213); Remigius of Auxerre, *Expositio in libro Boetii* 4 pr. 7, p. 39: "Nam uirtutes philosophi medias esse dixerunt et inter plus minusue locatas. Verbi gratia quattuor (sunt) principes uirtutes, iustitia fortitudo prudentia temperantia. Et iustitia inter pleonexiam et mionexiam collocata est; fortitudo inter timiditatem et audaciam; prudentia inter calliditatem et hebetudinem; temperantia inter luxuriam eneruatorum et insensibilitatem pecudum"; John Scot Eriugena, *In Boetii consolationem philosophiae commentarius* 4 pr. 7, pp. 268–269: "Quattuor sunt uirtutes: fortitudo, iustitia, temperantia et prudentia. Fortitudo est medium inter audaciam et timiditatem et dicitur uirtus ideo quia uirtus sic diffinitur. Virtus est medium uitiorum utrimque redactum ... et fiet unum medium qui audet audenda et qui timet timenda; id est uirtus. Iustitia est medium inter plus iustum et minus iustum; prudentia inter calliditatem et hebetudinem; temperantia inter luxuriam et libidinem eneruatorum".

²²⁴ Remigius of Auxerre, *Commentum in Martianum Capellam* (1.7.8), (1.8.2), (2.57.10), and (7.369.21), 1: 78 ("Per fasceam vero pectoralem quadriformis uirtus accipitur, prudentia uidelicet, temperantia, fortitudo, et iustitia, qua pectus, id est mens ubi est sedes sapientiae, ab omni uitiorum deformitate munitur"), 81, 170–171 (Greek names; "iustitia, quae Grece dycheia uocatur, est unicuique propria distribuere, Deum plus quam se, proprium tamquam se, diligere"), 2: 187. For Remigius's Christianizing tendencies in his literary commentaries, see also Marenbon, "Carolingian Thought", 173–174, 178.

²²⁵ Four virtues included among the virtues of kings: see, e.g., Theodulph of Orléans, *In adventu regis* 2, p. 164; Smaragdus of Saint-Mihiel, *Via regia* 4, PL 102: 943B. Four virtues recommended to kings and nobles: see, e.g., Agobard of Lyon, *De iniusticiis*, CCCM 52: 225 (to Matfred of Orléans); Dhuoda, *Liber manualis* Epigr. and 1.5, pp. 76, 106 (to Dhuoda's son William); Sedulius Scotus, *Ad Karolum Calvum* 6.1 l. 7, p. 257 (to Charles the Bold); *Sacramentary of Echternach* 104, p. 404 (to Zwentibold of Lorraine). Cf. Paulinus of Aquileia, *Ep.* 3, PL 99: 508B–509A, advising Charlemagne to exhort all his subjects to observing the four virtues.

petty tyrants in order to restore the rights of the humble.²²⁶ Even if early medieval authors frequently connected the virtues with the active life, Paschasius's interpretation of the virtues in the light of politics departs from the religious conception of virtue which dominated contemporary moral writing. Hrabanus Maurus even sets forth a double interpretation of the virtues, religious and political, in his *De anima*, written for King Lothar II. His religious interpretation, which applies to all Christian believers, comes first. Hrabanus identifies prudence with *prudentia spiritus* (Rom. 8:6), a gift of God which aims at *vera et sancta* and cannot be had perfectly in this life. Similarly, he distinguishes diabolical from Christian fortitude, which strengthens believers to bear adversity, while he equates justice with loving God and one's neighbour. Only temperance does not receive a specifically religious interpretation, but is presented as a general principle of moderation.²²⁷ Having finished these expositions of the four virtues, Hrabanus explains their significance for kings in particular:

Although these virtues are necessary for all, they nevertheless provide royal dignity with its highest adornment. For through prudence, which carefully foresees everything, it cautiously and reasonably considers what can happen ... Through fortitude, it sustains with a strong and unshaken mind whatever it carefully perceived, whether adversity or prosperity—the fortuities, that is, of the vacillating world: war, upheaval, sedition, and the various ways of men ... And who ought to be more just than a king? For men carrying public responsibilities, inclined as they are to injustice by their eager desire, do not dare to act unjustly toward the subjects when taking royal justice into consideration, for fear of a just revenge. Also, the king ought to be particularly temperate, so that his commands agree with all and are neither too lax nor, conversely, very severe, but proceed from such moderation and composure that everything will take place in accordance with everyone's possibilities ... With these four virtues as solid columns, then, all honour and adornment of royal dignity is exalted; all things are governed and embellished in a felicitous way.²²⁸

²²⁶ Paschasius Radbertus, *Vita Adalhardi*, PL 120: 1517A–C.

²²⁷ Hrabanus Maurus, *De anima* 7–10, PL 110: 1116B–1118A.

²²⁸ Ibid. 10, 1118B–D: “Hae itaque virtutes cum omnibus sint necessariae, excellentiae tamen regiae maximum decus ornatumque praestant. Per prudentiam quippe omnibus provide prospiciens, caute et rationabiliter ea quae provenire possunt, considerat ... Per fortitudinem vero omne quod provide perspexerit, sive adversa sive prospera, forti et inconcusso animo supportat: eventus scilicet fluctuantis saeculi, bella, tumultus et seditiones, nec non et diversos mores hominum ... Quem vero justiore decet esse quam regem? Omnes namque iudices cunctique actores, quamvis cupiditate ducti injusta

The contrast between Hrabanus's religious and political understanding of the virtues is striking. As religious qualities, the virtues appeal to all believers, have their origin and their final end in God, and remain imperfect in the present life; as political qualities, they aim at the welfare of the community, enable kings to exercise rational control over society, and foster good, effective government. A formal distinction between political and religious virtues was only to be accepted from the late twelfth century, but in Hrabanus's *De anima* it is already implicit.

A political interpretation of the cardinal virtues is also found in the *Praeloquia* of Rather of Verona († 974). Rather discusses in this work the moral and spiritual obligations of the diverse classes of Christian society. Although he infers from Sap. 8:7 that the cardinal virtues are profitable to all humans, he specifically recommends them to kings and presents them as the essence of royal dignity. Rather even goes so far as to state that a peasant who possesses the four virtues may be called a king, while a king who lacks them is not worthy of ruling others. Following Cicero's definitions as adapted by Cassiodorus, he describes justice as giving everyone his due, prudence as telling good from evil, temperance as moderating the passions, and fortitude as enduring hardship; the only Christian element in his definitions is the association of justice with Matt. 22:21 (render to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's). Also, Rather warns in patristic vein for the vices into which the virtues may degenerate: kings must be prudent rather than cunning, courageous rather than proud, moderate rather than indolent, and just rather than cruel.²²⁹ The separation of the virtues' specific, political significance and their general, religious purport remains less outspoken than in Hrabanus's *De anima*, but the cardinal virtues do figure in the *Praeloquia* as the chief moral ingredients of royal government.

Finally, political and religious interpretations of the cardinal virtues go together in the *vita* of Odilo of Cluny, composed in 1051/52 by his pupil Jotsald of Saint-Claude. Associations of the virtues with saintly prelates

disponere nitantur, considerantes iustitiam regis, nihil injustum subditis inferre prae-sumunt: quoniam justam vindictam verebuntur. Temperantem autem regem apprime decet esse, ut ejus praecepta cunctis conveniant, ne nimis laxa existant, neve iterum valde gravia: sed tali moderamine atque temperie disposita, ut juxta possibilitatem cunctorum omnia fiant ... His itaque quatuor virtutibus quasi solidissimis columnis, omnis regiae dignitatis honos decusque attollitur: feliciterque cuncta gubernantur atque exornantur".

²²⁹ Rather of Verona, *Praeloquia* 3.2.5–3.3.6, CCCM 46A: 80–81. For the dependence of Rather's definitions on Cassiodorus, *De anima*, see Dolbeau, "Ratheriana II", esp. 526.

were common enough by the eleventh century,²³⁰ but the *vita* of Odilo contains the first biographical account in the Latin West structured for the main part according to the fourfold scheme. Jotsald uses the virtues in order to present Odilo not only as a brave servant of God, but also as a just monarch. Odilo's prudence manifested itself in a thirst of biblical knowledge, his fortitude in heroic asceticism, his temperance in moderation imposed on his exercise of the other cardinal virtues. Jotsald's description of Odilo's justice, however (to which he devotes more space than to the other three virtues taken together), clearly smacks of royalty. As abbot of Cluny, Odilo practiced justice by giving everyone his due, so that men of all ranks loved him. He notably conversed amiably with princes and ecclesiastical authorities, whereas he relieved the poor (by ordering his monks to take care of them), buried the dead left in the streets (again by ordering his monks to do so), and even deigned to personally embrace a cleric suffering from leprosy. Moreover, he harmoniously governed many different types of monks and joyfully welcomed guests. These are typical ingredients of princely behaviour and one might well argue that Jotsald here presents his late abbot as a monastic king, acclaiming his goodness by means of the cardinal virtue of justice.²³¹ In fact, Jotsald took his definitions of the cardinal virtues not only from Ambrose's *De officiis*, but also from Macrobius's commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis*, a work which discusses the four virtues as *vitutes politicae* on the one hand, as virtues of the contemplative life on the other. Even though the work of Macrobius was not widely known before the twelfth century and the term *virtus politica* only rarely adopted,²³² the association of the cardinal virtues

²³⁰ Apart from hagiography, see also, e.g., *Benedictio abbatis monachorum*, PL 147: 148D–149A: “largire tuarum dona virtutum, justitiam, temperantiam [al. add. prudentiam, charitatem, sobrietatem, patientiam], fortitudinem et longanimitatem, constantiam insuperabilem, fidem non fictam, spem inconcussam ...” (many other virtues follow); Gregory VII, *Registrum* 1.1*, p. 2: “eligimus nobis in pastorem et summum pontificem virum religiosum, geminae scientiae prudentia pollentem, aequitatis et iustitiae prestantissimum amatorem, in adversis fortem, in prosperis temperatum et iuxta apostoli dictum bonis moribus ornatum, pudicum, modestum, sobrium, castum, hospitalem, domum suam bene regentem, in gremio huius matris ecclesiae a pueritia satis nobiliter educatum et doctum atque pro vitae merito in archidiaconatus honorem usque hodie sublimatum, Heldibrandum videlicet archidiaconum ...”. The last passage was inserted into the first *vita* of Gregory VII, from the early 12th century: see Paul of Bernried, *Vita Gregorii VII* 3.21, PL 148: 49B–C. It reappears in later *vitae*, too.

²³¹ See Jotsald of Saint-Claude, *Vita Odilonis* 1.5 (prudence), 1.6–10 (justice), 1.11–12 (fortitude), 1.13 (temperance), pp. 154–171; see also Bejczy, “Les vertus cardinales dans l'hagiographie”, 331–332.

²³² The only references to the term before the 12th century which I have been able

with political rule remained alive in the Early Middle Ages, as the above examples show. A confirmation of this view is provided by the miniatures in early medieval manuscripts which depict biblical and contemporary kings surrounded by the four virtues.²³³

In the eleventh century, several didactic writings appeared which, even if they may not actually develop a philosophical approach to virtue, at least quote some philosophical definitions of the four virtues in their own right. The dictionary completed by the Lombard grammarian Papias at some date before 1045, for instance, includes nine entries on *virtus*. The first entry includes the definition of virtue and its division into the cardinal quartet from Boethius's *De differentiis topicis*, while the eighth entry consists of a long extract from Cicero's *De inventione* on the cardinal virtues and their species. Moreover, the first entry on the plural form *virtutes* contains a shortened quotation from Pseudo-Augustine's *Categoriae* on the four virtues as being located between two opposed defects.²³⁴ Three cardinal virtues have their own entries in the dictionary; in each case, Papias proposes several definitions, adapted in majority from Cicero and Isidore of Seville.²³⁵ In the didactic poem *Quid suum*

to find are Sedulius Scotus, *Collectaneum miscellaneum* 46, CCCM 67: 220–226, and Manegold of Lautenbach, *Liber contra Wolfelmum* 22, pp. 93–94. Rufinus, bishop of an unknown see in the late 11th century, briefly refers to *iustitia politica* in *De bono pacis* 2.8, PL 150: 1615A. Even an anonymous paraphrase of Macrobius's exposition on the virtues composed around 1000AD omits the term *virtus politica*: see Silvestre, "Une adaptation du commentaire de Macrobie". For the reception of Macrobius before the 12th century, see Caiazzo, *Lectures médiévales de Macrobie*, 30–40, 52–57 (observing that the *Commentarii* were mainly read as a source of information for astronomy, geography, number symbolism, and music); Bejczy, "The Concept of Political Virtue", 10–11.

²³³ Mähl, *Quadriga virtutum*, 171–176, discusses some Carolingian examples. See also Katzenellenbogen, *Allegories of the Virtues and Vices*, 32 n. 1, for an 11th-century example (an evangeliary composed for Emperor Henry III).

²³⁴ Papias, *Vocabularius*, pp. 371–372.

²³⁵ Ibid. 169: "Iustitia est qua recte iudicando sua cuique tribuunt dicta quasi iuris status" (Isidore, *Etymologiae* 18.15.2 and 2.24.6); "Iustitia est constans et perpetua uoluntas ius suum cuique tribuens" (Justinian, *Institutiones* 1.1.1); "Iustitia est habitus animi: communi utilitate seruata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem" (Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53.160); "Iustitiae partes sunt timere deum. uenerari religionem pietate et humanitate aequi bonique delectatio: odium malorum referendae gratiae studium continere" (cf. Isidore, *De differentiis* 2.39.156). Ibid., p. 273: "Prudentia est agnitio uerae fidei et scientia scripturarum ..." (Isidore, *De differentiis* 2.39.154–155); "Prudentia humanis rebus: sapientia diuinis tribuitur" (ibid. 1.417, PL 83: 52C); "Prudentiae partes sunt scientia rerum ciuiliū militarium terrestrium et nauticarum" (cf. Cicero, *De oratore* 1.60); "Prudens est utilis rerum futurarum ordinator: peritus uero usu doctus: callidus exercitatione artis instructus: facundus qui facile fari possit" (Isidore, *De differentiis* 1.421, PL 83: 52C–53A);

virtutis, which probably dates from the first half of the eleventh century and was mainly diffused in Southern Germany, references to Christian authors are even altogether absent while quotations from classical authors abound. Virtue is the central theme of the poem, but the author does not discuss the cardinal virtues in particular.²³⁶ The four virtues do appear, however, in another didactic work of German origin: the *Colores rhetorici*, a manual written around 1050 by Onulph of Speyer for a young master teaching literature to oblates in a monastic school. Onulph asserts that his reflections on the four virtues follow Augustine's teachings, "even though other characteristics have been given by the philosophers as well as the saints". In reality his definitions of the virtues, for which he claims scriptural authority, resume those of Alcuin's *De virtutibus et vitiis*—the first series only, adapted from Cicero's *De inventione*.²³⁷ Although the passage on the virtues thus makes a pious impression at first glance, what Onulph actually does is proposing the philosophical definitions of the virtues as found in Alcuin's treatise while ignoring Alcuin's religious redefinitions. His references to Augustine and the Bible may be deliberate attempts to dissimulate his philosophical predilection.

The most striking sign of a budding interest in classical virtue theory among eleventh-century didactical writers is found in a letter of Goswin of Liège, head of the cathedral school of Mainz. In this letter, written about 1066/70 to his successor at the head of the cathedral school at Liège, Goswin states in so many words that not only Christian theologians but also many philosophers and heroes of pagan antiquity knew and observed the virtues, partly as a gift of nature, partly as a result of

"Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum scientia. partes eius sunt memoria: intelligentia: prouidentia" (Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53.160). Ibid., p. 346: "Temperantia est uirtus qua libido concupiscentiaque rerum refrenatur" (Isidore, *Etymologiae* 2.24.6); "Temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque alios non rectus impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio. Eius partes sunt continentia clauentia. modestia" (Cicero, *De inventione* 2.54.164); "Temperantia est animorum uirtus: temperatio uero cuiuscunque rei temperamentum" (cf. Isidore, *De differentiis* 1.553, PL 83: 65B).

²³⁶ See *Quid suum virtutis*, with Paravicini's introduction.

²³⁷ Onulph of Speyer, *Colores rhetorici* 1.16–20, pp. 376–378 (citation 1.18, p. 377: "Ecce proprietates earum ab Augustino datas, licet aliae quoque datae sint, tam a philosophis quam a sanctis"). See also Wallach, "Onulf of Speyer", esp. 40. Onulph extends the definition of fortitude, stating that it not only consists in bearing adversity, but also in withstanding temptation, and insists that those who strive after making a strong impression on others lack true fortitude as well as the other cardinal virtues. Fortitude essentially consists in patience which, combined with humility, is the most important of all virtues.

study.²³⁸ Goswin's explicit recognition of pagan virtue presents an isolated but most remarkable instance of intellectual audacity which preludes to the heated twelfth-century debate on the connection of virtue and the Christian faith.

Conclusion

Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine guaranteed the survival of the cardinal virtues in the Latin Middle Ages by reinterpreting the classical scheme in the light of the faith. By each following their own strategy—subtle appropriation in the case of Ambrose, spiritualizing the virtues in the case of Jerome, connecting virtue with Christian love in the case of Augustine—the three fathers transformed the virtues into qualities proper to Christians, and to Christians only. Christianizing the virtues was not just an element for them of making ancient culture serviceable to the faith, a project famously labelled “spoiling the Egyptians” by Augustine. Virtue was simply unthinkable for the fathers outside a religious context. Goodness had its source in God, and any conception of virtue unrelated to God was therefore false. If the cardinal virtues were to have a function in Christian religion, they had to be understood as divine gifts enabling believers to live in union with God—if not perfectly in this life, at least in the next. It is this understanding that Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine elaborated in various ways. As a result of their efforts, the cardinal virtues became the exclusive property of Christian believers, as categories of a religiously conceived goodness culminating in celestial beatitude.

Julian Pomerius and Gregory the Great, the two most important late patristic writers on the cardinal virtues, confirmed the Christian understanding of virtue established by their predecessors, but put a new emphasis on the four virtues as the prime moral guidelines of the active life. Allowing believers to accomplish moral acts and thereby to gain heaven, the virtues appear in their work as the main instruments by which God secures morality and salvation to his followers. Until the late eleventh century, most authors who elaborated on the virtues in moral

²³⁸ Goswin of Liège, *Epistula ad Walcherum* 21, CCCM 62: 27: “Nec solum theologi evangelicae lucis irradiati claritate, verum et priores philosophi et heroes quam plurimi gentilibus obvoluti tenebris, nondum exorto sole iustitiae, et negotiosis et otiosis virtutibus obvoluti tenebris, nondum exorto sole iustitiae, et negotiosis et otiosis virtutibus, quas partim naturae beneficio, partim liberalium disciplinarum studio assecuti sunt, vitam suam in illo suo honesto et utili sollertissime exercuerunt”.

and spiritual treatises followed this line of interpretation. Meanwhile, they reinforced the instrumental character of the virtues by giving them a central role in moral education. They advocated the virtues to their audience as means to live by God's will, stressed the need to propagate them among all Christian believers, and moreover conceived of the virtues as necessary tools in the struggle against sin—aspects which found little emphasis in patristic writing. If the fathers were preoccupied with Christianizing the virtues themselves, early medieval authors used the Christianized virtues in order to morally elevate Christian society. The formulation of a Christian ethic based on the cardinal virtues is hence the work of early medieval rather than patristic writers.

Underlying the early medieval aim of moral education is the belief that virtue is realizable in the here and now. On the one hand, this belief involves trust in the human capacity to attain goodness and expel evil by a conscious attempt to live in accordance with God's precepts. Even if the notion of humanly acquired virtue is absent from early medieval moral writing, the idea that virtue demands strenuous effort of the moral agent is prominent from Carolingian times onward. On the other hand, the belief in virtue's attainability rests on the firm conviction that God's power is fully active on earth. A life in virtue is not only an individual preparation for beatitude furthered by divine grace, but also a telling event in the framework of moral cosmology. By the virtues, God confers his goodness to his chosen ones and imposes his moral order on the world. Virtues are signs of God's living presence, tokens of his promise, proofs of his covenant. Early medieval exegetes and hagiographers emphasized these aspects by showing that the cardinal virtues are omnipresent in God's message as expressed in the Bible, the structure of the universe, and the exemplary lives of the saints.

Despite the overwhelming supremacy of religious conceptions of virtue, classical teachings on the cardinal virtues, often transmitted through the fathers, continued to be quoted throughout the early medieval period. Teachings of a more technical nature, such as the theory of the connection of the virtues and the doctrine of virtue as a mean, were quoted most often, as these posed no challenge to the Christian notion of virtue and morality. The idea that prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance give birth to all other virtues was likewise widely accepted, although notably some eleventh-century authors took efforts to give faith, hope, and charity a place next to, or even above, the cardinal quartet. Yet classical moral philosophy was seldomly discussed on its own merits, and only very few authors recognized the virtues of the ancients

in their own right. A number of early medieval authors nevertheless explored the philosophical and political aspects of the cardinal virtues, often, though not always, in combination with a more religious approach. While in some cases remarkable positions were taken—Boethius’s classicism, Martin of Braga’s undiluted Stoicism, Hrabanus Maurus’s separating the religious understanding of the virtues from their practical significance for royal government—a debate on the ultimate foundation of virtue did not develop. It remained for the twelfth century to call the relation between the human and the divine dimension of virtue into question.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TWELFTH CENTURY

The Renewal of Moral Thought

The flowering of studies, literature, and the arts customarily designated as “the renaissance of the twelfth century” profoundly affected the field of moral thought. Many more texts on themes relevant to moral theology and philosophy were written after 1100 than in previous centuries, either as separate works or as parts of other genres such as homiletics, theological *quaestiones*, and biblical exegesis. Moreover, the increasing systematization of these works is manifest. Logical reflection, the methodical confrontation of received opinions, and the desire to compose tightly organized bodies of knowledge pervaded the entire domain of learning in the period and transformed the composing of moral writings as well. Naturally, early medieval texts continued to contribute to the moral and spiritual formation of believers in the twelfth century and beyond,¹ but the Early Middle Ages did not produce any work of systematic ethical reflection comparable to Peter Abelard’s *Ethica* or any reasoned classification of the virtues and vices of the kind in Alan of Lille’s *De virtutibus et de vitiis et de donis Spiritus sancti*. Equally manifest, especially in relation to concepts of virtue, is the lively reception of classical moral philosophy. Cicero’s *De inventione* and Macrobius’s *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* became frequently quoted sources for the definitions and classification of the cardinal virtues and retained this position until the end of the Middle Ages. While many early medieval authors do not seem to have realized that Christian moral thought had classical antecedents, and that the cardinal virtues in particular were of non-Christian origin, twelfth-century authors were well aware of these facts and took up the challenge posed by the existence of ancient moral philosophy, either rejecting its claims or trying to define a border between natural goodness and true, Christian virtue.

¹ See, e.g., Wasselynck, “La présence des Moralia”.

Modern scholars have depicted twelfth-century ethical discourse as revolving around a divide between a progressive, secularizing, philosophical approach, with Aristotle and Boethius as its authorities and Peter Abelard as its chief representative, and a conservative, religious, theological approach, based on Augustine and determining the views laid down by 1160 in Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*.² Although this picture is not entirely without validity, it needs revision, if only because the first approach owes a great deal to the renewed study of Augustine, too. Scholars recognize that twelfth-century authors, whether reputedly "progressive" or "conservative", put an increasing emphasis on the intentions underlying virtuous or vicious behaviour.³ The moral psychology of Augustine lay at the basis of their concerns. The emphasis on right intentions sprang from the Augustinian conception of the will as the seat of morality, and of the good will—that is, the will submitting itself to God out of charity—as the condition of all true virtue. It is no coincidence that the Augustinian dictum "Have charity and do whatever you want" suddenly became popular in twelfth-century literature.⁴ Augustinian charity even came to replace Gregory the Great's humility as the Christian chief virtue in intellectual discourse, and achieved at least equal footing with humility in monastic literature.

It nevertheless makes sense to evaluate twelfth-century moral thought by the amount of its openness toward antiquity. While some authors, such as Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury, admired classical moral philosophy and explored its common ground with Christian teaching, others, such as Bernard of Clairvaux, refused to appreciate the moral dispositions of non-Christians in terms of goodness and virtue. A third

² See, e.g., Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 100ff.; Luscombe, "The *Ethics* of Abelard", 67; Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires* 1: 285–287.

³ See, e.g., Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 4: 307–486; Blomme, *La doctrine du péché*; Luscombe, introduction to *Peter Abelard's Ethics*, xvii–xviii.

⁴ See Ivo of Chartres, *Decretum Prol.*, PL 161: 48B; Peter Abelard, *Commentaria in ad Romanos* 2 (on 4:8), CCCM 11: 126; id., *Ethica* 1.24.4, CCCM 190: 25; id., *Sic et non* Prol. and 138.16, pp. 98, 473; Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis* 1.13.12, PL 176: 546D; Richard of Saint Victor, *Annotationes in Psalmos*, PL 196: 358D–359A; Godfrey of Auxerre, *Expositio in Cantica* 5, p. 425. In its current form *Habe caritatem et fac quid (quicquid) vis*, the quotation is not literal. The earliest testimony of the dictum in this form that I found is Rather of Verona, *De translatione Metronis* 13, CCCM 46: 28. For Augustine's genuine words, see *In Epistolam Iohannis ad Parthos* 7.8, PL 35: 2033: "Dilige, et quod vis fac" (cited by Abelard, *Sic et non* Prol. and 138.32, pp. 98, 476); *Sermo* 163B (ed. Morin), p. 214: "dilige, et quicquid vis fac"; see also Caesarius of Arles, *Sermo* 29, CCSL 103: 128 (= Pseudo-Augustine, *Sermones de scripturis* 107.4, PL 39: 1958): "Dilige ergo, et quicquid volueris fac".

position originated in Parisian theology after 1160. The Parisian masters recognized virtue on a double level: true, gratuitous, salvific virtues were accessible to Christians only, while non-gratuitous virtues, conducive to earthly ends, were attainable for every upright human being. Adherents of all three positions defended their views notably in reference to the cardinal virtues. For Abelard, these virtues expressed what ancient and Christian morality had in common; for Bernard, the Christian character of the four virtues implied that they had no value in their classical conception; for the Parisian masters, the place of the cardinal virtues in ancient as well as Christian morality indicated that notably these virtues existed on the level of nature as well as grace. Not for nothing did several authors of the twelfth century refer to the cardinal virtues as subjects hotly debated in the schools.⁵

In this chapter, I will first study the classicizing tendencies in moral thought as displayed in twelfth-century educational literature, “humanism”, and legal theory. Thereupon, I will examine to what point these tendencies affected moral theology. After discussing early twelfth-century school theology, I will turn to the predominantly “conservative” moral thought of Benedictine, Victorine, Cistercian, and other monastic writers. The final part of the chapter is devoted to Parisian moral theology and its attempts to bridge the gap between the classicizing and religious views of morality and virtue.

Classicizing Tendencies

Classicizing Moral Literature

Classical moral philosophy reached twelfth-century authors through various avenues. Cicero and Seneca, who belong to the most widely read authors of the century, provided a direct knowledge of Stoic moral

⁵ See Rupert of Deutz, *De victoria verbi Dei* 8.14, p. 259 (see below, p. 96); Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *Expositio psalmorum* (on 33:2), 2: 198 (see below, p. 99). Cf. Peter of Blois, *Sermo* 38, PL 207: 673A–B: “In hac sapientia excidit columnas septem [Prov. 9:1], scilicet septem dona Spiritus sancti vel septem principales virtutes. Quatuor de quibus philosophi diu disputaverunt et scripserunt, hae sunt: prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo et iustitia. Sunt et aliae tres quae complent septenarium, de quibus philosophus non gustavit: spes, fides et charitas”; Iulianus, [Treatise on virtues], MS Paris, BnF lat. 16079, f. 83^{vb} (13th century): “de his quatuor uirtutis partibus uel potius speciebus multa a magnis philosophis disputata leguntur” (after which Iulianus drops the subject because the virtues are not of sufficient interest to his fellow monk Achardus, the recipient of the treatise).

thought, while Macrobius and Boethius transmitted various elements of Neoplatonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic ethics.⁶ Moreover, the study of moral sayings of classical authors by aid of anthologies formed part of instruction in the arts.⁷ The most famous specimen in the genre is the *Disticha Catonis*, probably composed in the third century and in use as a textbook in Western education since Carolingian times. Around 1100, several other works focusing on ancient morality and virtue appeared which quickly gained acceptance in the schools. Apart from florilegia⁸ and William of Doncaster's *Explicatio aphorismatum*, one can point to the *Moralium dogma philosophorum* (ca. 1150?), a widely divulged work which became the object of various adaptations in Latin and the vernacular. Its definitions of the cardinal virtues and their subspecies, influenced by Cicero's *De inventione* and Macrobius's *Commentarii*, are frequently quoted in late medieval moral literature.⁹

The lack of a Christian perspective in these educational works springs to the eye. Not only does the late ancient *Disticha Catonis* breathe a distinctly worldly morality, but references to the Bible and to Christian authorities are rare even in William of Doncaster's work and the *Moralium dogma*.¹⁰ As to contents, the *Moralium dogma* depicts the cardinal virtues as providing the standards for public morality, in accordance with the classical sources of the work. Thus, justice is described as *uirtus conseruatrix humane societatis et uite communitatis*, a phrase which recalls the ancient conception of justice as securing the coherence

⁶ For the reception of these authors see Rüegg et al., "Cicero in Mittelalter und Humanismus"; Nothdurft, *Studien zum Einfluß Senecas*; Caiazzo, *Lectures médiévales de Macrobie*; Boethius in the Middle Ages.

⁷ See Delhay, "Grammatica et ethica"; Wieland, *Ethica*, 231–233.

⁸ The most important florilegium with ample attention for the virtues is the *Florilegium gallicum*. I used MS Paris, BnF lat. 17903. See also *Florilegium morale Oxoniense*; Delhay, "Un petit florilège moral".

⁹ For the reception of the work, see Gauthier, "Les deux révisions"; id., "Un prologue inédit"; Bloomfield 0206, 1479, 1587 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 0206, 1479, 6480a. See also MS London, BL Royal 11.B.xiv, f. 66^{va} (definitions of 24 virtues excerpted from the *Moralium dogma* and Cicero's *De inventione* by a late 12th-century glossator of Roman law; see Kantorowicz, *Studies in the Glossators*, 25–28, and Bejczy, "Gerald of Wales", 197–198, with edition).

¹⁰ Only 13 out of the 517 citations in the *Moralium dogma* stem from Christian sources; see Delhay, "Une adaptation", 234. The section on the cardinal virtues in William of Doncaster, *Explicatio aphorismatum* 3, pp. 18–30, is mainly based on Cicero's *De inventione* and Macrobius's *Commentarii*. It contains a few quotations from Boethius and Martin of Braga's *Formula* and a mere two patristic references.

of civil society.¹¹ Yet the *Moralium dogma* proposes in its introductory chapter an interesting hierarchy of the four virtues which has no antecedents in antiquity. According to the unknown author, prudence gives counsel to the other three virtues, which all pertain to action. Justice, which transforms the counsel of prudence into deeds, is protected by fortitude and temperance against *timor* and *cupiditas*, respectively, as the two main affects impeding moral conduct.¹² The interesting thing about this arrangement, which derives from the work of Peter Abelard, is the role of justice as the moral virtue par excellence, which has prudence as its informant and fortitude and temperance as its auxiliaries. The privileged position of justice among the cardinal virtues, which is regularly found in twelfth-century moral literature,¹³ evolves from the idea that virtue resides primarily in the will, and that justice is the virtue regulating the will in particular. These ideas are of Augustinian rather than classical flavour. Actually, they contradict Cicero's hierarchy of the four virtues in *De officiis* which is paraphrased with approval elsewhere in the *Moralium dogma*.¹⁴ Even the principal classicizing work on the cardinal virtues of the twelfth century thus defers to Augustinian moral psychology in its first presentation of the quartet.

In addition to classicizing educational writings, the twelfth century produced a number of scholarly commentaries on ancient works of thought and literature. A number of these works introduce the subject of the cardinal virtues even when the text under discussion does not. Thus, in his commentary on Cicero's *De inventione* (ca. 1130) Thierry of Chartres associates a passage appearing in the first book with the

¹¹ *Moralium dogma* 1, p. 12; cf. Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53.160, p. 148: "Iustitia est habitus animi communi utilitate conservata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem".

¹² *Ibid.* 1, p. 8.

¹³ Even Abelard's adversary Bernard of Clairvaux occasionally presents prudence, fortitude, and temperance as the auxiliaries of justice; see *Sermones de diversis* 52.4, *Opera* 6.1: 277: "Et in moribus quidem solam puto sufficere iustitiam, ceteris tamen virtutibus circumfultam. Itaque ne errore fallatur ignorantiae, sit ei praevia prudentia, sint hinc inde temperantia atque fortitudo, ne forte labatur, vel in dexteram, vel in sinistram partem declinando"; *ibid.* 72.2, pp. 308–309: "Iustitia est perfectio animae rationalis. Aliae virtutes sunt ad eius acquisitionem vel conservationem, fortitudo, temperantia, prudentia; iustitiam conservant ne amittatur aut minuatur"; cf. *Sententiae* 3.21 (synopsis of *Sermo de diversis* 72), *Opera* 6.2: 77: "sola sufficiat iustitia: ceterae enim tres virtutes custodes eius sunt et adiutrices".

¹⁴ *Moralium dogma* 2, pp. 52–53, paraphrasing Cicero, *De officiis* 1.43.152–1.45.158, pp. 69–72. Prudence here occupies the first place, followed by temperance, justice, and fortitude.

four virtues whereas Cicero mentions them only in the second book.¹⁵ Likewise, William of Conches mentions the cardinal virtues four times in his commentary on Macrobius's *Commentarii* before reaching the passage where Macrobius introduces them.¹⁶ The commentary on the first book of Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, traditionally attributed to Bernardus Silvestris but probably written by the same "Odo" who composed the *Ysagoge in theologiam*,¹⁷ contains five references to the virtues whereas Martianus Capella only names them in one passage in the second book.¹⁸ The same author's commentary on Virgil's *Aeneis* contains one longer and a shorter passage on the cardinal virtues as well as definitions of fourteen virtues which appear as the subspecies of temperance and justice in the *Ysagoge*;¹⁹ the *Aeneis* itself, however, does not mention the four virtues at all. As a final example, an anonymous glossator from the second half of the century explains at length that Horace "invites us at the four principal virtues" in *Odae* 3.1–4, whereas Horace does nothing of the kind.²⁰ The classifications and definitions of the cardinal virtues in these commentaries chiefly depend on Cicero and Macrobius rather than Christian sources.²¹

¹⁵ See Thierry of Chartres, *Commentarius super De inventione* (1.16.22), p. 113: "si res ab iis fortiter, sapienter, mansuete gestae proferentur"; cf. id., *Commentarius super Rhetoricam ad Herennium* (1.5.8), p. 230: "si res eorum fortiter, sapienter, mansuete, magnifice iudicatas proferemus".

¹⁶ See William of Conches, *Glosae super Macrobius* (1.1.7): "docuit iustitiam inter quattuor principales uel cardinales uirtutes principatum obtinere"; likewise (1.1.8); (1.4.4): "Cum sint quattuor cardinales uirtutes, istae duae ualent et sunt praecipuae in re publica" (referring, surprisingly, to *iustitia* and *pietas*); 1.6.41: "Quaternarius dicitur animae esse conficere, quia sunt quattuor cardinales uirtutes animae: iustitia, prudentia, fortitudo, temperantia". For the commentaries on Macrobius written in the 12th century, see Caiazzo, *Lectures médiévales de Macrobe*, 27–85.

¹⁷ See Evans, "The *Ysagoge in theologiam*".

¹⁸ Odo, *The Commentary on Martianus Capella* 4, pp. 87–88; 5, pp. 94–96; 7, pp. 166–170; 8, p. 173; 12, p. 225 (only most of the commentary on Book One is extant). Two additional references appear in an adaptation of the text composed around 1200: *The Berlin Commentary* 7.16(4.16), p. 95; 13.20(8.23), p. 152. For the precedent of Remigius of Auxerre, see above, p. 59.

¹⁹ See Odo, *The Commentary on the Aeneid* 5, p. 26 (long passage); 6, pp. 39–40 (lists), 66 (short passage).

²⁰ See Friis-Jensen, "Horatius lyricus et ethicus", 104: "ad quattuor principales uirtutes nos inuitat".

²¹ The definitions in both of Odo's commentaries are mainly inspired on the *Moralium dogma*, but some of them rather follow *De inventione*: see *The Commentary on the Aeneid* 5, p. 26 (justice, temperance); *The Commentary on Martianus Capella* 7, pp. 166–170 (fortitude). The influence of Cicero is expanded in *The Berlin Commentary* 8.15(5.12), p. 111: discussing the subspecies of justice, the author introduces *veritas*, defined much

Although the commentators were in no way obliged to confront the classics with Christian ideas, some of their observations on the virtues betray religious moral concerns. Both William of Conches and Odo relate virtue to the will: William affirms that only virtuous acts originating from the free will earn merit, while Odo associates prudence, temperance, and justice with *velle* and only fortitude with *posse*.²² Moreover, William concedes that the contemplative life of monks and hermits (who obviously do not figure in the work of Macrobius) results in greater virtue and beatitude than the active life of politicians or the intellectual life of philosophers (who for Macrobius come first).²³ Also, both commentators repeatedly contrast virtue with vice,²⁴ while Odo's commentary on

in accordance with *De inventione*, and an unnamed virtue "per quam vis aut iniuria aut omne quod obest defendendo aut ulciscendo propulsatur", which comes close to *vindicatio* as defined by Cicero; moreover, he supplies Odo's definition of *moderatio* with the definition from *De inventione*. The definitions of three subspecies of justice in William of Conches, *Glosae super Macrobius* (1.8.7), seem at least partly inspired by Cicero: "Innocentia est nec alicui nocere nec uelle. Vnde ait Augustinus innocentia est nec alicui nocere nec sibi [cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae* 3.8.16; Augustine, *Sermo* 353, PL 39: 1561]. Amicitia est uoluntas bonorum erga aliquem cum illius ipsius qui diligitur pari uoluntate [cf. Cicero, *De inventione* 2.55.166] ... Pietas est in patriae dilectione et parentum ueneratione [cf. Cicero, *De inventione* 2.22.66]". Moreover, the definition of virtue from *De inventione* recurs *ibid.* (1.8.3) as well as in William's *Glosae super Platonem* 8, p. 63. Otherwise, William supplies definitions of his own which have no parallels with the *Moralium dogma*, a circumstance which weakens the case for William's authorship of this work (it was attributed to William by its editor and Philippe Delhay, to Walter of Châtillon by René-Antoine Gauthier, and to Alan of Lille by Palémon Glorieux; see Williams, "The Quest for the Author").

²² William of Conches, *Glosae super Macrobius* (1.8.3): "Sic ergo meretur ex solis actionibus quae ueniunt ex libero arbitrio et ex bonis tantum quae sunt uirtutes"; Odo, *The Commentary on Martianus Capella* 4, pp. 87–88. *The Berlin Commentary* 5.1(2.17), p. 39, adds that prudence, temperance, and justice provide humans with an *appetitus boni*.

²³ William of Conches, *Glosae super Macrobius* (1.8.5): "Sunt autem quaedam uirtutes magnae, quaedam maiores, aliae maximae. Magnae efficiunt beatos, et ita secundum Plotinum politici sunt beati. Maiores efficiunt beatiore, et istae conueniunt philosophis. Maximae faciunt beatissimos, quae conueniunt heremetis ut Pythagorae et aliis, qui cuidam quaerenti ad quod natus esset, respondet: ad contemplationem diuinorum"; (2.17.4): "Est igitur uerum milites et politicos, si optimas res exercent, esse beatos, monachos uero maiorem consequi beatitudinem, quorum sunt uirtutes otiosae". See also above, n. 21, for the reference to Augustine in William's definition of innocence.

²⁴ See *ibid.* (1.9.3): virtues "dicuntur uehicularum animae et sunt causae eleuantes ipsam, uicia uero causae deprimentes" (no parallel in Macrobius); *id.*, *Glosae super Platonem*: at the age of fifteen happens a "transformatio in virtutes vel in vicia" (121, p. 215), "vel in viciu vel in virtutem informatio" (123, p. 218); Odo, *The Commentary on the Aeneid* 5, p. 26: cardinal virtues contrasted with *luxuria* (a term absent from the *Aeneid*); *ibid.*, on temperance: "Hec est enim que vitia prohibet"; cf. 6, p. 30, opposing a vicious interest in earthly things to a virtuous interest in knowing the Creator from his creation; *id.*,

De nuptiis contains some Christian views which likewise appear in his *Ysagoge*: good habits are no virtues if they are not observed on behalf of God; fortitude and temperance are the auxiliary virtues of justice; *miseri-cordia* is the most important species of justice and coincides with charity.²⁵ Significantly, Odo's statement that the virtues *per industriam insunt* was changed around 1200 in an adaptation of his text to the view that the virtues "are either assembled by industry or inspired by grace".²⁶ The same adaptor expositis the ascension of Mercury, accompanied by the cardinal virtues and Apollo, to Jupiter, as the human soul abandoning earthly reality in contemplation of the divine.²⁷

Despite its mitigation by Christian ideas, the classicizing moral literature of the twelfth century revived the notion that goodness and virtue were somehow inherent to human nature and hence at least partly independent from revealed truth. Notably Cicero's definition of virtue as "a habit of the mind consistent with nature, moderation, and reason"²⁸ elicited several "naturalistic" explanations according to which virtue consists in the soul's rational conversion to the innate good of man.²⁹

Twelfth-Century Humanism

Insight into the wider impact of ancient moral philosophy may be gained from studying the work of three famous twelfth-century "humanists"

The Commentary on Martianus Capella 5, p. 95: "Iunctis enim temperantia et iusticia et mala abhorremus et bona amplectimur"; *ibid.* 6, p. 144: "virtutes quatuor tota anime essentia sint" while vice represents death; *ibid.*, p. 149: "sepe virtutes inflationem superbie admittunt et sic animam efferri cogunt"; 7, p. 167: on vices disguised as virtues, following Isidore of Seville, *Sententiae* 2.35, CCSL 111: 161–163.

²⁵ Odo, *The Commentary on Martianus Capella* 7, pp. 166–168.

²⁶ See *ibid.* 5, p. 124 (likewise 9, p. 221); *The Berlin Commentary* 6.5 (3.14), p. 66: "Sciencias aut virtutes dicimus que aut industria comparat, aut gratia divina inspirat".

²⁷ *The Berlin Commentary* 18.11(12.3), p. 177.

²⁸ Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53.159, p. 147: "virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus".

²⁹ See Pseudo-Bede, *De mundi constitutione* (ca. 1100), p. 60: "virtus est habitus animi in modum nature rationi consentaneus, id est, consentit anime ad id quod natura sui est, id est, ad bonum; et in hoc faultrix eius est"; Thierry of Chartres, *Commentarius super De inventione* (2.53.159), p. 209: "modus naturae per vitium exceditur, ad quem modum per virtutem sequendo rationem fit reversio"; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 74: "Tunc enim bene est constituta mens nostra, cum modum nature sectatur ... per vicium exceditur"; Ralph of Beauvais, *Glosae super Donatum* Prol., p. 1: "Sed quia quidem rationi consenciant non considerantes possibilitatem nature, ut monachi in nimia abstinencia, que non est uirtus, ideo additur in modum nature. Vel aliter expone: in modum nature, idest ut animum in naturalem modum restituamus".

who were active in the regions (Northern France and England) where many classicizing texts were composed: Marbod of Rennes (1035–1123), Hildebert of Lavardin (1056–1133), and John of Salisbury (1115/20–1180).

Marbod, a *scholaster* based at Angers who in 1096 became bishop of Rennes, is the author of a *vita* of the Angevin hermit Florent of Mont-Glonne. One of the three parts of the *vita* is devoted to the four principal virtues “which all other virtues follow as foot-soldiers” so that whoever excels in them, excels in all. Prudence discerns good from evil, while justice brings perfection to the other three virtues; cupidity and fear are the two roots of sin against which temperance and fortitude are active (a device which Peter Abelard would integrate into his classification of the four cardinal virtues). Marbod borrowed his definitions of the four virtues from Cicero’s *De inventione*, but interprets each of them religiously: Florent’s confidence in Christ lay at the basis of his prudence; his temperance encouraged him to attack his own vices and those of others; his fortitude *pro veritatis assertione* rested on charity rather than temerity; finally, his justice was rooted in humility and consisted in attributing his shortcomings to himself and all good things to God (a first requirement of *suum cuique tribuere*), while his justice to others amounted to neighbourly love in accordance with the Golden Rule (Matt. 7:12).³⁰ On the basis of Cicero’s definitions of the virtues, Marbod thus creates an exemplary Christian ethic.

Apart from a brief reference to the four virtues in another hagiographic piece,³¹ Marbod expands on the quartet in a spiritual letter to a nun called Argénor. The amazing thing about Marbod’s exposition is that it is entirely based on Martin of Braga’s *Formula vitae honestae*, a work which lacks a Christian perspective and relates the virtues to the male world of politics. Strikingly, Marbod connects the virtue of continence (which replaces temperance in Martin’s *Formula*) with food and social representation, as Martin does, but not with sexuality, although chastity would seem a primary quality for a nun. The reason is not that Marbod copied his source uncritically, for he departs from it in other instances,

³⁰ Marbod of Rennes, *Sermo in vitam Florentii* 2.12–22, PL 171: 1584B–1588D; see also Bejczy, “Les vertus cardinales dans l’hagiographie”, 333–335. Marbod may have composed his sermon before 1096, when he moved from the cathedral school of Angers to the episcopal see of Rennes.

³¹ Id., *Vita Gualterii* (Walter of l’Esterp), PL 171: 1568B–D. Grégoire, “Marbod de Rennes”, 243, doubts the authenticity of the work, but Degl’Innocenti, *L’opera agiografica di Marbodo*, regards it as genuine.

notably by distinguishing his interpretation of justice from what “the philosophers” say. Applying the principle of *suum cuique tribuere* to the religious life, Marbod encourages Argénor to submit her body to her soul, and her soul to God; moreover, she should willingly serve and respect everyone, blame her vices on herself, and praise God for all good things.³² Marbod’s manifest interest in ancient moral philosophy is hence not inspired by a wish to define a secular ethic. Quite to the contrary, the cardinal virtues figure in his work as exemplary categories of the religious life.

Marbod’s younger contemporary Hildebert of Lavardin, bishop of Le Mans in 1085/1102, archbishop of Tours in 1125, and one of the greatest poets of his time, enjoys a reputation as a promoter of ethical naturalism. According to his modern biographer, his moral thought centres around the idea of man’s natural goodness: in disregard of the evangelical precepts which exceed the demands of nature, human beings should develop virtues on the basis of their natural goodness in order to realize the ideal of human life, that is, happiness on earth.³³ An impartial reading of Hildebert’s remarks on the cardinal virtues does not confirm this interpretation. Hildebert, who studied theology under Anselm of Laon, deals with the cardinal virtues notably in a couple of letters to religious women. His letter to Countess Adele of Blois and Chartres, who retired to the monastery of Marcigny in 1122, presents the cardinal virtues as supports of the religious life. According to Hildebert, Adele chose out of prudence to follow Christ. Fortitude and temperance should enable her to stick to her choice in adversity and in prosperity, respectively, while humility—the *consummatio et clausula virtutum* which Hildebert here explicitly substitutes for justice—should always accompany her on her spiritual journey, as it did in case of the apostles. Hildebert illustrates his exhortations with a quotation from Augustine’s Letter 155 which characterizes the four virtues in the present life as instances of “loving what should be loved.”³⁴ The second letter of Hildebert, addressed to an unnamed, affluent widow recently converted to the cloistered life (either Adele or some-

³² Marbod of Rennes, *Ep.* 5, PL 171: 1479C–1480C; the passage on “neither splendid nor squalid” clothes alludes to Jerome, *Ep.* 52.9, CSEL 54: 430.

³³ See Von Moos, *Hildebert von Lavardin*, esp. 275–289. Von Moos concedes, however, that Hildebert ventures to make faith the foundation of his natural ethics—a statement which strikes me as a contradiction—and that in Hildebert’s view human beings depend on grace in order to bring their virtues to perfection.

³⁴ Hildebert of Lavardin, *Ep.* 1.4, PL 171: 146B–147B, quoting Augustine, *Ep.* 155.13 (cited above, p. 24 n. 68).

one in a similar situation), follows much the same pattern. Hildebert congratulates the widow on the prudence of her choice and quotes the same passage from Augustine. Thereupon he explains that the cardinal virtues perfect the Christian life and constitute a chariot leading to heaven. Prudence is the name Scripture gives to the most important virtue, which makes one embrace the good; fortitude enables one to hold to the good in adversity, as several biblical examples show; temperance does the same thing in prosperity, while imposing a meritorious middle course on all other virtues; finally, humility, which is identical with justice—the *complectio* and *clausula virtutum*, according to Augustine—is indispensable to any virtuous act. Hildebert's exposition ends with two conventional metaphors: he associates the cardinal virtues with the four rivers of Paradise which irrigate the earth to prepare a celestial harvest, and with the corners of Job's house which stands for conscience and the good will.³⁵ Hildebert's view on the cardinal virtues, then, is by no means naturalistic. Like Marbod, Hildebert connects the virtues with the interior life of the religious; unlike Marbod, he shows little interest in ancient moral philosophy but rather draws from biblical and patristic sources, while his emphasis on humility³⁶ and his use of exegetical metaphors accord with monastic traditions.

If Hildebert shows less affinity with classical moral thought than Marbod, John of Salisbury shows more. Not only does John abundantly quote from ancient philosophers in all of his major works, but in his *Policraticus* he allows himself academic doubt about the Stoic, Peripatetic, and Epicurean theories of virtue, plainly refusing to regard these theories as mistaken just because of their non-Christian inspiration.³⁷ In addition, the *Policraticus* contains explicit praise for the virtue of ancient Roman rulers, notably of Trajan.³⁸ Statements in the work to the effect that "all that nature brings forth obeys virtue and provides the best guide for correct living"³⁹ even suggest that virtue, in John's view, is inherent in nature and thus does not depend on the faith. Yet presenting John's conception of virtue in Aristotelian terms, as a steadfast *habitus* formed

³⁵ *Ep.* 1.10, PL 171: 163A–166D. The reference to Augustine is spurious.

³⁶ *Ep.* 1.5, PL 171: 149A, addressed to an illustrious widow (Adele?), likewise presents humility as the prime virtue leading to salvation.

³⁷ John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* 7.8 (ed. Webb) 2: 118.

³⁸ *Ibid.* 5.7–8, 1: 314–318.

³⁹ *Ibid.* 3.6, CCCM 118: 185: "omnia quae natura uirtutum parens et recte uiuendi dux optima gignit".

by repeated action alone,⁴⁰ is pushing things too far. John regularly affirms in the *Policraticus* that true virtue depends on faith and grace and constitutes the *via regia* to beatitude, even if natural endowment and mental exercise can produce a laudable *virtutis imago*, especially in case of the ancients who displayed so many good qualities.⁴¹ In a similar vein, John places philosophical truth together with divine grace at the basis of virtue in the *Entheticus*⁴² as well as in the *Metalogicon*. According to the latter work, rational truth is the fountain-head of the virtues, while ignorance makes humans incapable of moral behaviour. Critical investigation leads to finding the truth, the subject matter of prudence, from which the other virtues proceed. Prudence consists in insight into the truth, justice embraces it, fortitude defends it, while temperance moderates the activities of the other three.⁴³ Still, truth only implants the seed of virtue in minds prepared by grace, as John insists. Grace alone brings forth the good will and makes the seed of virtue grow.⁴⁴ John's remarkable sympathy for ancient theories and practices of virtue thus does not make him deny or forget the crucial role of divine grace in the moral formation of man. Neither does his insistence on learning make him adopt an intellectualist position: virtue eventually depends on the human will, which needs God's assistance to become good. Characteristic for John's attitude is his identification of the four virtues "called cardinal by the philosophers, since they are believed to flow as the four main streams from the main source of *honestas*", with the four rivers of Paradise proceeding from the Holy Spirit to prepare a future harvest.⁴⁵ Far from considering ancient

⁴⁰ See Nederman and Brückmann, "Aristotelianism in John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*"; Nederman, "Knowledge, Virtue and the Path to Wisdom", 281.

⁴¹ *Policraticus* 3.1, CCCM 118: 174 (grace); 3.9, CCCM 118: 196–198 (grace, *virtutis imago*); 7.8 (ed. Webb) 2: 118 (*via regia*); 7.9 (ed. Webb) 2: 129: "quis ex sola lectione, nisi adsit gratia illustratrix creatrix uiuificatrixque uirtutum, credat posse fieri hominem sapientem?"

⁴² *Entheticus*, 1: 105, l. 11: truth as "virtutis origo"; 121, l. 222: grace as "pronuba uirtutum"; 121, ll. 249–250: philosophy "virtutes parit et nutrit, vitiumque ... pellit"; 149, l. 658: reason "uirtutum sola ministrat opes". Stoicism receives qualified praise (esp. p. 139, ll. 523–526), but "cultus honesti" (p. 133, l. 419) and "amare uirtutes" (p. 133, l. 421–422) are among the final objects of Scripture.

⁴³ See esp. *Metalogicon* 2.1, CCCM 98: 56–57.

⁴⁴ See *ibid.* 1.23, pp. 50–51.

⁴⁵ *Policraticus* 4.12, CCCM 118: 273–274: "Hae sunt quattuor uirtutes quas philosophi cardinales appellant, eo quod a primo fonte honestatis quasi primi riuuli manare credantur, et de se bonorum omnium fluentia propagare. Haec forte sunt quattuor flumina quae de paradiso deliciarum Dei egrediuntur ut irrigent omnem terram, quo fructum desiderabilem afferat in tempore suo".

and Christian moral thought in terms of opposition, John sought and found a common ground between the two, giving due regard to the truth contained in either system.

Canon and Civil Law

While twelfth-century humanism flowered in Northern France and England in particular, legal studies concentrated in Bologna and gradually spread from there to Southern France and other parts of Europe. The study of Roman and canon law has important connections with moral thought. Medieval jurists lecturing at the universities habitually called law a branch of ethics.⁴⁶ Notably the concept of justice occasioned them to reflect on the nature of virtue, and many of their ensuing ideas have parallels in contemporary moral literature.⁴⁷

The main contribution of twelfth-century canon lawyers to virtue theory resides in their developing the conception of natural justice. The *Decretum Gratiani* opens with the statement that humanity is governed by morals and by natural law. Thereupon, Gratian identifies natural law with the Golden Rule as contained in the Law and the Gospel.⁴⁸ From the 1140s, several decretists associated the Golden Rule with the virtue of justice in particular, defined by them as “a tacit agreement of nature devised for the aid of many” (*naturae tacita conventio in adiutorium multorum inventa*). The definition, invariably attributed to Gregory the Great in the commentaries, stems from Martin of Braga’s *Formula vitae honestae*.⁴⁹ Others qualified the Golden Rule as *iustitia naturalis*, a phrase Augustine used for the attitude of the gentiles who do by nature the things contained in the Law (Rom. 2:14). The phrase likewise occurs in contemporary religious and philosophical literature, possibly under the influence of the decretists.⁵⁰ Some support for a naturalist conception of virtue thus existed among the first generations of canon lawyers. Indeed, Gratian himself affirms, invoking a spurious quotation from

⁴⁶ See Evans, *Law and Theology*, 15.

⁴⁷ See Bejczy, “Law and Ethics”, with ample documentation.

⁴⁸ *Decretum Gratiani* D. 1 c. 1 d.a.

⁴⁹ For the resonance of the definition in 12th-century canonist writings, see Kuttner, “A Forgotten Definition”, 79–94.

⁵⁰ See Bejczy, “Law and Ethics”, 198–200. For contemporary applications of the phrase in a non-religious context, see also Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 2.52, p. 153 (referring to the public spirit of the ancients); John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* 2 Prol., CCCM 98: 56 (referring to laws which serve the common good).

Jerome, that non-Christians can “really possess virtues”, but not “possess real virtues” with a salvific effect.⁵¹

For civil lawyers virtue theory was of special interest, since the opening paragraphs of the *Institutiones* and the *Digesta*, two integral parts of Justinian’s *Corpus iuris civilis*, quote the definition of justice by the Roman lawyer Ulpian (*iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens*) which is a product of Stoic ethics.⁵² Starting with Irnerius († after 1125), the father of the study of Roman law at Bologna, medieval glossators took pains to conciliate Ulpian’s words with Boethius’s definition of virtue as *habitus mentis bene constitutae*, connecting the *constans et perpetua voluntas* mentioned by Ulpian with the fixed determination of the mind implied by the conception of *habitus*.⁵³ Many glossators explain, mostly on Cicero’s authority, that *virtus* is a genus which has the four cardinal virtues as its species. But how strictly should the phrase *constans et perpetua* be taken? The glossators agree that having a permanent will or intention to act rightly is sufficient for being just, even if one cannot always proceed to act.⁵⁴ This argument has obvious parallels with the concentration on the intention of the moral agent in contemporary moral thought. Actually, several twelfth- and early thirteenth-century moral writings contain discussions of justice which are clearly inspired by legal models.⁵⁵

No twelfth-century jurist made such extensive use of moral thought as Martin Gosia († 1158/66), the second of the “Four Doctors” of civil law who taught in Bologna. In his commentary on the *Institutiones*, Martin inserts a long extract from Macrobius’s commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis* concerning Plotinus’s distinction between political virtues, purgatorial virtues, virtues of the purged mind, and exemplary virtues.⁵⁶ Polit-

⁵¹ See *Decretum Gratiani* C. 28 q. 1 c. 14 d.p.: “uirtutes negantur apud infideles esse uerae, non quin uerae sint in eis, iuxta illud Ieronimi: ‘Virtutibus Romani promeruerunt imperium’, sed quia effectu carent eternae salutis”. The quotation of Jerome is spurious. Stephen Langton and Praepositinus of Cremona quoted Pseudo-Jerome’s words to confirm the existence of natural virtues; see below, n. 271.

⁵² Justinian, *Institutiones* 1.1.1; *Digesta* 1.1.10 Prol. The *Digesta* read “tribuenda” instead of “tribuens”.

⁵³ See notably Kantorowicz, *Studies in the Glossators*, 59–65; Cortese, *La norma giuridica* 2: 5–8 (both attributing Boethius’s definition to Papias); Kuttner, “A Forgotten Definition”, 75–76.

⁵⁴ See Cortese, *La norma giuridica* 2: 15–17, 22–23.

⁵⁵ See Bejczy, “Law and Ethics”, 204–206. For the reception in 12th-century legal theory of Aristotle’s idea of virtue as a medium between two vices, see de Miramon, “Réception et oubli de l’*Ethica vetus*”.

⁵⁶ According to Catapano, “Alle origini della dottrina dei gradi di virtù”, Macrobius

ical virtues regulate the earthly concerns of man; by purgatorial virtues, man tries to detach himself from these concerns; virtues of the purged mind define the contemplative life; finally, exemplary virtues reside in the mind of God. Significantly, Martin declares justice as defined by Ulpian to be a political virtue only, related to secular concerns and free of religious connotations, but having divine justice as its model and corrective.⁵⁷ In fact, Martin is the first author to use Macrobius' notion of *virtus politica* in order to give non-religious virtue a place in medieval moral thought, a few decades before Parisian theologians would do likewise.

Very different ideas circulated among some of Martin's colleagues. While Martin maintained a distinction between political justice as contained in the law and exemplary justice as a supreme model of virtue, others tended to conceive all positive law as the materialization of the virtue of justice. In their view, obedience to the law was sufficient for fulfilling one's social and religious duties and even for meeting the demands of Christian charity.⁵⁸ Taken to the letter, these views hardly leave any room for a morality outside the world of written laws of human making.

Early Moral Theology

Classical moral philosophy affected educational and juridical writing from the early twelfth century and led in some cases to a recognition of morality and virtue outside the faith. To what extent did moral theology undergo similar developments? In answering this question, I will first discuss two prominent theological schools of the early twelfth century: those of Laon and of Peter Abelard. Thereupon, I will move to moral and

followed in fact Porphyry's adaptation of Plotinus's doctrine. Plotinus recognized only two sorts of virtues, political and contemplative; the distinction between *virtutes purgatoriae* and *virtutes purgati animi* is not his, while he denied, moreover, that the models of virtue in the divine mind (*virtutes exemplares* according to Macrobius) were themselves virtues. See also Henry, *Plotin et l'occident*.

⁵⁷ Martin Gosia, *Exordium Institutionum*, pp. 4–5; cf. Macrobius, *Commentarii* 1.8.4–10, pp. 37–39. At the same time, Martin claims that divine equity, having become the permanent object of the human will, constitutes justice. The contradiction is only apparent; see Bejczy, "Law and Ethics", 212–213.

⁵⁸ See Bulgarus (?), *Materia Institutionum*, p. 3/271: "si enim iuri parendo vivas honeste, et Deo et civitati suum ius conservabis"; *Divinam voluntatem vocamus iustitiam*, p. 456: "Si enim iuri parendo uiuamus honeste, non tantum deo suum ius tribuitur, set et ciuitati cuius decus in hoc conseruatur"; Rogerius, *Quaestiones super Institutis* 1.7, pp. 273–274: "Hoc preceptum, quod 'honeste vivere' est, ad Dei et proximi dilectionem, ut mihi videtur, sufficit". For a discussion, see Bejczy, "Law and Ethics", 213–215.

theological writing in a monastic context and evaluate the contributions of Benedictine, Victorine, Cistercian, and other religious authors. Finally, I will examine the moral theology developed by Parisian masters in the second half of the century.

The School of Laon

The School of Laon—a name used here to refer to Anselm of Laon († 1117) and the theologians working under his direct influence⁵⁹—is believed to have generally disregarded the theme of the virtues.⁶⁰ This view needs correction. Several collections of sentences composed in Anselm's environment introduce specific topics of moral thought which following generations of theologians would further develop, such as the idea that virtue resides in the will which becomes good through its assent (*consensus*) with the will of God,⁶¹ the conception of vice and evil as the absence of virtue,⁶² the idea of the (cardinal) virtues as means between two vices,⁶³ the problem of whether Adam possessed the (cardinal or other) virtues in the state of innocence,⁶⁴ and the problem of whether the (cardinal or other) virtues are present in God.⁶⁵ The influence of classical moral philosophy is limited in these works. While the definitions of virtue of Cicero and Boethius, which both centre around the concept of *habitus*, are occasionally quoted,⁶⁶ the sentences and biblical commentaries attributed to Anselm himself express an unshattered belief in the conception of virtue as a divine gift.⁶⁷

⁵⁹ For a discussion of what “the school of Laon” stands for, see Flint, “The School of Laon”.

⁶⁰ Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 99; Luscombe, introduction to *Peter Abelard's Ethics*, xxv. Colish, “Another Look at the School of Laon”, develops a more nuanced view and argues that the Laon theologians were sensitive to contemporary moral concerns.

⁶¹ Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 5: 59–60 (*Liber pancrisis*), 222 (William of Champeaux), 292.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 348.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 293.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 128 (“plenitudo virtutum”); *Sententiae Berolinenses*, p. 47 (cardinal virtues).

⁶⁵ Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 5: 251, 345 (various virtues); *Sententiae Varsavienses* 17, p. 340 (cardinal virtues).

⁶⁶ Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 5: 59 (*Liber pancrisis*: Boethius), 292 (Cicero); Weisweiler, *Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms*, 168 (Boethius).

⁶⁷ Anselm of Laon (?), *Sententie Anselmi*, p. 110, presents the cardinal virtues as four steps in the spiritual ascent to God. Cf. id. (?) (Pseudo-Bruno the Carthusian), *Expositio in Epistolas Pauli*, PL 153: 497D: God gives the virtues—“ut iustitiam, prudentiam, et huiusmodi”—to the faithful. One letter of Anselm has an addition of later date

More important still, the greatest and most influential work composed by the School of Laon, the *Glossa ordinaria* on the Bible, contains frequent references to the cardinal virtues, in particular in the sections on the Old Testament.⁶⁸ The glosses are excerpted for a great part from patristic and early medieval authorities, but in many instances they imply some creative work on the part of the Laon composers.⁶⁹ Thus, the gloss which associates the four walls of heavenly Jerusalem (Apoc. 21:16) first with the theological virtues and their *operatio*, then with the cardinal virtues, may be the brainchild of Anselm,⁷⁰ while Gilbert the Universal († 1134) may have personally authored the gloss on Lev. 4:7 which calls the four virtues *caeterarum virtutum genera*.⁷¹ The gloss associating the virtues with the Paradise rivers (Gen. 2:10–14), adapted from Augustine and Gregory the Great,⁷² became particularly influential: from the late twelfth century, it was used to relate the four virtues to the different parts of the soul.⁷³ Moreover, the *Glossa* includes the passages from the biblical commentaries of Bede and one anonymous contemporary of Bede in which the phrase *virtutes cardinales* occurs.⁷⁴ It may be due to the *Glossa*'s influence that the phrase came to be regularly employed in the course of

(PL 162: 1590A–B; see Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 5: 175–178) which presents the four virtues as the allies of charity, with humility replacing justice and leading the other three virtues.

⁶⁸ See e.g. *Glossa ordinaria* (Ex. 30:32ff., 30:34), 1: 190 (PL 113: 285A, C); (Lev. 16:4), 1: 247 (PL 113: 341B); (Lev. 16:18), 1: 248 (PL 113: 343B); (2 Reg. 5:11), 2: 55 (PL 113: 566D); (2 Reg. 6:33), 2: 105 (PL 113: 592A); (2 Reg. 7:26), 2: 110 (PL 113: 596C–D); (2 Reg. 7:38), 2: 112 (PL 113: 598B); (1 Par. 25:7), 2: 213 (PL 113: 660B); (1 Par. 26:17), 2: 215 (PL 113: 661A); (Ps. 14:2), 2: 471; (Ps. 118:27), 2: 606 (PL 113: 1041C); (Eccl. 35:13), 2: 780 (PL 113: 1218C); and the glosses cited in the next few notes.

⁶⁹ Only the glosses on the Canticle are available in a critical edition (CCCM 170). Two unedited series of glosses by Anselm himself are included among the source material.

⁷⁰ *Glossa ordinaria* 4: 575 (PL 114: 747C–D) = Anselm of Laon (?), *Enarrationes in Apocalypsin* (on 21:16), PL 162: 1578C; cf. Jerome's addition to Victorinus of Poetevio, *In Apocalypsin* (see above, p. 18 n. 41).

⁷¹ *Glossa ordinaria* 1: 216 (PL 113: 306D).

⁷² *Ibid.*, 1: 22, adapted from Augustine, *De Genesi contra manichaeos* 2.10.13–14, CSEL 91: 133–135 (although Isidore is referred to in the gloss) and Gregory the Great, *Moralia* 2.49.76, CCSL 143: 105. Augustine's one other association of a biblical quaternary with the cardinal virtues made its way into the *Glossa* as well: see *Glossa ordinaria* (Matt. 15:38) 4: 54, paraphrasing *De diversis quaestionibus* 61.4, CCSL 44A: 127.

⁷³ See below, p. 159.

⁷⁴ See above, p. 84 n. 147. The *Glossa* incorporates Bede's passages from *De templo* and *In Lucam* at (3[1] Reg. 7:38), 2: 112 (PL 113: 598B), and (Luc. 6:20), 4: 161–162. The relevant passage from the *Expositio evangelii secundum Marcum* appears at (Marc. 1:16), 4: 92.

the twelfth century, first in monastic writing (and in the work of John of Salisbury),⁷⁵ later in the work of secular masters, after Peter Lombard accepted it in his *Sententiae*.⁷⁶

It would be impossible to deduce a specific view on the virtues from the *Glossa*. Composed from a wide variety of sources by several authors who also added remarks of their own, the work naturally contains contradictory statements. On one point, however, the ambiguity is significant. Many glosses repeat the view of earlier authorities, shared by the Laon theologians themselves, that all virtues have their origin in God.⁷⁷ But Gilbert the Universal praises the moral uprightness of (ancient?) philosophers who, elevated by the cardinal virtues, touched the truth

⁷⁵ The only 11th-century mention I found is Odilo of Cluny, *Vita Maioli* (anno 1033), PL 142: 952C. The following references can be dated between 1100 and 1165: *Tituli funebres* 6.175, PL 152: 602B–C (collected after the death of Bruno in 1101 by a Carthusian from Calabria, see Laporte, *Aux sources de la vie cartusienne* 1: 19–24; the *titulus* in question stems from the Augustinians of Nieul-sur-l'Autize); Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sententiae* 3.121, *Opera* 6.2: 225; Ernaud of Bonneval, *De operibus sex dierum*, PL 189: 1553B; Godfrey of Admont, *Homiliae dominicales* 10, 11, 22, 34 and 68, PL 174: 73A, 79B, 147D, 234D, 477C; id., *Homiliae festuales* 56, PL 174: 912B; id., *Homiliae in Scripturam* 15, PL 174: 1120A; Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermo* 55.20, CCCM 2B: 86; Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *Commentarius in Psalmos* (on 14:2 and 24:6ff.), PL 193: 823C–D, 1121D; id., *De investigatione Antichristi* 1.44, p. 352; Wolbero of Sankt Pantaleon, *Commentaria in Canticum Praef.* and (on 3:10), PL 195: 1016A, 1143B–C. William of Saint Thierry, *Speculum fidei* 8, p. 68, calls faith, hope and charity “tres cardinales virtutes”. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 154–155, discusses the use of the term by Lombard and later theologians without being aware of its monastic antecedents. For John of Salisbury, see *Policraticus* 4.12, CCCM 118: 273.

⁷⁶ See Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III.33.1.1, p. 187 (“de quatuor virtutibus quae principales vel cardinales vocantur”); III.33.1.3, p. 188: “Hae virtutes ‘cardinales’ dicuntur, ut ait Hieronymus: ‘quibus in hac mortalitate bene vivitur’, et post ad aeternam vitam pervenitur”. The punctuation suggests that the Lombard found the term in Jerome’s work, where it does not occur—apart from Pseudo-Jerome’s commentary on Matthew which is not cited elsewhere in the *Sententiae*. Perhaps one should read: “Hae virtutes ‘cardinales’ dicuntur; ut ait Hieronymus: ‘quibus in hac mortalitate ...’”? The Lombard uses the phrase *virtutes cardinales* also at *Sermo* 4, PL 171: 355D.

⁷⁷ See *Glossa ordinaria* (1 Par. 27:25), 2: 216 (PL 113: 661D): “Quidquid enim sancti virtutum habent, Deo attribuant” (cf. Hrabanus Maurus, *Commentaria in Paralipomenon* 2, PL 109: 403C); (Prov. 8:14), 2: 664 (PL 113: 1091B–C): “plenitudinem virtutum sola Dei sapientia possidet, ab hac humana infirmitas, quidquid habet virtutis, accipit” (cf. Bede, *In Proverbia* 1, CCSL 119B: 60); (Sap. 8:7), 2: 731: “Qui temperans est, prudens, fortis et iustus, quid illi deest? Has autem virtutes *nemo habet nisi cui omnium virtutum origo deus contulit*” (for the passage in italics, see Halitgar, *De vitiis et virtutibus* 2.10, PL 105: 676B = Julianus Pomerius, *De vita contemplativa* 3.18, PL 59: 501D–502A); (Rom. 14:23), 4: 303 (PL 114: 516C): “Omnis vita infidelium peccatum est ... et nihil bonum sine summo bono, ubi deest agnitio veritatis aeternae. Falsa virtus est etiam in optimis moribus” (cf. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Liber sententiarum* 106, CCSL 58A: 281).

of the Gospel,⁷⁸ while Anselm's brother Ralph of Laon in his glosses on Matthew twice refers to the natural virtues of unbelievers.⁷⁹ Near the end of the century, Praepositinus of Cremona and Stephen Langton would quote Ralph's glosses in order to affirm the existence of virtue outside the Christian faith. Some openness toward non-religious conceptions of virtue thus marks even the school of Laon and colours its contribution to medieval moral thought.

The School of Peter Abelard

In the work of Peter Abelard (1079–1142) several innovative tendencies in twelfth-century moral thought come together. Like John of Salisbury, Abelard greatly admired classical moral thought, being more concerned with the similarities than with the differences between ancient and Christian ethics. In his view, the ancients practiced the virtues in a laudible way, so that Christians could learn a lot from their religious fervour as well as from their public morality.⁸⁰ Moreover, the ancient philosophers described the (cardinal) virtues with so much accuracy according to Abelard that the Christians were right to borrow their views.⁸¹ Indeed, the Christian collocutor staged in Abelard's *Collationes* is indebted to the definitions of the four virtues proposed by his non-Christian opponent, while Abelard's *Theologia christiana* contains a long section on the parallels between Christ's precepts and the cardinal virtues as defined by Macrobius.⁸²

Apart from Latin classical sources, Abelard also made use of Aristotle's ethical insights, known to him through Boethius and some of Aristotle's logical works. These insights permitted Abelard to break with the scheme of the cardinal virtues as it was thus far understood. His

⁷⁸ Ibid. (Is. 66:20), 3: 97 (PL 113: 1315A): "Philosophos, scilicet et doctrina et morum honestate fulgentes: unde citius ad doctrinam quatuor Evangelistarum pervenerunt, et quatuor principalibus virtutibus sublevati caelestia mente attigerunt".

⁷⁹ Ibid. (Matt. 4:23), 4: 16 (PL 114: 88B): "Docens naturales justitias, castitatem scilicet et humilitatem et similia quae homo naturaliter habet"; (Matt. 8:7), 4: 32: "Vel milites et serui centurionis virtutes sunt naturales, quarum copiam multi ad deum venientes secum deferunt, vt cornelius dicitur vir iustus et timens deum" = Bede, *In Lucae evangelium* 2 (on 7:8), CCSL 120: 156, repeated by Sedulius Scottus, *Kommentar zum Evangelium nach Matthäus* 1 (on 8:9), p. 244.

⁸⁰ See Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 2.45 and 2.57–58, CCCM 12: 150, 155.

⁸¹ See ibid. 2.27, p. 143; similarly *Theologia Summi boni* 1.66, CCCM 13: 111; *Sententiae Abaelardi* 32, PL 178: 1749D.

⁸² *Theologia christiana* 2.64ff., CCCM 12: 157ff.

reading of Aristotle convinced him that prudence was a *scientia* rather than a virtue, that is: an intellectual quality enabling one to distinguish between good and evil, actually identical with *discretio* as described in the Rule of Benedict.⁸³ Abelard insists in several works that this intellectual quality does not provide humans with the willingness and capacity to act in accordance with the good. These moral dispositions are rather the work of justice, fortitude, and temperance. Among these virtues, justice, which coincides with the good will firmed up into a *habitus* (another Aristotelian conception), takes the first place, being nearly synonymous with virtue itself. Fortitude and temperance have mere auxiliary functions, as they protect the just will against fear and cupidity, respectively. This classification has rightly been characterized as Abelard's own,⁸⁴ even if it has a partial antecedent in the work of Marbod of Rennes.

The ironical thing about Abelard's revolutionary classification is that it more Augustinian than Aristotelian in inspiration, based as it is on a radical distinction between the intellect and the will. Aristotle does not consider prudence a *scientia*, as Abelard believes, but an intellectual virtue which necessarily involves all moral virtues. Abelard's essentially anti-Aristotelian assumption that insight into morality as provided by prudence has in itself no moral consequences rests in fact on his Augustinian view of the will as being perfectly capable of acting against one's better judgment. His reading of Aristotle is thus unwittingly distorted by his voluntarism, which is radical even by contemporary standards: according to most other thinkers, Anselm of Canterbury excepted, justice controls the will without coinciding with it, while Abelard equates the virtuous will with justice itself.

⁸³ See *Collationes*, p. 130: "Nonnulli uero prudentie discretionem matrem potius siue originem uirtutum quam uirtutem nominant"; similarly *Ethica* 2.2, CCCM 190: 85; cf. *Regula Benedicti* 64.19, p. 652. According to Ingham, "*Phronesis* and *prudencia*", 644, "the spiritual, biblical tradition identifies prudence with discretion and as the mother of virtues, rather than a virtue itself". Ingham refers to Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones super Cantica* 49.5, but here Bernard discusses discretion without connecting it with prudence. In fact, Abelard's identification of prudence with discretion is rather unusual.

⁸⁴ See Marenbon, *The Philosophy*, 283–287. For similar arrangements by Abelard's pupils, see *Commentarius cantabrigiensis in epistolas Pauli* (on 2 Cor. 6:7), 2: 295–296; Omnebene of Verona, *Sententiae*, cited in Graf, *De subiecto psychico*, 86–88. For the view that prudence is a science rather than a virtue, see also (apart from the evidence assembled by Marenbon) Peter Abelard, *Glossae super Praedicamenta*, p. 227.

In modern scholarship the Augustinian aspect of Abelard's ethics is often underestimated or denied,⁸⁵ even though his famous intentionalism (the view that acts are morally neutral in themselves and derive their value from the agent's intention) betrays an Augustinian attention for the inner mind.⁸⁶ As a consequence, Abelard has often been credited with the idea that human beings can acquire virtue by natural means.⁸⁷ Yet although Abelard is one of the first to adhere to the Aristotelian view of virtue as a quality developed into a steadfast habit, he nowhere says that human beings can develop virtuous habits without divine assistance. For Abelard, virtue depends on the will, and his solution for the problem of how the will can become good and virtuous is the same as Augustine's: only grace can fill the human heart with a love strong enough never to depart from the will of God. Strictly speaking, all virtue amounts to charity, as Abelard repeatedly claims.⁸⁸ True enough, his *Theologia christiana* concedes that some ancient philosophers possessed the virtues and were saved, but that is not to say that these philosophers acquired the virtues by natural means. Abelard's point is rather that since they possessed the virtues, one must assume that God divulged to them the principles of the faith.⁸⁹ Equally telling is Abelard's adaptation of the Trajan legend. It is Abelard who introduced the story that the Roman emperor Trajan was resuscitated and converted to Christianity before being saved for his virtue.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the tension between classical and Christian models

⁸⁵ See, e.g., Hauskeller, *Geschichte der Ethik*, 87: "So stark waren der Einfluß und die Autorität von Augustinus, daß sich die christliche Ethik über sieben Jahrhunderte hinweg nicht aus dem Bann seines Menschen- und Gottesbildes zu lösen vermochte. Der erste Denker von Rang, der dem Augustinismus die Stirn bot, war ... Peter Abaelard".

⁸⁶ For a discussion of Abelard's intentionalism and its incongruous aspects, see Bejczy, "Deeds Without Value". Pranger, "Medieval Ethics", 28–32, and Otten, "In Conscience's Court", 59 n. 19, attempt to put my view into perspective.

⁸⁷ For references see Bejczy, "The Problem of Natural Virtue", 138 n. 21.

⁸⁸ See *Collationes*, p. 118: "si proprie uirtus intelligatur, que uidelicet meritum apud Deum optinet, sola caritas uirtus appellanda est"; *Sermo* 17, PL 178: 503B–C (the cardinal virtues as instances of charity, in reference to Augustine's *De moribus Ecclesiae*); *Sic et non* 137, pp. 464–470 (*Quod sola caritas uirtus dicenda sit et non*, confronting patristic authorities, including Augustine's *Ep.* 155 and *De moribus Ecclesiae*, with Cicero). See also *Sententiae Abaelardi* 32, PL 178: 1751C–D: justice is a *voluntas animi* coinciding with charity; likewise *Sententie Parisienses*, pp. 52–54; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 90–91; cf. Omnebene of Verona, *Sententiae*, cited in Graf, *De subiecto psychico*, 87.

⁸⁹ *Theologia christiana* 2.15 ff., CCCM 12:139 ff. For patristic antecedents of this view, see Colish, "The Virtuous Pagan," 56 ff.

⁹⁰ See Colish, "The Virtuous Pagan," 59 ff. See also *Ethica* 1.44.3, CCCM 190:143: Cornelius the Centurion, for all his apparent goodness and charity, would not have earned eternal life without baptism.

of moral thought often remains unsolved in Abelard's work. Despite his claim that prudence is no virtue, Abelard frequently employs the scheme of the four cardinal virtues and even confirms the doctrine of their necessary connection.⁹¹ Moreover, he sometimes employs the scheme in a devotional context, manipulating with the number four in ways that smack of early medieval exegesis,⁹² while in other cases he sticks to classical definitions, describing justice, for instance, as the safeguard of public order.⁹³

In sum, Abelard is not the secularizing moral philosopher for whom some of his modern commentators take him. Like Augustine, he conceives of the human being as a fallen creature who can only overcome his moral deficiencies by the aid of grace. The process of acquiring virtue does not so much consist in developing a natural capacity for goodness as in curbing one's evil inclinations with God's assistance, the human will being too weak to achieve the process on its own.⁹⁴ All this does not impede Abelard from adopting Aristotle's definition of virtue which, if charitably interpreted, does not contradict Christian ideas. The troublesome combat against vice which in Christian thought forms part of the human condition is in line with the constant application by which virtue is acquired according to Aristotle. Moreover, the Aristotelian notion of virtue as a steadfast habit agrees with the Christian idea that virtue and salvation require perseverance in the good.⁹⁵

Abelard's direct influence on twelfth-century moral thought remained modest. His exclusion of prudence (and faith and hope, for that matter)

⁹¹ See *Collationes*, pp. 114–122 (connection confirmed, equality denied), 138; Abelard infers the connection from Cicero's *De officiis*. See also *Sic et non* Prol. and 137.8, pp. 95–96, 466–467.

⁹² See, e.g., *Sermo* 14 (ed. De Santis), esp. 215–218: the first three petitions of the Pater Noster honour God, the last four relate to the four virtues “in quibus fidelis anime perfectio constitit”, “que perfectionem confirmant anime” (p. 215); prudence mainly consists in understanding God's word, justice in pity, temperance in rejecting temptations, fortitude in bearing adversity; *Hymni diurni* 15.3, in *Hymnarius Paraclitensis* 2: 51: “Corpus ex quattuor / constare novimus, / Ornari totidem / mentes virtutibus”.

⁹³ See *Collationes*, p. 134; *Sententiae Abaelardi* 32, PL 178: 1750D–1751B; *Sententie Parisienses*, p. 52; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 75.

⁹⁴ See *Sententiae Abaelardi*, PL 178: 1755D–1756A; *Sententie Parisienses*, pp. 59–60.

⁹⁵ See Jerome, *Commentarii in Matheum* 1 (on 10:22: “Qui perseveraverit in finem hic salvus erit”), CCSL 77: 69: “non incoepisse, sed perfecisse virtutis est”. In Abelard's day, this statement had become a stock phrase in papal correspondence; see Innocent II, *Ep.* 463 (anno 1139/41), PL 179: 533B = Jaffé, *Regesta* 1: 896 nr. 8122 (5783); Lucius II, *Ep.* 75 (anno 1144), PL 179: 920B = Jaffé, *Regesta* 2: 17 nr. 8676 (6106); Eugenius III, *Ep.* 431 (anno 1151), PL 180: 1458A = Jaffé, *Regesta* 2: 71 nr. 9455 (6565).

from the range of the virtues was hardly followed outside his own school, with the remarkable exception of the lawyer Placentius who moreover endorsed Abelard's identification of virtue with the good will.⁹⁶ Some of Abelard's ideas survived to later generations thanks to their insertion into the *Ysagoge in theologiam*, a work composed by 1135/38 which combines his views with those of Hugh of Saint Victor. It is from the *Ysagoge*, for instance, that Abelard's idea of justice as the central moral virtue sustained by fortitude and temperance spread to the *Moralium dogma* and some other moral tracts, and from there to the Later Middle Ages.⁹⁷ Odo, the author of the *Ysagoge*, supplied this arrangement with his own definitions of the virtues and their subspecies which likewise appear in his commentary on Martianus Capella.⁹⁸ These definitions were copied into the *Moralium dogma*,⁹⁹ Alan of Lille's *De virtutibus et de vitiis et de donis Spiritus sancti*, and several later medieval writings.¹⁰⁰ Yet the *Ysagoge* has only come down in one complete and three abridged redactions,¹⁰¹ while the commentary on Martianus Capella survives in a single, incomplete

⁹⁶ See Bejczy, "Law and Ethics", 207–209.

⁹⁷ See *Moralium dogma* 1, p. 8; Pseudo-Hugh of Saint Victor, *De contemplatione*, p. 60; *De origine virtutum et vitiorum*, p. 129; below, pp. 154–156.

⁹⁸ See *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 73–78; Odo, *The Commentary on Martianus Capella* 7, pp. 167–168. Evans, "The *Ysagoge in theologiam*", 13, demonstrates that the commentary identifies *virtus* with prudence and divides it into justice, fortitude, and temperance; thus, neither the commentary nor the *Ysagoge* include prudence among the cardinal virtues. The *Ysagoge* does not give definitions of prudence and its parts, whereas the commentary does; one assiduous medieval reader copied these definitions from the commentary into a margin of the single extant complete manuscript of the *Ysagoge*.

⁹⁹ The *Moralium dogma* is commonly believed to depend on the *Ysagoge* (see, e.g., Gauthier, "Les deux révisions", 234–235), but its definitions of the four virtues come closer to Odo, *The Commentary on Martianus Capella* 4, pp. 87–88; 7, pp. 166–170 (prudence, temperance).

¹⁰⁰ See Pseudo-Hugh of Saint Victor, *De contemplatione*; William of Doncaster, *Explicatio aphorismatum philosophicorum* (William's definitions of *parcitas* [p. 24] and *innocentia* [p. 29] occur both in Odo's works and the *Moralium dogma*, but the definition of *verecundia* [p. 24] only in Odo's works); Commentary on Pseudo-Seneca, *De copia verborum*, MS Rouen, BM 671, f. 173^{r-v} (ca. 1300; Bloomfield 5405 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 5405; only the subdivisions, not the definitions); Pseudo-Richard Rolle, *De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus*, MS Cambridge, UL Mm.5.37, ff. 127^r–135^r (ca. 1400; Bloomfield 3967 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 3967; adaptation of Martin of Braga's *Formula*, expanded with Odo's definitions of the subordinate virtues).

¹⁰¹ None of these rearrangements includes the definitions of prudence and its species. See MSS London, BL Royal 10.A.xii, ff. 117^{va}–123^{ra}; London, BL Cotton Cleo. C.XI, ff. 70^{ra}–77^v (Bloomfield 6437 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 6437); London, BL Harley 3038, ff. 3^{ra}–7^v, esp. f. 4^{ra}: "Virtutem alii quadrifariam diuidunt, alii in tres partes. Partimus ergo uirtutem in iusticiam, fortitudinem, temperanciam" (prudence is not even mentioned).

manuscript. The remarkable influence of Odo's definitions can be explained by assuming that they circulated separately. I actually discovered a list of his definitions in one English manuscript of the first half of the thirteenth century;¹⁰² similar lists may have been preserved in other manuscripts as well.

Religious Moral Thought

The challenge posed by the classicizing tendencies in twelfth-century moral thought put contemporary monastic writers (Benedictines, Victorines, Cistercians, and others) into a position of defense. Most of them took a rejective attitude to the idea of morality outside the faith, even if some authors integrated classical views into their reflections on the cardinal virtues. Two different strategies of defense prevail in twelfth-century monastic literature. Usually the authors preferred to ignore the claims of ancient moral philosophy and stuck to the patristic unity of virtue and religion as if nothing had happened. In some cases, however, they attacked those claims with zealous indignation.

Benedictine Voices

Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) was doubtless the most formidable Benedictine theologian of his age. His principal interest for virtue theory lies in his idea of justice. In his view, salvation extends only to the perfectly just, with justice being understood as the right will (*rectitudo voluntatis*), that is, the will controlled by the human desire for the good (*affectio recti*). When this desire is abandoned, humans are incapable of retrieving it and face damnation unless grace restores their justice.¹⁰³ The Augustinian inspiration of Anselm's thought is evident: humans are saved through the virtuous disposition of the human will which needs grace to overcome its frailty and stick to the good. Inner human intentions count much more from this perspective than outward acts.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² MS Oxford, Bodleian, Lyell 8, f. 26^{vb} (Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4309a). The list includes the definitions of prudence and its parts.

¹⁰³ See notably Anselm of Canterbury, *De concordia praescientiae* 3.4 and 3.11–13, *Opera* 2: 268, 280–286; *De libertate arbitrii* 10–12, *Opera* 1: 222–224. The definition of justice recurs in *De veritate* 12, *Opera* 1: 194; *De libertate arbitrii* 3, *Opera* 1: 212; *De conceptu virginali* 3, 5, and 29, *Opera* 2: 143 (twice), 147, 172; *De concordia praescientiae* 1.6 and 3.2, *Opera* 2: 256, 265.

¹⁰⁴ See e.g. *De veritate* 12, *Opera* 1: 193.

Anselm's references to the cardinal virtues are relatively scarce. In a letter written shortly after his archepiscopal election, he elegantly denies being apt for a leading position in the Church because of his lack of what appear to be the four virtues,¹⁰⁵ while he declares in one minor work that nobody can fully possess the four principal virtues without loving his neighbour and God.¹⁰⁶ Also, the *Dicta* assembled by Anselm's secretary compare the human being to the Temple of Salomon, founded on faith and built of "squared stones" which stand for the four principal virtues.¹⁰⁷ Another work of doubtful authenticity introduces the metaphor of the "spiritual cloister" walled off from the evil of the world by the four cardinal virtues,¹⁰⁸ while a Pseudo-Anselmian text elaborates the related theme of the *domus interior*. Human conscience appears in this text as a house which stores the treasure of virtue; the cardinal virtues, whose biblical origins are evoked, guard the house day and night against sin and the devil.¹⁰⁹ Few as they may be, these passages indicate that the cardinal virtues counted in Anselm's environment as structuring elements of the inner life. Far from being instruments of social and political morality, the virtues protect the human being against evil and help him concentrate on God and the hereafter.¹¹⁰ Moreover, the virtues are discussed in a purely biblical context; ancient moral philosophy does not seem to play any significant role.

One of the first to quote Anselm's definition of justice was the author known as Honorius Augustodunensis (ca. 1070/80–ca. 1158), whose real name and career lie hidden in darkness.¹¹¹ His numerous writings, which

¹⁰⁵ *Ep.* 160, *Opera* 4: 31: "Quod ego ipse non imputo mihi tantum ad virtutem, quantum ad hoc quia talem me scio, tam parum utilem, parum fortem, parum strenuum, parum prudentem, parum iustum, ut potius mihi congruat et expediat eligere subesse praelato quam aliis praesse ...".

¹⁰⁶ *De humanis moribus per similitudines*, p. 95.

¹⁰⁷ Alexander of Canterbury, *Dicta Anselmi* 20a, p. 195 ("Quadrum autem quattuor sunt virtutes principales: prudentia, fortitudo, iustitia, temperantia. Unusquisque vero ... sedeat in quadrato, id est has quattuor virtutes habeat"); see also the summary of this dictum in a 12th-century compilation (*Memorials of St. Anselm*, 305) and an extended version (*ibid.*, 314).

¹⁰⁸ Anselm of Canterbury (?), *De spirituali claustrum*, pp. 332–333.

¹⁰⁹ Pseudo-Anselm of Canterbury, *De custodia interioris hominis*.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Elmer of Canterbury, *Ep.* 8.9, p. 93: "quisquis huic mundo amorem suum subtrahere propter Deum concupiscit, quattuor principales uirtutes, id est prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem atque temperantiam, ex quibus numerosa proles caeterarum uirtutum exoritur, in usum sae conuersationis assumit".

¹¹¹ See Honorius Augustodunensis, *Inevitabile* (written ca. 1108), PL 172: 1200C–D. For the authenticity, diffusion, and dates of his writings, see Garrigues, "L'oeuvre d'Honorius".

found a much wider diffusion than those of any of his twelfth-century confreres, occasionally introduce current topics of moral debate such as the conception of virtue as a mean between two vices, the connection of the cardinal virtues, and the problem of whether God possesses the virtues.¹¹² Honorius's interest in virtue theory remains superficial, however. The large majority of his references to the cardinal virtues connect the scheme with biblical fours, in conformity with the exegetical tradition of the Early Middle Ages. Some of his associations are imaginative; thus, the encyclopedic *Elucidarium* (1098/1101) ends with a view on the heavenly Jerusalem rebuilt with the "squared stones" of the elect who are formed by the cardinal virtues.¹¹³ Other associations make an artificial impression. Honorius connects the virtues with, among others, the fourth penitential psalm (Ps. 50), the fourth section of the Book of Psalms, the four sections of Psalm 116, the four musical instruments by which the Lord is praised (Ps. 97:5–6), the four beams of the houses of the Spouse (Cant. 1:16), the four pillars of Salomon's litter (Cant. 3:9–10), and the fourfold repeated exclamation *revertere* in Cant. 6:12.¹¹⁴ In a similar vein, he regularly associates the virtues with various quadruple elements from the liturgical calendar.¹¹⁵ Generally disregarding classical moral theory and sometimes attacking it—in his *Speculum ecclesiae* (surviving in over five hundred manuscripts), he blames Plato and Aristotle for introducing a *prudencia saecularis* which leads to damnation¹¹⁶—Honorius consistently presents the cardinal virtues as gifts of God which

¹¹² See *Commentaria in Ecclesiasten* (on 1:16–18), PL 168: 1206D (medium); *ibid.* (on 9:18), 1286C–D (connection); *Elucidarium* 1.61, p. 372 (virtues in God); *Gemma animae* 1.12, PL 172 548B (cardinal virtues in Christ); *De cognitione vitae* 19, PL 40: 1017, and *De viciis et virtutibus* (doubtful authenticity), 138–139 (virtues *substantialiter* rather than *accidentaliter* in God).

¹¹³ *Elucidarium* 3.121, p. 477.

¹¹⁴ *Expositio in Psalmos* Praef., PL 172: 282A–B (= PL 193: 1601B; Ps. 50); PL 194: 664C (fourth section), 721B (Ps. 116), 591B–592A (instruments; justice denotes the active, prudence the contemplative life; temperance is connected with scholars, fortitude with kings); *Expositio in Cantica* 1, PL 172: 381C (beams), 408B (litter); 3, 455C, 464C ("revertere"; likewise Peter Lombard, *Sermo* 23, PL 171: 446D). Garrigues, "L'oeuvre d'Honorius" (1986), 61–63, points out that the interrelation of fours determines the structure of the *Expositio in Cantica*.

¹¹⁵ Thus he associates the virtues with the four lessons from the Gospel introduced by Benedict in the third nocturn (*Gemma animae* 2.29, PL 172: 625A–B); with the series of Ps. 1, 2, 3, and 6, of 7 to 10, and of 11 to 14, all three concluded by one *Gloria Patri* (*ibid.* 2.2–4, 617B–618A); with four days of fasting preceding Lent (perhaps Quatember?) (*ibid.* 3.42, 655B); with the *feria quarta* (*Sacramentarium* 6, PL 172: 743D); with the four *vigiliae* (*Speculum ecclesiae*, PL 172: 1080D); etc.

¹¹⁶ *Speculum ecclesiae*, PL 172: 1062A–B.

perfect the life of the just and help them to follow Christ on their way to heaven.¹¹⁷ In one of his writings he even relates the quartet to the contemplative rather than the active life.¹¹⁸ In fact, the work of Honorius opens a devotional tradition in later medieval moral literature which upholds a purely religious understanding of virtue by largely ignoring contemporary moral philosophy.

Bruno of Segni (ca. 1040/50–1123) is mainly known today as a staunch supporter of ecclesiastical autonomy in the Investiture Contest. His inflexibility cost him the favour even of Pope Pascal II, who in 1111/12 removed him from the abbacy of Monte Cassino. Bruno's stance in matters of morality seems just as intransigent. His *Liber sententiarum* (ca. 1100), which devotes one chapter to the cardinal virtues, assimilates the virtues to Christian doctrine as much as possible. Thus, Bruno equates *prudentia* with the divinely inspired *sapientia* preached by the apostles and the fathers rather than the wisdom of philosophers and orators, which is folly in God's sight. Taking the dictum *impossibile est sine fide placere Deo* (Heb. 11:6) to the letter, Bruno condemns any virtues which do not spring from faith as false and perfidious products of "heretics, pagans, philosophers, and Jews", groups which he regularly lumps together in his invectives. Although the chapter does not seem to contain any allusion to the classics, it opens with the statement that the four virtues together cover the whole range of earthly life and are necessarily connected¹¹⁹—ancient philosophical doctrines which Bruno may have found in patristic sources. Elaborating on these views, Bruno presents the four virtues as the chief moral guidelines of political rule or, more precisely, as the basic principles of Christian politics embodied by biblical figures and ecclesiastical authorities (bishops, the pope, Benedict of Nursia) rather than secular rulers. The suggestion conveyed by his exposition is that political power is best entrusted to spiritual authorities. As the principal successors of the saints and apostles who perfectly

¹¹⁷ See esp. *Expositio in Psalmos*, PL 194: 591B ("quatuor virtutibus perficitur vita iustorum, prudentia, fortitudine, iustitia et temperantia"); *Expositio in Cantica* 1, PL 172: 408B (following Christ); *Clavis physicae* 13, 124, 125, 286 and 292, pp. 10, 92 ("dona gratie, id est virtutes"), 93 ("omnis virtus donum proprie vocatur"), 233, 238.

¹¹⁸ See *Expositio in Psalmos* (on 34:1), PL 193: 1335A–B: faith determines the active, the cardinal virtues the contemplative life.

¹¹⁹ Bruno of Segni, *Sententiae* 2.4, PL 165: 911B: "Quatuor sunt virtutes, quibus totus regitur mundus, ita sibi conjunctae, ut sine se esse non valeant". See also *ibid.* 6.2 (de confessoribus sermo 7), 1066B: "His quatuor virtutibus regitur mundus quae inter se conjunctae sunt, ut una sine reliquis esse non valeat". At *Expositio in Exodum* (on 25:1–7), PL 164: 307A, Bruno affirms that the cardinal virtues comprise all other virtues.

represent the four virtues, bishops, in Bruno's view, are morally entitled to government over Christian society.¹²⁰ Bruno's case shows that aversion to non-Christian conceptions of virtue can go together in a monastic environment with the idea that the cardinal virtues principally relate to the world of politics. His connection of the virtues with episcopal rule in particular has parallels in the work of his confreres Hugh of Flavigny (1065–1114),¹²¹ Guibert of Nogent (1055–1125/26),¹²² and Gilbert Foliot († 1187).¹²³

Bruno's contemporary Rupert of Deutz (1075/76–1129), the most productive though not the most influential author of the twelfth century,¹²⁴ made some particularly creative attempts to interpret the cardinal virtues religiously. A remark in his *De victoria verbi Dei* shows that he was familiar with the ethical debates going on in his time: he refers to the cardinal virtues as concepts "which are intensely studied in divine as well as human schools, and which secular as well as ecclesiastical philosophers preach far and wide".¹²⁵ Being thus well aware of the virtues' classical origin, Rupert did not set store by ancient moral philosophy. In his view, the philosophers of antiquity knew merely the names of the four virtues, but not their true, Christian meaning.¹²⁶ The Epicurean, Stoic, and Peripatetic philosophers exercised themselves badly in these virtues, contrary to the *vir ecclesiasticus*.¹²⁷ In one work Rupert goes so far as to contend that justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude are merely pagan names for the virtues which Christians know respectively as faith, hope, charity, and the perseverance in these three virtues.¹²⁸

¹²⁰ For an extensive analysis of Bruno's views, see Bejczy, "Kings, Bishops".

¹²¹ Hugh of Flavigny was a headstrong supporter of the Gregorian reform. All persons to whom he attributes the four virtues in his *Chronicon* are ecclesiastical authorities with a reputation of sanctity; see Bejczy, "Kings, Bishops", 283.

¹²² See Guibert of Nogent, *Moralia in Genesim* 1 and 2, PL 156: 33C, 66A–D.

¹²³ See Gilbert Foliot, *Letters* 12 (written ca. 1139/48), p. 49 (= *Ep.* 60, PL 190: 787B).

¹²⁴ See Van Engen, *Rupert of Deutz*, 3–5.

¹²⁵ Rupert of Deutz, *De victoria verbi Dei* 8.14, p. 259: "quas et divinae et humanae scholae concelebrant, quas philosophi tam seculares quam ecclesiastici celeberrime predicant".

¹²⁶ *De sancta Trinitate* 24 (Reg. 3.20), CCCM 22: 1322; *De gloria filii hominis* 4 and 5, CCCM 29: 123, 149.

¹²⁷ *De sancta Trinitate* 24 (Reg. 3.20), CCCM 22: 1322.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* 15 (Lev. 2.2), p. 856. Cf. *Commentaria in Iob* (on 1:21), PL 168: 972A: the four corners of Job's house stand for the "quatuor constantiae virtutes" (the term is Rupert's own; cf. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* 2.49.76, CCCM 143: 105. Gregory was Rupert's main source; see Van Engen, "Rupert de Deutz", 1127).

The cardinal virtues constitute a recurrent theme in Rupert's biblical commentaries. According to Rupert, several Old Testament figures embodied the four virtues. Joseph, who refused to sleep with the wife of his master (Gen. 39), showed temperance in not giving in to lust, justice in following God's will, fortitude in rejecting temptation, and prudence by leaving his master's house.¹²⁹ Job likewise possessed the four virtues,¹³⁰ but Rupert's most elaborate praise is for Esther. As queen of Persia, Esther displayed temperance in maintaining her chastity and humility even amidst great wealth, justice in confessing her sins to God as well as in her aversion of the uncircumcised, prudence in postponing her request to deliver the Jews until the most suitable moment, and fortitude in ordering to kill the enemies of the Jews until the last man. Rupert's analysis of Esther's conduct in the light of the four virtues goes on for several chapters.¹³¹

Rupert's associations of New Testament figures with the cardinal virtues are less frequent,¹³² but in his commentary on Matthew he presents the Sermon on the Mount as a detailed explanation of how Christians must understand justice (Matt. 5:20 to 6:1), temperance (6:1 to 6:34), fortitude (7:6/7 to 7:13), and prudence (from 7:15), qualities negatively mirrored in the Scribes and Pharisees.¹³³ Justice as preached by Christ requires unanimous faith and fraternal love, argues Rupert; murder, adultery, and perjury were already forbidden under the Law, but Christ perfected justice by prohibiting anger, coveting another's wife, and swearing. Temperance consists in longing for a heavenly rather than an earthly reward for justice and, generally, in being detached from temporal needs, like the birds of the air and the lilies of the field. Fortitude implies perseverance in the good and the capacity to wrestle with God's word until it

¹²⁹ *De sancta Trinitate* 8 (Gen. 8.33), CCCM 21: 520.

¹³⁰ See *Commentaria in Iob* (on 1:1 and 32:22), PL 168: 963A–B, 1117D–1118A (Elihu unduly attributed the “quatuor principales virtutes, ex quibus vere sapiens compositus est” to himself). Neither association with the cardinal virtues is borrowed from Gregory's *Moralia*.

¹³¹ *De victoria verbi Dei* 8.14–22, pp. 259–266.

¹³² An exception is *De sancta Trinitate* 30 (Hiez. 1.7), CCCM 23: 1651–1652, where he connects each of the four virtues “which every believer should emulate” with one of the evangelists: prudence with Matthew, temperance with Luke, fortitude with Mark, justice with John.

¹³³ *De gloria filii hominis* 4, CCCM 29: 123–125 (explaining the Sermon's structure). Fortitude should be the subject from 7:6, but at *ibid.* 197 the verse is associated with temperance.

renders its full meaning.¹³⁴ Finally, the gift of prudence, armed with God's Word and provided with the eyes of Scripture, guards Christians against false prophets. Rupert's interpretation is unique in twelfth-century exegesis¹³⁵ and moreover constitutes the most lengthy digression on the cardinal virtues in medieval biblical commentaries that I know, filling about one hundred pages in modern print. Thanks to his interpretative efforts, the cardinal virtues stand out in his work as the central message of Christ rather than as an element of ancient moral philosophy.

While Rupert counters the classicizing tendencies in contemporary moral debate by transforming the cardinal virtues into evangelical precepts, Gerhoh of Reichersberg (1093/94–1169) indulges in direct attack. His commentary on the Psalms, composed with the work of Rupert as a model, contains a lengthy exposition on the cardinal virtues.¹³⁶ In it, Gerhoh ridicules the philosophers of antiquity who thought themselves very wise by defining the virtues as gifts of nature. What they failed to see is that these virtues form a road to beatitude and provide likeness with God. Indeed,

[Scripture] contains much better and more useful lessons about prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude than worldly philosophy, whose teachings are full of lies. For where in the world have such prudence and justice been found as described by those thinkers? Was the whole world not imprudent and even blind before eternal Wisdom, mixed with our dust, made mud from spat, as it were, to smear the eyes of the faithful with it? What place in the world possessed justice, if it is apparent from Holy Scripture that everything was covered with sin? Which of Adam's sons observed temperance against lust ...? Who of his descendants, engendered by the illness of lust, proved himself courageous?¹³⁷

¹³⁴ On fortitude and its relation to humility in Rupert's work, see Bejczy, "Cardinal Virtues in a Christian Context".

¹³⁵ I know only one other medieval moral text which interprets the Sermon in terms of the cardinal virtues: *Fasciculus morum* 3.21, p. 284 (see below, pp. 150–151).

¹³⁶ Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *Expositio Psalmorum* (on 33:2), *Opera inedita* 2: 192–206 (in fact commenting on 1 Cor. 1:30: "Qui factus est nobis a Deo sapientia, et iustitia, et sanctificatio, et redemptio").

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 195: "[Scriptura] docet prudentiam, iustitiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem longe meliorem et utiliorem quam philosophia mundana, cuius doctrina mendacis tota est plena. Ubi enim in toto mundo inventa est huiusmodi prudentia vel iustitia qualem illi descripserunt? Nonne mundus totus fuit imprudens, immo caecus, antequam aeterna Sapientia, pulveri nostro admixta, quasi de sputo lutum fecit quo credentium oculos linivit? Quis locus in mundo fuit iustitiae, sancta Scriptura omnia sub peccato concludente? Quis filiorum Adam temperantiam contra concupiscentiam servavit ...? Quis ab illo per concupiscentiae languorem genitus, fortis est inventus?"

In Gerhoh's view, it was Christ who introduced the true cardinal virtues in the world: he made us prudent through his precepts, justified us by his mercy, taught us temperance by his examples, and fortified us by his death. The four arms of the Cross stand for his teaching of wisdom by which we supersede evil, justice by which we submit the flesh to the soul and the soul to God, temperance by which we bear prosperity, and fortitude by which we bear adversity. Before the Incarnation, these virtues were simply unknown to humankind.¹³⁸ Gerhoh's invective, which occasionally involves personal attacks ("the philosophers applauded themselves for their knowledge of the four principal virtues, although they were slaves of sin"),¹³⁹ goes on for fourteen pages in the modern edition of his commentary. His heated censure testifies to the harsh opposition that classicizing moral thought faced in twelfth-century monasticism, even if Gerhoh's arguments do not strike one as particularly convincing (discrediting the ancients by pointing to their sins hurts the principle that immoral practice does not invalidate moral theory; moreover, Gerhoh's Christian world was not entirely free of sin either).

The work of Abbot Godfrey of Admont (ca. 1100–1165) presents a more peaceful instance of religious morality. The numerous observations on the cardinal virtues in the sermons preached to his monks¹⁴⁰ characterize Godfrey as a religious enthusiast untouched by contemporary moral debate. Godfrey consistently presents the virtues as elements of a trajectory guided by God toward the spiritual life. Prudence, fortitude, and temperance fight various sorts of sins, while justice is the state of mind of those who have come near to God. Three views notably recur in his sermons: first, the cardinal and other virtues are instruments in the struggle against sin which brings the soul closer to God; second, humans owe their virtues to grace, not to their own goodness or merit;¹⁴¹ third, the most important cardinal virtue is justice, which coincides (as in the exhortative letters of Hildebert of Lavardin) with humility. More

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp. 196–198.

¹³⁹ Ibid. 198: "Gloriati sunt philosophi de scientia quatuor principalium virtutum, cum essent ipsi vitiorum servi".

¹⁴⁰ Härderlin, "God's Visiting", 24, argues that the authorship of the sermons is open to debate; their provenance from Admont is uncontested. Borgehammar, "Who Wrote the Admont Sermon Corpus", attributes the *Homiliae dominicales* to Godfrey's brother Irimbert († 1176), who became abbot in 1171. Irimbert wrote commentaries on several books of the Old Testament at Godfrey's instigation. Associations with the virtues occur only (though frequently) in his *In librum Iudicum*.

¹⁴¹ See Godfrey of Admont, *Homiliae festuales* 12, 53, and 80, PL 174: 671A, 899C, 1039A; *Homiliae in Scripturam* 15, PL 174: 1129C.

precisely, the justice of the elect consists in attributing their virtues to God and their shortcomings to themselves, and thus equals humility, the mother of all virtues and the paramount virtue of Christ.¹⁴² Godfrey's preoccupation with humility even makes him rewrite the story of the First Man. In his view, Adam perfectly possessed the cardinal and all other virtues when living alone in Paradise. In order to prevent him from considering these virtues his own rather than divine gifts, God created Eve: taking away Adam's rib, God deprived Adam of part of his fortitude so that he would feel his fragility and the misery of his condition. Indeed, Adam regretted his pride from the moment he saw Eve (a view which would seem to imply that he was guilty of pride even before the Fall). From then on, the first human couple were conscious of their weakness and the need always to humiliate themselves before God.¹⁴³

Despite its prevailing conservatism, twelfth-century Benedictine writing contains some innovative elements of moral thought as well. First, the scheme of the seven principal virtues is a twelfth-century Benedictine invention. In the 1130s, a monk from Hirsau called Conrad by posterity presented the theological and cardinal virtues as the seven principal offsprings of humility and contrasted them with the seven capital vices.¹⁴⁴ After its introduction by Conrad, the septenary of the virtues gradually made its way into monastic writing¹⁴⁵ and, from the second half of the century, into academic theology as well, where it became a standard arrangement until far beyond the Middle Ages. Second, some twelfth-century Benedictines joined contemporary moral theologians in

¹⁴² See notably *Homiliae dominicales* 12 and 22, PL 174: 82B–83C, 147D–150B; *Homiliae festuales* 56, PL 174: 912B–913C; *Homiliae in Scripturam* 11, PL 174: 1109B.

¹⁴³ *Homiliae dominicales* 22, PL 174: 151C–153B; cf. *ibid.* 55, 361B (antithesis between *os/fortitudo* and *caro/fragilitas*), 362A (Adam enjoyed *fortitudo* and *incorruptio* before the Fall).

¹⁴⁴ See below, p. 228.

¹⁴⁵ For references in 12th-century monastic writing, see, e.g., Herrad of Hohenbourg, quoted below, p. 228; Peter of Celle, *De panibus* 8, PL 202: 967C–D; Adam Scot, *Sermo XIII ad viros religiosos*, pp. 234–235 = *De triplici genere contemplationis* 1.10, PL 198: 802B–C. Cf. *De stabilitate animae* 11, PL 213: 920C–D, written by an anonymous Benedictine, for the view that the theological virtues produce the cardinal and all other virtues. Yet even after 1100, monastic authors who speculated about the biblical number seven tended to combine the four virtues with the Trinity rather than the theological virtues. See Rupert of Deutz, *Commentaria in Iob* (on 38:31), PL 168: 1162A; Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *De investigatione Antichristi* 1.44, p. 352; Godfrey of Admont, *Homiliae festuales* 63, PL 174: 957C; *Speculum de mysteriis ecclesiae* (written by an unknown Victorine) 3, PL 177: 341C.

founding the cardinal virtues in charity, even though humility counted as the mother of the virtues in monastic circles since the days of Gregory the Great and Benedict of Nursia. Thus, Wolbero (†1165), abbot of Sankt Pantaleon in Cologne, set up his commentary on the Canticle as a *quadratura charitatis* by dividing it into four books corresponding to the four cardinal virtues which flow from charity.¹⁴⁶ The mind of the believers who come close to God is depicted in the work as a circle with charity at its centre and the cardinal virtues at its circumference. Sustained by charity, the cardinal virtues, from which the other virtues spring forth, are just as indispensable for salvation in Wolbero's view as the theological virtues, the sacraments, and the Gospel.¹⁴⁷

Virtue and the Inner Self: The Victorines

Hugh of Saint Victor (1096–1142) is traditionally opposed to Peter Abelard as an Augustinian theologian averse to philosophical inquiry.¹⁴⁸ In reality, Augustinianism characterizes the moral thought of both men, but it is true that Hugh generally dissociated himself from Abelard's views.¹⁴⁹ Hugh was certainly less impressed than Abelard by classical moral philosophy in which, as he once wrote, the virtues appear as lifeless limbs, cut off from the trunk of charity.¹⁵⁰ He rarely quoted ancient teachings on the virtues, while his references to the scheme of the cardinal virtues remain few and usually bear a religious connotation.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ Wolbero of Sankt Pantaleon, *Commentaria in Canticum* Praef., PL 195: 1015D–1016A. For other examples of Benedictines founding the cardinal virtues in charity, see Arnaud of Bonneval, *De operibus sex dierum*, PL 189: 1547D, 1553B; Gilbert Foliot, *Expositio in Cantica* (on 1:1 and 1:2), PL 202: 1156B–C, 1204C–D.

¹⁴⁷ *Commentaria in Canticum* (on 5:2, 6:9, and 8:11), 1184C–D, 1216B–C, 1263A–B.

¹⁴⁸ See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 100.

¹⁴⁹ See Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard*, 196.

¹⁵⁰ Hugh of Saint Victor, *De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris*, PL 175: 9D–10A.

¹⁵¹ At *Didascalicon* 6.14, p. 130, Hugh quotes—mainly “for the sake of scholarly completeness”, as believes Van 't Spijker, “Hugh of Saint Victor's Virtue”, 77–78—the definition of virtue from Cicero's *De inventione*; other classical definitions of virtue appear to be absent from his work. Cardinal virtues: see *De sacramentis* 2.4.3, PL 176: 434C (the four colours of priestly dress refer to “quatuor principales virtutes animi, quibus homo ex omni parte cingi debet et muniri”); *Libellus de formatione arche* 4 and 6, CCCM 176: 141, 146, 150–151 (temperance, prudence, and fortitude as elements of the mystical ark); *Didascalicon* 2.19, p. 38 (= *Excerptiones priores* 1.13, PL 177: 200A), quoting Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii* 1.3 (see above, p. 55). See also, among the works of doubtful authenticity: *Scala celi*, p. 243; *Miscellanea* 5.41, PL 177: 768A. For the authenticity of Hugh's works, see Goy, *Die Überlieferung der Werke Hugos*; Sicard, *Hugues de Saint-Victor*.

In *De sacramentis*, Hugh proposes his famous definition of virtue as “a rationally ordered affect of the mind” (*affectus mentis secundum rationem ordinatus*).¹⁵² The definition of virtue as an affect has antecedents in early Christian commentaries on Aristotle’s *Categories* as well as in Laon theology and the work of Anselm of Canterbury,¹⁵³ but it takes on a specific significance in the context of Hugh’s thought. Throughout Hugh’s writings, the intellectual and the affective life appear as two distinctive realms which together make up the inner person: while our intellectual capacities lead to understanding and truth, we should embrace love and virtue through our affective skills.¹⁵⁴ Though being ordered *secundum rationem*, virtue is for Hugh no product of reason but an affect originating from the will and perfected through grace and love.¹⁵⁵

The connection of virtue with charity, merit, and grace is consistent in Hugh’s thought. For Hugh, virtue is basically a gift of God which requires a *consensus* of the human will in order to become meritorious (a view introduced by the Laon theologians).¹⁵⁶ Although humans dispose of morally neutral abilities *secundum naturam* which one might call natural virtues,¹⁵⁷ virtues in the proper, moral sense only exist *secundum gratiam*. Seemingly good acts which do not originate from the mother virtue of charity cannot count as meritorious and, hence, as virtuous. From a moral point of view, such acts are neutral; honourable perhaps, but

¹⁵² *De sacramentis* 1.6.17, PL 176: 273B–275A.

¹⁵³ See Pseudo-Augustine, *Categoriae decem* 12, PL 32: 1433: “Habitus affectio est animi longo tempore perseverans: ut est virtus et disciplina”; Boethius, *In Categoriae Aristotelis* 2, PL 64: 220C: “virtus enim est mentis affectio in bonam partem”; *Liber Pancrisis* 68, p. 59: “Is uirtutem habet, animi affectum”. For Anselm see above, p. 92 (*affectio recti*).

¹⁵⁴ See Van ’t Spijker, *Fictions of the Inner Life*, 59–128. Cf., e.g., *Homiliae in Ecclesiasten* 2, PL 175: 141C: “Tota ergo animae rationalis substantia his duobus regitur, id est cognitione et affectu, ut per sapientiam quidem veritatem inueniat, per amorem autem amplectatur virtutem”.

¹⁵⁵ According to Van ’t Spijker, “Hugh of Saint Victor’s Virtue”, 87, Hugh’s definition of virtue as “sanitas ... animae rationalis” elsewhere in *De sacramentis* offers “an elaboration of the role of *affectus* in his earlier definition”. Cf. Hugh of Saint Victor (?), *Miscellanea* 1.52, PL 177: 502C–D: “virtus magis esse videtur affectus rationalis voluntatis bene formati, vel recte ordinatus”; *Summa sententiarum* 3.9, PL 176: 103D–104A: “Et timere et amare simpliciter prolata, affectiones sunt: cum additamento [sc. timere Deum, amare Deum], virtutes” (likewise *Sententiae diuinitatis* 2.3, pp. 34*–35*). See also Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3:100; id., *Etudes de morale*, 71–73.

¹⁵⁶ See e.g. *Adnotatiunculae in Threnos* (on 2:3), PL 175: 272A; cf. *De laude charitatis*, PL 176: 975B–976A.

¹⁵⁷ The *Ysagoge in theologiam*, pp. 70, 73, likewise designates *potentiae naturales* such as *irascibilitas*, *concupiscentia*, and *animositas* as “natural virtues”, pointing out that true virtues require human industry and divine grace.

not virtuous.¹⁵⁸ The standards of morality and of salvation thus firmly coincide for Hugh, the more so as he maintains, unlike Abelard but in conformity with Anselm of Canterbury, that only the truly virtuous will gain heaven.¹⁵⁹ His view excludes all natural forms of goodness from the range of virtue. Merit and virtue originate precisely when man chooses not to follow his natural inclinations but to act on behalf of God, as Hugh explains in *De sacramentis*.¹⁶⁰

Hugh's definition of virtue is frequently quoted in twelfth-century monastic writing,¹⁶¹ while many Victorine authors in particular accept his association of virtue with the affective rather than the intellectual life.¹⁶² Quite like Hugh himself, most Victorines show little interest in the theme of the cardinal virtues or in classical moral philosophy, with the exception of Richard of Saint Victor,¹⁶³ and tend to connect virtue

¹⁵⁸ See *De sacramentis* 2.13.11, PL 176: 539D; *De archa Noe* 2.5 and 3.13, CCCM 176: 41, 81; *Libellus de formatione arche* 3, CCCM 176: 135–136; *De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo*, PL 176: 844A–B; see also Van 't Spijker, "Hugh of Saint Victor's Virtue", 83–84, and Bejczy, "Deeds without Value", 4. At *Homiliae in Ecclesiasten* 16, PL 175: 230D–231A, Hugh seems to recognize a flickering of goodness and even of virtue in the damned: "aliquando ad amorem boni, secundum quemdam affectum, speciem virtutis habentem, quasi ad amplexum sapientiae approximare videntur".

¹⁵⁹ See *De institutione novitiorum* Prol., PL 176: 925A–B (which shows literal parallels with Herman of Runa, *Sermones festivos* 84.3, CCCM 64: 381, dated ca. 1100 by the editors); *De sacramentis* 1.6.8, PL 176: 269A. For Abelard's view, see below, p. 237.

¹⁶⁰ See *De sacramentis* 1.6.17, PL 176: 273C–274A.

¹⁶¹ For its reception in the 12th and early 13th centuries, see Van 't Spijker, "Hugh of Saint Victor's Virtue", 80–81; add Guibert of Gembloux, *Ep.* 47, CCCM 66A: 450, quoting Bernard of Clairvaux, *Liber de gratia et de libero arbitrio* 17, *Opera* 3: 178.

¹⁶² Cf. *Summa sententiarum* 3.14, PL 176: 111C: "Bonum spiritualis creaturae maxime consistit in duobus: in cognitione veritatis et in amore virtutis"; for Richard of Saint Victor, see Van 't Spijker, *Fictions of the Inner Life*, 129–184.

¹⁶³ For classical influences see Richard of Saint Victor (?), *Liber exceptionum* 1.1.4, p. 105 (= PL 177: 195B–C), quoting Cicero's definition of virtue from the *Didascalicon* and adding the Aristotelian formula: "Est autem habitus qualitas veniens per applicationem subjecti difficile mobilis"; Godfrey of Breteuil, *Ep.* 33, PL 205: 863D–864B (quoting Macrobius' definitions of the virtues and interpreting them religiously); Pseudo-William of Conches, *Tertia philosophia*, cited in Ottaviano, *Un brano inedito*, 29–30 (adapting Cicero's classification of the virtues in *De inventione* 2.53–55; for the possible Victorine origin of this work, see Gregory, *Anima mundi*, 28–40). See also Richard of Saint Victor, *Sermo* 4, PL 177: 909C (= *Liber exceptionum* 2.10.4, p. 383): the cardinal and other virtues are needed as chords attached to the mast of hope on the ship of faith (Schneyer, *Repertorium* 1: 49, attributes the sermon also to Adam of Saint Victor [nr. 1]). For associations with biblical fours, see *ibid.* 43, PL 177: 1012D (the four rivers of Paradise); 50, 1041D–1042A (the chariot from Is. 66:20 and the four gospels); 53, 1050A (the four mountains from Naum 1:15 are the cardinal virtues "quae nos a terrenis elevatos ad coelestia erigunt"); 95, 1196A–B (the golden rim from Ex. 25:25, four fingers wide). Cf. *ibid.* 67, 1108C–D (the four kings from Gen. 14:1–2 stand for devils attacking

with charity, grace, and merit.¹⁶⁴ In fact, the most substantial passages on the cardinal virtues in Victorine writing appear in two little known works of doubtful origin which to some extent challenge Hugh's ideas. First, a collection of theological questions attributed to Hugh and considered at least partially authentic in modern scholarship lends some support to the idea of natural virtue. Claiming that God impressed the outlines of the cardinal virtues on the human mind, the author affirms that the virtues are naturally present in human beings, albeit in an imperfect state, lacking merit and even contracting guilt unless they are directed to God by charity and grace.¹⁶⁵ Second, *De contemplatione et eius speciebus*, a treatise falsely attributed to Hugh but most probably of Victorine origin, contains elaborate passages on the four virtues depending not only on Cicero and Macrobius, but also on the *Ysagoge in theologiam* (notably as to the Abelardian view of fortitude and temperance as auxiliary virtues of justice) and on contemporary glossators of Roman law (notably as to the definition of justice)—sources which Hugh either ignored or avoided.¹⁶⁶ Yet even the author of this latter treatise confirms that perfect moral action requires a connection between the cardinal virtues and the faith.¹⁶⁷

the four virtues); *In Apocalypsim* 2.9, 4.6 and 7.5, PL 196: 771D–772A, 810A, 868B (following *Glossa ordinaria* [Apoc. 21:16]), 869C–870A (“sanctae Ecclesiae defensores perfecta operatione praecepta quatuor Evangeliorum atque Decalogum cum exercitatione quatuor principalium virtutum complent”), 869D; Pseudo-Richard of Saint-Victor, *Explicatio in Cantica* 12, PL 196: 443D–444A: the cardinal virtues constitute the four pillars of the *sancta anima* filled with grace.

¹⁶⁴ See, e.g., *Summa sententiarum* 3.9 and 3.17, PL 176: 104B–C (only the will perfected by grace is meritorious and hence virtuous), 114D (“Virtutes sunt et dona et merita”); Pseudo-Hugh of Saint Victor, *Quaestiones in Epistolas Pauli* Rom. 324, PL 175: 511B: “Nulla virtus vera est, nisi quae formatur agnitione aeternae veritatis; nec etiam in optimis moribus, ut in philosophis apparet, qui optimis moribus viguerunt, tamen falsa virtute nituerunt, quia aeternae veritatis caruerunt cognitione”; Walter of Saint Victor, *Sermo* 14.6, CCCM 30: 126. “Est quidem [caritas] uirtus uirtutum, radix et mater omnium, sine qua ceterae uirtutes inutiles, inefficaces et informes, salutis effectum et efficaciam non ferentes”; Acardus of Saint Victor, *Sermons inédits* 5.2, p. 69: “Sic caritas omnibus virtutibus preferitur, super quas omnes principatum tenet. Omnis enim virtus sine caritate est insipida, est infructuosa et omni carens merito”. For the central importance of charity among the virtues, see also Richard of Saint Victor, *Sermo* 1, PL 177: 903D (= *Liber exceptionum* 2.10.1, p. 375); *Sermo* 5, PL 177: 912C (= *Liber exceptionum* 2.10.5, p. 387); *Beniamin maior* 5.6, p. 130.

¹⁶⁵ Hugh of Saint Victor (?), *Quaestiones* (1959), p. 196; (1960), pp. 47–48; see also Bejczy, “The Problem of Natural Virtue”, 142–143.

¹⁶⁶ See Bejczy, “*De contemplatione*”.

¹⁶⁷ Pseudo-Hugh of Saint Victor, *De contemplatione*, pp. 57, 61.

Virtue and the Inner Self: The Cistercians

In contrast to their Victorine contemporaries, many Cistercian authors eagerly took up the theme of the cardinal virtues, not so much from an interest in ancient moral philosophy as from a desire to save the Christian character of the virtues by deepening their religious understanding.

The work of Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) set the tone for the Cistercian dealings with the cardinal virtues. The vast majority of Bernard's references to the quartet—notably in his sermons, the *Paraboliae*, and the *Sententiae*—have a religious signification. The four virtues structure man's obedience to God,¹⁶⁸ guarantee the unity of the human and divine will,¹⁶⁹ appear as pearls on the garment of the Bride,¹⁷⁰ and accompany the soul to the house of Wisdom (Prov. 9:1).¹⁷¹ Very often the four virtues figure in Bernard's writings as weapons in the human struggle against sin (justice occasionally being positively defined as enabling humans to do the good) which confer celestial glory to the undefeated.¹⁷² Similar interpretations abound in the work of other Cistercian authors.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ See Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sententiae* 3.53 and 3.121, *Opera* 6.2: 95, 225.

¹⁶⁹ See *Sermo de voluntate divina*, *Opera* 6.1: 37–39.

¹⁷⁰ *Sermones super Cantica* 27.3, *Opera* 1: 183.

¹⁷¹ See *Paraboliae* 1 and 2, *Opera* 6.2: 261–273; *Paraboliae* 1bis, 2bis, and *Parabola composita* (ed. Rochais, *Enquête*), pp. 54–55, 36–40, 61–62; see also *Sententiae* 1.20 (synopsis of *Paraboliae* 2), *Opera* 6.2: 13. Cf. *Sermones super Cantica* 3.111, pp. 189–190: the four virtues are denoted by the four pillars of the tabernacle (Ex. 39:19); “Per has a mundi tumultu disceditur, ad Dei aspectum ascenditur”.

¹⁷² See *Sermones super psalmum ‘Qui habitat’* 14.10, *Opera* 4: 474–475: the virtues fight the four animals of Ps. 90:13; *Sermo de voluntate divina* 1, *Opera* 6.1: 37–39 and *Sermones de diversis* 117, *ibid.* 395 (see below, p. 248); *Sermones de diversis* 72.2, *ibid.* 308, and *Sententiae* 3.21, *Opera* 6.2: 77 (see below, p. 248); *Paraboliae* 6.6, *Opera* 6.2: 287 and (ed. Rochais, “Inédits”), p. 75 (extended text): fortitude fights *adversa*, temperance *prospera*, justice *hypocrisis*, prudence Satan (the four main threats of the Church); *Sententiae* 1.42, *Opera* 6.2: 21: prudence fights *adversa*, fortitude *prospera*, justice *vana gloria*, temperance the devil; 2.152, pp. 52–53: the helmet of prudence, the breastplate of temperance, the shield of constancy, and the sword of justice are the four principal arms of Christians (cf. Eph. 6:14–17); 3.107, p. 174: the four principal virtues protect humans against the four winds of sin (*suggestio*, *delectatio*, *consensus*, *superbia/desperatio*); 3.120, p. 222: “fortitudo ... necessaria est illis quos minae cogunt; temperantia illis quos promissa alliciunt; prudentia illis quos errores decipiunt; iustitia, id est rectitudo voluntatis, illis quibus mala sapore sui se incutiunt. Et haec quattuor virtutes sunt principales, quia omne consilium nequam et impium exstirpant”; *Sermones de diversis* 113, *Opera* 6.1: 391: the four virtues set one free of sin; *Sermo de conversione* 10.21, *Opera* 4: 93: fortitude fights temptation, prudence folly, temperance desire, justice enables one to act well.

¹⁷³ See Isaac of Stella, *Sermones* 43.22–24, 3: 79–80: prudence fights the devil, temperance our impulses, patience adversity, while justice resides in doing the good; likewise Thomas the Cistercian, *Commentaria in Cantica* 1, 3, 7, and 8, PL 206: 70D–71A, 191B–

Interpreting the cardinal virtues as shields against sin and a stairway to heaven has obvious antecedents in early medieval writing, but the Cistercian reflections on the virtues go beyond tradition in several respects. First, Cistercian authors tend to present the cardinal virtues as constitutive elements of the contemplative rather than the active life (a view preceded in the work of Honorius Augustodunensis). In *De consideratione*, Bernard urges Pope Eugenius III (r. 1148–1153), a former monk of Clairvaux, to turn away from worldly affairs and lead a spiritual life devoted to God. The cardinal virtues, brought forth by *consideratio*—the central concept of the work, denoting a self-reflection which leads to religious transformation—serve as a base for this enterprise.¹⁷⁴ For Aelred of Rievaulx (ca. 1110–1167) the four virtues likewise perfect the growth of man to the contemplative life by conditioning true, spiritual friendship.¹⁷⁵ Godfrey of Auxerre (ca. 1120–after 1194), Bernard’s secretary and abbot of Clairvaux from 1161, even interprets the four virtues as ascetic qualities, associating them with *spernere mundum* (temperance), *spernere nullum* (justice), *spernere sese* (prudence), and *spernere se sperni* (magnanimity).¹⁷⁶ Moreover, Godfrey adapts Bernard’s connection of the virtues with peace (temperance brings peace of the flesh, fortitude peace of the mind, prudence peace with fellow human beings, justice peace with God) to a more pious set of connotations, associating the virtues with peace *cum Deo* (fortitude), *sub Deo* (temperance), *a Deo* (justice), and *in Deo* (prudence).¹⁷⁷ In accordance with these interpretations, many Cistercian authors employ the metaphor of the cardinal virtues as the walls, pillars, or “squared stones” of the spiritual edifice (Job’s house, the *domus interior*, the House of Wisdom, etc.) in which the religious

D, 443C–444A, 575C–578D. All four virtues fighting sin: see, e.g., Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermones de oneribus* 6, PL 195: 385A–B; *De spiritali amicitia* 2.49, CCCM 1: 311: prudence fights *errores*, temperance *libidines*, justice *malitia*, fortitude *ignavia*; *Sermones* 64.21–24, CCCM 2B: 168–169: temperance fights *libidines*, justice *inaequalitates*, fortitude *adversa*, prudence *errores*. Virtues accompanying the soul to Wisdom: see, e.g., Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermones* 22.20, 39.9–19, and 55.20, CCCM 2A: 181, 314–317, CCCM 2B: 86; id., *Sermones de oneribus* 22, PL 195: 451B–D; Isaac of Stella, *Sermones* 3, 1: 114–128.

¹⁷⁴ Bernard of Clairvaux, *De consideratione* 1.8–11, *Opera* 3: 404–406.

¹⁷⁵ Aelred of Rievaulx, *De speculo caritatis* 1.32.90–92, CCCM 1: 52–54 (cf. Peter of Blois, *De amicitia christiana* 2.12–13, pp. 298–312 = PL 207: 906C–909B); *De Iesu puero* 3.20, CCCM 1: 267; *De spiritali amicitia* 1.49, CCCM 1: 297.

¹⁷⁶ Godfrey of Auxerre, *Super Apocalypsim* 19, pp. 234–235. The list of four kinds of *spernere* is attributed to Malachias of Armagh (1094/95–1148); cf. Pseudo-Hildebert of Le Mans, *Carmina* 124, PL 171: 1437A; Peter the Chanter, *Verbum abbreviatum* 114, PL 205: 302D.

¹⁷⁷ Id., *Expositio in Cantica* 6 (Sermo dominica in septuagesima), p. 573.

personality resides,¹⁷⁸ or, less frequently, as building blocks of the entire Church.¹⁷⁹ Helinand of Froidmont's appeal to a former Cistercian novice and Premonstratensian who had left the monastery to marry a woman shows that these metaphors could serve as forceful instruments of persuasion:

Return, brother, return from your wanderings in the world in which the unfaithful abide ... to the cloistral tetragon, where through the marvelous working of prudence the columns of justice, posed on the bases of fortitude and most firmly consolidated by the cement of temperance ... stabilize the ravishing quadrangle of the perfectly ordered life.¹⁸⁰

Statements like these are not only rhetorically significant. Helinand suggests that the contemplative life as sustained by the cardinal virtues is only to be found in the monastery. Cistercian authors certainly believed, like many early medieval authors, that the cardinal virtues should be observed by every Christian, and that the secular clergy had a special responsibility in teaching the virtues to their flocks.¹⁸¹ But their association of the virtues with the contemplative life which has its perfect setting in the monastery strongly suggests that the true champions of virtue are

¹⁷⁸ See Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sententiae* 3.111, *Opera* 6.2: 189–190 (virtues sustaining Job's house); id., *Sermones de diversis* 52.2–4 and 98, *Opera* 6.1: 275–276 (House of Wisdom sustained by four virtues and the Trinity), 365 (House of Wisdom built of squared stones); Hugh of Pontigny, sermon cited in Talbot, "The Sermons of Hugh of Pontigny", and Delhay, *Le problème de la conscience*, 100–101 n. 107 (virtues as walls of the *domus conscientiae*); Galand of Reigny, *Proverbia* 113, p. 154 (virtues surrounding the *interior domus* of the religious); Garnier of Langres (?), *Allegoriae in sacram scripturam*, PL 112: 889C–D (virtues as legs of the *cathedra iustitiae*—seat of the *boni*—or *austeritas spiritualis regiminis*). This last text is sometimes ascribed to Garnier of Saint Victor or Adam Scot; see Hoste, "Garnier de Rochefort", 128; Dimier, "Garnier de Rochefort", 1291.

¹⁷⁹ See Galand of Reigny, *Proverbia* 6, pp. 58–60 (with charity as cement); Isaac of Stella, *Sermo* 1.14, 3: 290; Garnier of Langres, *Sermo* 38, PL 205: 814C.

¹⁸⁰ Helinand of Froidmont, *De reparatione lapsi*, PL 212: 756D–757A: "Redi, frater, redi a mundano circuitu, in quo impii ambulant ... ad claustralem tetragonum, ubi mirabiliter fabricante prudentia, columnae iustitiae super bases fortitudinis, caemento temperantiae firmissime solidatae ... vitae ordinatissimae pulcherrimam stabiliunt quadraturam".

¹⁸¹ See Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermo* 64.21–24, CCCM 2B: 168–169: the cardinal virtues are necessary for everyone, but especially for priests; cf. Godfrey of Auxerre, *De colloquio Simonis cum Jesu* 15, pp. 120–122: the four virtues are indispensable for clerics, even though many neglect them. When in 1130 Guy of Lausanne was elected bishop, Bernard wrote him a short note to explain that he needed the cardinal virtues in his new function; see *Ep.* 26, *Opera* 7: 79. Henry of France, brother of King Louis VII and monk in Clairvaux, applied Bernard's note to himself when he became bishop of Beauvais in 1149; see *Ep.* 146 in Peter the Venerable, *Letters*, p. 361. See also Adam of Perseigne, *Ep.* 62 (written ca. 1215/22), p. 613: bishops should lead their flocks to heaven on the bridge constructed by their personal conduct based on the four virtues.

the regular clergy—quite in contrast to contemporary suggestions that even unbelievers can boast of moral goodness.

A second aspect by which Cistercian speculations on the virtues surpass traditional views is the elaboration of the bond of the cardinal virtues and Christian love. While humility still counted as the prime virtue for Benedictine authors, the Victorines understood virtue in terms of charity; in the Cistercian hierarchy of virtues, charity ranks equally with humility (as it does, for instance, in the work of Hildegard of Bingen and in contemporary papal correspondence).¹⁸² Bernard of Clairvaux declares humility essential for the other virtues in many of his writings,¹⁸³ but he makes similar statements about charity, calling it the *virtutum magistra* which guarantees the salvific character of all other virtues.¹⁸⁴ Other Cistercian writers display a similar ambiguity. *De statu virtutum*, an anonymous work written for Cistercian novices, proclaims both humility and charity the fountainhead of the other virtues;¹⁸⁵ Aelred does likewise in *De institutione inclusarum*,¹⁸⁶ while Ogerius of Locedio

¹⁸² See Hildegard of Bingen, *Ep.* 85 R/A, CCCM 91: 205: “he due uirtutes omnes reliquas uirtutes producant”; likewise *Liber divinorum operum* 1.4.46 (comm.) and 3.3.3, CCCM 92: 180, 382; *Scivias* 1.2.33 (title: *De commendatione humilitatis et caritatis que clariores ceteris virtutibus existunt*) with comm., CCCM 43: 37–38. But see the following passages for humility alone as *regina virtutum*: *Liber divinorum operum* 3.2.10 (comm.), CCCM 92: 368; *Scivias* 1.2.31 (comm.), 3.8.2 (comm.) and 3.13.9 (comm.), CCCM 43: 34 and CCCM 43A: 481, 624, 629; the last two passages have a parallel in *Ordo virtutum* (ed. Pitra), 459, 464; (ed. Barth et al.), 302, 312. The formula “virtutum omnium magistram, charitatem et humilitatem” appears in Anastasius IV, *Ep.* 84, PL 188: 1083A = Jaffé, *Regesta* 2: 102 nr. 9941 (6816); Alexander III, *Ep.* 616, PL 200: 584C = Jaffé, *Regesta* 2: 223, nr. 11619 (7759); Innocent III, *Ep.* VIII/214, PL 215: 800B.

¹⁸³ See Diers, *Bernhard von Clairvaux*, 70–78; Kitchen, “Bernard of Clairvaux’s *De gradibus*”.

¹⁸⁴ See e.g. *Parabolae* 1bis (ed. Rochais, *Enquête*), p. 55: charity as “vera Dei sponsa et virtutum magistra”; *Sententiae* 3.111, *Opera* 6.2: 192: “Caritas in nullo est sola, huius ad virtutes tanta est cohaerentia, ut, ubi ipsa fuerit, et virtutum sit praesentia. Sine caritate non prosunt ad salutem aliae virtutes”.

¹⁸⁵ Pseudo-Bernard of Clairvaux, *De statu virtutum* 1.4, PL 184: 794C: *humilitas sufficiens* is “genitrix virtutum”, *humilitas abundans* and *superabundans* “nutriunt virtutes, et custodiunt et ampliant”; 1.15, 798D–799A: humility as “fundamentum in quo oportet reliquas virtutes fundari”; but see 3.37, 810C: “Nulla virtus sine caritate roboratur, imo in peccatum vertitur”; 3.39, 812A: “Charitas enim omnium virtutum obtinet principatum, unde et vinculum perfectionis dicitur [Col. 3:14], eo quod universae virtutes ejus vinculo religuntur”. On this text, see Leclercq, “Le premier écrit authentique”; Lottin, “Quelques recueils”, 266–268. See also Bloomfield 0740 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 0740.

¹⁸⁶ *De institutione inclusarum* 24 and 27, CCCM 1: 656 (humility “omnium uirtutum fundamentum”), 659 (charity “omnes uirtutes contineat, et constringat in unum”).

(ca. 1140/50–1214) calls charity the *regina virtutum* in one of his sermons, but humility the *virtutum imperatrix* in another.¹⁸⁷ Accordingly, some Cistercians present humility as the root of the cardinal virtues,¹⁸⁸ while others, including Bernard himself and William of Saint Thierry (ca. 1085–1148), opt for charity.¹⁸⁹ Aelred, the greatest theorician of love of the Cistercian order, presents the four virtues as servants of charity in *De speculo caritatis*. Faith, hope, and the cardinal virtues are the six working days preceding the Sabbath of charity. The main function of the four virtues in the present life is to protect humans against wrong forms of love. Temperance fights against the enticements of the body, prudence against loving the blameworthy, fortitude against the betrayal of love in adversity, justice (which amounts to *caritas ordinata*) against inequality. In heaven, where there will be no more evil to combat, the cardinal virtues will merge into charity itself.¹⁹⁰ The Augustinian inspiration of Aelred's observations, which were extracted in a number of twelfth-century religious works,¹⁹¹ is manifest; they actually depend on Augustine's Letter 167, written to Jerome. Equally Augustinian in character is Aelred's claim that "our philosophers have pointed out that anything which does not spring from the root of charity should be removed from the fruits of virtue".¹⁹²

¹⁸⁷ Ogerius of Locedio, *Sermones de verbis Domini in coena* 5.5–6 and 11.8, PL 184: 901C–D (charity), 934B (humility).

¹⁸⁸ See Pseudo-Bernard of Clairvaux, *Ep.* 469.2, PL 182: 674B–C; Godfrey of Auxerre, *Expositio in Cantica* 2, pp. 160–180; Adam of Perseigne, *Ep.* 7, PL 211: 602A = *Ep.* 11 (ed. Bouvet), p. 186.

¹⁸⁹ See Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sententiae* 1.22, *Opera* 6.2: 15: "Debet unusquisque proximum suum diligere tamquam seipsum, ut quem poterit hominem ... adducat ad Deum colendum. Haec qui sola discretionem eligit, prudens est; qui nulla hinc afflictione avertitur, fortis est; qui nulla alia delectatione, temperans est; qui nulla elatione, iustus est"; William of Saint Thierry, *Expositio super Cantica* 24.116, CCCM 87: 83–84; Isaac of Stella, *Sermones* 4.16, 43.14 and 43.21, 1: 141, 3: 72, 78; Thomas the Cistercian, *Commentaria in Cantica* 6, PL 206: 394B. Some Cistercians present charity as the root of all virtues without referring to the cardinal virtues in particular: see, e.g., Galand of Reigny, *Parabola* 18.4, p. 302; id., *Proverbia* 13, p. 66; Gilbert of Hoyland, *Sermones in Canticum* 32.6, PL 184: 170A; Gunther of Pairis, *De oratione, jejuniis et elemosyna* 4.1, PL 212: 133B. Similar statements about humility occur as well.

¹⁹⁰ Aelred of Rievaulx, *De speculo caritatis* 1.31.89 and 33.93–97, CCCM 1: 52, 54–56 (the parallels with Augustine's *Ep.* 167 are not noted in the edition).

¹⁹¹ See *Compendium speculi caritatis*; Pseudo-Bernard of Clairvaux, *De charitate* 13, PL 194: 606D–607B; Peter of Blois, *De amicitia christiana* esp. 2.11, pp. 294–296 (= PL 207: 906A–C); see also Koehn, "Pierre de Blois", esp. 1515.

¹⁹² Aelred of Rievaulx, *De speculo caritatis* 1.33.93, p. 55: "quidquid de radice caritatis non pullulauerit, a uirtutum fructibus sequestrandum nostri philosophi censuerunt".

The idea that virtuous love is a divine perfection of the soul's natural affect for goodness is commonplace in twelfth-century Cistercian writing.¹⁹³ Bernard subscribes to Hugh of Saint Victor's view that virtues are natural *affectiones* ordered by grace¹⁹⁴ and elaborates this view in a couple of sermons, identifying in one case the mental affects underlying the virtues with the four basic passions (*affectus*) of man: *amor*, *laetitia*, *timor*, *tristitia*. Bernard explains that these passions can turn either into the cardinal virtues or into vices, thereby taking distance from the Stoic view of the four passions as the virtues' counterparts.¹⁹⁵ In a similar vein, Isaac of Stella (ca. 1100-after 1167) argues in his *Epistola de anima* as well as in several sermons that the passions become cardinal virtues if they are developed into the four modes of the love of God as distinguished in Augustine's *De moribus ecclesiae*. Isaac's view found wide diffusion in the later Middle Ages, especially because it made its way into the Pseudo-Augustinian treatise *De spiritu et anima*.¹⁹⁶ The cardinal virtues are likewise conceived as transformations of the four passions in the work of Godfrey of Auxerre and Garnier of Langres (ca. 1140–1225/26) as well as in *De origine virtutum et vitiorum* (ca. 1200/30), which may be a Cistercian product.¹⁹⁷ Outside Cistercian writing, the idea that the cardinal virtues are perfections of the four passions is not found in

¹⁹³ See, e.g., id., *Genealogia regum Anglorum* Praef., PL 195: 712D, for the recognition of a natural love of virtue in the rational soul; Thomas the Cistercian, *Commentaria in Cantica* 6, 7, and 10, PL 206: 411B ("naturalis innocentia ... per se non est virtus, sed informata charitate transit in virtutem"), 473A ("naturales potentiae, ut pudicitia, sobrietas ... sine charitate non sunt virtutes"), 708A ("virtutes sine charitate non virtutes sed, sed naturales potentiae"). See also below, p. 114, for William of Saint Thierry.

¹⁹⁴ See Bernard of Clairvaux, *Liber de gratia et de libero arbitrio* 17, *Opera* 3: 178.

¹⁹⁵ See id., *Sermones de diversis* 50.2–3, *Opera* 6.1: 271–272 (prudence is *probatas timor*, temperance *temperata laetitia*, fortitude *confortata tristitia*, justice *ordinatus timor*). Cf. *ibid.* 72.2, pp. 308–309: grace forms the virtues of justice and fortitude which arise from the will, and of prudence and temperance which arise from reason; justice is, in its highest form, a *perfectio animae rationalis*. See also *Sententiae* 3.120, *Opera* 6.2: 222, where Bernard contrasts the four virtues negatively with *timor*, *spes*, *ira*, and *gaudium*.

¹⁹⁶ Isaac of Stella, *Epistola de anima*, PL 194: 1877B–D, 1878D–1879A = Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* 13 and 4, PL 40: 789, 782; cf. *ibid.* 20, p. 794. See also id., *Sermones* 3.1–2, 4.2, 4.16, and 17.11, 1: 114, 130, 141, 318. Isaac's four passions are *metus* or *timor*, *dolor* (both originating from *irascibilitas*), *gaudium*, and *spes* or *desiderium* (both originating from *concupiscibilitas*).

¹⁹⁷ See Garnier of Langres, *Sermo* 22, PL 205: 719A–721C, conceiving two complementary "circles of the perfect life", one depicting the virtues connected through the passions, the other good works connected through the virtues. For Godfrey and *De origine virtutum*, see below, pp. 244–245, 250–251.

the twelfth century, even though the view that the virtues regulate the affective life was widely accepted.¹⁹⁸

The religious preoccupation of the Cistercians did not prevent them from occasionally referring to ancient doctrines on moral virtue (virtue as a *habitus*, virtue as a mean between two defects, the connection of the cardinal virtues, the four degrees of the cardinal virtues according to Macrobius), although they usually avoided quoting the classics by name.¹⁹⁹ Bernard set the example in this respect as well. In *De consideratione*, he claims that the cardinal virtues are closely interconnected and constitute means between the vices: prudence consists in finding the mean, justice in directing oneself to the mean, fortitude in adopting it, temperance in using and preserving it. Yet Bernard's frame of reference is strictly biblical. Taking an anti-intellectual attitude, he states that he has no intention of debating the virtues, only of exhorting to *consideratio*, thereby dissimulating the philosophical elements integrated into his religious ethic.²⁰⁰ Neither does Bernard refer to the Stoics when examining the relations between the virtues and the passions. It might even be in order to manifest his autonomy from ancient moral philosophy that he sometimes lists fortitude as the first cardinal virtue,²⁰¹ an unusual choice followed only in his immediate environment.²⁰²

¹⁹⁸ See Gilbert Foliot, *Expositio in Cantica* (on 7:11), PL 202: 1288B; Wolbero of Sankt Pantaleon, *Commentaria in Canticum* (on 6:12), PL 195: 1222D–1223A, 1225C; Peter Comestor, *Sermo* 19, PL 198: 1774C–1775A; Alan of Lille, sermon cited in Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires* 2: 246 n. 15; Innocent III, *Sermones communes* 5, PL 217: 615C.

¹⁹⁹ *Habitus*: Isaac of Stella, *Sermo* 3.1, 1: 114 (“*habitus animi bene constituti*”; cf. Boethius, *De differentiis topicis* 2); likewise id., *Sermo* 4.16, 1: 141; id., *Epistola de anima*, PL 194: 1878D (= Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* 4, PL 40: 782); *De origine virtutum*, *passim*. Mean: Isaac of Stella, *Sermo* 53.7, 3: 242; *De origine virtutum*, p. 130 (both quoting Horace, *Ep.* 1.18.9, without acknowledgment); Garnier of Langres, *Sermo* 14, PL 205: 663B. Connection: Garnier of Langres, *Sermo* 22, PL 205: 719B–C; *De origine virtutum*, p. 132. The fourfold division of the virtues of Macrobius is quoted without acknowledgment in *De spiritu et anima* 20, PL 40: 794, and with an acknowledgment to Plotinus in *De origine virtutum*, pp. 130–131.

²⁰⁰ Bernard of Clairvaux, *De consideratione* 1.8–11, *Opera* 3: 404–406. Bernard refers, however, to the “philosopher’s” saying *ne quid nimis*; cf. Seneca, *De vita beata* (*Dialogi* 7) 13.5, p. 210: “in virtute non est verendum, ne quid nimium sit, quia in ipsa est modus”. *Ne quid nimis* occurs as a standard phrase in Latin Christian literature from patristic times. For other discussions of virtue as a mean in Bernard’s work, see *Sermones super Cantica* 58.10, *Opera* 2: 134; *Sententiae* 3.126.5, *Opera* 6.2: 244 (referring to Boethius).

²⁰¹ See, e.g., *Sermo de conversione ad clericos* 10.21, *Opera* 4: 93; *Sermones de diversis* 72.2, *Opera* 6.1: 308; *Parabola* 6.6, *Opera* 6.2: 287; *Ep.* 26, *Opera* 7: 79.

²⁰² See Hugh of Pontigny, sermon cited in Talbot, “The Sermons of Hugh of Pontigny”, 16–17, and in Delhay, *Le problème de la conscience morale*, 100–101 n. 107; Pseudo-

Bernard's works contain only one direct attack on a philosophical understanding of the cardinal virtues. But it is an attack of singular vehemence:

It must be remarked too that the wise of this world have multiplied arguments about these four virtues to no purpose; they had no chance of grasping their true meaning, because they knew nothing of him whom God made our wisdom in order to teach us prudence, our righteousness to forgive our sins, our holiness through his example of chaste and temperate living, and our redemption through patience in his resolute acceptance of death ... What have you to do with righteousness if you are ignorant of Christ, who is the righteousness of God? Where, I ask, is true prudence, except in the teaching of Christ? Or true justice, if not from Christ's mercy? Or true temperance, if not in Christ's life? Or true fortitude, if not in Christ's Passion? Only those can be called prudent who are imbued with his teaching; only those are just who have had their sins pardoned through his mercy; only those are temperate who take pains to follow his way of life; only those are courageous who hold fast to the example of his patience when buffeted by sufferings. Vainly therefore will anyone strive to acquire the virtues, if he thinks they may be obtained from any source other than the Lord of the virtues, whose teaching is the seed-bed of prudence, whose mercy is the well-spring of justice, whose life is a mirror of temperance, whose death is the badge of fortitude.²⁰³

Observations on the futile ancient dealings with the virtues also occur in the writings of Aelred of Rievaulx and Henry of Marcy (ca. 1140–1189, abbot of Clairvaux in 1176),²⁰⁴ but perhaps Godfrey of Auxerre was Bernard's best disciple in this respect. Godfrey distinguishes true and false cardinal virtues in the following way:

Bernard of Clairvaux, *Ep.* 469.1, PL 182: 674A–B; Gilbert of Hoyland, *Sermones in Canticum* 36.7, PL 184: 192C–D; Godfrey of Auxerre, *Expositio in Cantica* 3 and 6 (*Sermo in ascensione Domini*, *Sermo dominica in septuagesima*), pp. 293–294, 545, 573; id., *Mariale*, *Sermo* 1 in assumptione Mariae, p. 234; Henry of France, *Ep.* 146, in Peter the Venerable, *Letters*, p. 361.

²⁰³ *Sermones super Cantica* 22.10–11, *Opera* 1: 136–137; trans. Walsh, *On the Song of Songs*, 103.

²⁰⁴ See Aelred of Rievaulx, *De speculo caritatis* 3.31.75, CCCM 1: 141; *De spiritali amicitia* 1.26, CCCM 1: 293; *Sermones* 21.8–10, CCCM 2A: 166–167; Henry of Marcy, *De peregrinante civitate Dei* 6, PL 204: 303C–D: the bread, wine, and water of the Eucharist “sunt illa tria, quae philosophi prudentiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam vocaverunt, et in eorum perfectione justitiam humanam constituerunt”; having no understanding of God, the philosophers vainly attributed the virtues to themselves. Cf. William of Auberive, *De sacramentis numerorum*, cited in Leclercq, “L'arithmétique de Guillaume d'Auberive”, 187: “O gratia, uirtutum uita, uenia uitiorum! Sine te culpa non tollitur, sine te nomine suo uirtus abutitur”.

Temperance is no true virtue if someone refrains from the enticements of desire by the execution of his own will; neither is prudence true which is highminded and departs from the humble; nor is it proper to fortitude to bear burdens in such a way as to hate the person who imposed them; nor does justice earn a reward in the eyes of God if it is practiced in the eyes of men in order to be seen by them. Let your mind, then, be dusted with this divine yeast, so that your temperance may imitate him who came to do his Father's will rather than his own; so that your prudence may learn of him humility of heart in order to stoop to the small; may your fortitude likewise learn meekness so that it loves those whom it endures, and may your justice refuse the praise of men ... Justice lacking purity, magnanimity lacking meekness, prudence lacking humility, and temperance unaccompanied by obedience are not genuine. May our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of the virtues and the King of glory, confer on us the fullness of all of these virtues.²⁰⁵

Statements like Bernard's and Godfrey's clearly express that there can be no virtue but Christian virtue. Adopting the classical scheme of the cardinal virtues, the Cistercians invest it with undiluted Christian content, taking Christ himself as the sole model of morality and denying any common ground with the ethical systems of antiquity, thereby attempting to disinfect the virtues from the classicizing pollution that had recently come about them.

Seen against this background, it is remarkable that several Cistercians leave some room in their writings for the existence of virtue outside the faith. According to Gilbert of Hoyland († 1172), Christians share good works and virtues with non-Christians, even though the absence of grace makes their virtues "sterile".²⁰⁶ Aelred admits in one sermon

²⁰⁵ Godfrey of Auxerre, *Expositio in Cantica* 6 (Sermo in festivitate Benedicti), pp. 502–503: "Non enim vera virtus est temperantia, si quis illecebras voluptatum propriae voluntatis executione declinat; nec prudentia vera est, quae altum sapit et humilibus non consentit; nec fortitudinis sic tolerare molestias, ut oderis inferentem; nec iustitia fructum invenit coram Deo, si coram hominibus fiat, ut videaris ab eis. Habeat ergo etiam spiritus tuus divini huius fermenti conspersione, ut imitetur eum temperantia tua qui non suam venit sed Patris facere voluntatem, ut ab eodem discat prudentia tua cordis humilitatem, ut parvulis condescendat; discat et mansuetudinem fortitudo tua, ut quos tolerat, diligit, sed et iustitia tua gloriam ab hominibus non accipiat ... Non est enim vera iustitia cui puritas deest, non magnanimitas cui mansuetudo, non prudentia cui humilitas, non temperantia cui oboedientia non cohaeret. Quarum omnium veram nobis virtutum plenitudinem, virtutum Dominus et rex gloriae conferat Iesus Christus Dominus noster". The remark on temperance seems to detach virtue from the will, but the emphasis is here on the *own* will as contrasted to the will subjected to God; see also *ibid.* (Sermo in annuntiatione Mariae), p. 584, for a connection between *temperantia* and *obtemperantia*.

²⁰⁶ Gilbert of Hoyland, *Sermones in Canticum* 33.3, PL 184: 172D: "Opera ipsa et virtutes cum his qui foris sunt communia nobis esse possunt, unguenta non possunt"

that pagan philosophers understood by reason the four cardinal virtues which spring from Wisdom,²⁰⁷ while William of Saint Thierry, the most influential Cistercian author after Bernard, asserts that the rational soul consists *naturaliter* of the four cardinal virtues, just as the body consists of the four elements.²⁰⁸ In his famous letter to the brethren of Mont-Dieu, William credits the ancients with an *affectus virtutum naturalis* and twice refers to virtue as a product of nature rather than grace.²⁰⁹ At the same time, William subscribes to the idea that virtue depends on faith and has its unique source in Christ, while he denies that the apparent virtues of the pagans have real significance.²¹⁰ Probably William believed, like many of his confreres, that virtue has its origin in nature but its perfection in grace. His letter to the brethren explains at length that the cardinal and other virtues are perfections of reason and will brought about by God;²¹¹ the cardinal virtues in particular provide the order of man's spiritual ascent.²¹² Yet William suggests in one other work that man, created in the image of God, is capable by his own power of the highest good:

For God is the fullness of all goods, and man is the image of God. Therefore in that he is capable of the fullness of every good, the image is like unto his Exemplar. For the form of every good is in us: of virtue, wisdom, and everything that can be thought to be better. Moreover, man expresses his dignity in this ... that his soul has within itself a will able to do what it desires, that is, the power of free judgment.²¹³

(referring to the *unctio* given by the Holy Ghost); *ibid.* 36.6, 192A: "Steriles sunt virtutes, quae non fecundantur per fidem"; see also 32.6, 170A: no virtue can exist without charity.

²⁰⁷ Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermo* 22.20, CCCM 2A: 181: "primae generationes Sapientiae, quattuor scilicet principales uirtutes ... etiam gentiles philosophi potuerunt ratione docente cognoscere".

²⁰⁸ William of Saint Thierry, *De natura corporis et animae* 88, CCCM 88: 134.

²⁰⁹ *Epistola ad fratres* 221, 276, and 284, CCCM 88: 274 ("Virtus uero, quoniam naturae res est"), 285 ("uirtutes ... uelut naturaliter insitas"), 286 (*affectus*).

²¹⁰ See *Speculum fidei* 41, p. 106; *Expositio super Cantica* 21.101, CCCM 87: 75–76.

²¹¹ *Epistola ad fratres* 50–51 and 227–230, CCCM 88: 238, 275–276; cf. *Speculum fidei* 4, p. 64: "Virtus namque est recta vel perfecta ratio".

²¹² See Ingham, "Phronesis and prudentia", 641–643.

²¹³ William of Saint Thierry, *De natura corporis et animae* 86, CCCM 88: 133: "Plenitudo enim omnium bonorum est Deus, imago autem Dei est homo. Igitur in eo quod sit plenitudinis omnis boni capax, ad principale exemplum imago habet similitudinem. Est enim in nobis omnis boni forma, uirtutis, sapientiae, et omnium quae in melius possunt intelligi. In eo item quod ... animus ... per se potentem ad id quod desiderat habet uoluntatem, uirtutem scilicet liberi arbitrii, suam exprimit dignitatem". Translation adapted from *The Nature of the Body and Soul*, p. 138.

With these words, which could have been written by a Quattrocento humanist, William cannot seriously have meant to say that man can reach perfect goodness and virtue without divine assistance. His letter to the brethren explains that man, though capable of goodness through his likeness to God, is incapable of forming his own will and therefore needs to submit his will to God. Only thus can the cardinal and other virtues develop.²¹⁴ If virtue consists in a spontaneous assent with the good, humans must accept grace before this spontaneity becomes possible.²¹⁵

Other Religious Authors

Transforming the cardinal virtues into qualities of the religious life was no exclusively Cistercian phenomenon. Numerous twelfth-century regular and secular clerics used architectural metaphors (the four virtues as walls, corners, stones, etc.) in order to present the virtues as structuring the individual soul or the Church,²¹⁶ while the tropological interpretation of the cloister in the light of the virtues found its most elaborate expression in *De clauastro animae* of the Augustinian canon Hugh of Fouillooy († ca. 1172).²¹⁷ Accordingly, some monastic writers connected the four virtues with the regular clergy in particular.²¹⁸ Yet associations

²¹⁴ See *Epistola ad fratres* 50–51, CCCM 88: 238.

²¹⁵ See *Meditativae orationes* 1.6 and 5.11, pp. 44, 100. For William's views on the formation of the self, see Van 't Spijker, *Fictions of the Inner Life*, 185–231.

²¹⁶ Soul: see Pseudo-Honorius Augustodunensis, *Expositio in Cantica* Prol., PL 172: 519C; Wolbero of Sankt Pantaleon, *Commentaria in Canticum*, PL 195: 1143B–D, 1224C; Peter of Celle, *De conscientia*, p. 214, cf. p. 203; Philip of Harveng, *Moralitates in Cantica*, PL 203: 540A–B, cf. 518A; Alexander Nequam, *Tractatus super mulierem fortem*, p. 110; Pseudo-Innocent III, *Commentarium in psalmos poenitentiales*, PL 217: 1020D–1021A; see also *Commentaria in Ruth* (on 4:11), CCCM 81: 288; for examples from hagiography, see Bejczy, “Les vertus cardinales”, 324–325. Church: see Werner II of Sankt Blasien, *Liber deflorationum*, PL 157: 1248C–D; cf. Peter of Celle, *De tabernaculo* 1b and 2.4, CCCM 54: 210, 230. Either the soul or the Church: Innocent III, *Ep.* VI.243, PL 215: 273B; *Sermones de tempore* 29, PL 217: 449C–450B (house of Christ); *Sermones de sanctis* 12, PL 217: 513A–B (house of Wisdom); *Sermones communes* 2, PL 217: 603C–D (*spiritualis civitas*, see Ps. 126).

²¹⁷ Hugh associates the virtues with the walls, the corners, and the stones of the monastery. See *De clauastro animae* 2.20, PL 176: 1074B–C (corners, following Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* 2.49.76); 3.15, 1116B–D (stones); 4.31, 1169A–B (walls, following Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Hiezechihelam* 2.10.18). Sometimes Hugh associates the cloistral quadrangle with alternative virtues; see *ibid.* 3.1–2, 1087D, 1088D. See also Bauer, *Claustrum animae*; Whitehead, “Making a Cloister of the Soul”; Laemers, “Claus-trum animae”.

²¹⁸ See Peter of Celle, *De disciplina claustrali* 17, p. 214; cf. Stephen of Chalmet, *Lettres des premiers chartreux*, 220–222; Irimbert of Admont, *In librum Iudicum* (on 20:2),

of the virtues with the active life as a preparation for celestial beatitude were still common in monastic literature near the end of the twelfth century,²¹⁹ while both regular and secular clerics confirmed that the virtues were especially needed by the priesthood,²²⁰ doubtless in order to set examples of virtue to those entrusted to their care.²²¹ Secular as well as religious writers attributed the cardinal virtues to each other in their letters,²²² while in hagiography, the cardinal virtues still figured as qualities of religious men and women as well as bishops. The virtues mostly illustrate the spiritual qualities of the saints, but sometimes also their capacities of wielding public power, as in some early medieval saints' lives.²²³ Moreover, the four virtues continued to be used as exegetical motives—in a letter on the method of Bible study, an unknown twelfth-century author typically recommends his correspondent to look carefully in both Testaments for lessons on the cardinal virtues and the vices opposing them²²⁴—and figured as a motif in hymns,²²⁵ liturgical

p. 415; cf. Thibault of Langres, *De quatuor modis* 2.1, p. 67 (the editor does not believe that Thibault was a regular cleric). Cf. Peter of Blois, *Sermo* 51, PL 207: 711A: "Istam quadrigam trahunt non solum quatuor evangelistae, sed quatuor status religiosorum, incipientium, proficientium, currentium, pervenientium" (the term *religiosi* can refer to monks, ecclesiastics, and devout people in general).

²¹⁹ See e.g. Irimbert of Admont, *In librum Iudicum* (on 20:2), p. 415; Philip of Harveng, *De silentio* 34, PL 203: 998D; Absalon of Springiersbach, *Sermo* 20, 26, and 28, PL 211: 122A–B, 155C, 166C–167A.

²²⁰ See Godfrey of Babion, *Sermo* 128, PL 171: 918B–D (for Godfrey's authorship, see Bonnes, "Un des plus grands prédicateurs", 200–205; Longère, *Les sermons latins de Maurice de Sully*); Innocent III, *Sermo de sanctis* 13, PL 217: 519B (= *Mysteria evangelicae legis* 1.26, PL 217: 785B–C); see also id., *De missarum mysteriis* 1.63, PL 217: 797D–798A; cf. id., *Sermones de diversis* 2, PL 217: 656D–657C, for the indispensability of prudence for popes; Robert of Flamborough, *Liber poenitentialis* (written 1208/13), pp. 111–112.

²²¹ Thus Wolbero of Sankt Pantaleon, *Commentaria in Canticum*, PL 195: 1183A–B, 1184C.

²²² See, e.g., Theobald of Bec, *Ep.* 70, in John of Salisbury, *Letters* 1: 112; Stephen of Tournai, *Lettres* 175 and 212, pp. 209, 263; "Lettre cistercienne", p. 187; Godfrey of Breteuil, *Epp.* 31 and 33, PL 205: 859A–B, 863D–864B. To judge by Hugh of Bologna's authoritative work on letter-writing, *Rationes dictandi* (1130), p. 59, alluding to the cardinal virtues of one's correspondent was a common procedure in 12th-century epistolography.

²²³ See Bejczy, "Les vertus cardinales dans l'hagiographie", 317–336, discussing 28 *vitae* of the 12th century which mention the cardinal virtues.

²²⁴ *Epistola ad Hugonem amicum de modo et ordine legendi sacram Scripturam*, PL 213: 716B–C: in both Testaments "natura cardinalium virtutum et vitiorum quae virtutibus opponuntur, undecunque haberi poterit, perquirenda et investiganda".

²²⁵ See *Prosarium Lemovicense* nos. 181 (*De ss. Petro et Paulo*), 183 (*De ss. Petro et Paulo*), and 227 (*In dedicatione Ecclesiae*), pp. 199, 201, 248. See also above, n. 92, for the hymn composed by Abelard.

texts,²²⁶ and religious art, for instance, in liturgical crosses with each arm representing one cardinal virtue.²²⁷ Let me take Christ's place at the Cross, prayed the Benedictine Ekbert of Schönau († 1184); let God pierce my left hand with temperance, my right hand with justice, my right foot with prudence, my left foot with fortitude!²²⁸ In this devotional atmosphere, little room was left for classicizing or secularizing interpretations. Nearly all religious authors of the twelfth century primarily understood the cardinal virtues as perfections of the human soul aiming at the union with God. The following passage in a sermon of Adam Scot (ca. 1150–1212/13), who in 1187/89 left the Premonstratensian order to become a Carthusian, may stand for many others. Adam associates the travel of Mary and Joseph from Galilee to Judea and from Nazareth to Bethlehem with the four virtues,

which are called cardinal or principal because of their great perfection, for having the secret of the faith revealed to us belongs to prudence, while firmly confessing the faith in confrontation with its enemies belongs to fortitude; likewise, executing good works nevertheless belongs to justice, and refusing all human praise and acclamation in doing those good works to temperance ... Climb up, then, from prudence, which resides in acknowledging the faith, to fortitude, which resides in oral confession; climb up from justice, which resides in the sanctity of outer action, to temperance, which resides in the rightness of the inner intention. In this way, proceeding spiritually from virtue to virtue, you will witness a daily progress in sanctity.²²⁹

²²⁶ See, e.g., John Beleth, *Summa de ecclesiasticis officiis* 23, CCCM 41A: 48: "Quatuor lectiones de euangelio, que secuntur, significant, quod laudatores Dei per quatuor euangeliorum doctrinam debent esse quatuor uirtutibus insigniti"; Sicardus of Cremona, *Mitræ* 1.13, PL 213: 48C–D (on the censor): "Si quatuor habuerit lineas, demonstrat eam ... quatuor uirtutibus, prudentia, iustitia, fortitudine, temperantia decorari"; ibid. 4.10, 188A: "Quaternarius psalmorum in uesperis ... nos dirigit ... ad quaternarium cardinalium uirtutum, circa quarum cardines expedit ut opera nostra uertantur" (likewise William Durand, *Rationale officiorum* 5.3.19, CCCM 140A: 62). A special motif is the association of priestly garments with the four virtues; see Bejczy, "Kings, Bishops", 272, 280–281; *Speculum de mysteriis ecclesiae* 6 (written by an anonymous Victorine), PL 177: 352D–353A.

²²⁷ See Katzenellenbogen, *Allegories*, 32–33; Bautz, *Virtutes*, 26 with n. 109.

²²⁸ Ekbert of Schönau, *Stimulus amoris*, PL 158: 759A–B (= Pseudo-Anselm of Canterbury, *Meditatio* 9, PL 184: 963B). Innocent III, *Sermones communes* 4, PL 217: 613A–C, likewise associates the virtues with the wounds of Christ.

²²⁹ Adam Scot, *Sermo* 23.11, 225C–D: "Et uidete si non in quatuor istis quatuor illae uirtutes continentur, quae ob magnam, quae eis inest, perfectionem, cardinales sive principales appellantur, nam secretum fidei nobis habere reuelatum, prudentiae; fidem uero constanter coram hostibus fidei confiteri, fortitudinis est. Sic nihilominus bonam exercere operationem iustitiae; omnem uero in eodem bono opere humanam refutare

Despite the predominance of devotional views like Adam's, a number of twelfth-century religious authors connected the cardinal virtues with royal government. The Benedictine Hugh of Fleury mentions the virtues as important qualities for rulers in his mirror written for King Henry I of England (ca. 1102/35), while historical writers as the Benedictine William of Malmesbury and the Cistercian bishop Otto of Freising associate the four virtues with Alfred the Great and Frederic Barbarossa, respectively.²³⁰ By 1200, moreover, two mirrors of princes appeared, both written by secular clerics, in which the cardinal virtues figure as the cornerstone of good government. In Gerald of Wales's *De principis instructione*, written between 1190 and 1216/17, the four virtues—mainly exemplified by ancient history and literature but recommended by Gerald under reference to Christ and the Bible—appear as the central ingredient of princely ethics,²³¹ while the canon Giles of Paris in his *Karolinus* (1200) upholds the virtuous life of Charlemagne as a glorious model to the future King Louis VIII of France. The first four books of the work, which describe the deeds of the Emperor, are each devoted to one of the cardinal virtues, while the fifth and last book explains how the emulation of Charlemagne's deeds will lead to virtue.²³² Possibly, the exploration of the political significance of the cardinal virtues in both texts was stimulated by the recognition of "political virtues" in Parisian theology near the end of the twelfth century.

laudem atque favorem, temperantiae est ... Ascendite ergo a prudentia quae est in fidei agnitione usque ad fortitudinem, quae est in oris confessione. Ascendite a iustitia, quae in sanctitate est exterioris actionis, usque ad temperantiam, quae in rectitudine est internae intentionis. Hoc modo de virtute in virtutem spiritualiter proficiendo quotidianum magis ac magis in sanctitate augmentum ... percipietis"; cf. *ibid.* 40.11, PL 198: 369D–370A, for an interpretation of the cardinal virtues as the perfections of the soul aiming at God.

²³⁰ Hugh of Fleury, *De regia potestate* 1.6, p. 473: "Debet etiam quattuor principalibus maxime pollere virtutibus, sobrietate videlicet, iusticia, prudentia ac temperantia. Nam sobrietate ab omni desidia vel torpore mentis defenditur; iusticia vero Deo simul et hominibus sensatis acceptabilis invenitur. Per prudentiam autem iustum ab iniusto separat et discernit, et temperantia omnem nimietatem evitat"; William of Malmesbury, *De gestis regum Anglorum* 2.124, p. 134 n. 1 app.; Otto of Freising, *Gesta Friderici I* Prol., pp. 11–12.

²³¹ See Bejczy, "Gerald of Wales". By the time Gerald started writing his treatise, Pope Innocent III recommended the virtues in a letter to Richard Lionheart: see Innocent III, *Ep.* 1/206, p. 296 (= PL 214: 179D–180A, PL 215: 1327B); see also Cheney and Cheney, *The Letters of Pope Innocent III*, no. 21.

²³² See Giles of Paris, *Karolinus*, esp. Prol., p. 236: "Ostenso in quatuor libris quomodo in his quatuor virtutibus se gessit Karolus, sine quibus non bene uiuitur". See also Billot-Vilandrau, "Charlemagne and the Young Prince".

Parisian Theology: Peter Lombard and After

The union of virtue and religion, which since the early twelfth century could no longer be taken for granted but was strenuously upheld in monastic writing, further dwindled after 1160 in intellectual discourse. Chiefly responsible for this development were the Parisian theologians of “Peter the Chanter’s circle”. These theologians, in majority secular clerics, formalized a distinction that remained implicit in the work of preceding generations of philosophers, lawyers, and theologians: the distinction between virtues uninformed by grace on the one hand and true, gratuitous, salvific virtues on the other. Remarkably, their recognition of uninformed virtue implies a rupture with Peter Lombard’s *Sententiae* (1155/57), which dominated academic theology from the late twelfth century until the age of the Reformation. In the next sections I will first examine the Lombard’s teaching on the virtues and then proceed with the novel ideas of the theologians active in the final decades of the twelfth century.

Peter Lombard

The Parisian bishop Peter Lombard († 1160) is often viewed as a conservative Augustinian thinker, especially in the field of ethics.²³³ To be sure, the Lombard restricts the notion of virtue in his *Sententiae* to qualities bestowed by grace. In a famous definition which he attributes to Augustine but in fact composed himself as an alternative for Hugh of Saint Victor’s definition, he describes virtue as “a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, that nobody uses badly, and that God alone works in man.”²³⁴ Although the term *qualitas* suggests influence of ancient philosophy, Peter insists, under frequent reference to Augustine, that virtue is a product of grace;²³⁵ elsewhere in the *Sententiae*, he argues that charity

²³³ Colish, *Peter Lombard*, marks a welcome turning-point in this respect.

²³⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II.27.1 § 1, 1: 480: “Virtus est, ut ait Augustinus, bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur et qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus solus in homine operatur”; cf. *ibid.* II.27.2.2, 1: 482: “quidam non inerudite tradunt uirtutem esse bonam mentis qualitatem siue formam, quae animam informat”. For discussions see Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 100–101, 114 n. 4; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 490–491. Only the phrases *recte vivitur* and *nemo male utitur* are actually taken from Augustine’s *De libero arbitrio*.

²³⁵ See Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II.27.1–7, 1: 480–485; cf. *id.*, *Glossa in Psalmos* (on 118:121), PL 191: 1105A.

is the mother and the form of every virtue.²³⁶ Contemporary Parisian masters agree with the Lombard in this respect,²³⁷ while his first followers extended his definition in such a way as to put even greater emphasis on the divine origin of virtue: God works the virtues *in homine sine homine*, or *in nobis sine nobis*.²³⁸ In later medieval commentaries on the *Sententiae* and other moral writings, the Lombard's definition is usually quoted in these extended forms.

Despite his apparently conservative stance, however, the Lombard explicitly recognizes non-Christian forms of morality. Even if only human intentions directed by the faith are meritorious, other intentions can also count as good: Jews or sinful Christians who assist the poor out of a natural compassion (*naturali pietate ductus*) do a good deed and possess a good will.²³⁹ Peter Lombard's modern commentators have not fully grasped the revolutionary nature of this statement.²⁴⁰ The Lombard not only braves the authority of Paul (*Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est*, Rom. 14:23),²⁴¹ but also contradicts his principal source text,

²³⁶ See *ibid.* III.23.3 § 2, 2: 142: charity "mater est omnium virtutum, quae omnes informat, sine qua nulla vera virtus est"; III.25.5 § 1, 2: 158; III.23.9 § 2, 2: 148: "Caritas enim causa est et mater omnium virtutum". Cf. *id.*, *Collectanea in Epistolas Pauli* (on Rom 1:17), PL 191: 1324A–B.

²³⁷ See e.g. Robert Pullen, *Sententiae* (ca. 1142/44) 1.15, PL 186: 711A: "omnis autem virtus a Domino Deo est"; 5.33, 854B–C: "Sola charitas ea virtus est quae virum bonum creat"; Pseudo-Odo of Ourscamp, *Quaestiones* 2.313, p. 140: "Sed virtutes putamus esse animae qualitates, quas Deus facit in nobis, quando vult; et item aufert a nobis, quando vult".

²³⁸ The addition *in homine sine homine* appears to be the work of Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae* III.1, PL 211: 1041A (dated 1168/76); see Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 102. It recurs in Peter the Chanter, *Summa Abel*, MS Paris, BnF lat. 10633, f. 133^v (see below, n. 258). I found the following 12th-century examples of the extension *in nobis sine nobis*: Alan of Lille, "A Commentary on the Our Father" 11, p. 161; Stephen Langton, *Summa quaestionum theologiae* CAMB092 and CAMB/212 (ed. Ebbesen and Mortensen), pp. 140–142 (twice), 165; Peter the Chanter, *Summa Abel*, f. 134^r: "Virtutes dicuntur ... quandoque dona gratuita, scilicet quae Deus operatur in nobis sine nobis"; *Summa Breves dies*, MS Oxford, Bodleian Laud. misc. 80, f. 165^{rb–va}: "sepe dicitur Deum operari uirtutes in nobis sine nobis ... operatur Deus uirtutes in nobis sine nobis, id est non ex nobis, quia non ex nobis est sed ex sola Dei misericordia ...". For the *Summa Breves dies*, see Quinto, *Doctor nominatissimus*, 43–53, and Emery et al., "Quaestiones, *Sententiae* and *Summae*", 34–60; for the numbering of Langton's questions, see Quinto, *Doctor nominatissimus*, 167–289.

²³⁹ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II.41.1–2, 1: 561–564.

²⁴⁰ Cf. Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 74; Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 484.

²⁴¹ In his discussion the Lombard quotes Rom. 14:23 as well as "Augustine" (actually Prosper of Aquitaine), *Sententiae ex Augustino delibatae* 106, PL 45: 1868: "Ubi deest agnitio aeternae veritatis, falsa virtus est, etiam in optimis moribus" (*Sententiae* II.41.1.3, 1: 562).

the anonymous twelfth-century *Summa sententiarum*, which denies that unbelievers can by nature have a good will.²⁴² Moreover, the example of natural compassion seems directed against those earlier authors (Julian Pomerius, Peter Abelard, Hugh of Saint Victor) who distinguish virtuous compassion inspired by charity from natural compassion which proceeds from inborn piety and is morally neutral at best.²⁴³ The Lombard's declaration in favour of natural goodness is echoed by his early commentators.²⁴⁴ Maurice of Sully (ca. 1120–1196), who succeeded Peter as bishop of Paris, admits in one of his sermons that wicked people are not only capable of doing the good (*bonum facere*) but even of doing well (*bene facere*), although this will not bring them into heaven.²⁴⁵

In the *Sententiae*, the theological and cardinal virtues more or less appear as joint schemes of principal virtues, in accordance with the tradition initiated by Conrad of Hirsau.²⁴⁶ In his distinction on the cardinal virtues (the division of the text into distinctions is actually the work of the thirteenth-century Franciscan theologian Alexander of Hales), Peter defines the virtues in reference to Sap. 8:7 and Augustine's *De Trinitate*, subscribing to the current view that by regulating our life on earth, the virtues open heaven for us. Thereupon, he argues that the four virtues are fully present in Christ; in fact, it is from him that we derive our virtues. Finally, Peter follows Augustine and Bede in stating that the four virtues will continue to exist in heaven, albeit with different functions.²⁴⁷ Partly inspired by Augustine is the Lombard's opinion, discussed in another distinction, that the virtues are not only necessarily connected by charity but also co-exist in equal measure in every individual, if not *in actu*, at least *in habitu*.²⁴⁸ A few decades earlier, Peter Abelard emphatically denied this view, which apparently was still not universally accepted by the end of the twelfth century.²⁴⁹

²⁴² *Summa sententiarum* 3.9, PL 176:104B–C.

²⁴³ Cf. Julian Pomerius, *De vita contemplativa* 3.1.5, PL 59: 475B–C; Peter Abelard, *Collationes*, pp. 140–142; id., *Problemata Heloissae* 14, PL 178: 700D–701B; Hugh of Saint Victor, *De quatuor voluntatibus in Christo*, PL 176: 844A–B; cf. id. (?), *Miscellanea* 1.180, PL 177: 577A–B.

²⁴⁴ See Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae* II.16, 2: 210; see also Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 80.

²⁴⁵ Maurice of Sully, sermon cited in Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires* 2: 231 n. 28.

²⁴⁶ The *Sententiae* subsequently discuss the theological virtues (III.23–32), the cardinal virtues (III.33), the gifts (III.34–35), and the commandments (III.37–40).

²⁴⁷ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III.33, 2: 187–189.

²⁴⁸ Ibid. III.36, 2: 202–205; see also Colish, "Habitus Revisited", 80.

²⁴⁹ See Peter Abelard, *Collationes*, pp. 118–120. Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae* III.30, PL 211: 1134A, mentions serious discord on the subject among "moderni doctores"; personally, he subscribes to the Lombard's view.

The Lombard's views of virtue in general and the cardinal virtues in particular became topics of debate from the late twelfth century. Even outside academic theology many authors, varying from religious writers to the Danish poet Anders Sunesen, proposed views that accord with those of the Lombard.²⁵⁰ Notably the observations on the virtues in a spiritual treatise of the Cistercian monk Gunther of Pairis (ca. 1150–ca. 1220) have a Lombardian ring about them. Gunther quotes “Augustine’s” (actually Peter’s) definition of virtue, repeatedly refers to virtue as a *qualitas*, and defends the interconnection of the virtues by accepting the distinction between *habitus* and *actus*. Also, he praises the morality of ancient philosophers such as Diogenes and Plato while rejecting the claim that they possessed virtues, since qualities uninformed by grace do not deserve the name of virtue.²⁵¹ Another example is Radulfus Ardens († ca. 1200), who is sometimes regarded as a Parisian master of theology but probably spent his entire active life in the Poitou. His *Speculum universalis* or *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis* constitutes the most voluminous work on the virtues and vices of the twelfth century. Following the Lombard, Radulfus insists that there can be good morals but no virtue without faith, in contrast to what “the philosophers” say. Radulfus makes a sharp distinction between the virtuous and the natural good: while virtuous intentions—that is: intentions firmed into unalterable dispositions

²⁵⁰ The Lombard's definitions of the cardinal virtues recur, e.g., in Herrad of Landsberg, *Hortus deliciarum* fragm. 931, 2: 466. For the survival of the virtues in the afterlife, see, e.g., Thomas the Cistercian, *Commentaria in Cantica* 6, PL 206: 370A; Adam Scot, *De tripartito tabernaculo* 3.7.150, PL 198: 755D–756B (using the Lombard's vocabulary). For the connection of the virtues, see, e.g., Wolbero of Sankt Pantaleon, *Commentaria in Canticum* (on 5:2), PL 195: 1182C–D (also on their equality); Innocent III, *Sermones de tempore* 16, PL 217: 387C; id., *Sermones de sanctis* 23, PL 217: 562A; id., *De missarum mysteriis*, PL 217: 962B. I know of two texts written ca. 1200 which contradict the connection of the virtues: Pseudo-Richard of Saint Victor, *De gemino paschate*, PL 196: 1072A–B, and Peter of Blois, *Ep.* 28.31–38, pp. 138–141 (written shortly after 1200; cf. Southern, “Some New Letters”, 420, for the view that Peter's letters are “theologically out of date”). For Anders Sunesen see esp. *Hexaameron* 7 ll. 3760–4182, pp. 194–210, discussing the virtues as a “quadriga ducens ad gaudia caeli” (l. 3765, p. 194). Anders was probably Stephen Langton's pupil; see Mortensen, “The Sources of Andrew Sunesen's *Hexaameron*”.

²⁵¹ See Gunther of Pairis, *De oratione, jejunio, et elemosyna* 3.1, PL 212: 123C (*qualitas*); 4.1, 133C–D (definition, praise; “Illud autem ignorari non debet, nullam animi qualitatem vere ac proprie virtutem nominari, nisi quam bonorum omnium mater charitas procreat et informat ... habitus mentis charitate informatus virtus est: remota autem qui in illis [ancient philosophers] propter fidem esse non poterat, virtutis nomine iudicatur indignus”); 13.3, 218B (*qualitas*, connection). The examples of Diogenes and Plato recall the reference to Socrates and Diogenes as embodying pagan fortitude in Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermo* 21.8, CCCM2A: 166, and Alan of Lille, *De arte praedicatoria* 24, PL 210: 160B (adding Cato).

and motivated by faith and charity; strikingly, this view combines the Augustinian focus on intention and charity with the Aristotelian notion of virtue as a fixed habit—procure salvation, naturally good intentions result in temporary rewards at best.²⁵² Virtues that are not directed to God are for Radulfus no virtues at all.²⁵³ At the same time, Radulfus admits that virtues have their origin in nature. His explanation (which has no antecedent in the Lombard's *Sententiae*) is that the virtues were given to man at his creation; after the Fall, man lost the virtues, which he can only recuperate through grace.²⁵⁴ Radulfus's complicated formal arrangements of the virtues have no antecedent in the *Sententiae* either and stand on their own in the history of medieval moral thought.²⁵⁵

Peter the Chanter's Circle

While Peter Lombard acknowledged the moral goodness of non-Christians but insisted that virtue could not exist without the faith, the Parisian masters active after the Lombard's death and grouped around Peter the Chanter († 1197) moved beyond the Lombard's system by expressly recognizing virtues outside the realm of religion.

²⁵² See Gründel, *Die Lehre des Radulfus Ardens*, 178–179, 214–219.

²⁵³ Radulfus Ardens, *Speculum universale* 10.65, MS Paris, Mazarine 709, f. 209^{vb}: “Deus enim est finis tam huius [sc. fortitudinis] quam ceterarum uirtutum alioquin non sunt uirtutes”.

²⁵⁴ See Gründel, *Die Lehre des Radulfus Ardens*, 235–238; Radulfus Ardens, *Speculum universale* 1.5, MS Paris, Mazarine 709, f. 3^{va}: “Rursus aliquis iudeus vel gentilis bones et compositos habet mores, qui tamen nullas habent uirtutes. Vbi enim fides non est, vera uirtus esse non potest”. Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 77 n. 3, infers from another passage (actually rehearsing opinions rejected by Radulfus) that Radulfus recognizes natural virtues. Gründel, *Die Lehre des Radulfus Ardens*, pp. 286–287, believes that for Radulfus the connection of the virtues was an ideal to be realized only in heaven. But see *Speculum universale* 12.149, ff. 340^{vb}–341^{va}, esp. 340^{vb}: “uirtutes sic sunt confederate quod nemo potest unam habere sine reliquis”; cf. Radulfus Ardens, *Homiliae in tempore* 25, PL 155: 1399C: “Cum enim omnes uirtutes inter se conjunctae sint, iste veram iustitiam non habebat qui consortibus ejus humilitate et charitate carebat”.

²⁵⁵ For a survey of these arrangements see Gründel, *Die Lehre des Radulfus Ardens*, 311–372. Gründel fails to mention *sufficiencia* as the complementary virtue of temperance; see, however, *Speculum universale* 10.107, MS Paris, Mazarine 709, f. 229^{rb}: “Que autem sit uirtus temperancie collateralis et qui termini querere non oportet cum temperancia sit uirtus omnium temperatrix et terminatrix. Si quis tamen instet possumus sufficienciam temperancie esse collateralem [colleteralem MS]”. Radulfus's arrangements do not even reappear in his own sermons, in which he presents the theological and cardinal virtues as a septenary: see *Homiliae de tempore* 13, PL 155: 1347B; *Homiliae in Epistolas et Evangelia* I.60, II.1, and II.22, PL 155: 1884D, 1948D–1949A, 2021C–D. Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 87, thinks Radulfus influenced the *Summa Breves dies*. See also *De origine uirtutum*, p. 127, for a possible allusion to his *Speculum*.

The recognition of natural virtue in Peter the Chanter's circle has the appearance of a collective enterprise.²⁵⁶ The Chanter himself argues in his *Summa de sacramentis* that the good works of unbelievers, though not meritorious, please God, since "they proceed from some sort of natural virtue" (*ex aliqua uirtute naturali fiunt*).²⁵⁷ In his unedited *Summa Abel*, a scholarly lexicon of religious key concepts, the Chanter restricts the Lombard's definition of virtue to faith, hope, and charity, which he calls "Catholic virtues" in contradistinction to the four "cardinal, political, or philosophical" virtues.²⁵⁸ This distinction alludes to the theory of the virtues which is mainly known from the work of Alan of Lille († 1203), who may have formulated his thoughts on the subject as early as in the 1160s;²⁵⁹ the theory also recurs in the largely unedited *summae* of several contemporary Parisian masters. Typical for the theory is the idea that human beings possess virtues *natura*, *in habitu*, and *in usu*. Naturally possessed virtues are no real virtues, but inborn capacities (as Hugh of Saint Victor already argued) which can be developed into steadfast habits at an adult age. When this happens, virtues exist *in habitu*; when the virtues are actually employed, they manifest themselves *in usu*. All this is not incompatible with the mainstream of twelfth-century moral thought. The Parisian masters claim, however, that developing inborn capacities to virtuous habits does not necessarily require the assistance of grace. Human beings, including Jews and pagans, are capable of acquiring "political" virtues through natural reason alone. Political virtues, a concept borrowed from Macrobius's commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis*,²⁶⁰ are directed towards well-being in the present life and

²⁵⁶ See for the following paragraphs Bejczy, "The Problem of Natural Virtue". See also Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 1.1: 161–183; Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 105–142; Wieland, *Ethica*, 222–229.

²⁵⁷ Peter the Chanter, *Summa de sacramentis* 89, pp. 87–88.

²⁵⁸ Id., *Summa Abel*, MS Paris, BnF lat. 10633, f. 133^v: "Virtutes alie cardinales sive politice vel philosophice, scilicet hee quatuor: prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia. Alie catholice, scilicet hee tres: fides, spes, caritas. De hiis tribus dicitur: virtus est qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur, qua nemo male utitur, qua Deus in homine sine homine operatur." For a similar restriction see Heinzmann, *Die Summe "Colligite Fragmenta"*, 218.

²⁵⁹ Alan's *De virtutibus et de vitiis* and *Theologicae regulae* (the two relevant works in this context) are usually dated ca. 1170/80; Lottin, "Le traité d'Alain de Lille" and *Psychologie et morale* 6: 40, dates the first text at ca. 1160 and argues that Simon of Tournai followed it. According to Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 1: 109–110, Alan depends on Simon.

²⁶⁰ Macrobius's view of the cardinal virtues is paraphrased in several texts which Alan may have known; see, e.g., William of Lucca († 1178), *Comentum in Tertiam ierarchiam Dionisii* 1.6, pp. 48–50; *Compendium logicae porretanum*, p. 74.

do not earn merit. They have a goal of their own: the *utilitas* of either the community or the human individual. This *utilitas* consists of practical benefits and honour.²⁶¹ Only Christian believers can possess so-called Catholic virtues as an effect of grace. The Catholic virtues are defined *secundum debitum finem* (they are directed towards God) and *secundum debitum officium* (they follow the rules of the Church); their reward is heaven.²⁶² These views constitute a novelty in twelfth-century ethics, even though some earlier authors alluded to the existence of natural virtue and morality. The Parisian masters forged these allusions into a doctrine, acknowledging not only the goodness but also the virtues of non-Christians and thereby dismantling the prevailing identification of virtue, grace, and merit in moral theology. Between the categories of divinely inspired virtues leading to heaven and natural qualities leading nowhere, the masters introduce a new category of natural virtues which do not appeal to man's celestial destination but encourage civilized life on earth, notably by promoting the dignity and prosperity of the civil community; hence, their alternative designation as *virtutes civiles*.²⁶³ Still, the Parisian masters relate virtue in its truest sense to the faith or to charity,²⁶⁴ from which non-Christians are excluded by definition.

It should be noted that the distinction between political and Catholic virtues does not usually coincide with the distinction between the cardinal and the theological virtues, as scholars sometimes believe (Peter the

²⁶¹ See Simon of Tournai, cited in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 118 n. 1: "Sunt autem fines quatuor: gloria, dignitas, amplitudo, amicitia" (the citation is continued in Bejczy, "The Concept of Political Virtue", 14 n. 23); Hubertus, cited in Heinzmann, *Die Summe "Colligite Fragmenta"*, 202 n. 123: "Officium virtutis civilis est congruus [actus] personae secundum mores et instituta gentis. Finis eius est utilitas rei publicae vel sua quae duplex est, scilicet utilitas et honor"; likewise Praepositinus of Cremona, cited in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 114. Alan of Lille does not specify the end of political virtues, but mentions as an example: "iste est castus, non propter Deum, sed propter humanum fauorem" (*De virtutibus et de vitiis* 1, p. 48).

²⁶² The distinction between the *officium* and the *finis* of virtue (attributed to Boethius by the Parisian masters) goes back to Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* 4.17, PL 44: 745.

²⁶³ Political virtues aim at the *honor* and *utilitas* of political communities, according to Praepositinus (see Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 114) and Hubertus (see Heinzmann, *Die Summe "Colligite Fragmenta"*, 202 n. 123, quoting Praepositinus). According to Simon of Tournai, the political virtues further the interests of the state (see Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 107); for further documentation see Bejczy, "The Concept of Political Virtue", 13–14.

²⁶⁴ See, e.g., Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis* 1.3, p. 120: only Catholic virtues are "simpliciter uirtutes." Hubertus opposes political and Catholic virtues as virtues "minus proprie" and "proprie"; see Heinzmann, *Die Summe "Colligite Fragmenta"*, 197.

Chanter's *Summa Abel* is an exception in this respect).²⁶⁵ True enough, the masters usually exemplify the political virtues by the cardinal quartet, since these virtues in particular were known to have functioned in a non-Christian environment. Yet for Alan of Lille, all virtues exist on a political and on a Catholic level. Even faith, hope, and charity exist as political virtues, as subspecies of religion, which in turn is a species of justice;²⁶⁶ conversely, the cardinal virtues, when inspired by grace (the normal case among Christians), pertain to the celestial destination of man. Not every Parisian master makes identical statements,²⁶⁷ but all seem to have agreed that the cardinal virtues exist both as political and as Catholic virtues. Opinions varied, however, on the transition of the virtues from a political to a Catholic level (an idea congruent with the Lombard's notion of grace transforming *qualitates informis* into virtues).²⁶⁸ According to Alan, grace transforms the inborn moral capacities of Christians directly into Catholic virtues. The transition from political to Catholic virtues only takes place if a Jew or heathen who possesses political virtues converts to Christianity.²⁶⁹ Other Parisian masters conceive of the political virtues as propaedeutic qualities even for Christians.²⁷⁰

Around 1200, the theory of the virtues devised in Peter the Chanter's circle underwent a modification. According to leading Parisian theologians such as Praepositinus of Cremona (ca. 1140–1210), Stephen Lang-

²⁶⁵ Innocent III likewise calls the cardinal virtues *virtutes politicae*; see *Sermones communes* 1 and 5, PL 217: 600A, 615B–C; *De missarum mysteriis* 1.63, PL 217: 797D.

²⁶⁶ Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis* 1.2, p. 54. Alan argues that “in a sense”, *religio* stands above justice as well: “In omnibus enim consideratur religio; unde et ipsa posset constitui quasi genus; quare et Tullius in Rhetorica inuentionum eam ponit primam speciem naturalis iuris tamquam principalem uirtutem et generaliore[m]; unde, quamuis sub iustitia collocetur quodam respectu, tamen alio respectu potest constitui superior”. I agree with Delhaye, “La vertu et les vertus”, p. 25, that the argument is weak.

²⁶⁷ Simon of Tournai appears to have considered faith, hope, and charity as merely Catholic virtues; see Bejczy, “The Problem of Natural Virtue”, 147–148. For Hubertus, faith was a species of prudence, hope of fortitude, charity of justice; see Heinzmann, *Die Summe “Colligite Fragmenta”*, 210.

²⁶⁸ See Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III.23.5, 2: 144; see also Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 1.1: 171–176.

²⁶⁹ Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis* 1.3, p. 120. Some scholars wrongly state that Alan considers political virtues propaedeutic for Christians: Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 118; Delhaye, “La vertu et les vertus”, 22–23; Colish, “Habitus Revisited”, 88.

²⁷⁰ See Simon of Tournai, *Summa theologiae*, cited in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 118 with n. 1 (stating, moreover, that all three theological virtues effectuate the transition, not charity alone); Hubertus, cited in Heinzmann, *Die Summe “Colligite Fragmenta”*, 226 n. 40; Godfrey of Poitiers (writing ca. 1213/15), cited in Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 1.1: 178 n. 72 and Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 84.

ton († 1228), and Godfrey of Poitiers († after 1231), grace produces not only the Catholic but also the political or natural virtues known by the ancients (as “Jerome” seemed to confirm) and alluded to in the Bible (as Ralph of Laon’s glosses pointed out). It is quite possible for these virtues, which already have God as their final goal, to be further elevated by grace and become instruments of salvation.²⁷¹ The transition of the virtues from a natural to a supernatural level thus depends on the intensification of an already present grace. What seems to have bothered the later masters about the original theory was not so much the fact that non-Christians were granted virtues (this they concede without difficulty) as the apparent separation of these virtues from the realm of grace.

The dual recognition of natural and supernatural virtues remained limited in the late twelfth century to academic Parisian theology, and even in this context it was not always fully endorsed. Remarkably, the Parisian masters regularly express views on the virtues which smack of religious moral writing. In their sermons they more often preach about faith, charity, and humility than about the cardinal virtues, as Jean Longère already observed,²⁷² when they do mention the four virtues in their sermons (or in their exegetical works, one may add), they often give them a spiritual significance, associating them with Mary and other saints as well as with biblical and liturgical quartets.²⁷³ Notably in the sermons of Alan of Lille, the cardinal virtues repeatedly appear as weapons

²⁷¹ See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 122–124 (Praepositinus, Langton, *Summa Breves dies* which is called here *Summa Bambergensis*); Stephen Langton, *Summa quaestionum theologiae* CAMB/212 (ed. Ebbesen and Mortensen), pp. 159–164; Hubertus, cited in Heinzmann, *Die Summe “Colligite Fragmenta”*, 226 n. 40; Martinus, *Summa theologica*, MS Paris, BnF lat. 14556, II f. 325^{vb}; Godfrey of Poitiers, cited in Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 84. Ralph of Laon’s glosses on Matt. 4:23 and 8:7 (see above, p. 87) are quoted by Praepositinus, Langton (p. 159), and Martinus (only on 8:7); Praepositinus and Langton also quote Pseudo-Jerome’s words from the *Decretum Gratiani* (see above, p. 82).

²⁷² Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires* 1: 352–355.

²⁷³ Mary: see *ibid.* 1: 301 (Odo of Ourscamp); Alan of Lille, *Dicta alia*, PL 210: 262A; *id.*, *Sermo* 2, PL 210: 200D. Saints: Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires* 2: 238 n. 10 (Hilduinus, on Augustine). Biblical fours: *ibid.* 2: 232–233 n. 5 (Odo of Ourscamp, on the garments of Aaron); see also Peter the Chanter, *Verbum abbreviatum* 119, PL 205: 309A (Paradise rivers, corners of Job’s house; taken from Hildebert of Lavardin, *Ep.* 1.10, PL 171: 166C). Liturgical fours: see Praepositinus of Cremona, *Tractatus de officiis* 1.108, p. 69 (the four first days of Lent; the virtues help us to deplore our earthly condition and combat sin); *ibid.* 4.76, p. 249 (four psalms grouped together by one *Gloria Patri*; likewise William Durand, *Rationale officiorum* 5.3.19, CCCM 140A: 62). Exegesis: see Peter the Chanter, *Glossae super Genesim* 2, pp. 51–52 (Paradise rivers, taken from *Glossa ordinaria* [Gen. 2:14]); Peter of Poitiers, *Allegoriae super Tabernaculum Moyse* 2.2, 2.3 and 3, pp. 111, 122, 126, 160–161, 171–172.

against the temptations of the world rather than habits enabling one to live morally in civil society, as the notion of political virtues would seem to imply.²⁷⁴ And while Peter the Chanter, Odo of Ourscamp († ca. 1172), Peter Comestor († 1178), and Peter of Poitiers († 1205) repeat the traditional view that the four virtues should be observed by all believers, but first of all by priests,²⁷⁵ Praepositinus of Cremona and James of Vitry (1160/70–1240) even connect the cardinal virtues with the cloister: prudence is required in the oratory, justice in the chapter, fortitude in the dormitory, temperance in the refectory. Exactly the same connections appear in an anonymous treatise, preserved in a thirteenth-century manuscript, on the organization of Benedictine life.²⁷⁶ Apparently the masters reserved their speculations on political or civil virtues for academic discourse; in other genres, their observations on the cardinal virtues have the devout overtones which prevailed outside the academy, too. Indeed, Alan proposes the conception of political virtue only in *De virtutibus et de vitiis* and the *Theologicae regulae*, while in his other writings (and even in one passage in his *Theologicae regulae*) he presents virtue as a divine gift formed by charity and leading to heaven, in conformity with Peter Lombard's teachings.²⁷⁷ Notably in his *De arte praedicatoria* Alan explores the religious significance of the cardinal virtues,²⁷⁸ so much in fact that his observations on prudence, fortitude,

²⁷⁴ See Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires* 1: 327–328 with 2: 246 nn. 12–15.

²⁷⁵ See *ibid.* 2: 232 n. 5 (Odo), 291 n. 65 (Comestor); Peter the Chanter, *Verbum abbreviatum* 56, PL 205: 176A; Peter of Poitiers, *Allegoriae super Tabernaculum Moysi* 2.3, pp. 140–141.

²⁷⁶ See Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires* 1: 322 with 2: 243 nn. 9–10 (Praepositinus); 1: 349 (Jacques); cf. [Instructions for Benedictines], MS Troyes, BM 1750, f. 183^v (Bloomfield 3437 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 3437): “*De quatuor virtutibus*. Notandum quod quatuor virtutes cuilibet claustrali necessarie sunt, quarum prima est prudentia, secunda iusticia, tertia temperancia, quarta fortitudo. Prudentia necessaria est in oratorio ... Iusticia necessaria est in capitulo ... Temperantia in refectorio ... Fortitudo necessaria est in dormitorio ...”.

²⁷⁷ See Alan of Lille, *Theologicae regulae* 91, PL 210: 669C: “Unde et ipsa [sc. caritas] dicitur Mater omnium virtutum, quia omnes virtutes informat; sine qua caeterae non habentur”; *De arte praedicatoria* 20, PL 210: 152A: “universae virtutes ejus vinculo [sc. caritatis] religantur”, 152C: charity as “omnium virtutum origo”; 153A–B: “Amor Dei mater est omnium virtutum”, 153C: “omnis virtus donum Dei”; *Elucidatio in Cantica*, PL 210: 76C: “charitas est quasi mediatrix et forma aliarum virtutum”; *Dicta alia*, PL 210: 262B: charity as “forma virtutum”; *ibid.* 262D: “Virtus via est, regnum Dei patria nostra est. Teneamus viam, ut perveniamus ad patriam”.

²⁷⁸ *Id.*, *De arte praedicatoria* 19 and 23–25, PL 210: 149D–151B, 157C–162D; but see 24, 160B: Cato's rigor, Socrates's magnanimitas, and Diogenes's contemptus mundi

and justice reappear in the sermons devoted to these virtues in the *Sermones ad fratres in eremo commorantes*, composed around 1200 under Augustine's name for an audience of regular clerics.²⁷⁹

A similar ambiguity marks the work of other Parisian masters. In his *Summa theologiae*, Simon of Tournai († ca. 1201) relates prudence to the understanding of what is necessary for salvation, despite his acknowledging the political virtues of non-Christians.²⁸⁰ Stephen Langton observes in his *Summa quaestionum theologiae* that virtue cannot exist without charity, although he admits elsewhere in the work that the ancients were familiar with most virtues known to Christians except faith, hope, and charity.²⁸¹ The lemma *Virtus* of Peter the Chanter's *Summa Abel* equates the cardinal with the political virtues, but also connects each of them with a couple of "collateral virtues" of religious purport: justice is accompanied by *misericordia* and *veritas*, prudence by *carnis mortificatio* and *obedientia*, temperance by *humilitas* and *benignitas*, fortitude by *spes vitae* and *mundi contemptus* (with Job and the martyr Lawrence of Rome as examples). The Chanter actually adapted this passage from a sermon of Peter Comestor, addressed to a religious audience.²⁸² In his main work of pastoral theology, *Verbum abbreviatum* or *De vitiis et virtutibus* as he called

constitute a sort of fortitude situated between the false fortitude of hypocrites and the salvific fortitude of the just.

²⁷⁹ Pseudo-Augustinus Belgicus, *Sermones ad fratres in eremo commorantes* 4 (on prudence), 13 (on fortitude), and 14 (on justice), PL 40: 1240–1242, 1256–1259, depend on Alan's chapters 23, 24, and 19, PL 210: 157C–161B, 149D–151B, respectively. *Sermo* 13 praises fortitude as a quality of monks, martyrs, and hermits; *Sermo* 14 requires justice of preachers, anchorites, and prelates.

²⁸⁰ Simon of Tournai, *Summa theologiae*, MS Paris, BnF lat. 14886, f. 34^{rb–va}: "Est autem prudentia habitus mentis bene constitute ad intelligentiam de diuinis ad salutem necessariis et de humanis et temporalibus ad peregrinationem huius uite expedientibus. Completur enim prudentia sapienciam que est de diuinis et scientia que est de temporalibus ... Prudentia ergo est habitus mentis bene constitute ad intelligendum et contemplandum eterna salute necessaria et ad intelligendum temporalia et eligendum utilia et cauendum contraria."

²⁸¹ See Stephen Langton, *Summa quaestionum theologiae* CAMB/212 (ed. Ebbesen and Mortensen), p. 162: "dicitur 'caritas informat omne(m) virtutem' ... cum omnis virtus in sui natura formata sit, i.e. faciens dignum vita aeterna (alioquin virtus non est) ..."; CAMB133 (ed. Bejczy), 324: "Dicimus quod istarum quatuor prout dicuntur politice—nec fiat uis utrum naturalia efficiantur gratuita—notitiam habuerunt philosophi gentiles ... sed non habuerunt notitiam fidei, spei et caritatis. Sed cum habuerunt notitiam humilitatis et mansuetudinis et multarum aliarum sicut et nos ..."

²⁸² See Appendix II. The Comestor's religious audience is apparent from his remark "Quid autem validum arcet nos ab illicitis, quam votum obedientiae? cui vos totos astrinxistis?" (*Sermo* 36, PL 198: 1809A).

it himself, the Chanter even adopts a purely religious view. His chapters on the cardinal virtues elaborate on one of Hildebert of Lavardin's letters to a nun in which the virtues appear as roads to heaven. Hildebert's pious interpretations of the virtues, including the association of fortitude with sustaining monastic poverty and the equation of justice with humility, all reappear in the Chanter's text.²⁸³ In one other passage, the Chanter presents the cardinal virtues as the principal aids of man in his course toward religious perfection,²⁸⁴ while he repeatedly characterizes virtue as a product of charity and faith.²⁸⁵ In sum, Alan of Lille and his colleagues by no means adopted a consistently secular, philosophical perspective on the virtues, as some scholars have suggested.²⁸⁶ Their recognition of non-religious virtue, however crucial for the history of Western moral thought, remains exceptional even in their own work.

Several Parisian masters assemble the theological and cardinal virtues as one group of seven principal virtues, sometimes adding the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost;²⁸⁷ only by 1230, a formal distinction between virtues and gifts became accepted in Parisian theology.²⁸⁸ Moreover, some masters propose interesting speculations on the name "cardinal virtues" which Peter Lombard reintroduced into theological discourse. According to Alan of Lille, the cardinal virtues are thus called "either because

²⁸³ See Peter the Chanter, *Verbum abbreviatum* 115–119, PL 205: 305A–309C; for the parallels with Hildebert's *Ep.* 1.10, see Diem, "Virtues and Vices," 211–215.

²⁸⁴ See *ibid.* 84, 254A–B.

²⁸⁵ See *ibid.* 91, 92, and 96, PL 205: 265D ("omnes [sc. virtutes] sunt una facies in radice charitatis"), 266D ("Prima igitur mater earum [sc. virtutum] et origo est fides; secunda mater et velut nutrix est charitas"), 268B ("Ipsa enim [sc. fides] est hypostasis et basis omnium virtutum, omnium bonorum"), 275C ("Charitatis filiae sunt fere omnes virtutes, dona et bona opera"). Cf. *ibid.* 92, 267B: "Ex solo enim Deo est [sc. fides]; caeterae virtutes quodammodo a natura habent originem".

²⁸⁶ See Delhay, "La vertu et les vertus", 14, 22; Nederman, "Nature, Ethics", 110.

²⁸⁷ Theological and cardinal virtues only: Alan of Lille, *Sermo* 8, PL 210: 218D; *Summa Breves dies*, MS Oxford, Bodleian Laud. misc. 80, ff. 143^{rb} ("quatuor principales uirtutes et alias tres, scilicet fidem, spem, caritatem"), 166^{ra} (three "principal" and four "cardinal" virtues). Adding the gifts: Peter the Chanter, *De penitentia*, p. 201 (cited in Innocent III, *Sermones de tempore* 11, PL 217: 365B); Alan of Lille, "A Commentary on the Our Father" 9, p. 160 (gifts and "septem cardinales virtutes" which remain unspecified). Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae* III.27, PL 211: 1127D, and Stephen Langton, *Summa quaestionum theologiae* CAMBo90 (ed. Ebbesen and Mortensen), p. 134, argue that theologians habitually divide the virtues into three (the theological virtues), four (the cardinal virtues), or seven (the gifts). Contemporary authors who mention the theological and cardinal virtues in one breath with the gifts include Radulfus Ardens, *Homiliae in Epistolas et Evangelia* I.60, PL 155: 1884D; Peter of Blois, *Sermo* 38, PL 207: 673A.

²⁸⁸ See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 329–456.

they are starting-points or principles, since the other virtues more or less take their origins from them, or because the other virtues revolve around them as around a hinge”.²⁸⁹ The notion that all virtues derive from the cardinal quartet is of course traditional,²⁹⁰ but Alan’s second explanation involves an original element. His point seems to be that the cardinal virtues together determine every other individual virtue instead of each comprising its own set of subordinate virtues. Accordingly, Alan argues that every virtue consists in embracing the good and rejecting the bad (prudence), has God as its final goal (justice, understood as giving God his due), comprises bearing adversity as well as prosperity (fortitude), and resides in a middle course between two vices (temperance).²⁹¹ Similar statements are found in the work of other Parisian masters. Praepositinus of Cremona and Stephen Langton both discuss the question of why only four particular virtues are called “cardinal” or “principal”, whereas other virtues are just as important for salvation. Praepositinus answers that morality and good works revolve around the cardinal virtues, while Langton explains that only the cardinal virtues (a name proposed by the ancients, as he erroneously claims) are inherent in every meritorious human act.²⁹² Though possibly inspired by the early medieval idea that the four virtues determine the structure of good works, the views proposed by Alan, Praepositinus, and Langton anticipate the scholastic conception of the cardinal virtues as general conditions of every specific moral virtue.

²⁸⁹ Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis* 1.1, p. 50: “Hec autem quatuor uirtutes cardinales dicuntur, uel quia initiales siue principia sunt, quia ab istis cetera procedunt quasi a quibusdam initiis; uel quia circa eas tamquam circa cardinem cetera uertuntur”. See also *ibid.* 1.6, p. 67: “Omnes autem [sc. uirtutes] pertinent ad cardinales”.

²⁹⁰ Hubertus likewise viewed the cardinal virtues as genera and the other virtues as their species; see Heinzmann, *Die Summe “Colligite fragmenta”*, 204, 207–210.

²⁹¹ Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis* 1.2, pp. 53 (justice, prudence), 56 (fortitude), 57 (temperance).

²⁹² See Praepositinus of Cremona, *Summa theologiae* (q. 94, *De quatuor virtutibus principalibus*), MS Oxford, Bodleian Laud. misc. 80, f. 75^{vb}: “Solutio: hee uirtutes specialiter ad mores pertinent, quia tota uita boni hominis etiam [autem?] maxime in bonis operibus consistit, circa istas sicut hostium circa cardinem uersatur, et ideo cardinales dicuntur”; Langton, *Summa quaestionum theologiae* CAMB133 (ed. Bejczy), p. 325: “Ideo ergo quatuor precipue cardinales dicuntur quia omnes alias, id est motus earum, modificant, et non e contrario ... Quicquid enim meritorie facit homo, facit temperate, prudenter, fortiter et iuste, sed non potest ita dici quod omnia faciat mansuete, et sic de modis aliarum uirtutum”.

Conclusion

The growing attention for the scheme of the cardinal virtues in the twelfth century is not in itself a sign of increasing openness toward ancient moral philosophy. Even if some religious authors pay little attention to the scheme in their reflections on morality, others frequently refer to it without having much sympathy for classical ideas. What divides twelfth-century moral writing is not so much the importance attached to the cardinal virtues as the question of how these virtues were to be valued in the light of classical and religious traditions. The Latin fathers had so successfully Christianized the four virtues that most early medieval authors had lost sight of their classical roots. Having rediscovered these roots, twelfth-century intellectuals faced the problem of to what point virtue and morality could be conceived as products of human nature unilluminated by the faith. The mere posing of the problem put the Christian monopoly of moral goodness at stake. While a number of clerics active in the schools revealed the common ground between classical and Christian moral thought, many religious authors, Benedictines and Cistercians in particular, tried to save the Christian character of morality by articulating the religious significance of the cardinal virtues and rejecting, either or not explicitly, the claims of the classics. In the second half of the century, Parisian theologians tried to bridge the gap between both currents, first through acknowledging the morality, but not the virtue, of non-Christians (Peter Lombard), later through the recognition of virtue on the level of nature as well as grace (Peter the Chanter's circle). By this recognition, the masters gave up the Christian monopoly of moral goodness instituted by the church fathers, although they continued to reserve virtue in its proper sense—that is, a quality informed by grace and motivated by charity—for Christian believers.

In the course of twelfth-century moral debate, not only the philosophical but also the political significance of the cardinal virtues came to stand apart from their religious conceptualization. The growing attention for ancient moral philosophy revived the classical notion of the four virtues as the moral directives of the public life. Many religious authors, however, connected the cardinal virtues with the spiritual formation of believers and even claimed, in contrast to early medieval tradition, that these virtues steered the contemplative rather than the active life. The frequently employed metaphors of the *domus interior* and the spiritual cloister suggested that the virtues wall off believers from the world rather than allowing them to live morally in it. Here, too, the Parisian masters

tried to overcome division. In their view, the cardinal virtues regulate life in the civil community in as far as they are naturally acquired; in as far as they are infused, or transformed, by grace, the virtues have a religious function and guarantee the salvation of individual believers. While the masters personally explored the religious significance of the virtues in their pastoral work and occasionally even in their academic treatises, their recognition of political virtues made it possible to evaluate public morality on its own merits rather than as a preparation for the hereafter. It is perhaps no coincidence that the first mirrors for princes which centre around the cardinal virtues as the chief guidelines of moral government were written near the very end of the century, when the notion of political virtues had become accepted in Parisian moral theology.

It is my conviction that the reception of Augustinian moral psychology accounts as much for the twelfth-century renewal of moral thought as the revived interest in ancient moral philosophy. While classical conceptions of the cardinal and other virtues challenged the religious notion of morality that prevailed since the patristic era, it is Augustine who guided twelfth-century authors in responding to the challenge, in particular through his emphasis on the inner motives of the moral agent and the connection of these motives with charity. No twelfth-century author cut the connection between virtue and religion to the point of affirming that man could reach the ultimate good by developing his natural capacity for virtue irrespective of charity and grace. Neither did any twelfth-century author consider the cardinal virtues as being exclusively related to the present life. Actually, it is the authors who displayed most openness toward the classics who took most efforts to reserve virtue in its highest form for Christian believers. Once having acknowledged that non-Christians may possess some kind of virtue, these authors needed a criterion for distinguishing the secondary virtues of unbelievers from the true, salvific virtues of Christians. They found this criterion in the idea of grace filling the human heart with charitable intentions, in accordance with Augustine's teachings. While monastic writers appealed to this idea in order to conserve the Christian character of virtue, it enabled the theologians of Peter the Chanter's circle to distinguish virtue in its truest sense from the forms of virtue and morality of non-Christians that deserved to be recognized in their own right.

CHAPTER THREE

THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH CENTURIES

Moral Discourse: Aristotle and Beyond

The novel teachings on the virtues developed in Peter the Chanter's circle, still much of a local phenomenon in the late twelfth century, exerted a lasting influence on late medieval moral theology and philosophy, even though the scholastics refined moral doctrine to an extent unimagined by the first generations of Parisian masters. It is not so much the recovery of the *Nicomachean Ethics* or the late medieval expansion of lay culture that secured a place in Western Christendom for secularized conceptions of virtue and morality as the revolution in moral theology inaugurated by Alan of Lille and his colleagues, secular clerics concerned with defining the boundaries of religious orthodoxy. Thanks to this revolution, welcomed in the schools after 1200 despite the resentment of religious authors, the reception of Aristotle's virtue ethics could proceed with relative smoothness from the first half of the thirteenth century. The scholastics did not have to force Aristotle's naturalistic views on a uniformly religious conception of morality, but could make use of the room for philosophical views of virtue created several decades before the reception of the *Nicomachean Ethics* set in.

The recovery of Aristotle's *Ethics* nevertheless had major consequences for the development of moral thought. Several Aristotelian views on the virtues were already known in the twelfth century due to their transmission by Cicero, Boethius, and other Roman authors,¹ but Aristotle's authority was far from undisputed in the period. In the late twelfth century the author of the *Summa Breves dies*, a collection of theological questions once attributed to Stephen Langton, could still ask himself why Christians should at all bother about the teachings of a non-Christian author like Aristotle.² Fifty years later, such a remark would hardly have

¹ See Nederman, "Aristotelian Ethics".

² See *Summa Breves dies*, MS Oxford, Bodleian Laud. misc. 80, f. 165^{vb}, discussing the view that the *motus* of the cardinal and all other virtues underlie all meritorious acts: "Contra tamen uidetur facere ratio aristotelica. Ait enim: 'Sic contingit plura simul scire

been considered appropriate in scholastic discourse.³ Moral theologians by then increasingly took Aristotle's ideas as a starting-point for their reflections and tried to bring these ideas in accordance with Christian doctrine as well as Stoic and Neoplatonic views, while philosophers took efforts from the 1230s to interpret Aristotle's ethical system more or less in its own right. Moreover, moral theology became the object of extensive reception outside academic circles. Pastoral and catechetical manuals which summarize the basics of moral theology (usually mitigating its Aristotelian aspects) appeared in increasing numbers from the middle of the thirteenth century. These texts are of particular interest for this study, since they give insight into the moral consciousness of broad layers of late medieval society—not in the sense that they express the thoughts of the common people (whoever those are), but in the sense that they reflect the main categories used for the moral formation of Christian believers. At the same time, devotionalist traditions of moral thought which declined Aristotle's authority survived in various genres of religious literature.

This chapter starts with a survey of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century treatises devoted to the cardinal virtues in particular, followed by an evaluation of the main genres of sources relevant to late medieval virtue theory—academic theology and philosophy, theological and philosophical compendia, treatises on the virtues and vices, religious moral literature, anthologies of moral sayings and exempla, theological dictionaries, and moral concordances on the Bible. In examining this material, it will no longer be possible to lay out different types of moral thought by studying authors individually or by their religious background. The differentiation of moral thought in the Late Middle Ages is better illustrated by concentrating on a number of specific topics which gave rise to debate. I will first discuss the attempts of moral writers to preserve the scheme of the cardinal virtues despite the existence of alternative arrangements, in particular Aristotle's classification of the virtues. How did late medieval authors account for the existence of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance as the four principal moral virtues? Thereupon I will examine

sed non plura simul intelligere, id est ad plura intelligenda moueri. Sed quod sic obicitur, non obest, tum quia in fide nostra catholica auctorem non catholicum non laudamus, tum quia ipse non ait pluribus motibus rem unam non posse intelligi, sed potius ait uno motu uel pluribus res plures simul non posse intelligi" (the second argument is appropriate). Cf. Aristotle, *Topica* 2.10, trans. Boethius, p. 46.

³ For some criticism of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in early 13th-century theology, see Luscombe, "Ethics in the Thirteenth Century", 668–669.

how the twelfth-century conceptualization of the cardinal virtues as both naturally acquired and gratuitous habits was continued in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. How did moral authors in this period position the four virtues in the divide between nature and grace, philosophy and religion? In what ways were the cardinal virtues believed to provide for both the temporal and the spiritual concerns of man? To what extent were they, even as acquired moral virtues, considered relevant for man's final destination, or rather confined to social and political life?

My use of sources in the following paragraphs will be more selective than in the previous chapters, since considerably more source material survives from the Late Middle Ages than from earlier periods. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to systematically investigate late medieval sermons and biblical commentaries, which survive in enormous numbers and remain largely unedited, but the study of preaching manuals and biblically inspired moral tracts offers some compensation.

The Cardinal Virtues: Text and Context

Treatises Devoted to the Cardinal Virtues

Several hundreds of Latin treatises on virtues and vices are known from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, no more than a handful of which are confined to the cardinal virtues.⁴ These few treatises are very unequal as to their background, length, and diffusion, but for this very reason a

⁴ Some texts are unduly titled or catalogued as treatises on the cardinal virtues. Thus MS Cambridge, Caius 211 (226), f. 170^v (13th century), classified in Bloomfield 1430 as *De quatuor uirtutibus que principales uel cardinale[s] uocantur*, is a work without title; only the first lines concern the virtues (see Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1430). MS Troyes, BM 1750, ff. 183^r–189^r (13th century), classified in Bloomfield 3437 as *De iv virtutibus*, is a short treatise on Benedictine life; only the first chapter concerns the virtues (see Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 3437). MS Florence, BML Plut. 33.31, f. 46^{ra} (14th century), classified in Bloomfield 2880 as “Short work on 4 cardinal virtues”, is a variant of Bloomfield 5857 compiled by Giovanni Boccaccio (see Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2880; Bejczy and Verweij, “An Early Medieval Treatise”, 217 with edition in n. 16). *De iii virtutibus*, MS Dublin, Trinity 332 (C.4.23), f. 88^{r-v} (13th century) is but one item in a catechetical *numerales*. *De quatuor virtutibus*. *Gregorius*, MS Paris, BnF lat. 5822, ff. 11^r–14^r (13th century?) is a compilation of citations from Gregory the Great, *In Hiezechielem*; only the first lines concern the virtues. *De uirtutibus cardinalibus et moralibus*, MS Trier, SB 535, ff. 1^r–84^v (13th century; Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1722a; absent from Verweij, “The Manuscript Transmission”), is an abbreviated, chaotic rearrangement of William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus*, concentrating on the theological virtues, the gifts, and the beatitudes.

survey of them may be helpful for gaining an impression of the various contexts in which late medieval discussions of the cardinal virtues took place.

The only scholastic treatises on the cardinal virtues which appear to have been composed in our period are Albert the Great's *De bono* (ca. 1243/48) and the *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus cardinalibus* (1272) of Thomas Aquinas, which in fact form part of his *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus*. These two treatises are quite different in nature. Operating in a theological context, Aquinas addresses four problems inspired by Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*: the nature of the cardinal virtues, their connection, their equality, and their survival in heaven—topics which Aquinas likewise discusses in his commentary on the *Sententiae* and in his *Summa theologiae*. Despite his adopting Aristotelian definitions of the four virtues, Aquinas insists on their salvific character. By contrast, Albert's main interest lies with the cardinal virtues as acquired, politically relevant qualities. Contrary to his principal source text, the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor († 1236), Albert leaves most theological concerns aside.⁵ His discussion focuses on the definitions of the virtues, their subject matter, their objectives and acts, the vices opposed to them, and their subdivisions. Aristotle is by far the most frequently quoted authority.

The political relevance of the cardinal virtues receives even stronger emphasis in a number of late medieval treatises which employ the scheme in the context of secular government. About 1290, the Benedictine abbot Engelbert of Admont (ca. 1250–1331) wrote *De regimine principum*. The work is an original attempt to subsume the entire range of princely rule and civic behaviour under the four cardinal virtues, while Engelbert moreover refuses to admit a Christian perspective and only quotes from Aristotle and the Latin classics.⁶ Different in character are the *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus* (ca. 1295), written by the Dominican friar Henry of Rimini “for the citizens of Venice” but probably rather serving as a tool for Dominican preaching and education, and *De regimine principum seu de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus pro eruditione principum*, completed in 1387 by the Carthusian monk Michael of Prague for either Count Palatinate Rupert II († 1398) or his succes-

⁵ For an introduction of *De bono* and an assessment of Albert's dependence on Philip, see Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues*, 56–64.

⁶ Hamm, “Engelbert von Admont”, 545–546, calls the work verbose and repetitive; for a more balanced assessment, see Ubl, *Engelbert von Admont*, 71–81.

sor Rupert III († 1410) who became king of Germany in 1400. Henry and Michael chiefly base themselves on Aquinas's teachings on the cardinal virtues in the *Summa theologiae*.⁷ Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum* (ca. 1280), the most influential *speculum principis* of the Middle Ages, set a major precedent for following Aquinas's teachings on the virtues in a political context and itself became a major source of moral philosophy for late medieval readers.⁸ Henry of Rimini appears not to have used Giles's work, but Michael of Prague certainly did. Moreover, Giles's discussion served Engelbert of Admont as a model for a second treatise on the virtues, the *Speculum virtutum*, written shortly after 1300 for the sons of the German king Albert I. Engelbert claims that his *Speculum* examines the virtues as pertaining to individual life rather than to politics, but declares near the end of the work that its lessons apply to kings and princes in particular.⁹ Finally, some twenty years after Henry of Rimini another Dominican friar, Borromeo of Bologna, wrote his *Liber de quattuor virtutibus* (1319/20) for Pietro Contarini who was then Venetian governor of Giustinopoli (Capo d'Istria). The aim of the work is to provide lessons in government derived from the four virtues, which comprise everything needed for the exercise of public authority.¹⁰ Borromeo's divisions of the virtues suggest influence from the *Moralium dogma philosophorum* and Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*.¹¹

The *Breviloquium de virtutibus* (ca. 1260/70) of the Franciscan theologian John of Wales († 1285) likewise emphasizes the political significance of the cardinal virtues. Apparently designed as an aid for preachers, it is in fact a collection of exempla for the instruction of rulers

⁷ For Henry of Rimini, see Siddons, *Virtues, Vices, and Venice*. His *Tractatus* survives in 23 known MSS and several incunables. Storey's edition of Michael of Prague's *De regimine*, known from 5 MSS, only covers Book 1. See also Herrmann, "Der Fürstenspiegel des Michael von Prag"; Hohlstein, "Clemens princeps".

⁸ See Briggs, *Giles of Rome's De regimine principum*, 147, 150–151; Coleman, "Some Relations".

⁹ See Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum* 4.13 and 12.21 ff., pp. 204, 454 ff.

¹⁰ MS Milan, BN Braidense AD.IX.42 (15th century; Bloomfield 1044 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1044). For a survey of chapters and an edition of the prologue and ch. 1.6, see Luna, "Un nuovo documento", 240–243.

¹¹ Borromeo borrows his division of justice from the *Moralium dogma*, but follows Aquinas's divisions of temperance and fortitude. As for prudence, ch. 2.2. discusses its division into *eubulia*, *synesis*, and *gnome* (its *partes potentiales* according to Aquinas); the next chapter is titled *Quod prudens vir debet esse providus, circumspectus, cautus et docilis*, evoking the four parts of prudence according to the *Moralium dogma*.

divided into four parts, each of which concerns one cardinal virtue and its species. Surviving in over one hundred and fifty manuscripts, the *Breviloquium* is the most widely disseminated text from the Late Middle Ages confined to the cardinal virtues (although it never reached the popularity of Martin of Braga's *Formula vitae honestae*).¹² Its classicizing perspective is remarkable. Explaining in the preface that the exemplary lives of the saints are sufficiently known from the Bible and hagiography, John restricts himself to stories on the princes and philosophers of antiquity, borrowed from classical as well as Christian sources.¹³ Only the epilogue takes a Christian tone: if the ancients were so virtuous on behalf of mere temporal ends, argues John not unlike Alcuin in *De rhetorica*, Christians should exert themselves all the more, aided by faith, hope, charity, and the prospect of eternal bliss.¹⁴ The *Breviloquium* influenced a large number of Latin and vernacular texts, including Borromeo of Bologna's treatise,¹⁵ and was excerpted on a large scale in the famous *Liber de ludo scaccorum* (before 1337) of Jacobus de Cessolis.¹⁶ Moreover, it served as a main source for the *Speculum regum* which the Franciscan friar Álvaro Pelayo dedicated in 1340/44 to King Alfonso XI of Castile. Pelayo introduces the cardinal virtues with a "practical" chapter which paraphrases the *Breviloquium* in its entirety, and continues with a series of "theoretical" chapters on the subject which closely follow the *Summa de virtutibus* of William Peraldus. Together, these chapters cover some seventy percent of Pelayo's text.¹⁷ The *Breviloquium* may equally have been a source of inspiration for Francis Petrarch (1304–1374), whose *Rerum memorandarum libri* (1343–1345) are likewise set up as a quadripartite collection of exempla (in this case, classical as well as medieval) which illustrate the cardinal virtues and their species.

¹² For a survey of its contents and sources, see Swanson, *John of Wales*, 41–62. For the transmission of the work, see *ibid.*, 233–290 (delete MSS London, BM Harley 362; Oxford, Corpus Christi 18); Bloomfield 4971 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4971.

¹³ The prologue is edited in Diem and Verweij, "Virtus est via ad gloriam?", 252.

¹⁴ John's epilogue is edited *ibid.*, pp. 253–255; for Alcuin, see above, pp. 34–35.

¹⁵ Borromeo of Bologna, *Liber de quattuor virtutibus* 1.3, MS Milan, BN Braidense AD.IX.42, f. 2^r, repeats John's statement that the cardinal virtues constitute the four pillars of the royal throne. Also, Borromeo borrows many examples from the *Breviloquium*.

¹⁶ See Kalning, "Virtues and Exempla".

¹⁷ The modern edition of Pelayo's *Speculum regum* counts nearly 1000 pages. The chapter adapting the *Breviloquium* covers over 100 pages (1: 322–428); the remainder of the treatise, counting just over 600 pages (1: 428–488 and 2: 1–524), paraphrases Peraldus.

Petrarch accomplished only the first part, on prudence and its three Ciceronian compounds (*memoria, intelligentia, providentia*).

The scheme of the cardinal virtues not only served as a structuring principle for political tracts and collections of exempla, but also, as in the twelfth century, for exegetical writings. For instance, Cardinal Odo of Châteauroux († 1273), chancellor of the University of Paris, wrote a commentary on the Psalms in four parts, each devoted to one cardinal virtue.¹⁸ Another twelfth-century tradition which continued in the Late Middle Ages is the interpretation of classical works of literature in the light of the cardinal virtues. The most prominent examples of the period are the commentaries on the *Disticha Catonis*. From the thirteenth century, many commentators designated the cardinal virtues as the main theme of the work, although the scheme of the four virtues is actually absent from it. Moreover, commentators often gave a Christian turn to the text by presenting virtue as a divine gift leading to heaven and identifying justice, the first cardinal virtue associated with the *Disticha*, with biblical charity.¹⁹ These interpretative efforts suggest that expounding a purely secular morality inspired on the classics was still no matter of course in the Late Middle Ages—at least in the schoolrooms where the *Disticha* were studied.

A short, independent text on the four virtues is the anonymous *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus* preserved in one thirteenth-century manuscript. The text discusses the problem of the connection of the virtues “on behalf of some who do not properly understand the purport of this question” under reference to ancient as well as Christian authorities (Bernard of Clairvaux, Socrates, Aristotle, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite).²⁰ More popularizing in character is another brief text, Pseudo-Bonaventure’s *Opusculum de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus*. This text from the fourteenth or fifteenth century is an amalgam of citations concerning the nature of the four virtues, their definitions, and their subdivisions. The author cites the Bible, “Seneca” (actually Martin of Braga), Macrobius, Boethius’s *Philosophiae consolatio*, and Gregory’s

¹⁸ Odo of Châteauroux, *In psalmos ... secundum virtutes cardinales* (Bloomfield 0630 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 630; add MS *Assisi, BC 323). I used MS Paris, BnF lat. 12417.

¹⁹ See Hazelton, “The Christianization of ‘Cato’”, esp. 165–167 with n. 41. For additional texts, see Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2572a, 2657, 5330.

²⁰ *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus*, MS Cambridge, Jesus Q.G.18 (66), ff. 73^{ra}–74^{ra} (Bloomfield 5706 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 5706). An edition is included in Appendix II.

Moralia by name, but acknowledges neither his use of Alan of Lille's *De virtutibus et de vitiis* nor his principal source text, Hugh Ripelin's *Compendium theologiae veritatis*.²¹ Finally, an independent text comprising thirteen lines in a manuscript written near the end of the fourteenth century connects each of the cardinal virtues with one or two Bible verses.²²

Apart from these original compositions, discussions of the cardinal virtues excerpted from Cicero's *De inventione*, Macrobius's *Commentarii*, the *Ysagoge in theologiam*, and Alan of Lille's *De virtutibus et de vitiis* survive on their own in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century manuscripts.²³ The chapters on the cardinal virtues from Augustine's *De moribus ecclesiae*, Julian Pomerius's *De vita contemplativa*, Alcuin's *De vitiis et virtutibus*, and Halitgar's penitential likewise circulated independently in the late medieval period, but I only know of fifteenth-century copies;²⁴ conversely, the separate transmission of similar chapters from Isidore's *De differentiis* and Alcuin's *De ratione animae* seems to have come to an end in the Early Middle Ages.²⁵ Finally, the late fourteenth century produced two adaptations of Martin of Braga's *Formula*,²⁶ a work which in the fifteenth century would become the object of a vast commentary tradition.

²¹ The earliest known copy of this work is a printed version of 1495; see Bonaventure, *Opera* 5: L; Distelbrink, *Bonaventurae scripta*, 163–164 (no. 172; the MS mentioned here is from ca. 1500). According to Distelbrink, the author also used Bonaventure, *Hexaemeron* 6.27–32, *Opera* 5: 364, which is an extract from Macrobius. For a survey of its contents and dependencies, see Van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne*, 186–193.

²² [Treatise on the cardinal virtues], MS Halle, UB/LB Qu.Cod. 215, fol. 86^{vb} (anno 1390/1400; Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 0664a).

²³ Cicero: see Bloomfield 6480, 6484 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 6480, 6484. Macrobius: see Bloomfield 3933 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 3933. *Ysagoge*: see above, p. 92. Alan: see Bloomfield 4454, 6041, 6485 (virtues and vices) and 6040 (virtues only) with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4454, 6041, 6485, 6040; Quinto, "Stephen Langton: Theology and Literature", 314–322. I suspect that Alan's definitions also figure in MS *Graz, UB 676, f. 78^v (anno 1456).

²⁴ For Augustine, Alcuin, and Halitgar, see above, pp. 23, 37; for Julian Pomerius, see Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4905a.

²⁵ See above, p. 58 n. 219, p. 37 n. 130.

²⁶ See MS *Padua, Antoniana II.50, ff. 67^v–72^v (anno 1342): text of Martin with glosses; Richard Rolle (?), *De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus*, MS Cambridge, UL Mm.5.37, ff. 127^r–135^r (ca. 1400; Bloomfield 3967 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 3967): text of Martin expanded with definitions of the subordinate virtues borrowed from the *Ysagoge in theologiam*. Martin's work also made its way into vernacular literature. In the 13th century, a French verse translation was made for Philip Augustus, while Brunetto Latini inserted a prose translation into his *Livre du trésor*.

The Cardinal Virtues in Other Sources

In academic theology, Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* became the standard textbook all over Europe in the course of the thirteenth century. Candidates for a master's degree in theology were required since the 1240s to write a commentary on the work and hence to formulate their thoughts on the cardinal virtues, treated by the Lombard in distinction III.33. From the late thirteenth century, however, commentators took a freer attitude to the Lombard's text and often selected topics for discussion.²⁷ Commentators who did take distinction III.33 into account often asked their own type of questions; thus, John Duns Scotus (1265–1308) limited his discussion to the problem of whether the moral virtues are founded in the will, a question which the Lombard never posed.²⁸ The fact that from about 1300 the existence of infused moral virtues was no longer generally accepted in theology (see below, p. 185 ff.) may have diminished the importance of the cardinal virtues as objects of theological speculation.²⁹ Still, a considerable number of fourteenth-century commentaries on the *Sententiae* treat the virtues in an extensive manner.

Theologians also discussed the cardinal and other virtues in treatises, collections of questions, and summae, either as a main theme or among various other subjects. A theological treatise devoted to the virtues is the *Liber de virtutibus* of the Franciscan master Francis of Meyronnes (1288–1326/28). Examples of collections of questions concentrating on the virtues are the *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus* of Thomas Aquinas and a similarly titled work of John of Pouilly († after 1328). Summae of moral theology which give substantial attention to the virtues include the *Summa de bono* of Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great's *De bono*, and *De summo bono* (ca. 1272) of Albert's pupil Ulrich of Strasbourg.³⁰ But the most voluminous as well as the most influential discussion of the cardinal virtues in late medieval theology is found in Thomas

²⁷ See Friedman, "Conclusion", 507–527, 523–526.

²⁸ See *Quaestiones in tertium librum Sententiarum* 33, *Opera* (Paris ed.) 15: 437–458.

²⁹ The mid-13th-century theologian William of Meliton already confined himself to the theological virtues in his commentary because these were infused rather than acquired; see Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 1: 221.

³⁰ Ulrich of Strasbourg, *De summo bono*, MSS Paris, BnF lat. 15900 (books 1 to 4) and lat. 15901 (books 5 and 6). Ulrich's unfinished book 6 takes up the major part of the second MS (ff. 66^{vb}–263^{ra}); the discussion on the cardinal virtues covers ff. 81^{ra}–261^{rb}. For Ulrich's dependence on Albert, see Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 1: 204–208; Stammkötter, *De virtutibus secundum principia philosophica*, with a partial edition of Ulrich's work.

Aquinas's *Secunda secundae*, the part of the *Summa theologiae* devoted to morality and structured as a discussion of the theological and cardinal virtues with the vices opposing them. A striking example of the work's influence is the *Speculum morale* (ca. 1300), the spurious fourth part of the *Speculum maius* of Vincent of Beauvais. The sections on the virtues in the *Speculum morale* are copied nearly word for word from Aquinas's *Summa* and supplemented with views and exempla taken from a variety of sources, including the work of the Franciscan friar Richard of Mediavilla († ca. 1308), who follows Aquinas's teachings on the virtues in his commentary on the *Sententiae*.

Theologians and arts masters reasoned about the cardinal virtues in a philosophical context as well, notably in commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Glosses on the first, partial translations of Aristotle's work (*Ethica vetus* and *Ethica nova*) are known from the 1230s.³¹ In 1250/52, Albert the Great wrote the first commentary on Robert Grosseteste's full Latin translation of the *Ethics*, completed by 1247, which remained the standard base text for lectures and commentaries until the early fifteenth century. Albert's intention to consider the work from a philosophical rather than a theological point of view set the tone for later commentators including Gerald of Odo († 1349) and John Buridan († 1358/60). However, many commentators discussed questions bordering on theology,³² while some of them even inserted views from Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* which Aquinas avoided using in his own *Ethics* commentary.³³ Until the middle of the fourteenth century, most commentaries were written by Parisian masters. After that date, a commentary tradition set in at the newly founded universities of Central Europe,

³¹ See Wieland, *Ethica*; Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics*, 46–47; Buffon, “The Structure of the Soul”; Zavattero, “Moral and Intellectual Virtues”. Editions are being prepared by Valeria Buffon (Pseudo-Peckham), Anthony Celano (Robert Kilwardby), Claude Lafleur (the Avranches commentary), and Irene Zavattero (the Paris commentary on the *Ethica vetus*; see Zavattero, “Le prologue de la *Lectura in Ethicam ueterem*”). For an edition of the Naples commentary, see *Scriptum super librum Ethicorum*.

³² Müller, *Natürliche Moral*, 22–58, discusses Albert's claim to autonomy from theology in dealing with Aristotelian ethics. See notably *Super Ethica* 1.10 (55), p. 55: “Augustinus loquitur de virtutibus infusis, de quibus nihil pertinet ad moralem philosophum”. Cf. Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 3 q. 23, f. 54^{ra}: “virtutum alie infuse sunt, ut tradit sanctarum scripturarum auctoritas, et alie ex humanis operationibus generate, de quibus agit moralis philosophus. De primis non est hic questio”. For Buridan and the close links between ethical and theological teaching in Paris, see Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics*, 70–73, 153–155.

³³ For examples, see below, pp. 256–257, 277.

soon followed by Italy.³⁴ An authoritative text in this second tradition was the commentary of Buridan, which survives, like the commentary of Aquinas, in just over one hundred known manuscripts. It has been recently established that in fifteenth-century Vienna, university courses on the *Nicomachean Ethics* were in fact devoted to the study of Buridan's commentary rather than Aristotle's work.³⁵ Apart from comprehensive commentaries, some philosophers devoted questions to specific problems occasioned by the *Nicomachean Ethics*. A notable example are the *Quaestiones morales* of Richard Kilvington († 1361).³⁶

The impact of philosophical ethics on moral thought outside the universities remained moderate. Compendia or florilegia of Aristotelian ethics were relatively rare up to 1400 and usually had a modest diffusion.³⁷ Even the growing participation of lay authors in late medieval intellectual culture did not change much in this respect. The most important lay authors on morality of our period (if we exclude Petrarch, who took minor orders) are the Italian lawyers Albertanus of Brescia (fl. 1226–1253), Jeremy of Montagnone († 1320/21), and John of Legnano († 1383). Albertanus's *De amore Dei et proximi* (ca. 1238/40) chiefly arranges sayings of the classics and makes frequent use of the *Moralium dogma*, but its Christian character is already obvious from the title. Its

³⁴ For surveys see Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries"; Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics*; Flüeler, "Ethica in Wien anno 1438". For the virtue ethics developed by the commentators, see *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages*.

³⁵ See Flüeler, "Teaching Ethics at the University of Vienna".

³⁶ Richard Kilvington, *Quaestiones morales* (Bloomfield 6272, 6298 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 6272, 6298); see also Jung-Palczewska, "Works by Richard Kilvington", 199–203 (with a survey of the ten questions). I used MS Bruges, SB 503, ff. 51^{ra}–79^{va}.

³⁷ For examples see Grabmann, *Methoden und Hilfsmittel*, esp. 60–63, 89–95 (compendia), 156–188 (florilegia, none of them exclusively relating to the *Ethics*); Gauthier, "Introduction", 119 (pointing, among others, to the *Compendium philosophiae* from ca. 1240 which survives in 11 MSS; book 8 of this work is based on the *Ethica vetus* and *Ethica nova*); Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics*, 167–172, 472–482 (on 14th-century Italian works). A relatively widespread florilegium is Jean Bernier du Fayt, *Tabula moralium* (Bloomfield 5072 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 5072). The work lists quotations from all of Aristotle's work (and incidentally from Averroes's commentaries) under alphabetically ordered headings related to morality including *Fortitudo* (MS Bruges, SB 508, ff. 25^{va}–26^{va}), *Iustitia*, *iustus* etc. (ff. 33^{ra}–34^{rb}), *Prudentia* (f. 49^{rb}–vb), and *Temperantia* (f. 56^{va}–vb). The *Compendium moralis philosophiae* of Lucas Mannelli († 1362), which survives in one MS, is based on Aristotle's *Ethics* in combination with Cicero and Thomas Aquinas; see Kaeppli, "Luca Manelli", 244–248. A rare instance of a treatise on the virtues and vices entirely based on Aristotle, his Arabian commentators, and the classics is [Treatise on the virtues and vices], MS Troyes, BM 1959, ff. 116^v–119^v (Bloomfield 2677 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2677).

fourth part discusses the virtues together with the vices and ends with chapters on devotional themes as *amor presentis vite contemprandus*, *conversio ad Dominum*, and *vita activa et contemplativa*. A later work of Albertanus, the *Liber consolationis et consilii* (ca. 1246/48), combines ancient with Christian sources and takes the religious dimension of virtue into account, with prudence appearing as an acquired virtue on the one hand, but as a road to beatitude on the other, its main element being the divine gift of counsel.³⁸ Jeremy of Montagnone's *Compendium moralium notabilium* is a rather traditional collection of quotations from ancient, patristic, and medieval writers, even though it betrays a predilection for classical Latin poets.³⁹ Finally, John of Legnano's *De pace*, which chiefly comprises discussions of Aristotle's moral virtues plus prudence, incorporates (without acknowledgment) large portions of Buridan's commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* but also of Aquinas's *Secunda secundae*, including its observations on the vices. Also, the work contains numerous biblical and patristic quotations despite John's professed intention to refer principally to canon and civil law. John is, moreover, the author of a treatise *De virtutibus theologicis* which he apparently meant as an extension to *De pace*.⁴⁰

If philosophical ethics did not reach a broad audience, moral theology did. In the course of the thirteenth century, the theological scheme of the seven principal virtues, which originated in twelfth-century Benedictine writing, came to form part of basic catechetical knowledge. In 1286/89, Bishop William of Cahors included a chapter on the seven virtues in a synodal letter summarizing the elements of the faith,⁴¹ while the Council of Lambeth (1281) required knowledge of the seven principal virtues and vices even of "simple" priests in the English Church.⁴² Accordingly, the

³⁸ Albertanus of Brescia, *Liber consolationis et consilii* 8–9 and 11, pp. 21–23, 31–33. Albertanus's ideas may have been inspired by Alan of Lille's *De virtutibus et de vitiis*; his definitions of prudence and its species, except for *ratio* and *intellectus*, derive from Alan (see *ibid.* 6–7, pp. 20–21). See also *id.*, *De amore et dilectione Dei et proximi* 4.18, pp. 268–269; Alan seems to be the source, but the definitions of *providentia* and *cautio* follow the *Moralium dogma*. Powell, *Albertanus of Brescia*, 47, only mentions the *Moralium dogma* as Albertanus's source.

³⁹ For a discussion of the work, see Ullman, *Studies in the Italian Renaissance*, 82–115, listing 44 MSS.

⁴⁰ The incipit of *De virtutibus theologicis* is: "Viso de virtutibus moralibus et una intellectuali scilicet prudentia, restat videndum de theologicis ...". For a discussion of John's works, see McCall, "The Writings of John of Legnano".

⁴¹ See William of Cahors, *Epistola synodica* 12, p. 691.

⁴² Council of Lambeth, Canon 9 (*De informatione simplicium sacerdotum*), in *Councils and Synods* 2: 904–905. The stipulations of the council were repeatedly confirmed in

Oxford-schooled parish priest William of Pagula added a short chapter *De vii virtutibus principalibus* to his *Oculus sacerdotis* (ca. 1320), a widely used manual for priestly instruction; the chapter reappears almost word for word in a late fourteenth-century *Speculum christiani*.⁴³ The *Tabula fidei christianae*, a probably fourteenth-century catechetical composition preserved in more than a dozen, predominantly British, manuscripts, even introduces the seven principal virtues in its very first sentence.⁴⁴ Basic instruction in the seven virtues was moreover offered in popularizing works of theology which were written in considerable numbers from the mid-thirteenth century and in many cases reached a large diffusion. The most important specimen is the *Compendium theologiae veritatis* (ca. 1265/70) of the Dominican friar Hugh Ripelin, which survives in about six hundred known manuscripts. Noticeable examples written by other Dominicans include Simon Hinton's *Summa iuniorum* (ca. 1260) and the anonymous *Summa rudium* composed in the 1330s; important Franciscan representatives are the *Diaeta salutis* of William of Lanicea († 1310) and the *Compendium sacrae theologiae* (1311/17) of Jean Rigaud, heavily tributary to the *Diaeta* but also to Hugh's *Compendium* as well as to William Peraldus.

Theological compendia bridge the gap between scholastic speculation and practical moral teaching. Simon Hinton's *Summa iuniorum*, for instance, a work meant for the elementary instruction of Dominican priests, resumes the teaching of Hinton's masters Richard Fishacre and Albert the Great as contained in their commentaries on the *Sententiae*. Still, the authors of compendia generally avoid scholastic disputation, while the most recent author they usually quote by name is Bernard of Clairvaux; among the works just mentioned, only the *Summa rudium* explicitly refers to scholastic authorities, all of them belonging to the Dominican order.⁴⁵ Aristotle occasionally figures as one authority among

the course of the Middle Ages, even as late as 1518 by Thomas Wolsey; see Newhauser, "Preaching the Contrary Virtues".

⁴³ William of Pagula, *Oculus sacerdotis* 2.6, MS Cambridge, UL II.2.7, ff. 56^{vb}–57^{ra}; *Speculum christiani*, pp. 47–49.

⁴⁴ See *Tabula de fide catholica*, MS Paris, BnF lat. 3534, f. 6^v: "VII. virtutes principales. Spes fides caritas—iste sunt theologice. Iustitia temperancia fortitudo prudentia—iste cardinales". See Bloomfield 0641, 2347, 2547, 2690, 4156 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 0641, 2347, 2547, 2690, 4156.

⁴⁵ See *Summa rudium* Prol., sig. a2^{ra}, mentioning Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarantaise (Pope Innocent V), and John of Freiburg as authorities used in the work. The author does not mention Hugh Ripelin, whose *Compendium* influenced

many others (for instance, in the *Compendia* of Ripelin and Rigaud, and in the *Summa rudium*), but the *Diaeta salutis* does not mention him at all, while Hinton omits his name even in passages derived from Albert's commentary on the *Sententiae* in which references to Aristotle abound.⁴⁶ By contrast, all compendia freely cite from the Latin classics, in particular from Cicero, Macrobius, and "Seneca" (sometimes the Roman philosopher, sometimes Martin of Braga).

Related to theological compendia and usually aiming at a similar audience of preachers and confessors are treatises on the virtues and vices. The most voluminous and most widely disseminated treatise on the virtues of the Late Middle Ages is the *Summa de virtutibus* of William Peraldus († ca. 1265), composed before 1248 in the Dominican convent of Lyon as a counterpart of the *Summa de vitiis* which Peraldus finished in 1236.⁴⁷ The *Summa de virtutibus* consists of five parts devoted to virtue in general, the theological virtues, the cardinal virtues, the gifts, and the beatitudes. Being a compiler rather than a theorist, Peraldus proposes divergent views on the virtues taken from classical and Christian authorities, adding abundant quotations in praise of the virtues as well as numerous exempla drawn from the Bible and other sources. Although Peraldus avoids naming any more recent author than Bernard of Clairvaux, his work betrays awareness of contemporary moral theology; his use of Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono* is manifest,⁴⁸ while even Aristotle and Averroes are occasionally mentioned. The *Summa* survives in about four hundred manuscripts, over one third of which contain extracts or abbreviations (adaptations confined to the cardinal virtues alone do not appear to exist). The influence of the work was immediate. Either John of La Rochelle († 1245) or one of his close collaborators abbreviated Peraldus's summae to form part of John's planned *Summa theologiae disciplinae*,⁴⁹ while (Pseudo-)Mauritius Hibernicus (Maurice of Provins) used both summae for the entries on the virtues and the vices in the bib-

the discussion of the cardinal virtues; he may have thought that the *Compendium* was Albert's work.

⁴⁶ See Bejczy and Newhauser, "Two Newly Discovered Abbreviations".

⁴⁷ The *Summa de vitiis* and the *Summa de virtutibus* of William Peraldus are often quoted as one *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus*. In medieval manuscripts the works survive more often separately than together; see Verweij, "The Manuscript Transmission". In early modern editions, the works are often titled together *Summa virtutum ac vitiorum*.

⁴⁸ In his introduction to Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 41*, Wicki wrongly states that William acknowledges a debt to Philip. Wicki refers to Gauthier, *Magnanimité*, 278–279, who merely shows that William's division of fortitude depends on Philip's.

⁴⁹ See Bejczy, "John of La Rochelle and William Peraldus".

lical compendium which he started writing in 1248.⁵⁰ Moreover, Stephen of Bourbon, a confrere of Peraldus who likewise lived in the convent of Lyon, made ample use of the *Summa de virtutibus* for his *De materiis praedicabilibus* which he left unfinished at his death (ca. 1261), in the middle of a huge section on the cardinal virtues. Many later authors used the *Summa* as well. Its third part is entirely recapitulated in Álvaro Pelayo's *Speculum regum*, while the Augustinian preacher Jordan of Quedlinburg († 1370/80) paraphrases Peraldus's definitions of the virtues in his *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum* while borrowing the virtues' subdivisions from Aquinas.⁵¹

Remarkably, the cardinal virtues lost much of their popularity in late medieval hagiography,⁵² while associations of the quartet with the monastic life appear to have become rare.⁵³ Yet moral works which discuss the cardinal virtues in a purely devotional setting do survive from the late medieval period. A good example is the thirteenth-century *Paradisus animae*, preserved in over one hundred and fifty manuscripts in which it is often attributed to Albert the Great. The work discusses the four cardinal and thirty-eight other virtues in order to teach Christians how to distinguish virtue from vice. All virtues bring us to God and make us forsake the world; thus, prudence helps us to recognize God's goodness and the misery of human life, fortitude gives strength against the seven deadly sins, justice consists in giving God due praise. While interlarding his work with quotations from the Bible and Christian authors up to Bernard of Clairvaux, the author never refers to the

⁵⁰ See Bataillon, "Intermédiaires entre les traités de morale".

⁵¹ See Bejczy, "Jordan of Quedlinburg's *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum*".

⁵² I know of only nine 13th-century and four 14th-century *vitae* that mention the virtues; see Bejczy, "Les vertus cardinales dans l'hagiographie".

⁵³ John of Saint Edmund (?), *Summa ... de institutione religiosorum* 2.15, MS Cambridge, Sidney Sussex 85, ff. 139^v–140^r (Bloomfield 2626), is the only text I found which presents the cardinal virtues as constituting a spiritual cloister. See also [Instructions for Benedictines], MS Troyes 1750, f. 183^v (quoted above, p. 128 n. 276). A new phenomenon appears to be the association of the four cardinal virtues with cardinals. See William of Auvergne, *De virtutibus* 12, p. 162a: some say that the cardinal virtues are named "a sacro coetu cardinalium"; William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.1.1, p. 281b: the cardinal virtues notably apply to cardinals; John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 143^{rb} (after explaining how the cardinal virtues make one resist the temptation of vice): "Sic debet esse in cardinalibus nostre militantis ecclesie"; *ibid.*, f. 145^{va}: the four virtues are a college of cardinals with prudence as their pope; *Vita Petri de Luxemburgo*, quoted in Bejczy, "Les vertus cardinales dans l'hagiographie", 347 with n. 108.

Latin classics, let alone to Aristotle.⁵⁴ Similar in character is the probably fourteenth-century Pseudo-Bonaventurian *Summa de gradibus virtutum* which survives in twenty known manuscripts. The *Summa* proposes spiritual interpretations of thirty virtues, including the cardinal quartet. All virtues receive a threefold interpretation (*altus, altior, altissimus*) corresponding to three climbing degrees of religious intent and the desire to give oneself to God.⁵⁵

These examples should be sufficient to remind one that late medieval virtue theory cannot be reduced to scholastic doctrine or the reception of Aristotelian ethics. At the same time, one should realize that not all religious moral writings shun classical and scholastic sources. In his *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus*, for instance, the Bolognese notary Guido Faba († 1245) describes the cardinal virtues as four jewels on the crown of the just. God's justice, tempered by pity, is Guido's model for human justice; fortitude, which consoles in adversity, is exemplified by Job and Tobias; thanks to temperance, "you may fear the Lord in prosperity and know him in hardship"; finally, prudence is necessary so that one's deeds become acceptable to God. Yet despite these pious associations, Guido defines the cardinal virtues in accordance with Cicero's *De inventione* and Macrobius's commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis*.⁵⁶ The metaphor of the four jewels recurs in Jean Tigart's *Bellum spirituale de conflictu vitiorum et virtutum* (ca. 1350), in a chapter on the heavenly warrior which none the less opens with references to Aristotle's *Ethics* and its commentators.⁵⁷ The *Fasciculus morum*, a Franciscan manual for priests composed shortly after 1300, can serve as another example. The work introduces the cardinal virtues as the subject of Christ's

⁵⁴ See *Paradisus animae* 8–11, pp. 461–465.

⁵⁵ Pseudo-Bonaventure, *Summa de gradibus virtutum* esp. 9–12, pp. 649–650, for the cardinal virtues. The manuscript tradition starts in the late 14th century; see "Prolegomena", in Bonaventure, *Opera* 8: C–CI. See also Van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne de la vertu*, 196–198, for a comparison of the treatment of the cardinal virtues in this text and the *Paradisus animae*.

⁵⁶ Guido Faba, *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* 2.1–6, pp. 128–138, 142. Faba was ordained to the priesthood ca. 1223; the work is believed to have been written after it. See Bausi, "Guido Faba", also mentioning three MSS unknown to the *Summa*'s editor (p. 416). The image of the crown, which is of patristic origin (see above, p. 28), likewise occurs, e.g., in Alan of Lille, *Sermo in natali Sancti Augustini*; Bartholomew of Recanato's glosses on the prologue of the *Moralium dogma* (early 13th century), p. 79; William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.1.2, p. 282b; William of Lanicea, *Diaeta salutis* 5.8, p. 303.

⁵⁷ See Jean Tigart, *Bellum spirituale de conflictu vitiorum et virtutum* 43, MS Paris, BnF lat. 16437, ff. 141^v–142^v.

Sermon on the Mount,⁵⁸ but proposes definitions and subdivisions of these virtues which go back to classical sources. Prudence is defined according to Cicero's *De inventione*, but its three parts have religious functions: *memoria* is associated with examining one's conscience, *intelligentia* with correcting past sins and taking precautions against future ones, *providentia* with foresight of one's death and judgment; still, a final paragraph explains how much the ancients valued prudence. Also, the author exemplifies fortitude by Christ, although his definitions of this virtue derive from Macrobius and Aristotle.⁵⁹ As a final example, John de Burgh's *Pupilla oculi* (1384) may be mentioned, a learned, but widely circulating adaptation of William of Pagula's equally popular *Oculus sacerdotis*. John, chancellor of the University of Cambridge, expands William's pious observations on the cardinal virtues, inspired by Augustine and Bernard of Clairvaux, with acknowledged quotations from Aristotle, Cicero, "Seneca" (Martin of Braga), and Macrobius, but also from the Bible, the *Glossa ordinaria*, Bernard, and Thomas Aquinas, while retaining William's religious interpretation of the four virtues as remedies against the vices.⁶⁰

Three genres relevant to late medieval discussions of the cardinal virtues should still be mentioned. First, the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries produced a considerable number of anthologies of moral sayings and exempla. As a rule these anthologies explore Christian authorities up to Bernard of Clairvaux together with classical authors. Famous examples are the *Viridarium consolationis* of James of Benevent († 1271) and the *Manipulus florum* (ca. 1306) of Thomas of Ireland.⁶¹ Some florilegia, however, concentrate on Christian texts (Pseudo-Bonaventure's

⁵⁸ *Fasciculus morum* 3.21, p. 284. For the antecedent of Rupert of Deutz, see above, p. 98.

⁵⁹ See *ibid.* 5.27, p. 556; 5.31, pp. 588–592 (on prudence fighting, like faith, against the world; on p. 592 a commentator on the *Ethics* is cited); 5.34, pp. 596–602 (on temperance fighting, like hope, against the flesh); 5.37, pp. 618–622 (on fortitude fighting, like charity, against the devil). Justice is absent from this arrangement.

⁶⁰ John de Burgh, *Pupilla oculi* 10.3, ff. 127^v–128^r. John divides prudence into *prudencia mundana* (in temporalibus conquerendis), *humana* (circa comodum carnis), and *divina* (circa obsequia divina), while he interprets justice as observing one's religious duties.

⁶¹ For James of Benevent see Kaeppli 2052 (mentioning over 130 MSS) and below, p. 230; for Thomas of Ireland's *Manipulus*, surviving in nearly 200 MSS, see Rouse and Rouse, *Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons*, and Chris Nighman's electronic edition on the Internet. The *Manipulus* has entries on fortitude, justice, temperance, and virtue; several sayings included under *Virtus* pertain to the four cardinal virtues. For a text mainly, but not exclusively, restricted to Christian sources, see, e.g., Bloomfield 1506 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1506.

Pharetra, for instance, is restricted to patristic material), while others only explore classical sources, such as the *Moralis philosophia* (1266/68) of Roger Bacon—who nevertheless urges his Christian readers to surpass the ancients in virtue with God’s help⁶²—and Conrad of Halberstadt’s *Tripartitus moralium* (ca. 1342/50).⁶³ Other moral works which heavily rely on the classics, such as the *Speculum doctrinale* (ca. 1250) of Vincent of Beauvais and the *Sophologium* of the Augustinian eremite Jacques Legrand (ca. 1360–1415),⁶⁴ refer to Christian sources, too, and occasionally involve a Christian perspective.

Second, a fairly large number of theological dictionaries survive from the Later Middle Ages, some of which concentrate on moral items. In this genre we likewise find works of exclusively Christian contents, such as the *Tractatus de vitiis et virtutibus* of the Franciscan friar Nicholas of Biard († ca. 1295), next to compositions which include classical material, such as the *Dictionarium morale* of the Benedictine monk Pierre Bersuire († 1362) and the Lollard *Rosarium theologiae* (ca. 1400).⁶⁵ Scholastic variants exist as well: thus, the huge dictionary which forms part of the *Pantheologia* of the Dominican friar Rainerius of Pisa († ca. 1348) mainly arranges excerpts from Aquinas’s *Summa theologiae* and *Sententia libri Ethicorum* in its entries on the cardinal virtues.

Third, there is the genre of moral concordances on the Bible, which flowered in the late thirteenth century in particular. Meant as reference tools for preachers, these works classify biblical verses, sometimes provided with suitable interpretations, under the virtues (cardinal and other), the vices, and related moral concepts, thereby reinforcing the idea that the cardinal virtues form part of biblical teaching. Some concordances, such as *De virtutibus et vitiis* (ca. 1270) of John Peckham, arch-

⁶² Roger Bacon, *Moralis philosophia* 3 Proem., p. 47. See also Hackett, “Roger Bacon on Magnanimity and Virtue”, for the argument that Bacon’s *Moralis philosophia* subordinates Aristotle’s treatment of the virtues to Stoic and Neo-Platonic tendencies.

⁶³ For Conrad’s *Tripartitus*, which has entries on all four cardinal virtues and *virtus*, see Rauner, *Konrad von Halberstadt*.

⁶⁴ For a study of the sources and influences of the *Sophologium* (which in its chapters on the virtues partly relies on Vincent’s work), see Beltran, *L’Idéal de sagesse*; at 166–172, Beltran presents Legrand’s views of the virtues as non-religious in character.

⁶⁵ Nicholas of Biard, *Tractatus de vitiis et virtutibus* (Bloomfield 1841 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1841) has entries on fortitude and justice. I used MS Paris, BnF lat. 3732. Pierre Bersuire, *Dictionarium morale* 2: 1283a–1285a, discusses the four virtues in the lemma *Virtus*. The *Rosarium* has entries on all four virtues and on *Virtus*. It is mainly based on patristic and early medieval sources but occasionally refers to Aristotle and late medieval authorities including John Wycliff.

bishop of Canterbury, and the *Virtutum vitiorumque exempla* of Nicholas of Hanappes († 1291), patriarch of Jerusalem, are thematically arranged, with the cardinal virtues figuring amidst other schemes;⁶⁶ others list their subjects alphabetically.⁶⁷ I know of one concordance of the early thirteenth century limited to justice, fortitude, and prudence only.⁶⁸

It should be noted that the cardinal virtues do not invariably appear in any of the genres mentioned here. Not even treatises on virtues and vices always include our quartet, as will be explained in the next chapter. Still, the four virtues form a relatively stable scheme in late medieval moral thought, and the overwhelming quantity of relevant source material will often make it necessary in the remainder of this chapter to limit examples to a few notable cases.

Saving the Fourfold Scheme

In late medieval theology and philosophy, the cardinal virtues form a quartet, but normally not an independent quartet. Theologians and catechists usually take the cardinal and theological virtues together as a septenary of principal virtues. In the preface of his *Secunda secundae*, Thomas Aquinas even declares that moral theology amounts to the study of the virtues, and that the study of the virtues amounts to the study of the theological and cardinal virtues which together comprise all others.⁶⁹ In Aristotle's *Ethics*, the virtues known as cardinal do not stand on their own either. Aristotle distinguishes five intellectual virtues including prudence and eleven moral virtues including fortitude, temperance, and justice. The four virtues do not have any privileged position as a quartet.

The scheme of the cardinal virtues nevertheless continued to attract late medieval moral authors. But how to uphold the traditional notion that the four virtues cover the whole range of morality in light of the

⁶⁶ For these works see below, pp. 232 (Peckham) and 241–242 (Hanappes).

⁶⁷ See, e.g., (Pseudo-) Mauritius Hibernicus, *Distinctiones* (entries on fortitude, justice, prudence, and virtue); Nicholas of Biard, *Distinctiones theologicae* (entries on fortitude, justice, and prudence); Nicholas of Gorran († ca. 1295), *Distinctiones ad praedican-dum* (entries on fortitude, justice, and virtue). For these works see also below, p. 232.

⁶⁸ [Themes for preachers], MS Toulouse, BM 369, comprising sections on justice (ff. 105^{va}–127^{ra}), fortitude (ff. 127^{ra}–141^{vb}), and prudence (ff. 143^{ra}–226^{vb}); see Bloomfield 1601, 3203, 5742 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1601, 3203, 5742.

⁶⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II Prol., *Opera* 8: 5. Cf. Servasanto of Faenza, *De exemplis naturalibus* 3 Prol., MS Vienna, ÖNB 1589, f. 38^{ra}: “Sunt enim uirtutes innumere ... sed non sunt secundum nomina note omnes, sed ad septem maxime que sunt famosissime sunt reducibiles”; likewise 3.18, f. 48^{va}.

alternative arrangements of the virtues prevailing in moral theology and philosophy? In order to save the scheme of the cardinal virtues, theologians, philosophers, and other authors offered a variety of arguments which sometimes put the four virtues into an even more dominant position than tradition assigned to them.

Four Virtues?

Associating biblical and other quartets (the four elements, for instance) with the cardinal virtues remained a common phenomenon in the Later Middle Ages, notably in pastoral writings.⁷⁰ Apart from these associations, which generally lack explicative force, scholastics and other moral authors also tried to account rationally for the number of the cardinal virtues.

First of all, late medieval authors continued the twelfth-century tradition, initiated by Peter Abelard, which views justice as the executor of prudence's precepts, with fortitude and temperance assisting justice against fear and cupidity, respectively. Thus in his *Summa theologiae*, Thomas Aquinas describes prudence as perfecting reason and justice as doing the good (*boni factiva*); fortitude and temperance are *conservativae huius boni* in that they protect the human being against the passions (the fear of death and sexual temptation) which detract him from doing the good.⁷¹ Aquinas's arrangement reappears in one anonymous commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* which otherwise avoids the scheme of the four virtues,⁷² while arrangements very much like it occur in Henry of Rimini's treatise on the cardinal virtues,⁷³ the *Summa virtutum de*

⁷⁰ Biblical fours: see, e.g., William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.2, pp. 283b–284b (the Paradise rivers, the four colours of the curtains of the tabernacle, the four ingredients of the unction, the four wheels of the chariot of fire, and the four animals of Ez. 1); Synan, "Cardinal Virtues in the Cosmos of Saint Bonaventure", 33–36, discussing the numerous associations appearing in Bonaventure's *Hexaemeron*. Elements: see, e.g., Robert Grosseteste, *Deus est*, pp. 249–250; Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, pp. 754–755; Bonaventure, *Hexaemeron* 6.21, *Opera* 5: 363 (see Emery, "Reading the World Rightly and Squarely", 200ff.); John of San Geminiano († 1332), *Summa de exemplis* 1.84, f. 105^{rb–va}.

⁷¹ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.123.12, *Opera* 10: 25.

⁷² See *Questiones in Ethicam* 3 q. 57, MS Erlangen, UB 213, f. 57^{vb}: "duo sunt que videntur uoluntatem impediri ne rectitudo rationis rebus exterioribus inponatur per eam: primo quando voluntas ab aliquibus delectacionibus abstrahitur et inpeditur a rectitudine rationis, et ad hoc inpedimentum remouendum est temperancia ... secundo modo inpeditur voluntas retrahendo eam ab hiis que ratio precipit, et talia inpedimenta sunt pericula bellica, et ad hoc est fortitudo". I owe this transcription to Iacopo Costa.

⁷³ Henry of Rimini, *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus* 3, f. 84^v: "Sciendum est ergo quod virtutum moralium quedam sunt constitutue boni, vt prudencia que rationes

remediis anime,⁷⁴ the Dominican *Summa rudium*,⁷⁵ and John of Legnano's *De pace*.⁷⁶ Engelbert of Admont's observations on the connection of the four virtues in *De regimine principum* bear a particularly strong resemblance to Abelard's original teaching on the subject, although the *Moralium dogma* is Engelbert's likely source. According to Engelbert, prudence is the *scientia agendorum*, while the other three virtues are *exequentes virtutes* concerned with the *operatio cognitorum*. Justice pulls the affect to moral action and has its precepts executed by fortitude and temperance, which notably fulfil their tasks by counteracting *timor* and *cupiditas*.⁷⁷ The arrangements of Abelard, Aquinas and Engelbert remind one of the teachings of early medieval authors on moral acts coming into existence thanks to the cooperation of the four cardinal virtues. Each of the four virtues contributes in its own way to the creation of moral

rectas facit et iusticia que ipsam rectitudinem in rebus humanis ponit. Et quedam sunt impeditem mali, vt fortitudo et temperancia que passiones sensitiui appetitus modificant ne abducant hominem a iudicio rationis propter pericula mortis, circa que est fortitudo, et delectaciones venereas, circa quas est temperancia". See also Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 1.2.15, pp. 89–90 for a weak version of the arrangement, without a prominent place for justice.

⁷⁴ *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, pp. 55–57: prudence chooses the means of good actions which justice puts it into effect, while fortitude and temperance help in adversity and prosperity, respectively.

⁷⁵ *Summa rudium* 25, sig. h5^{va-vb}: "Sunt autem quattuor numero scilicet Prudencia Iusticia Fortitudo et Temperancia. Ex quibus prime due perfectiores sunt duabus posterioribus. Quia fortitudo et temperancia solum remouent istud quod posset prohiberi scilicet actus prudencie et iusticie verbi gratia Iusticia dicit mihi quod debeam subire mortem potius quam declinare a iusticia. Sed timor mundanus consulit mihi propter fragilitatem humane nature lesiones corporis fugere et signanter mortem. Et aliquantulum pro conseruatione subiecti a tramite iusticie declinare. Sed virtus fortitudinis dicit mihi difficilia viriliter secundum rationem aggredi et pro iusticia vsque ad mortem certare. Et similiter inuenimus de temperancia. Nam temperantia retrahit nos ab his que contra rationem appetitum alliciunt. Sicut fortitudo impellit ad ea sustinenda et aggredienda propter que homo resurgit ad bonum rationis".

⁷⁶ John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 144^{va}: "Nam ad virtutem spectat quod hominem et ipsius opus faciat secundum rationem esse et operari, vt dicit philosophus ii. ethycorum. Hoc autem contingit tripliciter. Vno modo secundum quod ipsa ratio rectificatur, et hoc fit per virtutem intellectualem que est prudencia. Alio modo secundum quod ipsa rectitudo rationis in rebus humanis instituitur, quod pertinet ad iusticiam. Tercio modo secundum quod tolluntur impedimenta rectitudinis in rebus humanis. Dupliciter autem impeditur voluntas humana ne(c) rectitudinem rationis sequatur. Vno modo per hoc quod attrahitur ab aliquo delectabili ad aliud quam rectitudo disponat, et hoc impedimentum tollit temperancia. Alio modo per hoc quod uoluntatem repellit ab eo quod est secundum rationem propter aliquod triste quod incumbit, et hoc tollit fortitudo".

⁷⁷ Engelbert of Admont, *De regimine principum* 4.1, 5.1 and 6.1, pp. 125 154, 172–173.

behaviour and is hence indispensable, while no role is specified for any other virtue. Presenting the cardinal virtues in this manner constitutes a stable tradition in the Middle Ages from the sixth century onward.

Apart from continuing earlier traditions, late medieval authors also justified the number of the cardinal virtues by developing new arguments. I will concentrate my discussion on three particularly influential arguments in favour of the fourfold scheme introduced by Philip the Chancellor in his *Summa de bono* and elaborated by numerous later authors.⁷⁸

First, Philip argues that the cardinal virtues fulfil the four necessary conditions of virtue established in Bernard of Clairvaux's *De consideratione* (the reference is in fact spurious): knowing (prudence), willing (justice), perseverance (fortitude), and moderation (temperance). From this arrangement, which he thinks congruent with Aristotle's *Ethics*,⁷⁹ Philip infers that all virtues are somehow *partes*, *species*, or *dispositiones* of the cardinal quartet, thus seemingly repeating the traditional idea that each cardinal virtue gives birth to a group of specific secondary virtues. However, Philip actually believes, expanding on ideas first formulated by Alan of Lille, that *all four* cardinal virtues underlie *any* of the other moral virtues. Instead of mother concepts in a genealogy of virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance form aspects of all mental dispositions and human acts with a claim to virtue.⁸⁰ This idea is obviously alien to Aristotle's *Ethics* but agrees with the Ciceronian view of virtue or *honestas*, which is identical with the virtuous life,⁸¹ as consisting of the

⁷⁸ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, pp. 754–755; see also Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 175–176; Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues*, 45–51. For Philip's other explanations of the fourfold scheme, see *Summa de bono*, pp. 744–751; for their influence on later authors, see, e.g., Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 156–174 (Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Odo Rigaldi, John of La Rochelle, Alexander of Hales); William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.1.2, pp. 282a–284b; Peter of Aquila [† 1361], *Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum* III.33.

⁷⁹ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 754, refers the four conditions to Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea* (*Ethica vetus*) 2.3 (1105a31–34), p. 10: “prius quidem si sciens; deinde si volens operatur propter hec; tertium autem si firme et inmutabiliter habens, operatur”.

⁸⁰ See, e.g., *Summa de bono*, p. 557: “sicut unaqueque virtus tenet rationem iustitie, sic videtur quod unaqueque tenet rationem prudentie in discretione ... et rationem fortitudinis, quia est circa suum difficile ... similiter rationem temperantie in quantum modum tenet”. But only justice extends to the theological virtues, too (pp. 557–558). For Alan, see above, pp. 130–131.

⁸¹ Cicero's identification of *honestas* and virtue is accepted by, e.g., William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 1.2, p. 18; Roger Bacon, *Moralis philosophia* 3 Proem., p. 45; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.145.1, *Opera* 10: 146; Engelbert of Admont, *De regimine principum* 3.12, p. 65. According to John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 1 q. 3, f. 4th, Albert the Great objected that “honestum ... est virtutis accidens et non ipsa virtus.

four cardinal virtues.⁸² Moreover, it is at least compatible with Augustine's conception of the cardinal virtues as modes of charity, on which every virtue depends.⁸³

Although the cardinal virtues never lost their position as classifying concepts in late medieval moral writing—the very structure of the *Secunda secundae* of Aquinas rests on the idea that the seven principal virtues comprise all others—the notion that they inform together all specific virtues made headway. Philip's view was frequently repeated and adapted in the thirteenth century,⁸⁴ while Robert Kilwardby claims in his commentary on the *Sententiae* that every particular virtue is a compound of the four cardinal virtues rather than a species of one of them, since all virtues consist in *recte discernere* (prudence), *recte concupiscere* (temperance), *recte audere* (fortitude), and *recte attribuere* (justice).⁸⁵ Aquinas likewise states in his *Summa theologiae* that the four virtues are called cardinal or principal because they represent four characteristics common to all virtues: *discretio*, *rectitudo*, *firmitas*, and *moderantia*.⁸⁶ Several theologians and other moral writers active after Aquinas,

Est enim honestum quod ab honore dicitur premium virtutis". Buridan rejects Albert's criticism, since Cicero refers to the good which is worthy of honour rather than to actual honour. However, Albert identifies *honestum* with *bonum* at *Super Ethica* 1.10 (51), 5.2 (370), and 8.3 (701) etc., pp. 50, 314, 600–601, while he defines *honor* as "exhibitio reuerentiae in testimonium virtutis" (ibid. 1.4 [24], p. 21) and as *praemium virtutum* in the Stoic conception (*Ethica* 1.2.6, *Opera* [ed. Borgnet] 7: 86).

⁸² See Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53.159, p. 147; *De officiis* 1.18.61, 1.43.152, 3.25.96, pp. 21, 52, 115 (quoted with approval by, e.g., William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.1.2, p. 282a–b; Peter Aureoli, *Quodlibeta* 14.3, p. 131b).

⁸³ Cf. Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 756: "amor summi boni est initium omnis virtutis cardinalis, unde per amorem diffinit eas Augustinus in libro De moribus ecclesiae".

⁸⁴ See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 176–179 for Philip's influence on Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, Odo Rigaldi, Bonaventure, and Albert the Great. See also Richard Fishacre, *In tertium librum Sententiarum* 33, 2: 122; Albert the Great, *De bono* 1.6.2, pp. 80–81; *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, p. 57 (quoted below, n. 181). Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.33.4, p. 720, and Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum* 4.11, pp. 199–201 (see also 4.12 and 4.14, pp. 201–203, 205–207), associate the cardinal virtues with three requirements of virtue inferred from the passage of Aristotle quoted by Philip: *scire* (prudence), *velle* (justice), and *immutabiliter operari* (Bonaventure) or *posse* (Engelbert) (temperance and fortitude); see also below, p. 256.

⁸⁵ Robert Kilwardby, *In librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 61, p. 258.

⁸⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.65.1 and II.II.123.11, *Opera* 6: 418 (four characteristics), 10: 23: "virtutes cardinales seu principales dicuntur quae praecipue sibi vindicant id quod pertinet communiter ad virtutes".

including even the Italian humanist Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406), make similar statements and in some cases list the same four characteristics.⁸⁷

Philip's second argument appears to be an original creation. According to Philip, humans gain heaven thanks to their *operationes* and *passiones*, which are controlled by the four virtues: prudence administers the works *quoad nos*, justice those *quoad proximum*; temperance checks the passions which originate in the human interior, fortitude those elicited by others. The argument recurs in various forms in the work of theologians active in the mid-thirteenth century as well as in some later compositions.⁸⁸ The most influential variant was introduced by Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa theologiae*. According to Aquinas, prudence provides the means for the moral actions controlled by justice. While these actions order humans to others, fortitude and temperance regulate the passions which order humans to themselves.⁸⁹ Similar arrangements occur in many later theological and moral writings.⁹⁰ Giles of Rome's famous classification of the virtues in *De regimine principum*, which is discussed below, likewise depends on it.

The third argument advanced by Philip is that the cardinal virtues determine the principal acts of the powers of the soul: reason (prudence), the irascible appetite (fortitude), and the concupiscent appetite (temper-

⁸⁷ Same list: Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* 5.17, f. 189^r (as conditions of every virtue); Richard of Mediavilla, *Super libros Sententiarum* III.36.1.1, 3: 434 (as conditions of every virtuous act); Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones de virtutibus* 6, p. 293 (as *generales affectiones* which go together in every virtuous act); Coluccio Salutati, *Ep.* 11.5, *Epistolario* 3: 346 (rightness, rationality, measure, firmness as four *necessarie condiciones* of every virtuous act). See also Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 1.2.5, p. 59: every moral action is done *prudenter, iuste, fortiter, and temperate*. Cf. Raymond Lull, *Ars generalis ultima* 9.9.1.1, CCCM 75: 266: justice "in aliis uirtutibus est commixtio earum"; 9.9.1.2, p. 269: "Prudentia connexit uirtutem cum uirtute"; 9.9.1.3, p. 271: "Sine fortitudine nulla uirtus est fortis"; 9.9.1.4, p. 274: "Vtrum temperantia sit necessaria omnibus uirtutibus? Et respondendum est, quod sic, ut uirtutes habeant actus temperatos".

⁸⁸ See, e.g., Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 177 (John of La Rochelle), 179 (Albert the Great); Richard Fishacre, *In tertium librum Sententiarum* 33, 2: 122; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.33.4, p. 720 (copied by Peter of Aquila, *Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum* III.33); Ulrich of Strasbourg, *De summo bono* 6.2.5, p. 310. Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super Sententias* III.33.3.1, pp. 221–222, rejects the argument: "frustra laborant isti cum nituntur reducere virtutes ad sufficientiam, quia tanta distinctio est in habitibus volitivis quam in actibus intellectus".

⁸⁹ See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.59.4 and 61.3–4, *Opera* 6: 383, 396–397.

⁹⁰ See, e.g., Henry of Rimini, *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus* Prol., f. 11^{r-v}; Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.5, f. 273^{rb}.

ance), while justice orders the acts of all three powers to God. Establishing a correlation between the virtues and the powers of the soul was far from unprecedented in medieval moral thought. As the cardinal virtues were generally conceived as mental habits, a compelling way to explain their number was to connect them with a fourfold division in the human mind. However, according to Plato's view which prevailed until the late thirteenth century, the powers, or faculties, of the mind (*vires animae*, *potentiae animae*) were only three: *ratio* or *rationabilitas*, *irascibilitas*, and *concupiscibilitas*, as they were named from the Early Middle Ages.⁹¹ How to establish a clear relation between these three mental powers and the four principal virtues? A solution was reached by 1200 thanks to a creative interpretation of the gloss on Gen. 2:10–14 which relates the virtues to the four rivers of Paradise. Stephen Langton was the first to infer from the gloss that prudence commands reason, fortitude the irascible appetite, and temperance the concupiscent appetite, while justice elicits movements (*motus*) from all three mental powers, in accordance with Augustine's observation (quoted in the gloss) that the Euphrates, whose destination is not specified in the Book of Genesis, stands for justice which "pertains to all parts of the soul".⁹² Variants of this explanation appear in numerous thirteenth-century writings in connection with the gloss, and in a still greater number of late medieval works without such a connection.⁹³ Yet theologians were aware of the weak points in the theory. Justice was the only cardinal virtue not to control a mental power of its own, so that it might seem superfluous, as William of Auxerre admits in his *Summa aurea* (ca. 1220).⁹⁴ Another problem was that

⁹¹ See, e.g., Isidore of Seville, *De differentiis* 2.30.104, PL 83: 85B–C; Alcuin, *De anima* 3, PL 101: 639D–640A (connecting the four virtues with the rational command over emotion and desire).

⁹² Stephen Langton, *Summa quaestionum theologiae* CAMB133 (ed. Bejczy), pp. 322–323.

⁹³ For a detailed discussion of the subject see Graf, *De subiecto psychico*. The earliest instance I found after Langton is Alexander Nequam, *Speculum speculationum* 3.90.5, p. 363 (disregarded by Graf). Other relevant texts unmentioned by Graf include *De origine virtutum* (see below, pp. 250–251); *De potentiis animae et obiectis*, p. 161; Giovanni Marchesini (fl. ca. 1300) (?), *Centiloquium* 3.36, p. 405; Jean Rigaud, *Compendium sacrae theologiae* 5.35, MS Paris, BnF lat. 3150, f. 67^{ra} (copied from Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium theologiae veritatis* 5.33, p. 179); John of San Geminiano, *Summa de exemplis* 1.84, f. 105^{rb}; Robert Holcot, *Super Sapientiam* 108 (on 8:7), sig. r1^{ra}; and a number of commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (see below, n. 104).

⁹⁴ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 3.19.2, 3: 387–388. See also Alexander Nequam, *Speculum speculationum* 4.21.10, p. 454: "Numquid ergo iusticia inest secundum propriam uirtutem, id est secundum aliquam anime propriam uim?"

justice seemed to impose rational control on the two sensitive appetites in the same way as prudence. Did justice not primarily belong to reason, then? Stephen Langton already raised and rejected this possibility, but Albert the Great nevertheless locates both prudence and justice in reason.⁹⁵ A few early thirteenth-century theologians even claim that all cardinal virtues are ultimately based in reason.⁹⁶

It is here that Thomas Aquinas provided an elegant solution by recognizing the will, or “intellectual appetite”, as a fourth power of the mind. In his view, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance pertain to *ratio*, *voluntas*, *irascibilitas*, and *concupiscibilitas*, respectively, so that finally each cardinal virtue controlled “its own” mental power.⁹⁷ The solution of Aquinas—which has an antecedent, probably unknown to Aquinas, in a Parisian summa of the late twelfth century⁹⁸—not only moves beyond the Platonic conception of the soul but also departs from Aristotle, who viewed all moral virtues as being related to the appetites and certainly did not believe that all just actions were traceable to the will.⁹⁹ By contrast, the solution accords well with Christian traditions of moral thought. The Augustinian emphasis on the will as the seat of morality at last found expression in the image of the soul,¹⁰⁰ while the connection of the will with justice agrees with the inclination of twelfth-century moral authors (Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, legal specialists) as well as Philip the Chancellor to see justice as the prime moral virtue in which the good will expresses itself. Anselm’s designation of justice as *rectitudo voluntatis* was indeed frequently quoted from the thirteenth century, even in the pastoral works of William Peraldus and Hugh Ripelin.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ See Albert the Great, *De bono* 6.1, pp. 79–80; Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 1: 178–204.

⁹⁶ The most outspoken example is Godfrey of Poitiers; see Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 1: 123–128, 257–261.

⁹⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententias* III.33.2.1.1 ad 3, p. 1048 (with caution); *De virtutibus cardinalibus* 1, p. 815; *Summa theologiae* I.II.61.2–3, *Opera* 6: 395–396. See also Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 2: 1–118; Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 216–224.

⁹⁸ The Parisian master Hubertus connects the four *potentiales vires animae* with the cardinal virtues: *irascibilitas* or *animositas* with fortitude, *rationabilitas* or *ratio* with prudence, *concupiscibilitas* or *voluntas* with justice, *vis delectandi* with temperance; see Heinzmann, *Die Summe “Colligite Fragmenta”*, 193. Hubertus is not mentioned in Graf, *De subiecto psychico*.

⁹⁹ See Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 174.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 209: “Augustine presented *voluntas* as the potential expression of either virtue or vice and so helped lay the foundation for later conceptions of *voluntas* as a faculty of the soul”.

¹⁰¹ According to Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 1.1: 43–50, the definition was influent

The arrangement of Aquinas recurs in several commentaries on the *Sententiae*,¹⁰² in various moral treatises,¹⁰³ and even in a number of commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics* which otherwise ignore the scheme of the cardinal virtues.¹⁰⁴ However, many theologians and philosophers active in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries argue that fortitude and temperance, too, reside in the will. Taking issue with the Aristotelian idea that morality and virtue consist in a rational ordering of the passions, they locate morality entirely in the will and hence consider all moral virtues to be motivated or at least mediated by it.¹⁰⁵ Perhaps one may say that by 1300 the circle was closed which had opened by 1100, when Anselm and Abelard identified virtue with the right will. Hugh of Saint Victor mitigated their idea by defining virtue as an ordered *affectus* or *motus* of the will, a theory which Peter Lombard rejected in favour of

until Philip the Chancellor rejected it. Actually the reverse is true: the influence of the definition was initially very limited (the texts of Pseudo-Bruno and Eadmer, cited by Landgraf at p. 43, do not really sustain it), while it was quoted after Philip the Chancellor's time by, e.g., John of La Rochelle, *De divisione animae* 3.4 and 3.16, pp. 149, 174; Robert Grosseteste, *Expositio in Ad Galatas* 3.15 (on 3:11), CCCM 130: 85 (see below, p. 190); Robert Kilwardby, *In librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 31, p. 116; William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.5.1, pp. 437–438 (with explicit approval; repeated by, among others, [Pseudo-?] Mauritius Hibernicus, *Distinctiones*, lemma *Iustitia*, Paris, BnF lat. 15944, f. 137^{rb}); Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium* 5.33, p. 179 (followed by Jean Rigaud, *Compendium* 5.35, MS Paris, BnF lat. 3150, f. 67^{ra}, and Pseudo-Bonaventure, *Opusculum de quatuor virtutibus*, p. 507); John of Pouilly, *Quodlibet* 4.10, ed. Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 2: 102*; Dionysius the Carthusian, *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* 2.33, p. 214.

¹⁰² See, e.g., Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.5, f. 273^{rb}; Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.33.2, f. 48^{vb}.

¹⁰³ See, e.g., Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 1.2.2, p. 50 (followed by John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, ff. 132^{rb-va}, 137^{vb}—but see below, p. 254 n. 105—and Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum*, sermon 439F); Henry of Rimini, *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus* Prol., f. 11^v; Francis of Meyronnes, *Liber de virtutibus* 5.2 and 5.8, MS Bruges, SB 226, ff. 93^v (replacing *voluntas* with *affectus*), 95^r.

¹⁰⁴ See below, p. 176; Peter of Corveheda, *Sententia super librum Ethicorum* 3.11, MS Vatican City, BAV Urb. lat. 222, f. 244^{ra-va}, accepting the idea that fortitude and temperance control the irascible and the concupiscent appetites. More faithful to Aquinas is John Dedecus, *Questiones in Ethica* 3.5, MS Oxford, Balliol 117, f. 227^{rb}: "Et est notandum quod predicatarum virtutum quatuor sunt cardinales siue principales propter hoc quod 4or potencias principales anime perficiunt. In intellectu practico principalis est prudentia, in voluntate est iusticia, in irascibili est fortitudo principalis et in concupiscentia est temperancia principalis. Per prudentiam habet homo rationes, per iusticiam operationes adequatas, per fortitudinem confirmatam et per temperanciam passionum refrenacionem".

¹⁰⁵ See Graf, *De subiecto psychico*; Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, esp. 199–245. See also below, pp. 255–257.

the Aristotelian concept of *qualitas*. Although the scholastics retained the notion of *qualitas*, the will revindicated its central position in medieval virtue ethics in the late thirteenth century, first as the seat of justice, later as the seat of moral virtue in general.

A remarkable instance of Philip the Chancellor's influence on late medieval moral thought is provided by Giles of Rome's *De regimine principum*. A combination of Philip's second and third arguments, mediated through Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, underlies the classification of the virtues in this work. According to Giles, prudence controls the intellect, justice the *operationes*. The ten other moral virtues listed in Aristotle's *Ethics* control the *passiones* which proceed from the irascible and the concupiscent appetites. Fortitude is the main virtue of the irascible appetite, temperance of the concupiscent appetite. The remaining moral virtues are annexed to them: *mansuetudo*, *magnanimitas*, and *magnificentia* to fortitude, *liberalitas*, *honoris amatiua* (a name designed by Giles for Aristotle's nameless virtue of aspiring after moderate honour), *veritas*, *affabilitas*, and *eutrapelia* to temperance.¹⁰⁶ The particularity of Giles's classification is that it makes use of Philip's and Aquinas's views in order to subsume the virtues figuring in the *Nicomachean Ethics* under the scheme of the cardinal virtues which Aristotle himself nowhere employs. Giles's classification nevertheless recurs in the commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics* of Henry of Friemar († 1320), Walter Burley († 1344/45), and John Dedecus (ca. 1350),¹⁰⁷ as well as in such various works as the *Speculum virtutum* of Engelbert of Admont, a *reportatio* of the philosophical teaching of John of Jandun († 1328),¹⁰⁸ John of Legnano's *De pace*,¹⁰⁹ and Jordan of Quedlinburg's *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum* (ca. 1365).¹¹⁰

While the first argument introduced by Philip the Chancellor rests on the assumption that the cardinal virtues together determine all moral acts—an assumption which likewise underlies the Abelardian arrange-

¹⁰⁶ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 1.2.3 and 1.2.5, pp. 51–56, 58–60; see also Lambertini, “Il filosofo, il principe e la virtù”, 257–258.

¹⁰⁷ See Henry of Friemar, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 2.5, MS Basel, UB F.I.14, f. 53^{ra}; Walter Burley, *Expositio super libros Ethicorum* 2.7, sig. f7^{vb}-f8^{rb} (Friemar appears to have been Burley's source); John Dedecus, *Questiones in Ethica* 3.5, MS Oxford, Balliol 117, f. 227^{rb} (probably derived from Burley). For a discussion of the work of Dedecus and Burley's influence on it, see Clark, “John Dedecus”. Clark lists 5 MSS and one early edition; a sixth MS is mentioned by Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics*, 169 n. 63.

¹⁰⁸ The *reportatio*, written by an otherwise unknown Dominicus, is edited in Schmutge, *Johannes von Jandun*, 133–134.

¹⁰⁹ John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 132^{rb}.

¹¹⁰ Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum*, sermon 439F.

ment of the virtues and depends on the early medieval view of the four virtues as the moral constituents of the active life—Philip's second and third arguments provide the scheme of the cardinal virtues with a psychological foundation, in agreement with the twelfth-century attention for the inner motives of the moral subject. Taken together, the three major explanations of the scheme figuring in late medieval moral thought account for the presence of the cardinal virtues in any human attempt to do the good. Even if the Middle Ages owed the scheme of the virtues to classical antiquity and its acceptance in Christian culture to the church fathers, the elaboration of the cardinal virtues as the main categories of moral psychology and behaviour is an original medieval creation which prompted the survival of the scheme into modern times.

Four Moral Virtues?

Medieval theologians tend to regard prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance as the four principal *moral* virtues, in contradistinction to the theological virtues (which are of a more spiritual nature) and Aristotle's intellectual virtues (which command reason rather than the affects).¹¹¹ Some masters concede that both the theological and intellectual virtues are superior to the moral virtues,¹¹² but as far as morality is concerned, the cardinal virtues rule supreme.

However, the notion of the cardinal virtues as the principal moral virtues poses an obvious problem from an Aristotelian point of view.

¹¹¹ Cf., e.g., William of Cahors, *Epistola synodica* 12, p. 691: "Sunt enim septem virtutes principales, tres theologicae ... et quatuor cardinales sive morales"; Nicholas of Lyra, *Postilla super totam Bibliam* (on Sap. 8:7), 3: sig. RRvva, contrasting the cardinal virtues as moral virtues with the intellectual virtues; Rainerius of Pisa, *Pantheologia* 2, lemma *Fortitudo*, fourth subentry: the four cardinal virtues called *virtutes morales*; likewise Thomas of Bailly, *Quodlibeta* 1.11, p. 59 (but at 2.12, p. 124, he distinguishes prudence from the moral virtues); John of Aragon, *Tractatus brevis*, MS Vienna, ÖNB 4745, f. 181^v: "ad has [sc. virtutes cardinales] omnes alie virtutes morales reducuntur". Even John Duns Scotus inadvertently calls the cardinal virtues *virtutes morales* at *Ordinatio* III.34, *Opera* (Vatican ed.) 10: 201, despite his insistence on the intellectual character of prudence. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 4: 701, presents a version of Scotus's text where the virtues appear as "quatuor uirtutes morales" and "genera sub quibus multe speciales uirtutes morales continentur".

¹¹² See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententias* IV.33.3.3, *Opera* (ed. Busa) 1: 603; Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.5, f. 273^{rb-va}; Francis of Meyronnes, *Liber de virtutibus* 5.5, MS Bruges, SB 226, f. 94^{r-v}; John of Aragon, *Tractatus brevis*, MS Vienna, ÖNB 4745, f. 181^v (theological virtues only). See, however, Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 2 q. 18, f. 34^{ra}, for the argument that moral virtues are *meliores* than intellectual virtues.

According to Aristotle, prudence is not a moral but an intellectual virtue, even if the moral virtues cannot exist without it. Faced with this problem, many thirteenth-century theologians differentiate between a cognitive conception of prudence and a conception which stresses its role in moral choice.¹¹³ Starting with the Dominican friar Robert Kilwardby († 1279), several theologians even insist that prudence is not only an intellectual, but also a moral virtue, since it determines the deliberations (often narrowed to: the precepts) underlying moral action¹¹⁴—a view extrapolated from Aristotle’s statement that prudence is no *habitus cum ratione solum* since it must be translated into practice.¹¹⁵ Remarkably, a similar view recurs in Grosseteste’s notes to his translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as in both of Albert the Great’s commentaries to this work. Grosseteste argues that prudence is an intellectual virtue in its cognitive function, but a moral virtue in that it directs the operations of justice, temperance, and fortitude;¹¹⁶ Albert affirms—following the Byzantine philosopher Eustratius of Nicaea († 1117), whose partial commentary on the *Ethics* Grosseteste translated together with Aristotle’s text—that prudence occupies a middle ground between the intellectual and the moral virtues.¹¹⁷ Aquinas develops the same idea in his theological work, from where it entered into a large number of late medieval theological and moral writings.¹¹⁸ In his commentary on the

¹¹³ See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 253–280 (add Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius* 210, pp. 623–626); Casagrande, “Virtù della prudenza e dono del consiglio”; Payer, “Prudence and the Principles of Natural Law”.

¹¹⁴ Robert Kilwardby, *In librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 30, pp. 113–115.

¹¹⁵ Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea* (recensio recognita) 6.5, pp. 482–483.

¹¹⁶ See Robert Grosseteste, *Notule*, MS Oxford, All Souls 84, f. 43^r marg. inf. (on 1.13): “prudentia quo ad primam operacionem suam, que est cognitio agendorum exteriorum et omittendorum, uirtus est intellectualis et speculatiua; inquantum autem extendit se in directionem operum iusticie, temperantie et fortitudinis, inter uirtutes morales et actiuas computatur” (repeated by Walter Burley, *Expositio super libros Ethicorum* 6.5, sig. 03^{va-vb}). On the *Notule*, see Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste*, 85–86; Lines, *Aristotle’s Ethics*, 464–465.

¹¹⁷ See Albert the Great, *Super Ethica* 6.1 (462), p. 394 (with an editorial footnote quoting Eustratius’s commentary in Grosseteste’s translation); id., *Ethica* 6.2.9, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 7: 417–418. For Albert’s teaching on prudence as a semi-moral virtue in his commentaries on Aristotle’s *Ethics*, see Müller, *Natürliche Moral*, 177–183. Albert was followed by Ulrich of Strasbourg, *De summo bono* 6.2.5, pp. 309–310.

¹¹⁸ See Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententias* III.33.2.1.3, 3: 1047; id., *Summa theologiae* I.II.58.3 ad 1 and II.II.47.4, *Opera* 6: 374, 8: 352. Likewise Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 1.2.2, pp. 46–47 (adopted by Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum* 12.2, p. 418, and influencing the opinion of John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 132^{va}, that the *virtus media* of prudence belongs to the moral virtues in a large sense); Richard of Mediavilla, *Super libros Sententiarum* III.23.2.3 ad 1

Nicomachean Ethics, however, Aquinas refrains from using the idea, but nevertheless states that prudence “requires the rightness of the appetite in the same way as the moral virtues” (*ad modum moralium virtutum requirens rectitudinem appetitus*),¹¹⁹ thus assimilating prudence to the moral virtues after all. Many later commentators on the *Ethics* repeat this view,¹²⁰ although they generally remain faithful to Aristotle’s notion of prudence as an intellectual virtue. Only John Dedecus calls prudence a *virtus media*,¹²¹ while Henry of Friemar refers in one particular passage to prudence as a moral virtue.¹²² However, John Buridan states in his commentary that although prudence is no moral virtue in the proper sense, it can be considered as such because of its necessary connection with the moral virtues and its role in directing all their actions.¹²³ Elsewhere in his commentary, Buridan cites the view of Eustratius that “the four principal moral virtues” (*quattuor principales virtutes morales, scilicet prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo et iustitia*) correspond to four bodily qualities. In fact, Eustratius does not speak of four “moral” virtues in this context, only

and III.33.2.4, 3: 242, 382; Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.33.2, 2: f. 48^{vb}; Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum*, sermon 439F (see also Bejczy, “Jordan of Quedlinburg’s *Tractatus*”, 77). Cf. Henry of Rimini, *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus* Prol., f. 12^r: “Inter virtutes autem morales ... prudentia prior ac dignior esse videtur”; Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.4, f. 273^{ra}: “large accipiendo uirtutes morales prout inter eas numeratur prudentia”. See also Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 2: 132*, on an anonymous disciple of Godfrey of Fontaines discussing the view “quod prudentia ... habet magis rationem virtutis practice”.

¹¹⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 6.4, *Opera* 47: 347; cf. *ibid.*: prudence “non tamen est cum sola ratione ... sed requiritur rectitudinem appetitus”. For Aquinas’s conception of prudence, see Westberg, *Right Practical Reason*, esp. 216–228.

¹²⁰ See, e.g., Radulphus Brito, *Questiones super Ethicam* 6 q. 142, p. 494: “licet prudentia sit virtus intellectualis, tamen presupponit semper appetitum rectum et per consequens alias virtutes morales”; Henry of Friemar, *Sententia totius libri Ethicorum* 6.5, MS Basel, UB F.I.14, f. 159^{rb}: “prudencia presupponit rectitudo appetitus de ipso fine que fit per virtutes morales et ideo ex necessitate autem exigit virtutes morales”, likewise ff. 159^{va-vb}; Guido Vernani, *Summa moralium* 6.2.3, MS Vatican City, BAV Ross. 162, f. 78^v (literally quoting Aquinas); Walter Burley, *Expositio super libros Ethicorum* 6.5, sig. 03^{rb-va}; John Buridan, see Krieger, *Der Begriff der praktischen Vernunft*, esp. 52 ff., 96 ff.; John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 178^{vb}.

¹²¹ John Dedecus, *Questiones in Ethica* 3.5, MS Oxford, Balliol 117, f. 227^{ra}: “Virtutes medie possunt dici virtutes perficientes intellectum practicum. Sed intellectus practicus ... circa agibilia ... hunc perficit prudencia”.

¹²² Henry of Friemar, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 2.5, MS Basel, UB F.I.14, f. 49^{vb}: “virtutum moralium quedam est aliarum regula et mensura, puta prudentia, quedam autem sunt regulate et mensurate, puta iusticia, fortitudo, temperantia”.

¹²³ John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 6 q. 9, f. 125^{va}: prudence “concedi potest moralis secundum connexionem, quia moralibus necessario connexa; potest etiam concedi moralis directiue, quia dirigit omnes virtutes morales in suis operationibus”.

of four “general” virtues.¹²⁴ Buridan’s misquotation reveals his tendency to consider all four cardinal virtues as the central concepts of morality, in accordance with medieval tradition before the recovery of Aristotelian ethics.¹²⁵

If the designation of prudence as a moral virtue goes against the letter of Aristotle’s teaching, it lends support to his idea that prudence has moral implications. In Aristotle’s view, the moral virtues involve prudence, and vice versa. While medieval moral authors generally acknowledge that no moral virtues can exist without prudence, the reverse opinion that prudence entails the moral virtues is less obvious to them. According to Augustine’s anthropology, the human being is capable of knowing the good without willing it. Can one then assume with Aristotle that a perfect understanding of morality goes together, unless in case of mental disarrangement, with the intention to do the good? Before the thirteenth century, only Peter Abelard dared to give an outright negative answer, but around 1300, opinions became divided. Thomas Aquinas as well as the majority of commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* agree with Aristotle that prudence involves the existence of the moral virtues.¹²⁶ Gerald of Odo in particular stresses that prudence

¹²⁴ See *ibid.* 1 q. 9, f. 8^{va} (repeated by John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, ff. 128^{ra}, 131^{ra}); Eustratius of Nicea, *In Ethicam nicomacheam* 1.2, in *The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics*, 35: prudence corresponds to *sensuum vivacitas*, temperance to *pulchritudo*, fortitude to *robur*, justice to *sanitas*. Cf. Walter Burley, *Expositio super libros Ethicorum* 6.5, sig. o3^{va}: “respondet Eustracius ... quod omnes virtutes morales et cardinales sorores sunt”; yet, Burley considers prudence an intellectual rather than a moral virtue, even though he cites Grosseteste’s view that it is both.

¹²⁵ For 15th-century echoes, see, e.g., Iohannes Versor, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum* 2.7, ff. 18^{vb}–19^{rb}, including prudence, though actually an intellectual virtue, among the moral virtues; *Moralis philosophie fundamentum compendiosum* (anno 1462; Bloomfield 0485 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 0485), MS Vienna, ÖNB 4291, esp. f. 277^r (“Diuiditur autem hoc modo uirtus moralis in uirtutes cardinales et non cardinales. Virtutes cardinales sunt 4or scilicet fortitudo, prudencia, temperancia et iusticia”) and the scheme on f. 281^r (distinguishing the cardinal virtues from Aristotle’s remaining moral virtues).

¹²⁶ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.58.5, *Opera* 6: 376; *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 6.11, p. 376. Cf., e.g., Henry of Friemar, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 6.5, MS Basel, UB F.I.14, f. 159^{rb}–^{vb}; Peter of Corveheda, *Sententia super librum Ethicorum* 6.14, MS Vatican City, BAV Urb. lat. 222, ff. 265^{rb}–266^{ra}; Guido Vernani, *Summa moralium* 6.4.3, MS Vatican City, BAV Ross. 162, ff. 83^v–84^v (“prudencia non potest esse sine uirtutibus moralibus et econuerso”, f. 83^v); Walter Burley, *Expositio super libros Ethicorum* 6.5, sig. o3^{rb}–^{vb}. See also Robert Holcot, *Super Sapientiam* 108 (on 8:7), sig. r1^{va} (repeating the argument of Aquinas); John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 180^{va} (perfect prudence cannot exist in sinners).

makes the moral agent good and not only underlies, but even requires, moral action.¹²⁷ Reacting against this tendency, John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham († 1347) radically separate prudence from the moral virtues. Doubtless unaware of Abelard's precedent, they argue that the will can choose counter to the insights of reason and prudence in nearly any circumstance, so that prudence can exist without the moral virtues (though not vice versa).¹²⁸

As we have seen, Abelard's teaching led to the disconnection of prudence from the scheme of the cardinal virtues in the *Ysagoge in theologiam*. The teaching of Scotus and others led to a similar disconnection in the commentary on the *Sententiae* of Francis of Meyronnes. Insisting that prudence is an intellectual rather than a moral virtue, Francis argues that the cardinal virtues are the four *principal* rather than the four *moral* virtues (unfortunately he does not explain what he means by "principal"). According to Francis, the principal *moral* virtues are likewise four in number: latria, fortitude, temperance, and justice. The function of these virtues is to make humans love God, their souls, their bodies, and their neighbours, respectively, and thus to enable them to observe charity. All other moral virtues, including those introduced by Aristotle, can be reduced to these four.¹²⁹ Obviously Meyronnes does not really drop the scheme of the cardinal virtues as the centrepiece of morality but merely replaces prudence with latria as a concession to Aristotle, while his presentation of the four main moral virtues as instances of charity reminds one of Augustine.

¹²⁷ See Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 6 q. 10, f. 127^{ra-vb}: prudence implies the *rectitudo operantis*, one cannot make a bad use of it; q. 14, f. 131^{vb}: "prudencia disponit ad bene vivere totaliter ... reddit vitam hominis bonam et reddit hominem bonum"; q. 15, f. 134^r: the activities of prudence are not only investigating, counseling, and giving precepts, but also *precepta exequenda agere*.

¹²⁸ See John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III.36, *Opera* (Vatican ed.) 10: 249–250; William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 12, *Opera theologica* 6: 421; id., *Quaestiones variae* 7.3, *Opera theologica* 8, pp. 342, 362–376. See also Dumont, "The Necessary Connection"; Ingham, "Moral Reasoning and Decision-Making"; Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 193–198; ead., "Rethinking Moral Dispositions", 369–373; Wood, *Ockham on the Virtues*, 53, 55. Cf. Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones de virtutibus* 6, p. 288: "ratio recta ... potest esse sine virtute, licet non plene"; Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super Sententias* III.33.3.1, pp. 221–222: prudence may exist without moral virtue; John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 170^{rb-vb}: the will can to some extent choose against the precepts of reason.

¹²⁹ Francis of Meyronnes, *In libros Sententiarum* III.33–37 q. 2.1–2, f. 173^{va}. Cf. id., *Liber de virtutibus* 5.3 and 5.5, MS Bruges, SB 226, ff. 93^v–94^v: the cardinal virtues comprise the moral virtues; 5.6, f. 94^v: prudence is an intellectual virtue and can exist apart from the moral virtues; 5.1, f. 93^v: latria is to be subsumed under distributive justice.

An altogether different solution is found in the work of Meyronnes's contemporary and confrere Peter Aureoli († 1322). In his view, the intellectual act of giving precepts, which is the main task of prudence, is determined by the will (an assumption which has antecedents in thirteenth-century theology).¹³⁰ The intellect needs the will in order to compose a *propositio imperativa*; as soon as this *propositio* is formed, the will necessarily follows it, thus obeying the precepts elicited by itself. Aureoli concludes that because of its voluntary aspect, prudence is a moral virtue, so that there is no reason not to include it among the cardinal virtues.¹³¹ What makes his solution fascinating is that it saves the Aristotelian idea that prudence has a moral effect by assuming that the will controls the preceptive power of the intellect rather than the reverse, in order to conclude, in obvious contrast to Aristotle's views, that prudence is a moral virtue. The idea of the will as the seat of a cardinal quartet of moral virtues could thus survive the Aristotelian challenge.

Four Principal Virtues?

The name "cardinal virtues", generally accepted in intellectual circles by 1200, suggests that the four virtues are central, or perhaps rather pivotal, concepts of morality. According to Alan of Lille they constitute the hinges (*cardines*) around which all other virtues move. Alan believes that even

¹³⁰ Cf., e.g., Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 759: "dicendum est quod duplex est cognitio, una que est in intellectu speculativo et altera que est in practico; et que est in practico, quedam inclinatur voluntatem, quedam ex voluntate elicitur. Que ergo ex voluntate elicitur et voluntatem inclinatur ad opus simpliciter est virtus, relique autem non sunt virtutes, sed una illa est dispositio antecedens virtutem, et illa prudentia potest in quibusdam operabilibus dici prudentia scientia". See also Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 235–236, for Peter John Olivi's tendency to locate prudence in the will rather than in reason.

¹³¹ Peter Aureoli, *Commentarii in libros Sententiarum* III.33.2.4, 2: 524a: "ad talem actum, qui est praeicipere, idest componere propositionem imperatiam, dicendo hoc fac, voluntas intellectum detinet, tum [lege cum] iste actus formaliter & electiue est [lege sit] ipsius intellectus, & isto posito in intellectu sequitur necessario actus in voluntate ... voluntas necessario eligit conformiter praecepta intellectus, & sic dicitur quod voluntas mouet se per accidens, quia determinat intellectum ad praeicipiendum, ad quod praeceptum mouetur voluntas necessario conformiter ... dicitur autem Prudentia virtus moralis ... quia non separatur a virtutibus moralibus, sicut illud praeceptum non separatur ab actu voluntatis, determinat intellectum ad tale praeceptum, vel saltem non separatur a voluntate, si voluntas determinet intellectum sine aliquo actu. Et ex hoc patet, quod est virtus Cardinalis, quia habet obiectum commune, puta bonum hominis, & modum generalem, scilicet praeicipere quod est rationis". Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super Sententias* III.33.4.1, pp. 231–232, compares the views of Aureoli and Scotus, arguing in favour of the latter.

faith, hope, and charity are subordinate to the cardinal virtues, a view which most later medieval authors reject,¹³² although one can point to notable exceptions.¹³³ Many authors prefer the view that it is “human life” or “moral life” which revolves around the cardinal virtues.¹³⁴

¹³² See Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 756: “non dicuntur cardinales respectu theologiarum, sed respectu aliarum”; likewise, e.g., John of La Rochelle, *De divisione animae* 3.2.15, p. 167; Odo Rigaldi, cited in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 178. Accordingly, some moral writers state that the cardinal virtues do not comprise “all”, but “several” other virtues: see, e.g., Thomas of Chobham, *Summa confessorum* 3.1.13, p. 44: “dicuntur ... cardinales, hoc est, principales; quia istis iiiiior plures alie sunt subiecte” (this literally recurs in Canon 9 of the Council of Lambeth, see *Councils and synods* 2: 905); *De septem virtutibus*, MS Cambridge, Corpus Christi 63, f. 130^r (ca. 1300; Bloomfield 2247 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2247): “Alie scilicet uirtutes autem necessarie uite humane regende reducuntur ad has sicut partes, ut species, ut dispositiones earum”; Borromeo of Bologna, *Liber de quattuor virtutibus* 1.3, MS Milan, BN Braidense AD.IX.42, f. 1^v: “Dicuntur autem dicte virtutes principales eo quod quelibet earum quibus aliis principatur”.

¹³³ See Pseudo-Alexander of Hales, *Summa de virtutibus* (ca. 1260), cited in Van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne*, 146: the cardinal virtues, understood in a large sense, comprise the theological virtues; in a sense, the theological virtues can be subsumed under justice; Hugh of Saint Cher, *In Sententias* III.33, MS Padua, BU 853, f. 106[116]vb: “omnes enim uirtutes theologice sub hiis continentur”, and esp. id., *Opus admirabile* (on Sap. 8:7) 3: f. 153^{va} (I owe the reference to Riccardo Quinto): “Item videtur, quod Fides, Spes, et Charitas sint utiliores quatuor Cardinalibus. Ad hoc dicimus, quod illae tres sub illis quatuor continentur. Fides sub Prudentia, Spes sub Fortitudine, Charitas sub Iustitia. Vel hoc ideo est: quia quatuor Cardinales magis consistunt in usu operum, quam istae” (likewise Robert Holcot, *Super Sapientiam* 108 [on 8:7], sig. r1^{va}; Rainerius of Pisa, *Pantheologia* 2, lemma *Virtus*, third subentry). The three Dominicans make their statements in order to confirm the words of Sap. 8:7 that nothing is more profitable in life than the cardinal virtues. The classification proposed by them has an antecedent in the summa of Hubertus; see above, p. 126 n. 267. See also [Graphic scheme of the virtues and vices], MS Erfurt, SB CA 2° 173, f. 18^r (late 14th century; Bloomfield 4619 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4619): the virtues appear in concentric circles; the innermost circle contains the cardinal virtues; the circles around it contain their species, with *religio* and *caritas* emanating from justice, *spes* from fortitude.

¹³⁴ See, e.g., Thomas of Chobham, *Summa de commendatione virtutum* 4.2, CCCM 82B: 137; William of Auvergne, *De virtutibus* 12, p. 161b; Albert the Great, *Ethica* 3.2.1, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 7: 234; Ulrich of Strasbourg, *De summo bono* 6.2.5, p. 308; Thomas Aquinas, *De virtutibus cardinalibus* 1 ad 12, p. 816; William de La Mare, *Quaestiones in tertium librum Sententiarum* 33.2, p. 124: “non dicuntur cardinales quia aliae ordinentur ... sed quia dirigunt vitam humanam”; Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium* 5.33, p. 179 (followed by Jean Rigaud, *Compendium* 5.35, MS Paris, BnF lat. 3150, f. 67^{ra}, and Pseudo-Bonaventure, *Opusculum de quatuor virtutibus*, p. 506); Servasanto of Faenza, *De exemplis naturalibus* 3.18, MS Vienna, ÖNB 1589, f. 48^{va}: “sicut hostium totum in cardine uertitur, sic omnis humana uita hiis uirtutibus regitur et circa temporalia ordinatur”; *De septem virtutibus*, MS Cambridge, Corpus Christi 63, f. 130^r: “Hec quatuor uirtutes dicuntur cardinales id est principales quia tota uita humana hiis uirtutibus regitur sicut hostium cardine”; Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum* 4.12, p. 202; Bongiovanni of Messina, *Quadrupartitus figurarum moralium* Prol., p. 3; Peter Aureoli, *Quodlibeta* 14.3, p. 131b; *Summa*

But why are the four virtues known as cardinal more important in the medieval view than others? As we have seen, Philip the Chancellor introduced the idea that the cardinal virtues fulfil the four necessary conditions of virtue. Prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are the principal virtues for Philip because they denote four essential aspects which all virtues have in common. At the same time, however, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance exist as specific virtues which have their own specific objects, as defined by Aristotle. As a consequence, Philip distinguishes “general” from “special” cardinal virtues.¹³⁵ Many prominent masters (Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Richard of Mediavilla, William de La Mare, Henry of Ghent) and popularizing authors (William Peraldus, Engelbert of Admont, Jordan of Quedlinburg) accept a similar distinction,¹³⁶ with notably Henry of Ghent († 1293) affirming that Aristotle’s *Ethics* refers to the virtues in both senses. This last view seems congruent with Eustratius of Nicaea’s remark that temperance and the other virtues comprise a general and a specific sense in Aristotle’s system, even though Albert the Great observes that Eustratius departs on this point from Aristotle’s text.¹³⁷ Indeed, Aristotle merely distinguishes

rudium 25, sig. h5^{va}: “Et ideo dicuntur cardinales quia sicut in cardine vertitur hostium ita conuictus humanus secundum istas virtutes dirigitur et rationabiliter ordinatur”; John of Aragon, *Tractatus brevis*, MS Vienna, ÖNB 4745, f. 181^v: “cardinales vocantur quia in eis nostra uita sicut hostium in cardine debet semper uerti”; Borromeo of Bologna, *Liber de quattuor virtutibus* 1.3, MS Milan, BN Braidense AD.IX.42, ff. 1^v–2^f: “Dicuntur enim cardinales siue morales eo quod omnes nostri mores laudabiles in eis firmanur et stabiliuntur, sicut totus motus hostii firmatur in cardinae”; John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 131^{ra}: “sicut similiter cardinibus mundi, scilicet polo arthico et antarthico, reuoluitur orbis, sic super hiis reuoluitur tota humana condicio”; John de Burgh, *Pupilla oculi* 10.3, f. 127^v: “appellantur virtutes cardinales, quia sicut ostium vertitur in cardine, ita in his tota vita hominis debet regulatur”.

¹³⁵ See Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues*, 50–51.

¹³⁶ See William de La Mare, *Quaestiones in tertium librum Sententiarum* 33.2, pp. 123–124; Richard of Mediavilla, *Super libros Sententiarum* III.33.2.5, III.33.3.5, III.33.4.2, and III.33.5.2, 3: 383 (prudence), 390 (justice), 395 (fortitude), 402 (temperance); Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* 5.17, ff. 189^{r-v}; William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.2.1, 3.3.2, 3.4.1, and 3.5.1, pp. 286a (prudence), 323b (temperance), 375a (fortitude), 436b–437a (justice); Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum* 5.1, 6.5, and 11.4–5, pp. 210 (temperance), 237–238 (fortitude), 374–377 (justice); Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum*, sermon 439H (prudence) and 440A (justice), G (fortitude), I (temperance) (based mainly on Peraldus). For Albert and Aquinas, see below, p. 173.

¹³⁷ See Albert the Great, *Super Ethica* 6.7 (516), pp. 440–441, with an editorial note quoting the commentary of Eustratius in Grosseteste’s translation: “Et non solum in temperantia commune et specificum inuenimus assumptum, sed est hoc et in aliis inuenire”. Eustratius’s remark was sometimes quoted as though referring to temperance only, e.g., by Guido Terreni, *Quodlibet* 1.15.1, ed. Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 2: 114*–115*. Accordingly,

general justice (which is identical with all virtue) from justice as a specific virtue concerned with the exchange of goods. The other moral virtues only have a specific meaning in his *Ethics*, with fortitude being restricted to military courage and temperance to moderating the sense of touch.

But can the four virtues be seen as cardinal and principal even in their specific, Aristotelian definitions? Medieval authors disagree on this point. Robert Kilwardby argues that Aristotle has a much narrower understanding of the four virtues than is implied by their conception as cardinal virtues; only in their general sense do they comprise all other Aristotelian and Christian moral virtues.¹³⁸ Likewise, the anonymous thirteenth-century author of the *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus* distinguishes the four cardinal virtues *circa generales operationes* from the Aristotelian virtues *circa speciales*,¹³⁹ while Peter Aureoli insists that the four virtues are only cardinal as *modi generales* which compass all other moral virtues; thus, the cardinal virtue of fortitude comprises, among many other virtues, fortitude in its specific, Aristotelian sense.¹⁴⁰ Engelbert of Admont takes a more ambivalent position in his *Speculum virtutum*: temperance is a cardinal virtue not in Aristotle's conception but in the understanding of Cicero and "Seneca" (Martin of Braga), according

some authors distinguish general and special justice and temperance, but not general and special fortitude; see, e.g., Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius* 236 and 241, pp. 676–677 (temperance), 685 (justice); Engelbert of Admont, *De regimine principum* 4.3 and 6.2, pp. 128–129 (justice), 173–174 (temperance); Robert Holcot, *Super Sapientiam* 108 (on 8:7), sig. q8^{vb}–r1^{ra}.

¹³⁸ Robert Kilwardby, *In librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 31 ad 4–5, p. 118.

¹³⁹ *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus*, MS Cambridge, Jesus Q.G.18 (66), f. 73^{ra}; see Appendix II.

¹⁴⁰ See Peter Aureoli, *Commentarii in libros Sententiarum* III.33.2.1, 2: 521b: "virtutes cardinales quatuor non sunt species specialissimae: sed sunt species subalternatiuae, & generales, in quas immediate virtus moralis diuiditur"; III.33.2.2, 521b–522b: temperance, which not only checks the senses of touch and taste but all human passions, has 29 species, "& ideo Temperantia, vt est virtus communis ad istas est virtus Cardinalis" (522b); III.33.2.3, 523a: "Et non accipitur hic fortitudo in speciali, non est in mortis periculo solum, sed est virtus generalis respectu cuiuscumque terribilis, & sic est virtus Cardinalis. Quod potest probari, sicut probatum est de Temperantia, quia respicit obiectum commune, idest omne quod obruit rationem, & habet rationem expulsam a medio rationis, & habet modum communem, scilicet firmiter contra talem obruitionem, & sub ista fortitudine, quae vocatur Cardinalis ponitur Fortitudo particularis, quae est in periculo mortis, quia ista retinet nomen fortitudinis, & sunt etiam multae aliae virtutes sub ista contentae". See also id., *Quodlibeta* 14 (*Vtrum virtus moralis diuiditur in quatuor Cardinales tanquam in species subalternas comprehendentes omnes virtutes*), pp. 128a–137b; prudence has 18 *virtutes speciales*, justice 22, fortitude 15 (including *fortitudo particularis* which deals with mortal danger), temperance 25 (14.4, pp. 131b–137a).

to which it pertains to the moderation of all bodily and mental pleasure. By contrast, justice is a cardinal virtue not in its general but in its specific sense.¹⁴¹

In commentaries written on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the distinction between general and special cardinal virtues takes on a particular significance.¹⁴² Although some commentators admit that Aristotle never actually distinguished four cardinal virtues,¹⁴³ the cardinal virtues recur in the commentaries in three different ways: as genera of the other virtues (the traditional, Stoically inspired notion); as general conditions of any moral virtue (in agreement with Philip the Chancellor's view); and as specific, Aristotelian virtues. In the fourteenth century, Gerald of Odo and John Buridan introduced a fourth option: in their view, the cardinal virtues, defined somewhat larger than in Aristotle's *Ethics* but still conceived as specific virtues, comprise the essence of moral goodness.

The notion of the cardinal virtues as genera finds relatively little following in the commentary tradition. Eustratius of Nicea suggests that the four virtues known as cardinal somehow comprise Aristotle's remaining virtues;¹⁴⁴ Grosseteste's notes on his translation of the *Ethics* contain a similar suggestion.¹⁴⁵ Walter Burley, who inserted Grosseteste's notes for

¹⁴¹ Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum* 5.1, 6.5, and 11.4–5, pp. 210 (temperance), 374–377 (justice).

¹⁴² For the next paragraphs see Bejczy, "The Cardinal Virtues in Medieval Commentaries".

¹⁴³ See Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 1.16, *Opera* 47: 58; Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 2 q. 21, f. 35^{va}. See also Peter Aereoli, *Quodlibeta* 14.4, quoted below, n. 152.

¹⁴⁴ See Eustratius of Nicea's comment on *Ethica nicomachea* 6.11, appearing in Grosseteste's translation in MS Oxford, All Souls 84, f. 140^{ra}: "Sicut et in practicis uirtutibus generales diximus uirtutes fortitudinem, temperantiam, iusticiam, assumpsimus autem et alteras speciales, liberalitatem, magnificentiam, magnanimitatem, sic et prudentia uirtus existens intellectiua et generalis habet sub ipsam deinceps hic assumptas: eubuliam, solertiam et synesim syggnonim"; cf. the anonymous 13th-century gloss *ibid.*: "Quod sicut uirtutes enumerate 40 libro reducuntur ad tres generales actiuas, sic hic enumerate ad prudentiam".

¹⁴⁵ See Robert Grosseteste, *Notule*, MS Oxford, All Souls 84, f. 65^{vb} marg. inf. (on 3.13), discussing the virtue regulating the pleasures of smell, sight, and touch: "Dubitari potest ad quam cardinalem uirtutem moralem huiusmodi uirtus reducitur" (apparently assuming that such a reduction is always possible). Although Aristotle distinguishes this virtue from temperance (related to touch and taste, as Grosseteste points out *ibid.* f. 66^r marg. inf.), "nobis autem uidetur quod temperantia dupliciter dicitur, proprie scilicet et communiter: proprie quidem secundum quod auctor tractat de ea, communiter uero secundum quod ipsa est medietas circa delectaciones et tristitias sensibiles" (likewise Walter Burley, *Expositio super libros Ethicorum* 3.13, sig. k5^{vb}–k6^{ra}). See also *ibid.* f. 49^{rb} marg. (on 2.6), calling temperance and fortitude "principales uirtutes"; cf. f. 55^v marg. inf.

a large part into his commentary, is the only commentator active between 1250 and 1400 to have actually defended the view of "Cicero and Seneca" that the four virtues are called cardinal not as specific virtues, but as genera which comprise the other moral virtues as their species.¹⁴⁶ Thomas Aquinas, from whose commentary Burley probably borrowed this view, personally rejected the notion of the cardinal virtues as genera with the argument that in their general sense these virtues denote characteristics common to all virtues rather than to any virtues in particular.¹⁴⁷

The notion of the cardinal virtues as general conditions of virtue, briefly alluded to in Grosseteste's notes,¹⁴⁸ finds support in the theological work of Albert the Great and, most notably, Thomas Aquinas. Yet in their commentaries on the *Ethics* Albert and Aquinas reject the same notion,¹⁴⁹ insisting that precisely in their specific, Aristotelian conception, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are the principal moral virtues because they concern the foremost aspects of moral action. Aquinas even goes so far as to maintain that the four principal virtues are more appropriately called "cardinal" in their Aristotelian than in their general sense. As general virtues, prudence causes rational judgment, justice fulfills what is right and due, fortitude strengthens the mind, and temperance tames the passions. But in their Aristotelian sense the same virtues concern the most demanding aspects of the object matter they have as general virtues: giving precepts, the highest activity of prudent reason; governing the obligations between equals, the ultimate responsibility of the just will; enduring mortal danger for a just cause, the supreme instance of courage; and restraining the sense of touch,

(on 3.4): "Dicitur quandoque voluntas appetitus situs in anima sensibili secundum quod moderatus est a voluntate que est rationalis appetitus boni, et secundum hanc voluntatis significacionem dicuntur virtutes 3 practice, scilicet iusticia, temperancia, fortitudo".

¹⁴⁶ See Walter Burley, *Expositio super libros Ethicorum* 2.7, sig. f8^{rb}: "Videtur tamen mihi quod opinio Senece et Tullii possit probabiliter sustineri, scilicet quod virtutes cardinales sunt genera subalterna continentia sub se virtutes speciales ... Vel potest dici quod ille quattuor virtutes que dicuntur cardinales vno modo sunt species, scilicet ut sunt circa determinatam materiam, et alio modo sunt genera subalterna vt dictum est, et sic proprie dicuntur cardinales". Burley's commentary survives in 26 known MSS and three printed editions; see Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics*, 468–469.

¹⁴⁷ See Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 2.8, *Opera* 47: 102–103.

¹⁴⁸ See Robert Grosseteste, *Notule*, MS Oxford, All Souls 84, f. 46^r marg. inf. (on 2.4): all virtuous acts are done "prudenter, temperate, iuste, et fortiter".

¹⁴⁹ See Albert the Great, *Ethica* 3.2.1, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 7: 236; cf. *ibid.* 6.2.11, p. 420 (see also Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues*, 60–61); *id.*, *Super Ethica* 2.6 (135), p. 120; Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 2.8, *Opera* 47: 102–103.

the paramount task of moderating the passions.¹⁵⁰ Aristotle's remaining moral virtues concern matters of lesser importance and are therefore secondary. Accordingly, Albert's second commentary distinguishes the four principal virtues from the two virtues related to money (*liberalitas, magnificentia*), the three virtues related to irascibility (*magnanimitas, philotimia, mansuetudo*), and the four virtues of the social life (*amicitia, veritas, eutrapelia, verecundia*). Avoiding the view that the cardinal virtues comprise the secondary virtues as their subspecies, he refers to the latter as *virtutes adiunctae*, while Aquinas calls them (in his theological work only) *virtutes annexae*.¹⁵¹

Albert's and Aquinas's characterization of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance as truly cardinal virtues in their Aristotelian sense is remarkable for two reasons. First, it enforces the scheme of the cardinal virtues on the *Nicomachean Ethics* even though Aristotle himself disregards it. Second, the characterization upsets the traditional view of the cardinal virtues, for it is precisely because of their general character and broad range of application that the four virtues were considered principal since antiquity. Still, the argument that the special cardinal virtues centre around the four most demanding aspects of moral life found acceptance among numerous later theologians,¹⁵² while even a

¹⁵⁰ See Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 2.8, *Opera* 47: 102–103; *Super libros Sententiarum* III.33.2.1.1, pp. 1045–1046; *Summa theologiae* I.II.61.3–4, *Opera* 6: 396–397; cf. *De virtutibus cardinalibus* 1, p. 815. See also Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues*, 66–73. Cf. Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 755: the cardinal virtues are called thus “quia sunt primi actus virium operantium in hiis que sunt ad finem”.

¹⁵¹ For the cardinal virtues in Albert's commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics*, see Müller, *Natürliche Moral*, 153–155. Albert's views heavily influenced Ulrich of Strasbourg, *De summo bono* 2.6.5, pp. 308–310. Albert annexes the secondary moral virtues to fortitude and temperance only; Aquinas gives justice its share, too.

¹⁵² See, e.g., William de La Mare, *Quaestiones in tertium librum Sententiarum* 33.2, pp. 123–124; Richard of Mediavilla, *Super libros Sententiarum* III.33.1.7 ad 4, 3: 378; Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.5, f. 273^{rb}; Robert Holcot, *Super Sapientiam* 108 (on 8:7), sig. q8^{vb}–r1^{ra}. See also Francis of Meyronnes, *Liber de virtutibus* 5.5, MS Bruges, SB 226, f. 94^v: “reducuntur alie ad istas sicut communiore ad magis necessarias vite humane”; other moral virtues, such as liberality and magnificence, may be nobler, but are less necessary (cf. Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 4 q. 12, f. 66^{vb}: “nobilitas autem non facit virtutem cardinalem, sed necessitas”). Peter Aureoli rejects the argument: in his view, *latria* and *religio*, by which we give God his due, relate to higher instances of morality than the cardinal virtue of *iustitia particularis*, by which we give others their due; likewise, the *patientia* displayed by Lawrence in his martyrdom supersedes fortitude (*Quodlibeta* 14.2, pp. 130b–131a). Fortitude and temperance are no cardinal virtues in their Aristotelian sense, “imo nec de esse Cardinali in virtutibus Philosophus mentionem facit” (ibid. 14.4, p. 137a).

few works of pastoral theology affirm that justice, fortitude, and temperance constitute the principal moral virtues in Aristotle's system.¹⁵³

Among the commentators of Aristotle's *Ethics* active in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the views of Albert and Aquinas had a more modest resonance. John of Tytynsale († ca. 1289) and Henry of Friemar repeat the arguments from Aquinas's *Sententia libri Ethicorum*. In Tytynsale's view, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are not appropriately called virtues in their general sense, but rather concern four aspects or *modi* of all specific virtues.¹⁵⁴ Likewise, Friemar speaks of cardinal or principal "virtues" only when referring to them in their specific sense; in their general sense, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are not virtues but *modi generales* of the virtues.¹⁵⁵

The commentators active around 1300 at the Parisian arts faculty¹⁵⁶ reject the general cardinal virtues in much the same way as Tytynsale and Friemar do, without even referring to the scheme of the cardinal virtues as such. Taking the notion of general fortitude into account in their discussion of that virtue, the commentators explain that *fortitudo* refers to the constancy and firmness inherent to doing the good as well as, more specifically, to sustaining mortal danger in war, in conformity with Aristotle's teaching. Only in the last sense is fortitude a moral virtue; in the first sense, it is no moral virtue itself but only a disposition of the moral virtues, which all require a fixed determination of the mind.¹⁵⁷ In contrast to Aquinas, the commentators do not attempt to present Aristotelian fortitude, temperance, and justice as principal virtues. They recognize that fortitude and temperance control the strongest human fears and desires, respectively, but they do not therefore consider the other moral virtues as secondary. By having their specific objects, fortitude and temperance

¹⁵³ See, e.g., Henry of Rimini, *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus* Prol., f. 11^v; *Summa rudium* 25, sig. h5^{vb}.

¹⁵⁴ See John of Tytynsale, *Questiones super libros Ethicorum* 2 q. 15 and 3 qq. 33 and 45, MS Durham, Cathedral Library C.IV.20, ff. 222^{ra-rb}, 236^{va-vb}, 240^{va}.

¹⁵⁵ Henry of Friemar, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 2.5, MS Basel, UB F.I.14, f. 52^{va-vb}.

¹⁵⁶ Gauthier, "Trois commentaires 'averroïstes'", discusses the commentaries ascribed to Radulphus Brito, Giles of Orléans, and James of Douai (now edited as *Anonymi Questiones super Librum Ethicorum*). One may add the commentaries contained in MSS Erlangen, UB 213; Erfurt, SB Amplon. F 13; Paris, BnF lat. 16110. The designation "Averroist" is in fact mistaken, as Gauthier demonstrates: the commentators do not quote Averroes.

¹⁵⁷ See Radulphus Brito, *Questiones super Ethicam* 3 q. 75, p. 356; Giles of Orléans, *Questiones in Ethicam* 3 q. 60, MS Paris, BnF lat. 16089, f. 207^{vb}; *Questiones in Ethicam* 3 q. 57, MS Erlangen, UB 213, ff. 57^{vb}–58^{ra}; *Questiones in Ethicam* 3 q. 53, MS Erfurt, SB Amplon. F 13, f. 97^{ra}. I owe these references to Iacopo Costa.

are different from the other moral virtues, but not superior to them. This line of thought effectively puts an end to the notion of cardinal virtues: in their general sense, the cardinal virtues are no virtues, while in their specific sense, they are not cardinal. Curiously, most Parisian commentators nevertheless accept the view of Aquinas that man's intellectual, irascible, and concupiscent appetites are regulated by justice, fortitude, and temperance, respectively.¹⁵⁸ They do not seem to have realized that this view depends on the notion of the cardinal virtues in their general sense.¹⁵⁹ Henry of Friemar shows more caution in this respect, remarking in his commentary that the irascible and concupiscent appetites have too large fields to be covered by only one moral virtue each.¹⁶⁰

The Parisian arts masters apparently had some success in making the cardinal virtues irrelevant for the interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The commentaries of Peter of Corveheda (1336/50), Guido Terreni († 1342),¹⁶¹ and Guido Vernani († ca. 1345) stick to a purely Aristotelian classification of the virtues, even though the works of Corveheda and Vernani heavily depend on Aquinas's commentary. Albert of Saxony († 1390), whose commentary largely derives from Walter Burley's, does not refer to the cardinal virtues either.¹⁶² Seen against this background, the revival of the cardinal virtues in the commentary of Gerald of Odo (1285–1349) is a remarkable phenomenon. Gerald recognizes that the

¹⁵⁸ See Radulphus Brito, *Questiones super Ethicam* 5 q. 110, p. 427; Giles of Orléans, *Questiones in Ethicam* 5 q. 95, MS Paris, BnF lat. 16089, f. 214^{ra}; *Questiones in Ethicam* 5 q. 93, MS Erlangen, UB 213, f. 64^{vb}; *Questiones in Ethicam* 5 q. 88, MS Erfurt, SB Amplon. F 13, f. 104^{vb}. I owe these references to Iacopo Costa.

¹⁵⁹ See Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues*, 69–70; see also above, p. 161.

¹⁶⁰ See Henry of Friemar, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 2.5, MS Basel, UB F.I.14, f. 51^{ra}.

¹⁶¹ Guido Terreni, *Quaestiones in libros Ethicorum* 5, MS Paris, BnF lat. 3228 (P), f. 38^{va}, checked against Bologna, BU 1625 (B), f. 30^{va}: "Causam huius assignant aliqui quia omnis uirtus moralis est uel temperantia uel fortitudo uel iusticia, quia omnes [iste add. B] alie ad istas ut ad principales reducuntur, ut 2. huius est uisum ... dicendum quod generalis uirtus debet esse iusticia et non alia, nam, ut dictum est, per uirtutem generale ordinatur aliquis ad alterum ... sed ad iusticiam pertinet perficere hominem in ordine ad alterum, fortitudo autem secundum se solum perficit in ordine ad se et temperantia similiter. Ergo uirtus generalis erit iusticia". Terreni refers back to an earlier discussion on the cardinal virtues in his questions on Book 2, but I have been unable to find it there. In his questions on Book 3, B, ff. 36^{ra}–41^{vb} (missing in P), Terreni discusses fortitude and temperance according to their Aristotelian definitions. See esp. B, f. 39^{ra}: temperance only pertains to touch while other virtues regulate other *delectationes* and hence cannot be subsumed under temperance.

¹⁶² For Albert's dependence on Burley, see Heidingsfelder, *Albert von Sachsen*. Albert's *Expositio libri Ethicorum* is in fact a brief chapter-by-chapter summary of Aristotle's thought. For the transmission of the work, see Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics*, 469 (24 MSS). I used MS Oxford, Bodleian Can. misc. 304.

scheme of the cardinal virtues, viewed from Aristotle's perspective, is a heterogeneous list of one intellectual plus three moral virtues. Yet he tries to overcome the inapplicability of the cardinal virtues to Aristotle's system by giving them a new status. According to Gerald, the cardinality of the four virtues does not lie in the fact that all other moral virtues can either be subsumed under them, as tradition had it, or annexed to them, as Albert and Aquinas believed, but in their intrinsic indispensability. The four virtues comprise the essentials of moral goodness in the sense that human beings need them as a minimum to be good, whereas the other moral virtues are accidental in this respect. Had Aristotle considered the question from this standpoint, adds Gerald, he would certainly have accepted the scheme of the cardinal virtues.¹⁶³

Gerald's view comes close to the idea of the cardinal virtues as necessary conditions of virtue, by which it was obviously inspired. He acknowledges, however, that conditions of virtue are not virtues themselves, and therefore defines the cardinal virtues otherwise. Discussing the question of whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue, Gerald claims that fortitude has three different meanings. *Generalissime*, it refers to the firmness inherent in every virtue (*firmitas cuiuslibet virtutis*). In this sense, fortitude is no cardinal virtue but rather a condition of any virtue (*conditio cuiuslibet virtutis*). *Specialissime*, fortitude is restricted to military courage (*fortitudo bellicosa*), in accordance with Aristotle's definition. In this sense, fortitude is no cardinal virtue either, argues Gerald in flagrant contradiction to Albert and Aquinas, since military courage is not indispensable for moral goodness. After all, the ancient philosophers and the first Christians never fought as soldiers, and yet they were better people than their contemporaries who engaged in wars. *Mediocriter*, however, fortitude consists in being prepared to withstand evil until death, either in war or in peace, rather than giving up the good. Only in this sense is fortitude a cardinal virtue, since one cannot be morally good unless one would rather die than surrender to evil.¹⁶⁴ Hence the cardinal virtue of fortitude as redefined by Gerald is more specific than general fortitude, since it involves the Aristotelian element of enduring mortal danger, but broader than Aristotle's conception of fortitude, since it is not limited to warfare. Thanks to this redefinition, Gerald is able to overcome the dilemma that the cardinal virtues are either too broadly conceived to be virtues or too narrowly defined to count as principal moral concepts.

¹⁶³ See Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 2 q. 21, f. 35^{va-vb}.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. 4 q. 5, ff. 60^{rb}-61^{ra}.

Unfortunately, Gerald does not redefine the other three cardinal virtues with similar precision as middle grounds between general conditions of virtue and specific Aristotelian virtues. However, he introduces a classification of the virtues in which he positions the cardinal virtues vis-à-vis some of Aristotle's remaining moral virtues (see Appendix I.3). According to this classification, prudence perfects the intellect while justice, fortitude, and temperance perfect the appetite according to the triple division of the good into *utile*, *delectabile*, and *honestum*.¹⁶⁵ *Utile* can be divided into *dare* and *expendere* on the one hand, to which liberality and magnificence pertain, and *reddere* on the other, which is controlled by justice. Only *reddere* is essential for moral goodness, argues Gerald, for one cannot be good unless one gives everyone his due, whereas one can be good without freely spending one's money. Justice is accordingly a cardinal virtue whereas liberality and magnificence are not. *Delectabile* can be divided into giving pleasure, checked by *eutrapelia* and *amicitia*, and receiving pleasure, checked by temperance. Only temperance is a cardinal virtue, for one can be morally good without giving pleasure but not when indulging in excessive pleasure. Finally, *honestum* concerns either honour or virtue itself. Magnanimity, which relates to honour, is no cardinal virtue, since honour is accidental to moral goodness; fortitude, however, is a cardinal virtue, for one cannot be good unless one prefers virtue to death.¹⁶⁶

Although Gerald's classification obviously attempts to reconcile the cardinal virtues with Aristotle's system, it disregards some of Aristotle's remaining moral virtues. Moreover, it only partly coincides with another classification given earlier in his work, which equally omits some of Aristotle's virtues but includes several virtues alien to his system, such as humility and virginity.¹⁶⁷ On one point, however, Gerald manifestly breaks with Aristotle. As a consequence of his idea that all non-cardinal virtues are accidental qualities, he maintains that Aristotle's theory of the necessary connection of prudence with the moral virtues applies to the cardinal virtues only. Prudence, justice, fortitude, and

¹⁶⁵ This division of the good, which expands on Aristotle's triple division of the lovable in his discussion of friendship (*Ethica nicomachea* 8.2 [recensio recognita], p. 522), already appears in Albert the Great, *Super Ethica* 8.3 (700), p. 600, and receives frequent support in the works of Thomas Aquinas; see, e.g., *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 1.5, p. 18; *Scriptum super Sententias* II.41.2.2, p. 1044; *Summa theologiae* I.5.6, *Opera* 4: 64–65.

¹⁶⁶ Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 4 q. 5, ff. 60^{va}–vb; see Appendix I.3 below.

¹⁶⁷ See *ibid.* 2 q. 22, ff. 35^{vb}–36^{ra}, and Appendix I.3 below.

temperance imply each other's presence, but they can exist without any of the remaining moral virtues.¹⁶⁸

John Buridan is known to have incorporated many of Gerald's views into his commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics*, albeit not uncritically.¹⁶⁹ This is particularly true for his teaching on the cardinal virtues. Rejecting the view of Albert the Great that the cardinal virtues concern all aspects of human life (*tota humana conversatio*), Buridan supports Gerald's idea that they comprise the essence of moral goodness and together make the human being *simpliciter bonus*. The other moral virtues merely relate to the *congruitas* and *decor* of moral goodness, not to its essence.¹⁷⁰ Buridan adds that nobody is morally good without preferring the *bonum honestum* to the *bonum utile* and the *bonum delectabile*. Justice and temperance make humans prefer the *honestum* to the *utile* and the *delectabile*, respectively, while fortitude prevents them from abandoning it and incurring guilt as a result of physical danger.¹⁷¹

In contrast to Gerald of Odo, Buridan does not distinguish the cardinal virtues from the same four virtues in their specific, Aristotelian sense. Discussing the virtue of fortitude, Buridan accepts only two meanings of the term: *generaliter sumpta*, fortitude refers to the *firmitas animi* common to every moral virtue, while *specialiter sumpta* it pertains to physical danger in acquiring or retaining virtue, or in avoiding mortal sin. This latter formula is obviously broader than Aristotle's definition of fortitude as courage in war. Acknowledging this, Buridan explains that "war" in Aristotle's definition has to be understood not only as military confrontation, but also as voluntarily submitting oneself to physical danger for the cause of virtue (much in line with Gerald's fortitude *mediocriter sumpta*).¹⁷² As examples of fortitude related to war in the second

¹⁶⁸ See *ibid.* 6 q. 17, ff. 138^{ra}–^{va}; see also Walsh, "Buridan on the Connection of the Virtues", 458–459. In contrast to Gerald, Scotus categorically denies the necessary connection of the acquired moral virtues (notably justice, fortitude, and temperance) among each other; see Wolter, *Duns Scotus*, 87.

¹⁶⁹ See Walsh, "Some Relationships".

¹⁷⁰ See John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 3 q. 19, ff. 56^{rb}, 57^{vb}; likewise 4 q. 1 ad 2, f. 70^{ra}. For the rejected statement see Albert the Great, *Ethica* 3.2.1, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 7: 234.

¹⁷¹ See John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 3 q. 20, f. 57^{rb}–^{va}.

¹⁷² Cf. also Walter Burley, *Expositio super libros Ethicorum* 3.12, sig. k4^{rb}: "Et ideo circa pericula mortis in bello est principaliter fortitudo. Potest tamen esse ex consequenti circa pericula cuiuscumque mortis que sustinentur propter bonum virtutis, ut propter confessionem fidei vel propter iustitiam vel propter quamcumque aliam virtutem conseruandam".

sense Buridan mentions not only martyrs, as Aquinas (in his theological work) and some other commentators did,¹⁷³ but also women who suffer injuries from their assailants rather than give in to adultery, as well as clerics who endure severe fasting and vigils for religious ends.¹⁷⁴ The other cardinal virtues likewise exist as *proprietas* common to all virtuous acts on the one hand and as specific virtues on the other.¹⁷⁵ Special temperance, justice, and prudence do not seem to differ much from Aristotle's conceptions of these virtues. But interestingly enough, Buridan argues that temperance has virginity as its superlative form, in the same way that liberality relates to magnificence, *philotimia* to magnanimity, and ordinary fortitude to courage in war. Buridan uses this argument in order to challenge the doctrine of the connection of the virtues. According to Buridan, the superlative virtues are not necessary for every moral agent: not everyone can preserve his virginity, spend magnificently, claim great honours, or fight in war, even if every truly good person would do so if circumstances required it.¹⁷⁶ Yet elsewhere in his commentary he accepts the idea that all moral virtues are connected by prudence, at least at their highest level of perfection (a position defended by some theologians, too).¹⁷⁷

Buridan's classification of the virtues makes better sense than Gerald's, on which it is obviously modelled, in that it includes all virtues distinguished in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance denote both cardinal and Aristotelian virtues, for these coincide in Buridan's conception; in fact, Buridan extends Aristotle's definitions of the specific cardinal virtues in such a way as to include aspects of morality that are fundamental from a medieval Christian perspective. In my view, Buridan thus provides the most suitable attempt in the tradition of medieval commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics* to reconcile the scheme of the cardinal virtues with the Aristotelian system. The weakness of the solution of Albert and Aquinas is that it simply declares the four virtues cardinal in their specific Aristotelian con-

¹⁷³ See below, p. 277.

¹⁷⁴ John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 3 q. 20, ff. 57^{rb}–58^{rb}.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. 3 q. 27, f. 65^{ra}–^{rb}.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. 4 q. 7, f. 77^{rb}–^{va}. Walsh, "Buridan on the Connection of the Virtues," 461, states that Buridan returns to the full Aristotelian position while rejecting Gerald's treatment. However, Buridan's construction of superlative virtues which not all good persons actually develop seriously detracts from Aristotle's view.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 6 q. 21, ff. 137^{rb}–138^{va}; cf., e.g., Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* 5.17, f. 191^r.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. 3 q. 19, ff. 56^{va}–57^{ra}; see Appendix I.3.

ception, while tradition rather located their cardinal status in their general applicability. Only by investing the four virtues with a more general meaning could one plausibly present them as cardinal, although defining them too widely carried the risk of deserting the concept of virtue altogether. Gerald of Odo first accepted a more general meaning for the cardinal virtues, but failed to explain how these virtues relate to the Aristotelian virtues with the same names. John Buridan invested the Aristotelian virtues themselves with a more general meaning, broadening their conception sufficiently to be able to view them as essential for moral goodness and hence, following Gerald's logic, as cardinal. It is probably due to Buridan's influence that the revival of the cardinal virtues in commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics*, initiated by Gerald of Odo, continued in the Late Middle Ages.¹⁷⁹

In contrast to scholastic philosophers and theologians, most pastoral authors felt little need to bring the cardinal virtues into accordance with Aristotle's system, which they did not credit with huge authority in the first place. Giles of Rome's classification of the Aristotelian virtues influenced some popularizing moral treatises, as has been noted above, but usually the cardinal virtues appear in religious moral literature as genera comprising even typically Christian qualities such as meekness and humility. William Peraldus, for instance, subdivides the cardinal virtues in his *Summa de virtutibus* in such a way as to make them cover all possible aspects of morality: prudence refers to the capacity to understand all things human and divine, temperance consists in checking the feelings elicited by all five senses, fortitude comprises the six virtues which the *Moralium dogma* subsumes under it (*magnanimitas, fiducia, securitas, patientia, constantia, magnificentia*), while justice concerns all human obligations to God and to others.¹⁸⁰ The fact that Aristotle has a much narrower understanding of the four virtues does not appear to have bothered Peraldus, even though he knew Philip the Chancellor's distinction between general and special cardinal virtues. Specific references to Philip's conception of the cardinal virtues as general conditions of virtue

¹⁷⁹ For 14th-century examples of Buridan's influence see John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, ff. 131^{ra-vā} and 143^{ra-vā} (adopting Buridan's classification of the cardinal and moral virtues); Conrad of Worms († 1392), *Questiones Ethicorum librorum* 4 q. 4, MS Munich, UB 2° 568a, f. 46^{ra-rb}: the cardinal virtues make the human being *simpliciter bonus*, the opposed vices make him *simpliciter malus*; Buridan's example of the *mulier fortis* resisting adultery is also quoted (likewise at 4 q. 5, f. 49^{va}). Conrad does not, however, distinguish general from special fortitude.

¹⁸⁰ See Appendix I.2 below.

are rare in pastoral literature,¹⁸¹ but references to the four virtues as the main characteristics of the upright human being are common enough. Whoever wants to live well must discern the good from the bad and choose the good (prudence), shun evil and stick to the good (justice), and avoid being extolled in prosperity (temperance) or depressed in adversity (fortitude), explains Edmund of Abingdon († 1240) in his *Speculum religiosorum*.¹⁸² According to Peraldus, the cardinal virtues stabilize the soul as a squared stone, with prudence guaranteeing its veracity, temperance its sobriety, fortitude its constancy, and justice its usefulness toward others;¹⁸³ hence, “good conduct, which consists in doing the good and suffering evil, entirely rests on these four virtues.”¹⁸⁴ Bongiovanni of Messina’s *Quadripartitum figurarum moralium*, composed in the first half of the fourteenth century, proposes another variant: man is ordered to God by prudence, to himself by magnanimity (which prevents despair in adversity and indulgence in prosperity), and to others by justice, while modesty withholds him from evil.¹⁸⁵ Upholding the cardinal virtues as the four prime concepts of morality did not present any particular difficulty for these authors. It was only problematic for academics who took Aristotle’s classification of the virtues seriously but did not want to give up the scheme of the cardinal virtues hailed in Christian, Stoic, and Platonic tradition alike.

Cardinal Virtues and Secular Ethics

Numerous theologians and other moral authors in the Later Middle Ages draw a set of clear distinctions between the theological and the cardinal virtues. While the theological virtues concern the contemplative life and the mind, the cardinal virtues concern the active life and the body. The theological virtues govern the heavenly destination of man and his religious needs; the cardinal virtues relate to man’s existence on earth, notably to his social and political activity. The theological virtues determine our relation with God and the salvation of individual souls;

¹⁸¹ But see *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, p. 57: virtue requires *scire* (prudence), *posse* (fortitude), *velle* (temperance), and *operari* (justice).

¹⁸² Edmund of Abingdon, *Speculum religiosorum* 13, p. 68.

¹⁸³ William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.1.1, p. 281a–b.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 281b: “tota conuersatio bona his quatuor uirtutibus innitur: quę conuersatio consistit in faciendo bonum, & patiendo malum”.

¹⁸⁵ Bongiovanni of Messina, *Quadripartitum figurarum moralium* Prol., p. 4.

the cardinal virtues determine our relations with others and the well-being of the civil community. Generally speaking, the cardinal and the theological virtues bear on two different but complementary dimensions of human existence, one natural, the other supernatural; the theological virtues make us *frui* eternity while the cardinal virtues govern the *uti* of temporal affairs, as several authors repeat after Philip the Chancellor.¹⁸⁶

The danger for modern interpreters is to think that only the theological virtues have a religious significance. Yet according to the Parisian bishop William of Auvergne († 1249), those who call the cardinal virtues “philosophical” in contradistinction to the “theological” or “evangelical” virtues of faith, hope, and charity are utterly mistaken, since the four virtues are no less celebrated in theology than in philosophy.¹⁸⁷ Indeed, Philip the Chancellor states that the four virtues are called “cardinal” because they form the hinge of the door to heaven,¹⁸⁸ a view which recurs in the work of many thirteenth-century theologians as well as in the *Summa de virtutibus* of William Peraldus.¹⁸⁹ As Hugh of Saint Cher explains, the cardinal virtues enable human beings to live their temporal lives in such a way that the door of heaven will be opened for them.¹⁹⁰ Relating the virtues to earthly existence does therefore not necessarily imply a reduction of their religious importance. Numerous moral authors repeat Philip’s view that the theological virtues order our actions and ourselves directly to our final destination (*in finem*) while the cardinal virtues do so indirectly

¹⁸⁶ See Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 746; John of La Rochelle, *De divisione animae* 3.2.9, p. 161; Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in libros Sententiarum* III.33.5, p. 388 (for the parallel teachings in the glosses on the *Sententiae* attributed to John of La Rochelle, see Bougerol, “La glose sur les Sentences du manuscrit Vat. lat. 691”, 139–143); [Catechetical compendium], MS Oxford, Merton 144, f. 135th (14th century; Bloomfield 2748 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2748). According to Thomas Aquinas, *De virtutibus cardinalibus* 4 ad 4, p. 827, the goal of the infused cardinal virtues is “fruitio Dei in patria”.

¹⁸⁷ William of Auvergne, *De virtutibus* 12, p. 162a. Borok, *Der Tugendbegriff des Wilhelm von Auvergne*, 128–129, nevertheless contends that William acknowledges “den Eigenwert der Kardinaltugenden als philosophische Tugenden”.

¹⁸⁸ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 755.

¹⁸⁹ See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 175–179 (John of La Rochelle, Albert the Great, Odo Rigaldi, Bonaventure); William of Auvergne, *De virtutibus* 12, p. 161b; Thomas Aquinas, *Super libros Sententiarum* III.33.2.1.1 ad 4, p. 1046; William de La Mare, *Quaestiones in tertium librum Sententiarum* 33.2, p. 123; William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.1.1, p. 281b.

¹⁹⁰ Hugh of Saint Cher, *In Sententias* III.33, MS Padua, BU 853, f. 106^{vb}: “*cardinales uocantur a cardine per similitudinem, quia sicut hostium per quod intratur in domum circa cardinem uertitur, ita rota huius temporis circa usus istarum iiii virtutum consistit per quos intratur in domum domini*”.

(*ad finem*)¹⁹¹—or, as Thomas Aquinas puts it: the cardinal virtues lead us to the door to heaven while the theological virtues bring us behind that door.¹⁹² Following this line of reasoning, the cardinal virtues eventually aim at celestial rather than earthly happiness. Their function is to order the natural aspects of human life in accordance with its supernatural destination, as some pastoral writings make explicit.¹⁹³

In the next sections I want to shed light on the convergence of natural and supernatural aspects in the late medieval conception of the cardinal virtues. I will first discuss the opposition between acquired and gratuitous moral virtues; next, I will examine the relevance of the acquired moral virtues in the prospect of salvation; finally, I will discuss the political relevance of the cardinal virtues, notably by elucidating the concept of *virtutes politicae*.

Acquired and Gratuitous Virtues

The dual recognition of virtue which arose in Peter the Chanter's circle remained basically intact in late medieval moral thought. Philosophers as well as the majority of theologians recognized the existence of moral virtues as habits acquired through continual application or, in the typical scholastic formula of the thirteenth century, *ex frequenter bene agere*. Although these do not procure salvation, they are virtues in their own right which establish a moral order in temporal affairs. Like the twelfth-century Parisian masters, the scholastics sometimes called these

¹⁹¹ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, pp. 746, 756; Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 183 (Odo Rigaldi, Albert the Great; for Albert, see also below, n. 318); John of La Rochelle, *De divisione animae* 3.2.9, p. 161; Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in libros Sententiarum* III.33.5, pp. 387–388; id., *Summa theologica* I (3), 1: 7; Pseudo-Alexander of Hales, *Summa de virtutibus*, cited in Van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne*, 146; William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 2.1.1, p. 38a; Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium* 5.17, p. 166 (repeated in William of Lanicea, *Diaeta salutis* 5.1, p. 291); Giovanni Marchesini (?), *Centiloquium* 3.36, p. 405.

¹⁹² See Thomas Aquinas, *Super libros Sententiarum* III.33.2.1.2, p. 1047; cf. *De virtutibus in communi* 12 ad 24, p. 746; *De virtutibus cardinalibus* 1 ad 2, pp. 815–816.

¹⁹³ See, e.g., Edmund of Abingdon, *Speculum religiosorum* 11, p. 60: “Tres prime, scilicet fides, spes, caritas, ordinant animam ad Deum, docentes qualiter erga Deum vivendum sit. Quatuor alie docent qualiter quisque vitam suam in seipso ordinare debeat, ut viam in celo sibi valeat preparare” (cf. id., *Speculum ecclesiae* 11, p. 61: “Alie quatuor nos informant qualiter debemus ordinare nostram vitam in isto mundo, ut nos perducant ad gaudia celi”); [Moral and spiritual exhortations], MS Cambridge, Caius 211 (226), f. 170^v (13th century; Bloomfield 1430 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1430): “Hec uirtutes cardinales dicuntur quibus in hac mortalitate bene uiuitur et post ad eternam uitam peruenitur”.

virtues *virtutes politicae*, but many of them preferred the designations *virtutes consuetudinales* or *virtutes acquisitae*, which bear an obvious Aristotelian connotation. The phrase *virtus consuetudinalis*, current mainly in the thirteenth century, was actually borrowed from the *Ethica vetus*;¹⁹⁴ Robert Grosseteste replaced it in his translation with *virtus moralis*.

The Parisian masters distinguished the political from the “Catholic” virtues which secure salvation thanks to their gratuitous character. In fact, the Catholic virtues may refer in their theories to virtues directly given by God, in accordance with Peter Lombard’s conception of virtue, as well as to political virtues informed by grace. From the thirteenth century, theologians made a clear distinction between *virtutes infusae* on the one hand and moral virtues acquired through human effort but having a salvific effect through the agency of grace and charity on the other. As a result, moral virtues, the cardinal quartet included, figure in late medieval theology on three different levels: as acquired virtues *tout court*, as acquired virtues elevated by grace, and as infused virtues. Most thirteenth-century theologians, including Thomas Aquinas, recognize the existence of the moral virtues on all three levels. Around 1300, however, the existence of infused moral virtues became a topic of debate, and a number of theologians including Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines († 1306/09), and John Duns Scotus left no place for them.¹⁹⁵ In their view, moral virtues have their base in human nature (a position likewise taken by those twelfth-century masters who considered political virtues as propaedeutic qualities even for Christians) while only the theological virtues are infused. It is perhaps under the influence of these theologians that some fourteenth-century moral authors active outside the universities replaced the infused moral virtues with the gifts of the Holy Spirit. According to John of Legnano, the virtue of fortitude is acquired by natural means, while fortitude also exists as a gift; according to Michael of Prague, the Christian prince should take efforts to acquire the the virtue of prudence and receive the gift of

¹⁹⁴ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (*Ethica vetus*) 2.1, p. 5.

¹⁹⁵ See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 459–535, 4: 739–807; for Henry of Ghent, see now *Quodlibet* VI 12, pp. 139–142 (especially with regard to the cardinal virtues: these are not infused, only elevated by charity). See also John of Pouilly, *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus*, MS Paris, BnF lat. 3228, ff. 86^{ra}–89^{ra}. John rejects the existence of infused moral virtues but concedes that the gifts of the Holy Spirit might be considered, albeit improperly, as infused cardinal virtues: understanding, counsel, and knowledge procure prudence, fortitude the virtue of that name, piety justice, fear temperance (f. 88^{ra}–^{rb}). For Durand’s position, see below, n. 241.

wisdom.¹⁹⁶ Significantly, both authors make their observations in the course of discussions based on the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas. Their preference for the gifts over the infused virtues implies a tacit adaptation of Aquinas's system.

Peter Lombard's definition of virtue remained a principal point of reference in later medieval theology. According to Odon Lottin, the definition only pertains to the infused virtues, whereas the scholastics applied it to virtue in general.¹⁹⁷ Actually the reverse is true: the Lombard designed his definition for virtue in general (which in his conception was always infused) while many thirteenth- and fourteenth-century theologians restricted it, like Peter the Chanter, to the infused virtues, in conformity with the idea that God works these virtues *in nobis sine nobis*.¹⁹⁸ A similar restriction is found in several pastoral writings¹⁹⁹ as well as in Giovanni Balbi's widespread *Catholicon* (1286), a dictionary of religious terms.²⁰⁰ It is precisely in order to overcome this restriction that Philip the Chancellor, followed by numerous other moral writers, quotes some alternative definitions of virtue in addition to the Lombard's (such as *virtus est habitus mentis bene composite*, taken from Pseudo-Augustine's *De spiritu et anima*) and explains that these include the acquired virtues as well.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁶ See John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 148^{rb}; Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum* 1.6, pp. 146–147 (see also Hohlstein, "Clemens princeps", 210).

¹⁹⁷ Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 149–150.

¹⁹⁸ See, e.g., William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 3.9.1.3, 3: 171–172; Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, pp. 529–530; John of La Rochelle, *De divisione animae* 3.2.4, p. 149; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* II.27 dub. 3, *Opera* 2: 672 (copied by Peter of Aquila, *Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum* II.27); Albert the Great, *Commentarii in II Sententiarum* 27, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 27: 477; id., *De bono* 1.5.1, p. 71; id., *Super Ethica* 1.10 (55), p. 55; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.55.4, *Opera* 6: 353; Giles of Rome, *In secundum librum Sententiarum* 27 dub. 4, 2: 356; Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de virtutibus* 1 ad 1, f. 102^{va}.

¹⁹⁹ See Simon Hinton, *Summa iuniorum*, p. 294; William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 1.3, p. 21; *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, p. 63; Thomas of Cleves, *Liber de sacramentis* (ca. 1380) 24, MS Vienna, Schottenstift 286 (290), f. 116^{vb}. On Thomas of Cleves, see Worstbrock, "Thomas de Kleve", esp. 1539. His chapters on the difference between the theological and cardinal virtues (ch. 27, f. 117^{vb}), the cardinal virtues in general (ch. 36, f. 121^{rb-va}), and the four individual cardinal virtues (ch. 37–40, ff. 121^{va}–123^{ra}) depend on Hugh Ripelin's *Compendium*.

²⁰⁰ See Giovanni Balbi, *Catholicon*, lemma *Virtus*, f. 305^{rb}.

²⁰¹ See Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, pp. 525–542, esp. p. 530, discussing six definitions attributed to Augustine (including those of the Lombard and of Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* 4, PL 40: 782, adapted from Boethius; see above, p. 111 n. 199), the definition of Hugh of Saint Victor, and four definitions of the "Philosophus"

There is no reason to believe that only Aquinas brought the definitive recognition of acquired virtues, as notably Odon Lottin suggested.²⁰² The late twelfth century already brought such recognition, which from the thirteenth century found support in philosophy, theology, and pastoral literature alike.²⁰³ Moreover, Aquinas's statements on the matter are clear but not exceptionally liberal. Discussing the question of whether virtue can be perfect without grace, Aquinas replies in his *Summa theologiae* that acquired moral habits constitute "true but imperfect" virtues unless they are referred by grace to the celestial destination of man.²⁰⁴ Only infused virtues are virtues in the proper sense according to Aquinas; the other virtues are no virtues *simpliciter*, but *secundum quid*.²⁰⁵ The position of Scotus is actually more generous: in his view, "any virtue whatsoever can be called perfect without charity" as long as it is ordered toward a good end. Without charity, virtues are imperfect only in the sense that they have no direct salvific function.²⁰⁶ Several theologians active around 1300 propose similar views and fully acknowledge the

(in fact, one of Cicero and three of Aristotle). For echoes, see John of La Rochelle, *De divisione animae* 3.2.14, pp. 165–166; Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in libros Sententiarum* II.27.9, 2: 258–260; *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, pp. 57–63; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* II.27 dub. 3, *Opera* 2: 671–672; Albert the Great, *De bono* 1.5.1, pp. 67–76; William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 1.3, pp. 18–21; Giovanni Marchesini (?), *Centiloquium* 3.36, pp. 404–405; Pierre Bersuire, *Dictionarium morale*, lemma *Virtus*, p. 1283a.

²⁰² Arguing that Aquinas shows more generosity toward non-Christian morality than his predecessors, Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 92, 98–99, plays down the generosity of earlier masters, stating, e.g., that Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* II.42 dub. 2, *Opera* 2: 955–956, denies the virtues of unbelievers. But Bonaventure merely says that unbelievers have no *true* (meritorious, gratuitous) virtues. See also Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 30, for the suggestion that the recognition of acquired virtues became universal only toward the end of the 13th century.

²⁰³ Apart from the works mentioned in the notes to the previous paragraph, see also, e.g., John of San Geminiano, *Summa de exemplis* 2.31, ff. 140^{va}–141^{ra}. John quotes Peter Lombard's definition of virtue but states that virtue can originate "ex naturę aptitudine", "ex gratię plenitudine", and "ex perfectorum similitudine" (by imitation) (f. 140^{va}). He explains the Aristotelian idea of acquired moral virtue as follows: "est enim in nobis quaedam naturalis aptitudo, & dispositio ad suscipiendum & acquirendum virtutes: earum autem perfectio fit completa ex consuetudine, & loquitur de virtutibus moralibus" (f. 140^{vb}).

²⁰⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.23.7, *Opera* 8: 171. See also Kempshall, *The Common Good*, 279, 289, 350, for the tendency among 13th-century scholastics to consider virtues not directed to God imperfect rather than false.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. I.II.65.2, *Opera* 6: 423.

²⁰⁶ See Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 102–104 ("quelibet uirtus in se poterit esse perfecta sine caritate"); Kent, "Rethinking Moral Dispositions", 365–368.

bonitas moralis of non-Christians.²⁰⁷ One of them is Peter Aureoli, who simply refuses to believe that Aristotle and other ancient philosophers, who developed so many valuable ideas on the virtues, could have worked in vain. Even in God's sight, the virtues of unbelievers are good *secundum quid*.²⁰⁸

Despite this benevolent tradition, the recognition of acquired virtue continued to meet opposition among late medieval theologians. The Dominican master Richard Fishacre († 1248), for instance, denies that virtue can exist without grace,²⁰⁹ while William Durand († 1296) states that justice, fortitude, prudence, and temperance do not deserve the name of virtues if they are not "crimsoned by the blood of Christ".²¹⁰ Even Philip the Chancellor calls charity "the form without which the other virtues are not reckoned to be virtues,"²¹¹ although acquired virtues do exist in Philip's system. Giles of Rome, who likewise recognizes acquired virtues in *De regimine principum*, states in his commentary on the *Sententiae* that virtue in its proper sense cannot exist without grace. Remarkably, Giles derives this view not only from Augustine's writings but also from Aristotle's idea that virtue leads to the ultimate good—that is, in Giles's understanding, to God. The ancient philosophers may have said

²⁰⁷ See Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 106–110 (Robert Cowton, Peter Aureoli), 113–118 (Godfrey of Fontaines), 122–124 (Hervaeus Natalis), 125–126 (Durand of Saint Pourçain).

²⁰⁸ Peter Aureoli, *Commentarii in libros Sententiarum* III.33.2.1, 2:502b–504b: "Dicitur hic, quod politice sint vere virtutes, licet non sint meritoriae, nec gratitae ... quia alias sequeretur, quod illi, qui tantum laborauerunt in acquisitione virtutum, in veritate nihil acquirunt de virtutibus: hoc est inconueniens, quia Aristoteles in Ethicor. tot pulchra verba & aliqua dicit de virtutibus, nec est ibi turpe verum, vel irrationabile: ergo ipse & alii philosophi aliquam veritatem virtutum attigerunt secundum iudicium veri boni: sed Deus iudicat tales virtutes bonas secundum quid"; before his conversion, Cornelius the Centurion possessed real virtues *secundum quid*, not *simpliciter*, which were nevertheless pleasing to God. For the idea that the acts of unbelievers proceeding from acquired virtue are pleasing to God, see also Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententias* II.40.1.5 ad 3, 3: 1039.

²⁰⁹ See Richard Fishacre, *In tertium librum Sententiarum* 23, 2: 13: "concedo quod virtus non potest esse informis"; at *ibid.* 33, p. 121, Fishacre states that prelates in particular must always observe the cardinal virtues.

²¹⁰ See William Durand, *Rationale divinorum officiorum* 3.17.8, CCCM 140: 221. According to Wood, *Ockham on the Virtues*, 212, the Franciscan Matthew of Aquasparta († 1302) "simply" denies that pagans can be virtuous. In reality, Matthew states that pagans can have political, but no true and perfect (i.e., salvific) virtues. See his *Quaestiones de fide* 3 ad 14, in *Quaestiones disputatae de fide et de cognitione*, p. 96.

²¹¹ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 702: "dicemus caritatem esse formam sine qua ceterae virtutes non reputantur virtutes".

nothing about grace, admits Giles, but their teachings help us nevertheless to develop our ideas about subjects involving it.²¹²

From the 1340s, the “Augustinian revival” in theology even led to extreme attacks on the idea of acquired virtue.²¹³ Appealing to Augustine’s authority, theologians such as Thomas Bradwardine († 1349), Gregory of Rimini († 1358), and Hugolin of Orvieto († 1373), all members of the Augustinian order of hermits, claim that humans need divine grace not only for meritorious acts but also for morally good acts. Acquired virtues unmotivated by charity are vices rather than virtues according to these masters, in accordance with Paul’s observation that “all that is not of faith is sin” (Rom. 14:23).²¹⁴ Notably Gregory of Rimini takes pains to contradict the “Pelagian” view (attributed by him to Scotus, William of Ockham, and Adam Wodeham) that humans can act morally by nature. Without special divine assistance, humans are incapable of either knowing or willing the good, argues Gregory in his commentary on the *Sententiae*, let alone of acting in accordance with it. Not admitting any difference between virtuous and meritorious action, Gregory rejects all non-Christian forms of morality and even refuses to consider the apparently virtuous acts of unbelievers as morally neutral; in his view, every human act performed without the special assistance of God attracts guilt.²¹⁵ The emphasis is here on the adjective “special”. Most late medieval theologians who recognize acquired virtues believe that humans owe these virtues to God’s general assistance, in the sense that every good ultimately depends on God. They deny, however, that humans need God’s special assistance to develop them.²¹⁶

Outside academic theology, the notion of acquired virtues encountered resistance as well. Robert Grosseteste, the very translator of Aristotle’s *Ethics*, makes the following observation in one of his biblical commentaries:

²¹² Giles of Rome, *In secundum librum Sententiarum* 27.1.3, 2: 344–345.

²¹³ For the “Augustinian revival”, see Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars*, 307–324.

²¹⁴ For Bradwardine, see his *De causa Dei* 1.39, p. 328Eff.; Oberman, *Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, 152–153*; Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, 123. For Gregory, see next note. For Hugolin, see his *Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum* II.25.3.4, 3: 389.

²¹⁵ See Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum* II.26–28 q. 1, 6: 17–87.

²¹⁶ See, e.g., Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.1, f. 271^{va}: “Non oportet quod concurrat aliquis specialis influxus Dei ad generationem talium uirtutum”; see also Albert the Great, *Super Ethica* 3.6 (190), quoted below, n. 260.

But is Jerome's statement not true, then, that someone can be just without the faith of Christ—justice being understood, to be sure, in its proper and true sense of a virtue of the mind, that is, as rightness of the will observed for its own sake? But the will which deviates from Christ, its Maker and Redeemer who is veritable Rightness and Justice, is by no means right. For this reason, this kind of justice cannot exist without the loving faith, as Augustine clearly demonstrates in several instances, stating that unbelievers cannot possess any virtue together with their infidelity.²¹⁷

If “just” is to be understood as “justified before God”, then being just would indeed require faith and love, but Grosseteste appears to leave little room whatsoever for virtues unmotivated by charity. Accordingly, Grosseteste usually interprets the cardinal virtues religiously in his *Dicta* and his sermons.²¹⁸

Similar examples can be drawn from diverse pastoral writings. The author of the *Paradisus animae* recognizes “natural” and gratuitous virtues, but by the first he merely understands innate abilities;²¹⁹ acquired virtues are absent from his system. Neither do virtues uninformed by grace find any mention in Franciscan manuals such as *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione* of David of Augsburg († 1272), the treatises of Servasanto of Faenza (1220/30–85/86), and William of Lanicea's *Diaeta salutis*. All three authors rather connect the cardinal virtues with

²¹⁷ Robert Grosseteste, *Expositio in Ad Galatas* 3.15 (on 3:11), CCCM 130: 85: “Sed numquid haec sententia Hieronymi uera est, scilicet aliquem posse esse iustum absque fide Christi, adhuc secundum quod iustitia proprie et uere dicta est uirtus animi, rectitudo uidelicet uoluntatis seruata propter se? Sed uoluntas nullo modo recta est quae a suo factore et redemptore Christo, qui est uera rectitudo et uera iustitia, distorta est; quapropter non potest esse haec iustitia sine fide diligente; quod etiam Augustinus ostendit euidenter in pluribus locis, uidelicet quod infidelibus non potest esse uirtus aliqua cum infidelitate”. For the spurious reference to Jerome, cf. above, p. 82.

²¹⁸ See *Dicta* 49 and 56, MS Oxford, Bodleian Bodley 798, ff. 33^{vb}, 45^{rb-va} (the four virtues as modes of charity); 52, f. 39^{vb} (in heaven, prudence gives way to *contemplatio*, justice to *sanctificatio*, fortitude to *impassibilitas*, temperance to *ordinatio*); 124, ff. 102^{vb}–103^{ra} (quoting Augustine's interpretation of Sap. 8:7; “Has itaque uirtutes docet sapiencia, cum in animas sanctas se transfert et eas sibi assimilat”); *Sermo* 19, MS Oxford, Magdalen 202, f. 158^{va} (the cardinal virtues relate to earthly reality, the virtues of Sap. 8:7 to contemplative life; yet “Sic igitur erimus angelis assimilati per spiritualitatem in fortitudinis uirtute, per modum nostrum immaterialitatis in temperancie sobrietate, per puritatem contemplacionis in prudenti continuacione [?] sapiencie, et per accionum vtilitate in ueritate iusticie”); *Sermo* 17, f. 153^{ra}, expanding on Hrabanus Maurus's comparison of the four virtues with the Cross (see above, p. 39). For the numbering of Grosseteste's sermons, see Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste*.

²¹⁹ See *Paradisus animae* Prol., p. 447.

charity, grace, and salvation.²²⁰ Despite his affinity with classical moral philosophy, even Pierre Bersuire describes virtue in his *Dictionarium morale* as a perfection of nature brought about by God and resulting in beatitude,²²¹ while the Dominican author John Bromyard († ca. 1352) flatly denies in his *Summa iuris moralis* (an alphabetical collection of preaching materials, mainly based on civil and canon law) that non-Christians can boast of any virtue: virtues, the cardinal four included, serve the fulfilment of religious duties and procure salvation.²²² The writings of John of Wales form a special case. John amply relates in his *Breviloquium* how the ancients practiced the cardinal virtues, but in his epilogue he accentuates the salvific character of these virtues and repeats Augustine's view that virtues which are not observed for the sake of God should rather be called vices. Strikingly, John's remarks on the virtue of the ancients are toned down, possibly as a result of conscious suppression, in part of the manuscripts transmitting his work as well as in an adaptation composed by the Augustinian eremite Michael of Massa († 1337).²²³ Other moral works of John are written from a plainly religious perspective. His *Tabula exemplorum*, for instance, presents the virtues as *arma lucis* given by Christ to humankind in order to resist the devil.²²⁴

²²⁰ David of Augsburg, *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione* 3.32.1, pp. 226–227, repeats Augustine's view that all virtues, the cardinal four included, amount to charity. Servasanto of Faenza, *De exemplis naturalibus* 3 Prol., MS Vienna, ÖNB 1589 (W), f. 37^{va}, checked against MS Cambridge, UL Ii.2.20 (C), argues that the end of the seven principal virtues is “ad beatitudinem peruenire et finem bonorum omnium obtinere [obtinere C: aptinere W]”; the virtues are divine gifts by which souls are purged (f. 37^{vb}) and their form is grace (3.18, f. 48^{va}); likewise id., *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis* Prol., in Oligier, “Servasanto da Faenza”, 173–174. For William of Lanicea see *Diaeta salutis* 5.8, p. 303: “In hac corona aurea, vel serto aureo [sc. gratia], insertae sunt quatuor gemmae valde pretiosae, vel quatuor virtutes principales, scilicet prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, et iustitia”.

²²¹ Pierre Bersuire, *Dictionarium morale*, lemma *Virtus*, p. 1283a–b. Bersuire starts with saying that virtue may be seen as a natural perfection of the mind, but then observes that the virtues “per Dei influentiam producuntur”; they are “quidam riuuli fonte diuinae gratiae procedentes, & se per terram animae diffundentes, ipsam spiritualiter irrigantes, atque bonis operibus foecundantes” (p. 1283a); “Virtutes enim nos faciunt post mortem viuere, & Deum facie ad faciem cernere, & videre” (p. 1283b).

²²² John Bromyard, *Summa iuris moralis*, lemma *Virtus*: “Per fidem habetur cognitio eterne et incommutabilis veritatis sine qua falsa est virtus eciam in optimis moribus ... Et ideo virtutes esse negantur apud infideles quia non promerentur gloriam”.

²²³ See Diem and Verweij, “*Virtus est via ad gloriam?*”, esp. 222–227. The variation started in the late 13th century, in both redactions in which the *Breviloquium* is known to have come down (see Küenzlen, Kalning and Plessow, “Die Schachbildlichkeit”).

²²⁴ John of Wales, *Tabula exemplorum*, lemma *Virtus*, MS Paris, Arsenal 857, f. 99^{rb}

Strikingly, the late medieval opposition against the idea of acquired virtues influenced even the writings of the first Italian humanists. Francis Petrarch insists in *De ignorantia* that one cannot become wise, virtuous, or good without the teaching and assistance of Christ. We must love the virtues on behalf of God; our goal is not virtue itself, as the ancient philosophers believed, but heaven. On our way to heaven the philosophers may help us, for by the virtues they teach we will reach our final destination; however, in matters relevant to religion Petrarch would rather put his trust in whichever pious Christian than in Plato or Cicero.²²⁵ Petrarch's fellow humanist Coluccio Salutati emphasizes not only the divine end, but also the divine origin of virtue, regularly quoting Peter Lombard's definition of virtue as a divine gift²²⁶ and insisting that virtues are infused by God, either directly or through nature and requiring human effort.²²⁷ Much in line with the Augustinian revival in theology, Salutati repeatedly affirms that virtue can only result from actions undertaken on behalf of God and aided by grace,²²⁸ and in one passage claims that non-Christians, who forcibly lack a religious understanding of virtue, are unable to treat ethics in a way worthy of imitation.²²⁹ By 1400, then, the existence of naturally acquired virtues was still a matter of debate inside the academic world as well as outside it.

One of the most typical features of the virtue ethics developed in Peter the Chanter's circle is the idea that charity and grace can transform the

(Welter, *La tabula exemplorum*, 81–82); see also the lemmata *Fortitudo* (f. 50^{ra-rb}; Welter, pp. 26–27) and *Prudencia* (ff. 89^{va}–90^{ra}; Welter, pp. 68–69; only here a reference to Cicero).

²²⁵ Petrarch, *De ignorantia* 4 and 5, pp. 314–322, 332–334; see also id., *Invectiva contra eum qui maledixit Italie* 10, pp. 452–454; id., *Invective contra medicum* 3, p. 126: “nec ethica prestare possit recte vivere, cum id potentioris alterius donum sit”. See also Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness*, 45.

²²⁶ For a survey, see Kessler, *Das Problem des frühen Humanismus*, 117 n. 33; see also ibid., 184–186, for Salutati's view of (perfect) prudence a divine gift.

²²⁷ Coluccio Salutati, *Ep.* 12.24, *Epistolario* 3: 560: “sunt a Deo, celo vel natura virtutes nobis infuse”; *Ep.* 14.5, 4: 21, referring to “virtutum habitus acquisiti vel infusi” while subscribing to the Lombard's definition of virtue at 4: 22; *De nobilitate* 25, p. 202, discussed by Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness*, 69: “sive nobis virtutem Deus infuderit, sive potentialiter inseruit a natura per actuumque frequentia excitaverit atque perfecit”.

²²⁸ *Epp.* 12.4 and 14.22, *Epistolario* 3: 471, 4: 164; Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness*, 74–76, 670.

²²⁹ *Ep.* 14.22, 4: 164. At the same time, Salutati frequently discusses the acquisition of virtue through practice and learning (see Kessler, *Das Problem des frühen Humanismus*, 119–121), and in one letter introduces a Saracen possessing the cardinal virtues (*Ep.* 13.13, *Epistolario* 3: 646).

acquired into gratuitous virtues. According to Jean Longère, thirteenth-century masters rejected this idea and generally maintained a strict distinction between natural and supernatural virtues.²³⁰ This view is not borne out by the evidence. William of Auxerre, to whose work Longère refers, affirms that the “political” (cardinal) virtues earn merit if they are informed by grace.²³¹ Many thirteenth-century theologians likewise explain that the acquired cardinal virtues can become gratuitous through the infusion of charity.²³² Some pastoral authors voice similar ideas. According to the *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, composed some time after 1241, the cardinal virtues are political virtues as long as they are uninformed, but become gratuitous virtues when grace informs them.²³³ Likewise, Hugh Ripelin teaches in his theological compendium that charity can elevate the cardinal virtues, acquired through human effort, to gratuitous virtues which procure salvation in the same way as faith and hope.²³⁴ Stephen of Bourbon introduces a variant of this idea in his homiletic manual. The cardinal virtues are in themselves *politicae* and *consuetudinales*, related to the natural capacities of man. However, the gift of counsel elicits actions from them by which humans gain salvation;²³⁵

²³⁰ See Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires* 1: 289.

²³¹ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 3.19.1, pp. 385–386. For the continuity of the theory in the early 13th century see also Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 84–86; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 1.1: 178–182.

²³² See, e.g., Robert Kilwardby, *In librum tertium Sententiarum* qq. 27 and 63, pp. 99, 267; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.23.1.4 and III.33.5, *Opera* 3: 495, 723; id., *Breviloquium* 5.4, *Opera* 5: 256–257; Richard of Mediavilla, *Super libros Sententiarum* II.27.1.3, 2: 349; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VI 12, pp. 139–142. William of Auvergne, *De virtutibus* 11–12, pp. 136b, 161b, acknowledges that the acquired virtues can be perfected by grace, but in his view only the virtues infused at baptism are true, salvific virtues. Borok, *Der Tugendbegriff des Wilhelm von Auvergne*, 119–125, concludes too hastily that virtues according to William originate in nature and are perfected by grace; the evidence quoted *ibid.* 124 nn. 23–25 does not support this view. Moreover, Borok conflates natural and consuetudinal virtues, which for William are two different categories.

²³³ See *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, pp. 53–55, 61.

²³⁴ See below, pp. 196–197.

²³⁵ See Stephen of Bourbon, *De septem donis* 5.7, MS Paris, BnF lat. 15970, ff. 546^{ra}–547^{va}: “Septimo dicendum quomodo per donum consilii multiplex beneficium gratie ipsis uirtutibus prebeatur politicis siue cardinalibus. Sicut enim iste uirtutes iuuant naturales uires, ita dona gratuita multa beneficia prestant istis uirtutibus consuetudinalibus et precipue donum consilii”; 5.8, f. 547^{va}: “[Q]uoniam donum consilii, sicut ostensum est, uirtutes eligit per quas homines dirigat et perducatur ad salutem ut ab ipsis eliciat opera salutis ...”. See also 5.10, f. 655^{rb}: the virtue of fortitude owes it salvific effect to the gift of that name. But see also 5.8.4–5, ff. 549^{va}–618^{vb}, discussing *prudentia spiritalis* as a *virtus gratuita*.

guided by counsel, the four virtues constitute the walls of the celestial house of wisdom.²³⁶

Some thirteenth-century theologians thought the transition from acquired to gratuitous virtues problematic, however. Philip the Chancellor goes so far as to deny that acquired virtues can become gratuitous with the argument that grace only perfects the gifts of God, not the products of nature.²³⁷ Although prominent theologians as Bonaventure (1221–1274) and Richard of Mediavilla contradict this view, Philip apparently succeeded to make some others hesitant. The elevation of the acquired virtues through charity is not discussed in John of La Rochelle's *De divisione animae* (Philip's *Summa de bono* is the main source of this work), while the *Summa theologica* attributed to Alexander of Hales († 1245), co-authored by John, rejects it.²³⁸ Albert the Great only gives qualified support to the theory,²³⁹ while Thomas Aquinas, followed by several later masters, holds that grace orders the acts of the acquired virtues to our final destination rather than that it informs the virtues themselves.²⁴⁰ For theologians who deny the existence of acquired moral virtue, the question of its elevation by grace does obviously not arise. Conversely, most masters who deny the existence of the infused moral virtues nevertheless accept the idea that charity and grace provide the acquired virtues, or their acts, with a salvific effect, often pointing out that infused moral virtues are superfluous precisely because the acquired virtues already procure salvation in combination with charity.²⁴¹ John

²³⁶ Ibid. 5.4, f. 544^{vb}. See also above, p. 146, for the view of Albertanus of Brescia that counsel is the main element of prudence.

²³⁷ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 598.

²³⁸ See Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* III (651) and (660), 4: 1034, 1048.

²³⁹ See Albert the Great, *Commentarii in III Sententiarum* 23.9, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 28: 422; id., *De bono* 4.1.5, pp. 240–241.

²⁴⁰ See Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententias* II.40.1.5, 2: 1023–1027, esp. 1023: “actus virtutis politicae non est indifferens, sed de se bonus est, et si sit gratia informatus, erit meritorius”; cf. ibid. III.33.1.4 ad 2, 3: 1041. Likewise, e.g., Thomas of Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 14 ad 7, p. 419; Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de virtutibus* 2 ad 16, f. 104^{va}: charity “importat actus aliarum virtutum et ponit modum suum circa actum vniuscuiusque virtutis”; Francis of Meyronnes, *In libros Sententiarum* III.23–33 q. 1.4, f. 171^{ra}; Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.33.4, 2f. 49^{rb}: “etiam uirtutes acquisitae, prout homo bonus utitur eis ad imperium caritatis, ut sic, huiusmodi uirtutes non minus ordinant hominem meritoriis suis actibus in supernam ciuitatem, quam faciunt infusae”.

²⁴¹ See Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 4: 739–807; id., *Etudes de morale*, 104–105 (Scotus; see also Wolter, *Duns Scotus*, 82), 108–109 (Hugh of Neufchâteau), 118–120 (Godfrey of Fontaines). See also Thomas of Bailly, *Quodlibeta* 1.11, pp. 59–60 (but see 2.13,

Duns Scotus even claims that the gifts, the beatitudes, and the fruits of the Spirit (Gal. 5:22) are likewise redundant. In his view, these are none other than instances of the three theological virtues and the four acquired cardinal virtues directed by charity.²⁴²

In the work of William of Ockham, the elevation theory receives a particularly artful elaboration. In Ockham's view, every moral virtue has five grades of perfection. The first grade consists of willing the good in accordance with right reason, the fifth of "heroic" virtue observed for the sake of charity. Non-Christians may possess the first three grades of virtue, but the fourth and fifth grades, which both involve the love of God, cannot exist without the theological virtues and are thus reserved for Christians. As soon as Christians reach the fourth grade by their own effort, God perfects their morality through the infused theological virtues.²⁴³ What Ockham introduces here is a process of five steps by which acquired virtues become gratuitous under the influence of faith, hope, and charity. The first three steps are common to humankind, but only Christians can proceed further. Yet in taking the first three steps they may well profit from the experience of the ancients, so that non-Christian morality can serve as a preparation for perfect moral virtue which requires the love of God. Ockham even affirms that the love of God may well go together in perfect moral virtue with non-Christian

p. 125, for the view that the moral virtues are infused together with grace and charity in those who convert to Christianity); John of Pouilly, *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus*, MS Paris, BnF lat. 3228, f. 88^{va}. Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.6, ff. 273^{va}–274^{rb}, believes that God may give the moral virtues to someone who has not acquired them; for those who have acquired virtues, the infused moral virtues are superfluous. Cf. Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.33.1, 2f. 48^{ra}: infused and acquired moral virtues both exist, but do not go together in the same person, for "frustra fit per plura, quod potest sufficienter fieri per pauciora".

²⁴² John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III.34, *Opera* (Vatican ed.) 10: 177–214; see also Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 4: 693–701. Before Scotus, Nicholas of Ockham already identified the gift of piety with justice and the gift of fortitude with the virtue of that name (Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 4: 692–693); Robert Cowton followed Scotus's identification of the virtues with the gifts, but replaced the theological virtues with the intellectual virtues of *intelligentia*, *scientia*, and *sapientia* (ibid., 718–725).

²⁴³ William of Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* 7.2–3, *Opera theologica* 8: 334–337, 354–357; see also Wood, *Ockham on the Virtues*, with a translation of the text and a commentary; King, "Ockham's Ethical Theory", 233–235; and, generally, McCord Adams, "The Structure of Ockham's Moral Theory". Walter Chatton, *Reportatio super Sententias* III.33.5.2, pp. 238–239, criticizes Ockham's view. For the Aristotelian conception of "heroic virtue" and its medieval reception, see Costa, "Heroic Virtue in the Commentary Tradition".

motives like striving after honesty. Still, he claims that the moral virtues of non-Christians, which aim at natural ends, constitute a species different from the virtues of Christians ordered to their supernatural destination.²⁴⁴

If acquired virtues can become gratuitous through charity, the loss of charity through sin leads to their degradation to the level of nature, as Hugh Ripelin explains in his *Compendium*. Through penitence, however, the virtues can regain their gratuitous state:

Regarding the virtues it is to be noted that although only one single grace exists which gratifies the soul, there are seven virtues which govern human life, three theological and four cardinal. And even if these virtues are gratuitous by being informed through divine grace, they can become uninformed through guilt and be informed again thanks to penitence with the assistance of grace, which is the origin, end, and form of virtuous habits. From this rule only charity is excepted, which cannot be uninformed like the other virtues, since it is the form of the virtues. For when the habits of the other virtues subsist without charity and grace, in which the life of the virtues consists, they are uninformed. But when grace comes to them, they are informed and decorated and become acceptable to God.²⁴⁵

Three aspects of Hugh's exposition deserve particular attention. First, it is evident that in Hugh's view the theological and cardinal virtues form together a group of seven main virtues which procure merit. In their gratuitous state, the cardinal virtues are just as relevant to the final destination of man as faith, hope, and charity. Even though elsewhere in his *Compendium* Hugh contrasts the cardinal virtues as acquired, political, human, and consuetudinal virtues with the theological virtues given *per infusionem*,²⁴⁶ he believes, in agreement with contemporary

²⁴⁴ William of Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* 7.2 and 7.4, *Opera theologica* 8: 336, 402–403; see also id., *Scriptum in librum quartum Sententiarum* qq. 3–4, *Opera theologica* 7: 58.

²⁴⁵ Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium* 5.16, pp. 165–166: “Circa virtutes hoc tenendum est, quod cum sit une gratia gratificans animam, septem tamen sunt virtutes quibus humana vita regitur, tres scilicet theologicae, et quatuor cardinales. Et licet hae virtutes sint gratuita per informantem divinam gratiam, possunt tamen informes fieri per culpam, et iterum informari per poenitentiam adveniente gratia, quae est habituum virtutis origo, finis et forma. De hac lege sola charitas excipitur, quae informis esse non poterit sicut caeterae virtutes, cum sit virtutum forma. Nam cum habitus aliarum virtutum habetur sine gratia et charitate, in quibus consistit vita virtutum, tunc sunt informes. Cum autem gratia supervenerit, tunc formantur et decorantur, et Deo fiunt acceptabiles”.

²⁴⁶ Ibid. 5.17 and 5.33, pp. 167, 179–180.

theologians,²⁴⁷ that even faith and hope can lose their gratuitous state through sin, while the cardinal virtues can gain a gratuitous state through charity. A second remarkable aspect of Hugh's digression is its quite untroubled integration of Christian and Aristotelian notions of virtue. Although the virtues may continually lose and regain their gratuitous state, they always remain intact as acquired habits; only charity itself expires through sin. This view, too, finds support in contemporary theology. Alexander of Hales, for instance, teaches that "charity is the form of all virtues in as far as they are meritorious habits, but not in as far as they are good habits", since the acquired moral virtues are still good habits in the absence of charity.²⁴⁸ Third, although Hugh fully recognizes the moral value of uninformed virtues, he clearly assigns them a secondary status. Uninformed virtues are like arid branches and gems changed into gravel, explains Hugh, while informed virtues flower with leaves and shine like brilliants.²⁴⁹ This hierarchy between informed and uninformed moral virtues goes back to the Parisian masters of the late twelfth century and was generally maintained in late medieval theology, except for those masters who rejected the existence of acquired virtue altogether.

As we have seen, the Parisian masters active around 1200 emphasized that humans owe even the acquired virtues to divine grace. Statements to a similar effect are commonplace in late medieval moral writing. Every virtue, whether acquired or infused, is a co-product of man and God (Robert Kilwardby);²⁵⁰ even the natural and acquired virtues are divine gifts (Roger Bacon);²⁵¹ God operates in nature and can thus elicit natural virtues (Ulrich of Strasbourg);²⁵² humans acquire moral virtues by aid

²⁴⁷ See, e.g., Robert Kilwardby, *In librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 63, p. 267; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.23.1.4 and III.33.5, *Opera* 3: 495, 723; id., *Breviloquium* 5.4, *Opera* 5: 256–257; Richard of Mediavilla, *Super libros Sententiarum* II.27.1.3, 2: 349.

²⁴⁸ Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in libros Sententiarum* II.27.15, 2: 262: "caritas est forma omnium prout virtutes sunt habitus meritorii, sed non prout virtutes sunt habitus boni". See also William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 3.40.2, p. 770: "virtutes consuetudinales, de quibus agit Aristoteles, in *Ethicis*, que et in peccato mortali possunt haberi"; Francis of Meyronnes, *In libros Sententiarum* III.23–33 q. 1.4, f. 171^{ra}: "habitus omnium aliarum virtutum vere possunt manere sine charitate".

²⁴⁹ Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium* 5.16, p. 166.

²⁵⁰ Robert Kilwardby, *In librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 27, pp. 98–100.

²⁵¹ Roger Bacon, *Moralis philosophia* 3.1.2, p. 50.

²⁵² Ulrich of Strasbourg, *De summo bono* 6.2.1, p. 267. For an incisive analysis of Ulrich's view, see Zavattero, "I principi costitutivi". Ulrich argues that grace implants the capacity

of the natural virtues given for the purpose by God (Raymond Lull);²⁵³ the acquired virtues come from God while being “mediated through our actions” (Hervaeus Natalis, Durand of Saint Pourçain).²⁵⁴ Bonaventure accordingly explains in his commentary on Sap. 8:7 that the ancient philosophers possessed the cardinal virtues in an imperfect state *per gratiam gratis datam*, though not *per gratiam gratum facientem*.²⁵⁵ A similar explanation is found in the *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*,²⁵⁶ while Thomas Aquinas teaches in his *Summa theologiae* that humans may reach after the good inherent to political virtue without the help of gratifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*), but not without the help of God.²⁵⁷ Discussing the cardinal virtues in his commentary on the *Sententiae*, Aquinas points out that we receive in fact all our goods from God: sometimes without our cooperation (*bona infusa*), sometimes with our cooperation (*bona acquisita*), sometimes through the cooperation of nature (*bona naturalia*).²⁵⁸ Significantly, several late medieval theologians argue that the Lombard’s definition of virtue as a divine gift does not apply

for virtue in human nature. The *intellectus agens*, which through emanation participates at the divine good (a notion borrowed from Albert the Great, *Ethica* 1.7.5, *Opera* [ed. Borgnet] 7: 114b), is capable of developing the virtues through repeated action and thus to restore the perfection of human nature that was lost at the Fall.

²⁵³ Raymond Lull, *Ars compendiosa Dei* 27.1.1.7, CCCM 39: 165: “Qui causat simplices uirtutes naturaliter, ut homo per ipsas acquirat uirtutes simplices morales”.

²⁵⁴ Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de virtutibus* 2 ad 20, f. 104^{vb}: “nihil possumus sine deo, et tamen sunt quedam in nobis a deo mediantibus actibus nostris, et de numero istorum sunt virtutes acquisite”; likewise *ibid.* 3 ad 2, f. 106^{ra}; Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.2, f. 272^{vb}: “Deus dat ... omnes uirtutes, non tamen immediate, sed mediantibus actibus nostris & principiis actuum, loquendo de uirtutibus acquisitis”.

²⁵⁵ See Bonaventure, *Commentaria in Sapientiam* (on 8:7), *Opera* 6: 162. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 184, wrongly states that according to Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.33.5, *Opera* 3: 723, the cardinal virtues need the assistance of grace “même en tant que principe d’actes naturels”. Bonaventure merely states that the acquired cardinal virtues can be perfected by grace and thus become meritorious.

²⁵⁶ *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, p. 61: “Gratis data comprehendit non solum gratuitas set etiam politicas et naturales et omnia dona spiritualia et data temporalia, cum omne datum optimum et [omne] donum perfectum desursum est, gratis datum, Iacobi i. Virtus uero gratuita, idest gratum faciens, comprehendit theologicas et cardinales secundum quod gracia informantur, quia ante gratiam inter politicas numerantur”.

²⁵⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.136.3 ad 2, *Opera* 10: 102. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice?*, 197–198, 205, claims that Aquinas in his *Summa* discusses the cardinal virtues as natural virtues which even as such cannot exist without charity. For a discussion, see Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 32.

²⁵⁸ *Id.*, *Scriptum super Sententias* III.33.1.2.2 ad 1, 3: 1029.

to the political or consuetudinal virtues, because in these humans and God operate together²⁵⁹—even though the adjectives “political” and “consuetudinal” refer to the humanly acquired state of these virtues. Contrary to what one might expect, many philosophers voice opinions of a similar nature. Albert the Great admits in his first commentary on the *Ethics* that moral acts depend on grace in the sense that God is the source of all natural goods.²⁶⁰ Likewise, an unknown philosopher active about 1270 affirms that uncreated virtue is active in all created virtues,²⁶¹ while Gerald of Odo states in his *Ethics* commentary that humans are incapable of acquiring moral virtues and abstaining from evil without divine assistance.²⁶² Gerald and numerous other commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* accordingly claim that human happiness enjoyed in the present life, which in Aristotle’s view is an effect of acting virtuously, is a co-product of God and man;²⁶³ a similar opinion recurs in John of Legnano’s

²⁵⁹ See, e.g., William of Auvergne *De virtutibus*, 12, p. 161b, on the consuetudinal virtues: “etsi Deus illas operetur, non tamen sine homine”; Hugh of Saint Cher, *In Sententias* II.27, MS Padua, BU 853, f. 61^{ra}: “Quam solus Deus operatur in homine ponitur ad differentiam politicarum virtutum, in quibus cooperatur homo Deo”; Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum* II.27.8, 2: 252; Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones super libros Sententiarum* III.14.1, f. 448^{ra}.

²⁶⁰ Albert the Great, *Super Ethica* 3.6 (190), p. 170: “quidam dicunt, quod in nullum bonum opus possumus, nisi infundatur nobis divina gratia aliqua. Et si quidem velint dicere gratiam divinam ipsa naturalia bona quae habemus a deo, verum dicunt. Si autem velint dicere, quod sit aliqua gratia infusa superaddita naturalibus, sine qua non possumus ad opera, falsum dicunt”.

²⁶¹ Pseudo-Robert Grosseteste, *Summa philosophiae* 6.5, p. 372.

²⁶² Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 3 q. 23, f. 54^{ra}: after stating that moral philosophy is concerned with virtues “ex humanis operationibus generate” rather than infused virtues, Gerald admits: “pro acquirenda virtute et declinando a malitia non sufficit potestas hominis sine dei auxilio”; divine power, in turn, remains ineffective without human *consensus*.

²⁶³ Radulphus Brito and the Erfurt anonymous acknowledge God as the first cause of happiness, whereas Giles of Orléans and the Erlangen anonymous only consider its human cause; see Grabmann, *Der lateinische Averroismus*, 41–46 (Erfurt), 48–51 (Giles), 53–55 (Erlangen), 57–60 (Brito). See also Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 1.10, *Opera* 47: 50–51; *Anonymi Questiones super Librum Ethicorum* 1 q. 29, p. 182: “felicitas non est a deo immediate, sed est a deo homine cooperante”; Walter Burley and Albert of Saxony, cited in Heidingsfelder, *Albert von Sachsen*, 109; Guido Vernani, *Summa moralium* 1.4.4–5, MS Vatican City, BAV Ross. 162, f. 11^{r-v}: “Si autem felicitas non sit aliquod donum missum immediate a deo, est tamen ab eo principaliter sicut a causa prima, et secundario ab homine”; Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 1 qq. 29 and 31, ff. 18^{ra}, 20^{vb}–21^{ra}: Aristotle’s teaching on earthly happiness is in accordance with the Christian faith, for “philosophus dicit felicitatem esse ab homine; non negat tamen ipsam esse a deo. Fides autem dicit ipsam esse ab homine et a deo; primum per

De pace.²⁶⁴ The idea that the human capacity for virtue has its ultimate source in divine goodness was apparently too deeply rooted to be abandoned even in a philosophical context.

Moral Virtues and the Final Destination of Man

According to the Parisian masters of the late twelfth century, the political virtues cannot in themselves procure salvation. Theologically speaking, this is a matter of course: if man would be able to save his soul by virtues acquired through his own effort, even unbelievers would have the possibility to gain heaven. In the view of the Parisian masters, the acquired virtues are only relevant to salvation in the sense that they can be informed by grace and consequently be directed to man's final destination. In late medieval theology, this position was notably retained by Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. While Aquinas insists in *De virtutibus cardinalibus* that the political virtues are strictly confined to the civil life,²⁶⁵ he asserts in his *Summa theologiae* that non-gratuitous virtues procuring such finite goods as the *conservatio communitatis* can be referred by grace to the supernatural good.²⁶⁶ Hence, the political virtues have no religious function of their own, but may become relevant to our final destination through the influence of grace. Naturally acquired virtues have natural effects; their supernatural effects result from an external, supernatural cause.

Nevertheless, the claim that even the naturally acquired virtues are somehow conducive to supernatural ends is present in moral theology and literature from the early thirteenth century. According to William of Auxerre, the political virtues uninformed by grace "enable the human being to have the theological virtues and make him similar to God in

philosophum affirmatur, secundum non negat"; John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 1 q. 17, f. 17^{ra}: "felicitas humana secundum Aristotelem est ab homine siue a causa humana tanquam a causa propria et determinata: sed a deo tanquam a causa vniuersali et primaria".

²⁶⁴ John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 129^{vb}: "felicitas humana dependet a causa humana sicut a causa limitata et immediata, a deo autem sicut a causa vniuersali et prima".

²⁶⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *De virtutibus cardinalibus* 4, p. 827: "Manifestum est autem quod virtutes acquisitae, de quibus locuti sunt philosophi, ordinantur tantum ad perficiendum homines in vita civili, non secundum quod ordinantur ad caelestem gloriam consequendam ... Sed virtutes cardinales, secundum quod sunt gratuita et infusae ... perficiunt hominem in vita praesenti in ordine ad caelestem gloriam ... [virtutes politicae] ordinantur tantum ad bonum civile praesentis vitae".

²⁶⁶ Id., *Summa theologiae* II.II.23.7, *Opera* 8: 171.

his outer works" (actually, William attributes the statement *virtus facit dignum beatitudine* to no other than Aristotle himself).²⁶⁷ William's view was attacked by Roland of Cremona, the first Dominican author of a theological summa (1229/30),²⁶⁸ but echoes of it are found in Philip the Chancellor's statement that man's social virtues are "preordered" to the virtues which bring man to God²⁶⁹ as well as in Godfrey of Fontaines's opinion that by checking the passions, the moral virtues make more room in man for the theological virtues.²⁷⁰ Near the end of the fourteenth century, Marsilius of Inghen († 1396) gave an example of how the acquired moral virtues may help one to obtain the theological virtues: uninformed fortitude may enable possible converts to Christianity not to fear reprisals from pagan authorities and thus to receive faith, hope, and charity.²⁷¹

Pastoral and didactic writers likewise stress the religious usefulness of acquired moral virtues. Thomas of Chobham († 1233/36) points out in his homiletic work that by regulating human conduct in the world, the political virtues provide man with a basic morality enabling him to transcend the world and accept the gifts of God,²⁷² while the lexicographer Giovanni Balbi affirms that the political virtues stimulate a contemplative attitude;²⁷³ many political writers make similar claims, as will be argued

²⁶⁷ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 3.19.11, 3: 385: "Iste enim quatuor virtutes habilitant hominem ad habendum theologicas virtutes et faciunt per exteriora opera hominem similem Deo"; likewise 3.18.3, p. 377. For the statement attributed to Aristotle, see *ibid.* 3.40.2, 3: 769; cf. Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea* (*Ethica nova*) 1.10, p. 83: "virtutis enim bravium et finis, optimum videtur quid et beatum".

²⁶⁸ Roland van Cremona, *Summae liber tercius* 208, pp. 619–629: "Iste quatuor virtutes, secundum quod sunt politice, idest informes, habilitant secundum suos actus ad habendum virtutes gratuitas ... Unde per sua opera exteriora faciunt hominem similem Deo, ut dicunt quidam magistri. Quod non videtur, secundum quod sunt informes, cum non illuminent, nec mudent hominem interiorem, qui est ad ymaginem et similitudinem Dei; hominem vero exteriorem quodam modo componunt et ornant". Surprisingly, Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 1: 143 and Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 189 and 259 n. 1, say that Roland does not discuss the virtues; actually, his discussion of the virtues occupies several hundreds of pages in modern print. See also Brungs, "Roland von Cremona O.P."

²⁶⁹ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 701: "Constat quod virtutes que ordinant hominem recte ad proximum sunt preordinate ad illas que sunt in Deum".

²⁷⁰ See Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 120–121.

²⁷¹ Marsilius of Inghen, *Questiones super libros Sententiarum* III.14.1, f. 451^{ra}, vb.

²⁷² See Thomas of Chobham, *Summa de arte predicandi* 6.4, p. 200; *id.*, *Summa de commendatione virtutum* 4, CCCM 82B: 107.

²⁷³ See Giovanni Balbi, *Catholicon*, lemma *Virtus*, f. 305^{va}: "Sunt enim politice secundum quod homo per eas in ciuilibus operibus vtens ad quietes contemplationis aliquis [*lege aliquas*] anhelat".

in the next section. “You created in me a natural capacity for listening, imagining, and reasoning”, writes Raymond Lull († 1316/17) in a prayer, “so that I may acquire the moral virtues by which I must serve, obey, and praise your might”.²⁷⁴ Following this passage, the human acquisition of moral virtues has its roots in the divine plan and serves religious ends.

Some late medieval theologians even propose views which challenge the idea that the acquired virtues have no salvific effect. Having stated that virtues can exist *secundum esse insufficiens et imperfectum* as well as *secundum esse sufficiens et perfectum*, Richard of Mediavilla observes in his commentary on the *Sententiae*: “In the first way many virtues can exist without gratifying grace, such as the virtues which are acquired on the basis of acts, which order *ad finem* without exceeding the natural capacities of man”.²⁷⁵ Richard states here in so many words that naturally acquired virtues order us toward our celestial destination, so that even non-Christians may apparently reach the door of heaven (but not pass through it). Half a century earlier, Philip the Chancellor still taught that only the infused cardinal virtues order humans *ad finem* through their upright behaviour in the world, a view to which Richard subscribes elsewhere in his commentary.²⁷⁶ But John of La Rochelle already modified Philip’s view in his *De divisione animae*. Putting consuetudinal, political, and cardinal virtues on one line and relating them to the active life, John supplies them with functions that Philip attributed to the infused cardinal virtues only: they make us *uti* the things which are *ad finem* and determine the actions and passions related to our *ingressus in vitam*.²⁷⁷

Far-reaching claims as to the supernatural effect of acquired moral virtues can be found in fourteenth-century sources as well. According to John of Pouilly, the acquired moral virtues, though not necessary in

²⁷⁴ Raymond Lull, *De contemplatione* 9, CCCM 79: 54: “Tu in me creasti uirtutem naturalem in sentiendo, imaginando et ratiocinando, ut uirtutes morales acquirerem, ut cum ipsis tuae uirtuti seruirem, oboedirem et ipsam laudarem”.

²⁷⁵ Richard of Mediavilla, *Super libros Sententiarum* II.27 art. 1.3, 2: 349: “Primo modo possunt esse multae virtutes sine gratia gratum faciente, sicut sunt virtutes quae acquiruntur ex actibus ordinantes ad finem non excedentes naturalem hominis facultatem”.

²⁷⁶ See Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, p. 756; Richard of Mediavilla, *Super libros Sententiarum* III.33.1.2, 3: 372: as acquired virtues, the cardinal virtues order us *ad civilitatem*, within the limits of our natural powers; as infused virtues, they direct us to our supernatural destination.

²⁷⁷ See John of La Rochelle, *De divisione animae* 3.2.7, 9 and 15, pp. 157, 161, 168. At *Sermones de adventu* 1, pp. 81–86, John discusses the cardinal virtues in a purely biblical setting, together with the theological virtues, humility, and patience; see also *ibid.* 5, pp. 110–114.

order to gain beatitude, are nevertheless expedient to this end, since they help the just to act morally with pleasure and not to be carried away by vehement passions.²⁷⁸ Other authors go much further. A *Summa theologiae* ascribed to Henry of Langenstein (1325–1397) distinguishes three classes (*gradus*) of virtues. Some virtues originate from charity, some from other divine gifts, and some *ex puris et nudis naturalibus* without any special assistance of God. The author claims that even virtues of the third kind may lead to fully meritorious actions.²⁷⁹ A similar suggestion arises from John Bromyard's *Summa praedicatorum*, an alphabetical collection of moral themes and exempla mainly drawn from the Bible and patristic literature. In discussing the cardinal virtues, Bromyard follows the *Nicomachean Ethics* and subscribes to Aristotle's view that moral virtues originate through the repeated use of natural capacities and are therefore perfections of nature.²⁸⁰ Nevertheless, Bromyard claims that the

²⁷⁸ See John of Pouilly, *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus*, MS Paris, BnF lat. 3228, f. 89^{ra}: "non sunt necessarie ad salutem, sed sunt multum expedientes, quia per ipsas potentia in qua sunt delectabiliter operatur et obedit et excluduntur vehementes passionem et temptationes quibus non resistit iustus sine difficultate".

²⁷⁹ Henry of Langenstein (?), *Summa theologiae* 4, MS Vienna, ÖNB 4806, f. 48^{va-vb}: "Primus [sc. gradus] est earum que ex habitu supernaturali qui est caritas procedunt et ille sunt virtutes complete et perfecte quibus ex diuina ordinatione correspondet premium beatitudinis eterne. Secundus est earum que procedunt ex aliis habitibus supernaturalibus, ut ex habitu fidei, et aliis graciis gratis datis, seu ex specialibus dei adiutoriis, quibus homo adiutus potest sine pluri moraliter recte agere. Tercius gradus esset earum uirtutum que ex puris et nudis naturalibus specialiter a deo non adiutis procedere possent ... Sed dicendum quod si non potest homo ex nudis naturalibus corruptis nisi male agere, ut forte uerius est, tunc mille acciones electiue hominis sub tercio gradu similitudinem virtutum habentes sunt proprie meritorie cuiuscumque boni"; cf. f. 49^{ra}: "deus disposuit ratione utentibus suis naturalibus superaddere dona gracie gratis date et consequenter recte et debite utentibus illis faciendo quod in se est dare gratiam gratificantem, non proprie ex merito dignificante ad illam sed consequencie ad dispositionem ydoneam". No *Summa theologiae* is attributed to Henry of Langenstein by Hohmann, "Initienregister der Werke Heinrichs". The MS was written in 1406.

²⁸⁰ John Bromyard, *Summa predicantium*, lemma *Virtus*, art. 1: "Quedam vero sunt cardinales, scilicet temperantia, iusticia, prudentia, fortitudo. Temperantia que [*lege qua*] virtuosus regitur circa concupiscentias ciborum et quaruncunque corporalium delectationum; hec specialiter refrenat hominem ab accidia, gula et luxuria, et tristitia que ex istorum contingit absentia. Iusticia que hominem regit in comparisonem ad alium. Prudentia que in omnibus agibilibus medium et modum ordinat. Fortitudo que in omnibus aduersis et precipue in periculo mortis hominem roborat et confirmat ... De omnibus nanque istis verificatur illud philosophi .vi. ethi. dicentis quod homo non potest perfecte habere vnam virtutem moralem nisi habeat omnes"; art. 2: virtue is a *perfectio nature*; art. 4: moral virtues originate "a natura quantum ad inclinationem, aptitudinem et capacitatem", and "ab vsu, actu et consuetudine quantum ad perfectionem". See also

moral virtues bring us into heaven by arming us against the vices which permanently besiege us.²⁸¹ Also, the Lollard *Rosarium theologiae* distinguishes uncreated virtue (God) from the created virtues, which are subdivided into natural virtues (innate abilities), intellectual virtues (*sapientia, scientia, intellectus, ars, prudentia*, following Aristotle), and moral virtues. Moral virtues comprise the three theological and the “philosophical” virtues, that is, Aristotle’s moral virtues, which the author defines in accordance with the *Nicomachean Ethics*.²⁸² Thereupon, however, the author quotes the definition of virtue as a gift from Peter Lombard’s *Sententiae* and insists on virtue’s salvific potential.

Even some commentaries on Aristotle’s *Ethics* contain remarkable statements on the relevance of the acquired virtues for what seems to be a religious—though not forcibly otherworldly—ideal. Despite their professed unwillingness to engage in theological reflection,²⁸³ many commentators active before 1250 suggest that the virtues aim not so much at earthly happiness, as envisaged by Aristotle, as at the human union with God. The moral virtues make human beings fit for this union, while the intellectual virtues produce it. Some early commentators even subordinate the human good (virtue) to the divine good (beatitude) and present this arrangement as Aristotle’s authentic teaching.²⁸⁴ Also, some early commentators point out that by virtue humans approach happiness without fully achieving it; in the end, happiness unites itself to humans rather than vice versa.²⁸⁵ Happiness, then, is attained in a way that surpasses

Bromyard’s *Summa iuris moralis*, lemma *Prudentia*, for a reference to Aristotle’s *Ethics* in order to illustrate the view that prudence includes respecting the contract with God concluded in baptism and confession.

²⁸¹ Ibid. artt. 2 (warfare) and 3 (heaven).

²⁸² *Rosarium theologiae*, lemma *Virtus*, MS Paris, Mazarine 1050, f. 241^r: “Virtus moralis philosophica est habitus electius in medio consistens quo ad nos determinatus ratione. Primo est habitus, scilicet qualitas radicata non de facili mobilis. Secundo est electius, quia oportet quod voluntarie eligatur. Tercio oportet quod sit in medio consistens quo ad nos, quia diuersi homines haberent diuersa media, quia illud quod est superfluum uni dicitur in odium alteri. Quarto oportet quod determinetur ratione, quia quilibet virtus habet propriam prudentiam per quam regularetur”.

²⁸³ See Celano, “Peter of Auvergne’s Questions”, 5–6; Wieland, “The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics”.

²⁸⁴ See Wieland, *Ethica*, 143–197; Celano, “The ‘finis hominis’ in the Thirteenth Century Commentaries”; id., “The Understanding of the Concept of *felicitas*”; id., “The Understanding of Beatitude”; Buffon, “Philosophers and Theologians on Happiness”; Zavattero, “Felicità e Principio Primo”; ead., “Moral and Intellectual Virtues”.

²⁸⁵ See Buffon, “Philosophers and Theologians on Happiness”, 465–467.

nature's power.²⁸⁶ Similar views prevail in the work of John Buridan, the most influential commentator of the fourteenth century. Buridan pretends to discuss happiness from a purely philosophical point of view, in as far as it naturally lies in human reach.²⁸⁷ Yet he explicitly identifies happiness with the perfect contemplation of God, which is primarily reached through the intellectual virtues. If the moral virtues are not required for contemplation, they are at least useful for it, because they keep the human being from excessively pursuing worldly desires.²⁸⁸ The parallel with John of Pouilly's argument that the moral virtues do not procure salvation but nevertheless further it by checking vehement passions is obvious. A still greater ambiguity affects Buridan's conception of the cardinal virtues in particular. The four virtues comprise the essence of moral goodness understood from a philosophical, not a theological perspective, as Buridan repeats after Gerald of Odo.²⁸⁹ Yet offending against these virtues does not just result in moral evil according to Buridan, but in mortal sin, whereas disrespect of other moral virtues only engenders minor vices.²⁹⁰ The cardinal virtues are therefore not only essential for the philosophical idea of moral goodness, but also for the protection of believers in their everyday struggle against sin. Even in the context of Aristotelian ethics, the cardinal virtues thus become relevant for salvation.

The suggestion that acquired virtue may lead to beatitude even without the intervention of divine grace irritated theologians from the late thirteenth century.²⁹¹ It not only elicited Gregory of Rimini's zealous

²⁸⁶ Cf. Lafleur and Carrier, "Dieu, la théologie et la métaphysique", 289.

²⁸⁷ John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 1 q. 17, f. 17^{rb}: "non [*lege nos*] autem (sicut Aristoteles in hoc libro) philosophice loquimur de felicitate secundum quod est nobis acquisibilis in hac vita secundum nature et condicionis humane communem cursum"; cf. 1 q. 18, f. 18^{va}: "redeuntes ad nostram intentionem que est in hoc toto libro nichil nisi pure philosophice tractare ...".

²⁸⁸ Ibid. 1 q. 16, ff. 15^{vb}–16^{ra}, esp. 16^{ra}: "Item dubium est de supradicto actu voluntatis [involved in contemplation] an sine virtutibus moralibus elici potest an non. Si autem dicatur quod non tunc ad felicitatem necessarie sunt virtutes morales ... Si autem dicatur quod sic: tunc ad eam non sunt necessarie sed peritiles valde quoniam si quis habeat appetitum immoderatum ad divitias vel ad honores aut ad delectationes inclinatum: valde difficile esset ... quod omne honestum efficaci voluntati preferret et diuitiis et honoribus ac etiam proprie vite".

²⁸⁹ Ibid. 3 q. 19, f. 56^{rb}: the cardinal virtues make the human being good "secundum quod de bonitate morali locuti sunt philosophi"; likewise Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 4 q. 5, f. 60^{va}.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., ff. 56^{va}–57^{ra}. Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 4 q. 5, f. 60^{va}–61^{ra}, only occasionally contrasts the cardinal virtues with mortal sin.

²⁹¹ Buffon, "The Structure of the Soul", 30 n. 57, suggests that the teachings of the

attacks against the “Pelagianism” inherent in contemporary moral theory (a rather ill-placed attack in case of Scotus, Ockham, and Wodeham, Gregory’s actual targets), but also made more moderate thinkers as Henry of Ghent insist that acquired virtue is in itself only capable of regulating moral life on earth.²⁹² In a similar vein, a number of early fourteenth-century Dominican masters clearly differentiate between the terrestrial aim of the acquired virtues and the celestial aim of the virtues (either moral or theological) infused by grace. Hervaeus Natalis (Hervé de Nédellec, † 1323) emphasizes that whereas the infused virtues relate to man’s final destination, the acquired virtues have no other purpose than procuring civilized human relations in accordance with right reason.²⁹³ Durand of Saint Pourçain († 1334) likewise holds that the acquired virtues guarantee proper conduct in civil life while salvation is secured by charity²⁹⁴—on its own, that is, not by acting on the acquired virtues, whose functions remain limited to man’s terrestrial existence. Similarly, Pierre de la Palud († 1342) affirms that moral virtues are needed for a perfect civil life on earth, but not for gaining heaven. In order to be saved, argues Pierre, conversion to God on one’s deathbed is sufficient.²⁹⁵

While the views proposed by these Dominicans conveniently reserve salvation for Christian believers by reminding, in agreement with the ideas of the twelfth-century Parisian masters as well as Thomas Aquinas, that the acquired virtues, considered in themselves, merely pertain to moral life in the civic community, they have the unintended effect of

early commentators on Aristotle’s *Ethics* may be the ultimate source of one of the articles famously condemned by the Parisian bishop Etienne Tempier in 1277: “Quod homo ordinatus quantum ad intellectum et affectum, sicut potest sufficienter esse per uirtutes intellectuales et alias morales de quibus loquitur philosophus in ethicis, est sufficienter dispositus ad felicitatem eternam” (*La condamnation parisienne de 1277* art. 157, p. 126).

²⁹² See Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet XIII* 10, pp. 73–75.

²⁹³ Hervaeus Natalis, cited in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 4: 783: “Nunc autem finis [sc. uirtutis] moralis infuse est exercere actum suum prout imperat caritas et prout exigit amicitia Dei; finis autem acquisita est facere quod dictat recta ratio ad recte conuiuendum in ciuilitate humana; et isti fines sunt diuersi formaliter et requirunt diuersas proportionem in eis que debent eis correspondere”.

²⁹⁴ See Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.6 ad 1, f. 274^{rb}: “sicut bene conuersamur in uita ciuili per uirtutes morales acquisitas, sic bene conuersamur in uita spirituali per uirtutes theologicas nobis infusas, nec oportet ponere propter hoc uirtutes morales infusas”.

²⁹⁵ See Lottin, *Etudes de morale*, 127–128, esp. 128 n. 1: “Sed ad perfectionem viatoris simpliciter requiruntur utraque: acquisita [sc. virtutes] quidem ut homo est ad ciuilitatem umanam; theologice autem ut est christianus ad ciuilitatem ecclesiasticam pertinet”. See also below, p. 237, for Abelard’s antecedent.

challenging the Christian interest in moral virtue. Why should Christian believers bother about acquiring any moral virtues if these will not save their souls? I believe that it is in order to counter this challenge that theologians as Godfrey of Fontaines and John of Pouilly tried to secure a minimum role for the acquired virtues in the salvation economy by pointing out that these virtues subdue disordinate passions and thereby help believers to find their way to God. Outside moral theology, parallel views occur not only in John Buridan's commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* but also in John of Legnano's *De pace*. Even if acquired moral virtues are not necessary for loving God, argues John, they are useful to that end, since they prepare the will for the act of love.²⁹⁶ Several fourteenth-century moral writers thus hold to the idea that acquiring virtues by natural means makes one fit for the work of grace—even if some contemporary theologians would principally deny it.²⁹⁷

Are the cardinal virtues, then, relevant for the final destination of man? As infused virtues, they certainly are, but not all late medieval theologians recognize them as such. As acquired virtues directed by grace, they are just as relevant. Some theologians dispute the working of grace on the acquired virtues, but then these theologians all recognize infused moral virtues; conversely, theologians who reject infused moral virtues all recognize the salvific function of the acquired virtues through the agency of grace, with the exception of Durand of Saint Pourçain. Finally, the cardinal virtues obviously cannot procure salvation as acquired virtues unaided by grace. Still, many theologians and other moral writers take pains to affirm that they are nevertheless expedient, while even philosophers believe that the acquired moral virtues stimulate the union of man and God.

In fact, consistently secular treatments of the cardinal virtues are rare in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Apart from the tradition of commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*—intentionally, but not always completely, restricted to a philosophical viewpoint—the best instances I know are the two moral tracts written around 1300 by Engelbert of Admont, a Benedictine abbot but a staunch adept of Aristotle nevertheless. His *De regimine principum* and *Speculum virtutum* both disregard

²⁹⁶ John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 130^{va}.

²⁹⁷ Apart from Gregory of Rimini and his consorts, see, e.g., Roger Marston († 1303), *Quaestiones disputatae* 2.2, pp. 174–200: humans cannot acquire *rectitudo voluntatis* without grace; neither can they prepare themselves *ad gratiam gratum facientem* by natural means (ad 11, p. 195).

the religious dimension of morality. In accordance with Aristotle, Engelbert conceives of the virtues as habits for which humans have a natural aptitude and which they realize through assiduous practice; he never mentions grace and charity in this context. The virtues appear as instruments which enable man to lead a civilized life in earthly society, not as a preparation for the hereafter but as an end in itself. Discussing the end of the virtues in the final chapters of the *Speculum*, Engelbert explains that the cardinal virtues lead to “beatitude”, human happiness, and the highest good—that is: to natural self-sufficiency. Only by divine virtues can humans achieve a perfect remedy against all evil and a fulfilment of all their needs, admits Engelbert; however, the science of ethics teaches the good from a purely human perspective, since Aristotle is merely concerned with happiness as far as it lies in human reach.²⁹⁸ This last observation is correct in itself, although one might ask why, then, Engelbert should have adopted a strictly Aristotelian perspective in a moral treatise addressed at a general Christian audience.

Political Virtues

In the ancient ethical systems with which medieval thinkers were familiar (notably Roman Stoicism and Aristotelian ethics), the cardinal and other virtues primarily relate to social and political life. The medieval history of the cardinal virtues partly consists in their depoliticization: next to, or even instead of, attitudes to be taken in public life, the virtues became instruments of salvation for individual believers. Still, the cardinal virtues often carry a political connotation in late medieval moral thought and are frequently called “political” or “civil” virtues.²⁹⁹ Some political treatises of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are chiefly devoted to the cardinal virtues, while other texts recommend them as the prime qualities of statesmen.³⁰⁰ And although the scholastics agree that Aristotle discusses the virtues of the human individual in his *Ethics* and the virtues of the citizen in his *Politics*, they nevertheless believe that even the *Ethics* centres around the virtues in as much as they belong to civil life.³⁰¹

²⁹⁸ Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum* 12.13 and 12.19, pp. 439–440, 450–452.

²⁹⁹ See Bejczy, “The Concept of Political Virtue”, on which this section largely depends.

³⁰⁰ See, e.g., Walter of Milemete, *De nobilitatibus, sapientiis, et prudentiis regum* 15, pp. 51–53 (kings); Francis Petrarch, *Letters of Old Age* 4.1, pp. 119–124 (military commanders).

³⁰¹ See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.161.1 ad 5, *Opera omnia* 10: 293; Aristotle discusses the virtues “secundum quod ordinantur ad vitam civilem”; Roger

In the late twelfth century the masters around Peter the Chanter introduced the term *virtutes politicae* in moral theology and used it in three different senses. First, the term stood for naturally acquired virtues. Second, it referred to the virtues of political life, in accordance with the view that the naturally acquired virtues consist in a permanent resolution to act in the interests of the community. Third, the phrase could be used as an alternative name for the cardinal virtues. This triple use of the term continued in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Although some scholastics (William of Auxerre, Hugh of Saint Cher, Albert the Great) and a considerable number of pastoral and didactic authors (an unknown abbreviator of William Peraldus, Stephen of Bourbon, Servasanto of Faenza, Giovanni Balbi, William Durand, Raymond Lull, Christian of Lilienfeld) use the expressions “political virtues” and “cardinal virtues” as synonyms,³⁰² the majority of them refer to the salvific function of these virtues in combination with grace—according to Peraldus, the four virtues have a preeminent position with regard to the other virtues by making the soul do the arduous works which result in salvation³⁰³—and to their survival in heaven,³⁰⁴ even though they might have agreed with Henry of Ghent that the virtues are no longer political when applied to the contemplative life.³⁰⁵ Calling the cardinal virtues “political” does therefore not necessarily imply a restriction of the quartet to the political atmosphere.

Bacon, *Moralis philosophia* 1 Proem., pp. 5–6; Bonaventure, *Hexaemeron* 1.2.1 (ed. Delorme), p. 73.

³⁰² See William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 3.19, 3.20.3, and 3.40.2, 3: 385–386, 395, 770 (“political virtues” may refer to consuetudinal as well as to the cardinal virtues); Hugh of Saint Cher, *In Sententias* III.33, MS Padua, BU 853, f. 105^{va}; Albert the Great, *Ethica* 1.9.1, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 7: 140; id. *Commentarii in III Sententiarum* 34.1, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 28: 619; *De uirtutibus cardinalibus et moralibus*, MS Trier, SB 535, f. 4^r; Stephen of Bourbon, *De septem donis* 5.7, MS Paris, BnF lat. 15970, f. 546^{ra}; Servasanto of Faenza, *De exemplis naturalibus* 3.18, MS Vienna, ÖNB 1589, f. 48^{va}; id., *Liber de uirtutibus et uitiis* 5.1, MS Florence, BNC Conv. soppr. E.VI.1046, f. 54^{rb}; Giovanni Balbi, *Catholicon*, lemma *Virtus*, f. 305^{rb}: “Uirtutes autem cardinales siue politice sunt quattuor, scilicet prudentia, fortitudo, iustitia, temperantia”; William Durand, *Rationale diuinorum officiorum* 3.17.8, CCCM 140: 221; Raymund Lull, *Investigatio mixtionum* 5, CCCM 79: 442; Christian of Lilienfeld, *Officia* 6, CCCM 19A: 36.

³⁰³ See William Peraldus, *Summa de uirtutibus* 3.1.1, p. 281b.

³⁰⁴ Exceptionally, Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.4, f. 273^{ra}, claims that only prudence and justice survive in heaven. Fortitude and temperance perish together with the sensitive appetites which they check, even if they may be *miraculose* restored in the afterlife.

³⁰⁵ See Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariam* 46.2, 2: ff. 20^v–21^r: “subtractus a uita politica ad contemplativam, morales siue politicas uirtutes habere non dicitur”.

Such a restriction is nevertheless suggested by those theologians and pastoral authors who explain that the term *virtutes politicae* counts among the designations of the cardinal virtues since one function of these virtues—their principal function according to some—is to create good relations in social, civil, or political life.³⁰⁶ As Godfrey of Fontaines observes, the acquired political virtues, which regulate the relations of humans to others and to themselves, make man into the *civile animal* of which Aristotle speaks.³⁰⁷ Many authors repeat after Alan of Lille that the term “political” derives from the Greek *polis* in the sense of *civitas* or community as well as from its alleged homonym meaning “multitude,” which refers either to the large numbers of people who compose civil society or to the many acts from which the virtues arise as habits.³⁰⁸

In the course of the thirteenth century, the political significance of the cardinal virtues was further specified. According to William of Auvergne, virtues exist either as attitudes of specific social groups, in which case they should be called “monastic,” or as qualities in dealing with society at large. The latter sort of qualities are “economic” if concerned with serving other human beings or “political, royal, or civil” if concerned with commanding them.³⁰⁹ William’s division has its roots in the threefold division of ethics into *ethica monastica*, *economica*, and *politica* which became current in the thirteenth century.³¹⁰ In accordance with this division, moral authors from about 1250 distinguish “monastic,” “economic,” and “political” virtues as pertaining to individuals, to households, and to the state

³⁰⁶ See, e.g., Thomas of Chobham, *Summa de arte praedicandi* 6.4, CCCM 82: 200; Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius* 208, p. 620; Guido Faba, *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* 2.1, p. 128; Robert Kilwardby, *In librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 25, p. 87; Albert the Great, *Commentarii in III Sententiarum* 33.2, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 28: 610 (repeated by Simon Hinton, *Summa iuniorum*, p. 301, with an added reference to Macrobius); id., *De bono* 1.6.2, p. 80; Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium* 5.16 and 5.33, pp. 165, 167, 179–180 (repeated by Jean Rigaud, *Compendium* 5.35, MS Paris, BnF lat. 3150, f. 67^{ra}); Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.33 dub. 5, *Opera* 3: 730; Thomas of Strasbourg, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.33.2, 2 f. 48^{vb}; Pseudo-Bonaventure, *De quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus*, p. 234a. Kempshall, *The Common Good*, 347–360, observes a tendency among scholastic authors to associate the moral and the theological virtues with temporal and spiritual power, respectively.

³⁰⁷ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* 14.1.1–2, pp. 303–305; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.61.5, *Opera* 6: 398.

³⁰⁸ For this last explanation, see *Summa virtutum de remediis anime* 1, p. 53; Odo Rigaldi, cited in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 178 n. 2.

³⁰⁹ William of Auvergne, *De virtutibus* 12, p. 162a.

³¹⁰ See Wieland, *Ethica*, 94–95; for 12th-century antecedents. see Nederman, “Aristotelianism and the Origins of Political Science”, esp. 184–187.

community, respectively.³¹¹ Thomas Aquinas applies the distinction to justice and fortitude but most notably to prudence, observing that *prudentia politica* (a term which also appears in Robert Grosseteste's translation of Aristotle's *Ethics*) belongs to princes and kings rather than to their subjects, as it guides the princely exercise of justice and the other moral virtues.³¹² Aquinas's threefold division of prudence became a common feature in moral theology as well as in commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics*;³¹³ also, the "political" notion of fortitude and justice receives attention in these commentaries.³¹⁴ However, Aquinas repeatedly points out that the expression *prudentia politica* should better be reserved for the attitude of subjects who wisely obey their rulers (in accordance with Aristotle's apparent use of the term) whereas the prudence of the rulers themselves, connected with the exercise of government, should rather be called *prudentia regnativa* (a term adopted from Grosseteste's translation of Pseudo-Andronicus of Rhodes, *De passionibus*; in Grosseteste's translation of the *Ethics*, the prudence specific to rulers is called *prudentia architectonica*).³¹⁵ Similar distinctions between the "administrative" prudence of rulers and the "political" prudence of their subjects appear in the work of theologians and other moral authors who depend on Aquinas.³¹⁶

³¹¹ See Van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne de la vertu*, 148, for the theory of Pseudo-Alexander of Hales, *Summa de virtutibus*, that these three classes of virtues can be subsumed under the "political virtues" of Macrobius.

³¹² See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.47.11–12 and 50.1 with ad 1, *Opera* 8: 359–360, 374.

³¹³ See Lambertini, "Individuelle und politische Klugheit", esp. 471–473, 477; id., "Political Prudence in Some Medieval Commentaries". For theology, see, e.g., Francis of Meyronnes, *In libros Sententiarum* III.33–37 q. 1.13, f. 173^{rb}; John Baconthorpe, *Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum* III.36.3, 2: 213–216. See also Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum* 12.3 and 12.4, pp. 421, 423.

³¹⁴ See, e.g., Albert the Great, *Super Ethica* 3.10 (209), p. 187 (*fortitudo politica* or *civilis*); John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 3 q. 23, ff. 61^{va}–61(bis)^{ra}: by political fortitude "ciues propter ea que principes possunt eis largiri vel inferre aggrediuntur potenter bella pericula" (f. 61^{vb}); *ibid.* 5 q. 2, f. 91^{rb}, distinguishing justice *pertinens ad dominum* (taking care of the public good) and *pertinens ad subiectum* (obedience of political authority); Albert of Saxony, distinguishing *iustitia domini* (taking measures on behalf of the subjects) and *iustitia subditi* (obedience to these measures; see Heidingsfelder, *Albert von Sachsen*, 105).

³¹⁵ See Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententias* III.33.3.1.4, 3: 1078; *Summa theologiae* II.II.48.1 and 50.1–2, *Opera* 8: 365–366, 374–375; Pseudo-Andronicus of Rhodes, *De passionibus*, trans. Robert Grosseteste, p. 240. Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea* 6.8 (recensio pura), p. 261.

³¹⁶ Richard of Mediavilla, *Super libros Sententiarum* III.33.2.3, 3: 381; Pseudo-Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum morale* 1.3.36, pp. 289, 309–310; Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 3.3.1, pp. 555–559 (see also Lambertini, "Tra etica e politica", 118–125); Henry

Giles of Rome moreover proposes the term *prudentia civilis* as an alternative for *prudentia politica* in its reduced sense of civic morality. Engelbert of Admont prefers to call the princely virtues of good government *virtutes administratoriae* or *virtutes regales*, while he calls the virtues enabling the subjects to live in peaceful harmony *virtutes politicae* or *virtutes civiles*.³¹⁷ As political qualities, then, the cardinal virtues centre in the late thirteenth century around the exercise as well as the acceptance of temporal power. They pertain to the princely efforts to establish a civil order in society on the one hand and to the efforts of the subjects to respect and maintain that order on the other.

Albert the Great is probably the scholastic master who most consistently interprets the cardinal virtues as political concepts. Not only in his commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics* does Albert affirm that the moral (notably the cardinal) virtues regulate the relations of citizens among each other,³¹⁸ but also in his commentary on the *Sententiae*. Explaining why the cardinal virtues are four in number, Albert argues that the *bonum statum civitatis* requires four habits on the part of the citizens: one which determines the rightness of their deeds, one which makes them act well toward others, one which checks the pleasures of the present life (notably the sense of touch), and one which governs the dangers impressed by others (notably during war). These habits are prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude; especially the last two are described in such a way as to fit Aristotle's definitions.³¹⁹ The remarkable

of Rimini, *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus* 1, f. 32^r; cf. Peter of Corveheda, *Sententia super librum Ethicorum* 6.9, MS Vatican City, BAV Urb. lat. 222, f. 263^{ra}, distinguishing *prudentia architectonica* or *legispositiva* (for princes) from *prudentia politica specialis* (for the executors of princely orders: *consules, baiuli, iudices*). Cf. also Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 6 q. 14, f. 131^{vb}: "secundum autem quod [sc. prudentia] reddit eum [sc. hominem] bonum preceptorem sibi ipsi et aliis, dicitur architectonica seu legis positiva uel regulativa; ut autem reddit eum bonum operatorem rerum communium ... dicitur politica". A different view in Radulphus Brito, *Questiones super Ethicam* 6 q. 145, p. 499: *prudentia politica* has two parts, *legis positiva* ("habet statuere legem propter bonum ciuium, vt melius simul uiuant") and *sententiatiua* ("applicat vniuersalem casum legis ad particularia agibilia vel facta").

³¹⁷ Engelbert of Admont, *De regimine principum* 2.8–3.1, pp. 52–53 (*virtutes administratoriae, regales*); 3.17 and 4.2, pp. 68–69, 128 (*virtutes politicae, civiles*). Engelbert's use of this terminology is not consistent throughout his work.

³¹⁸ See notably *Super Ethica* 10.12 (902), p. 756: the moral virtues are civil or political by nature, either in a strict sense (regulating the relations of citizens within the political community) or in a broad sense (regulating their relations in wartime, opposing one political community to another).

³¹⁹ See *Commentarii in III Sententiarum* 33.1, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 28: 606–607.

thing about this argument is that even when expounding the virtues in a theological context, Albert self-evidently takes his point of departure in political life. Only occasionally does he observe in his commentary on the *Sententiae* that the cardinal virtues have God as their end;³²⁰ other passages in the same work suggest that these virtues rather aim at the well-being of civil society.³²¹

Engelbert of Admont's *De regimine principum* concentrates even more exclusively on the political significance of the virtues. In Engelbert's view, politics aims at four different ends which are each served by one of the four virtues. Prudence, which provides the material needs of human life, makes the subjects live *commode*; fortitude, which combats dangers and enemies, makes them live *secure*; justice, which gives everyone his due, makes them live *iuste*; finally, thanks to temperance the subjects may live *honeste*.³²² Every possible responsibility on the part of rulers and their subjects is covered by the four virtues and their many species, which together constitute the field of political morality. Nowhere does Engelbert transcend the context of politics; thus, he interprets justice as attributing to everyone his due share in the material goods of the community (arguing that common property would involve constant strife and anarchy—a remarkable view for a Benedictine abbot), while as the highest instance of fortitude he does not adduce martyrdom, but death as a warrior on behalf of one's terrestrial fatherland.³²³

Engelbert's strictly secular approach is exceptional even among political writers in the Late Middle Ages. The majority of them consider virtuous life, including its religious aspects, as the goal of the political

³²⁰ See *ibid.* 26.1, p. 491: the theological virtues order our acts directly to God, the cardinal virtues "actus terminant in medio, et finem ponunt in Deo". At *ibid.* 33.4 and 34.1, pp. 612, 619, he alludes to the distinction *in finem/ad finem*. See also *ibid.* 23.2, p. 407; *Commentarii in II Sententiarum* 27, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 27: 478; and *Summa theologiae* 2.16.103.2, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 33: 263, for the view that while the theological virtues lead directly *in finem*, the political or cardinal virtues (acquired according to the *Summa*) regard the *medium*. As Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 183, observes, *medium* may stand for "les moyens pour y atteindre" as well as for the middle ground between two vices.

³²¹ See *Commentarii in III Sententiarum* 33.2, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 28: 609: "Alii autem, ut Philosophi, vocant eas cardinales, ideo quia sunt cardo revolutionis humanae vitae secundum statum civilem et honesti"; *ibid.*, p. 610: "Civiles autem dicuntur, secundum quod constituunt bonum statum unius cum alio in ordine civium: et haec eadem ratio est, quare dicuntur politicae, nisi quod unum est Graecum, et alterum Latinum"; cf. *De bono* 1.6.2, p. 80.

³²² Engelbert of Admont, *De regimine principum* 2.6, pp. 48–49.

³²³ *Ibid.* 4.2 and 6.4, pp. 128, 201.

community,³²⁴ notwithstanding the wide diffusion of tales about virtuous rulers of pagan antiquity—known, for instance, from the *Breviloquium de virtutibus* of John of Wales or the *Compendium morale de virtutibus* of Roger of Waltham († 1332/41), an educational mirror for young nobles.³²⁵ Giles of Rome, for instance, explains at the beginning of *De regimine principum* that the prince must seek his happiness in the love of God and use his power in order to imply the divine will. What God wants princes above all to do is to wield a just and holy government based on prudence and law. The prince must therefore exercise his power in accordance with prudence and directed by charity (*imperatus a charitate*). Moreover, Giles insists that princes must set virtuous examples of almost superhuman stature to their subjects, something for which they need the aid of grace.³²⁶ In Giles's conception, then, the virtues of government exceed the limits of Aristotelian philosophy and require charity and grace in order to be perfectly fulfilled.

Other political treatises on the virtues develop similar perspectives. Henry of Rimini's views seem more secularized at first sight than Giles's. In the prologue of his *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus* Henry declares that human beings are citizens of the terrestrial as well as the celestial city. Both kinds of citizenship require different virtues: the divine or theological virtues pertain to our celestial destination, while the human or cardinal virtues regulate civil life.³²⁷ Yet the first princely duty which Henry derives from prudence is to please God *qui est finis omnium regencium*; hence, the prince must build churches and hospitals, regularly go to mass, assist the poor, and so on.³²⁸ Also, Henry designates martyrdom as the foremost example of fortitude,³²⁹ while his work overflows with moral tales from classical as well as biblical sources; some chapters, such as those listing fifteen *remedia afflictorum* in a discussion of patience (a

³²⁴ But see Kempshall, *The Common Good*, 347–360: some authors (Remigio dei Girolami, Marsilius of Padua, William of Ockham) limit the role of temporal power to providing the *utile* (material security) rather than the *bonum*, thereby nearly excluding politics from the realm of ethics.

³²⁵ See Bloomfield 5289 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 5289. I used MS Cambridge, UL II.1.3.

³²⁶ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 1.1.2 and 1.2.33, pp. 39, 150; see also Kempshall, *The Common Good*, 151–152, 156.

³²⁷ See Henry of Rimini, *Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus* Prol., f. 11^v: “iiii virtutes anime perficiunt solum in vita ciuili vnde ad constructuram vite spiritualis non sufficiunt”.

³²⁸ *Ibid.* 1, f. 31^r.

³²⁹ *Ibid.* 3, f. 72^v.

subspecies of fortitude), have an outspokenly devotional aspect.³³⁰ Similar in character is Borromeo of Bologna's *Liber de quattuor virtutibus*. Many examples in the work concern princes of antiquity whose deeds are noteworthy in spite of their lack of faith, as Borromeo claims.³³¹ Yet Borromeo also warns that the virtue of religion consists in adoration of the true God in accordance with the three theological virtues, and that the prudence of the children of this world (Luke 16:8) is no virtue.³³² Moreover, in the epilogue he characterizes the perfection of the active life of the prince and his subjects, achieved by the cardinal virtues, as a preparation for the contemplative life.³³³ Finally, Michael of Prague's *De regimine principum* is written from an overtly religious perspective. Rather than giving advice about practical matters, Michael intends to detract Christian rulers from sin and accordingly puts greater trust in the authority of the saints than in the arguments of philosophers. The Christian prince should take an example in God, who governs the universe with wisdom, clemency, justice, and potency. These four exemplary virtues (adopted by Michael from Bonaventure's *Breviloquium*) should condition the observation of the cardinal virtues in secular government, by which temporal welfare as well as salvation are promoted.³³⁴

If the use of exempla from antiquity in political treatises suggests that non-Christians may govern in accordance with the cardinal virtues, the observations of Giles of Rome, Henry of Rimini, and Borromeo of Bologna imply that truly virtuous rule is only possible under Christian rulers. Statements to a similar effect occur in moral philosophy and theology. Roland of Cremona, for instance, repels the notion of simple-minded people that politicians who never listen to sermons and are unconcerned with divine matters may be capable and virtuous rulers.

³³⁰ Ibid., ff. 87^v–100^r.

³³¹ See the title of Borromeo of Bologna, *Liber de quattuor virtutibus* 1.13, MS Milan, BN Braidense AD.IX.42, f. 7^v: *Quod principes moderni debent attendere ad opera antiquorum principum eciam paganorum*. Luna, "Un nuovo documento", 241, omits the phrase *eciam paganorum* from her transcription. Borromeo argues in the chapter that Christian rulers should be ashamed of behaving less virtuously than pagan princes.

³³² See ibid. 1.20 and 2.2, ff. 13^r, 22^r.

³³³ Ibid. epil., f. 42^r: "Sed oportet principem esse ordinem dictas virtutes ad perfectionem vite actiue in se et in ciuibus ut de perfeccione actiue ad perfeccionem contemplatiue perueniat secundum quod ipsa perfeccio contemplatiua haberi potest ab homine in hac vita".

³³⁴ See Storey's introduction to Michael of Prague, *De regimine principum*, 61–67; Hohlstein, "Clemens princeps"; cf. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 7.7, *Opera* 5: 288–291. See also below, p. 278 n. 210.

In reality, such rulers are harmful according to Roland; indeed, all evil in society is caused by them.³³⁵ Other authors accentuate the political significance of charity. John of Salisbury already argued that biblical virtues have a marked effect in civic life.³³⁶ In a similar vein, Roger Bacon in his *Moralis philosophia* presents charity, accompanied by *concordia*, *pax*, and *iustitia*, as the chief virtue which orders the common good,³³⁷ while according to Robert Kilwardby, charity comprises the entire *ars recte vivendi* and therefore includes the political virtues.³³⁸ We have seen that according to some theologians, observing the political virtues leads to embracing religion and grace. What Roland of Cremona, Roger Bacon, and Robert Kilwardby defend is the reverse idea: religion and grace lead to political virtue. In either case, the natural and the supernatural dimensions of the virtues become intermingled.

The late medieval reception of Macrobius's commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis* likewise stimulated the connection of political virtues with the religious dimension of life. The fourfold classification of the cardinal virtues introduced by Macrobius involves a clear hierarchy: the political virtues represent a first stage of morality which those who advance further toward God will leave behind. A considerable number of late medieval theologians, political theorists, and pastoral authors accept this view. Robert Kilwardby, Bonaventure, and Giles of Rome agree that the political virtues pertain to moral goodness in its lowest degree.³³⁹ Roland of Cremona may have been the first to associate Macrobius's *virtutes politicae* with the acquired virtues, the *virtutes purgatoriae* with the salvific virtues infused by grace, and the *virtutes purgati animi* with the celestial virtues of the blessed.³⁴⁰ Bonaventure introduces a variant of Roland's idea, relating Macrobius's first three classes of virtue to the active life, the contemplative life, and the vision of light (similar views occur in

³³⁵ Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius* 237, pp. 678–679.

³³⁶ John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* 8.9 (ed. Webb) 2: 279–280.

³³⁷ Roger Bacon, *Moralis philosophia* 3 Proem., p. 45.

³³⁸ Robert Kilwardby, *In librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 27, p. 104.

³³⁹ See *ibid.* q. 31, p. 122: “status infimus est politicus qui consistit in usu virtuoso vitae communis sive civilis”; Bonaventure, *Hexaemeron* 1.3.24–25 (ed. Delorme), p. 97: “politicae proficiunt in purgatorias, purgatoriae proficiunt in eas quae sunt animae purgatae et hae ultimae solae faciunt beatos” (contradicting the view of Macrobius, *Commentarii* 1.8.12, p. 39, that the political virtues have a beatific effect, too); Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 1.2.32, p. 148: “Sunt autem huiusmodi virtutes minime inter virtutes alias”. For the influence of Macrobius's theory of the virtues in the 13th century, see also Van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne*, esp. 123–198.

³⁴⁰ See Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius* 242, pp. 687–688.

the work of some contemporary theologians);³⁴¹ to dealing with others, dealing with oneself, and conforming to God; and to the modification, the purgation, and the reformation of the self.³⁴² Accordingly, Bonaventure presents the three classes of virtue as progressive degrees of ascending to God, an idea accepted by Thomas Aquinas as well.³⁴³ Especially outside academic theology the idea circulated that sin is softened by the political and removed by the purgatorial virtues, while the virtues of the purged mind annihilate even the recollection of sin (Macrobius made similar statements bearing on the passions rather than sin);³⁴⁴ accordingly, the three sorts of virtues belong to the *incipientes*, the *proficientes*, and the *perfecti*, respectively.³⁴⁵ Like the Platonic scheme of the cardinal virtues, Macrobius's Neoplatonic classification of them was occasionally imposed on Aristotle's *Ethics* (again, the commentary of Eustratius of Nicea set a precedent in this respect).³⁴⁶ A number of early commentators identify Aristotle's consuetudinal and intellectual virtues with the

³⁴¹ See Robert Kilwardby, *In librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 31, pp. 122–124: *in via*, the active and the contemplative life are dominated by the political and the purgatorial virtues, respectively, while *in patria*, man enjoys the virtues of the purged mind; Pseudo-Alexander of Hales, *Summa de virtutibus*, cited in Van Lieshout, *La théorie plotinienne*, 145: the political virtues relate to the active life, the purgatorial virtues to the contemplative life *in fieri*, the virtues of the purged mind to the contemplative life *in facto*.

³⁴² See Bonaventure, *Hexaameron* 6.24 and 7.4, *Opera* 5: 363, 366; cf. *Hexaameron* 1.4.4 (ed. Delorme), pp. 99–100. See also Pseudo-Bonaventure, *Opusculum de quatuor virtutibus*, p. 509: “per virtutes cardinales, ut sunt politicae, homo ordinatur in operationibus suis quoad proximum suum; per virtutes, quae sunt purgatoriae, ordinatur ad seipsum: per virtutes purgati animi, ad Deum”.

³⁴³ Bonaventure, *Hexaameron* Princ. 1.33 (ed. Delorme), p. 16; id., *Sermo in festo omnium sanctorum* 2, *Opera* 9: 604; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.61.5, *Opera* 6: 398.

³⁴⁴ See Bartholomew of Recanato's glosses in *Moralium dogma*, p. 79; Guido Faba, *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* 2.1, p. 129; Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium* 5.16, p. 165; Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 1.2.33, pp. 148–149. Cf. Macrobius, *Commentarii* 1.8.11, p. 39.

³⁴⁵ See Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium* 5.33, p. 180 (repeated by Jean Rigaud, *Compendium* 5.35, MS Paris, BnF lat. 3150, f. 67^{ra}); Giovanni Balbi, *Catholicon*, lemma *Virtus*, f. 305^{va}; Francis of Meyrannes, *Liber de virtutibus* 5.8, MS Bruges, SB 226, f. 95^v (*in communibus, in intendentibus ad culmen perfectionis, in existentibus perfectis*); Robert Holcot, *Super Sapientiam* 108 (on 8:7), sig. r1^{rb} (*boni, meliores, beati and perfectissimi*, including Christ and Mary); Gauthier, “Un prologue inédit”, 55 (anonymous 14th-century prologue to the *Moralium dogma*). For a 12th-century antecedent, see *Florilegium morale Oxoniense*, p. 89 (*boni, meliores, optimi/perfecti*).

³⁴⁶ See Eustratius of Nicea, *In Ethicam nicomacheam* 1.17, in *The Greek Commentaries*, 176.

political and purgatorial virtues, respectively.³⁴⁷ Albert the Great derives three climbing degrees of virtue from Book 7 of the *Ethics* as well as from Plato's *Timaeus* and associates these with Macrobius's *virtutes purgantes, purgatoriae, and purgati animi*.³⁴⁸ In a similar vein, Giles of Rome infers a fourfold hierarchy of good people from Aristotle's Book 7 (*perseverantes, continentes, temperati, homines divini*). Connecting this hierarchy with the classification of Macrobius, he presents the *homines divini* as possessing the *virtutes exemplares* which Macrobius as well as most medieval authors locate in God's mind only.³⁴⁹ Thus while Macrobius's theory helped to accentuate the political function of the cardinal virtues, it also corroborated the idea that even political virtues serve religious ends, either directly or by assisting human beings to find the road to contemplation.

Conclusion

The recovery of Aristotle's *Ethics* in the thirteenth century put a double challenge to the scheme of the cardinal virtues as the prime constituents of Christian morality. First, Aristotle disregards the scheme of the four principal virtues introduced by his master Plato and known to the Middle Ages from Neoplatonic and Stoic sources. Theoretically, this could have led to the end of the cardinal virtues in medieval moral thought. Why hold to the ancient scheme of the four virtues if even the foremost ethical system of antiquity has no place for it? What happened, however, was that not only many theologians but also the leading commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* tried to reconcile the Aristotelian classification of the virtues with the scheme of the cardinal virtues which had become sanctified by tradition. Moreover, theologians and pastoral authors usually took the cardinal virtues together with faith, hope, and charity as the seven principal virtues of Christian religion, occasionally subsuming Aristotle's remaining moral virtues under them. Meanwhile, theologians

³⁴⁷ See Buffon, "Philosophers and Theologians on Happiness" 468–469. Guido Terreni, *Quodlibet* 1.15.1, ed. Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 2: 114*, extrapolates a similar identification from Eustratius's commentary.

³⁴⁸ Albert the Great, *Ethica* 7.1.1, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet) 7: 463–464; see also Müller, *Natürliche Moral*, 192–197.

³⁴⁹ Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 1.2.32, p. 146. Francis of Meyronnes, *Liber de virtutibus* 5.8, MS Bruges, SB 226, f. 95^v, likewise associates the exemplary virtues with Aristotle's heroic virtue and states that Christ and Mary possessed the exemplary virtues, like Adam in his state of innocence.

developed a full explanation of the cardinal virtues as the four principal elements of the human attempt to live a right life, combining the early medieval view of the virtues as the constituents of moral acts with the twelfth-century accentuation of moral psychology.

Second, the virtues appear in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as naturally acquirable qualities which guide the human being in the practical concerns of the present life. Given that the unity of religion and morality had already been broken in twelfth-century intellectual discourse, the intense exploration of the Aristotelian conception of virtue in late medieval thought might have led to the lasting disconnection of morality from the faith. Some developments actually point into this direction. Philosophers claimed the right to consider virtue from a purely philosophical viewpoint, irrespective of religious concerns. In theology, opposition arose to the existence of infused moral virtues, despite Peter Lombard's definition of virtue as a divine gift; moreover, some masters expressed reservations about the possibility of the acquired virtues becoming informed or directed by grace, while others emphasized that these virtues were not necessary for salvation and only pertained to civil life. Nevertheless, the majority of theologians, philosophers, and other moral authors affirmed that the acquired moral virtues had a religious significance, not only through the agency of grace but even on their own, as qualities deriving from the good inherent in the divinely created world and enabling humans to prepare themselves for accepting the gifts of God. Rather than separate virtue from religion, most late medieval moral authors tended to give even acquired virtue a place in their religious account of the human condition. Meanwhile, resistance against the concept of acquired virtue never ceased to exist and even intensified from the mid-fourteenth century, while religious interpretations of the virtues prevailed in pastoral literature.

The cardinal virtues, then, do not normally stand in the Late Middle Ages for a civic lay morality which gradually emancipated from religious traditions of moral thought. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, consistently secularized discussions of the virtues remained rare; moreover, the most convincing examples are found in the work of the Benedictine abbot Engelbert of Admont rather than in the writings of any lay author. True enough, the cardinal virtues were frequently associated in late medieval moral thought with temporal concerns and civic behaviour, and even regularly depicted as the main ingredients of political morality. For some authors political morality stood to some extent apart from religion, so that in the domain of politics the cardinal virtues enjoyed a

relative independence (absolute in the case of Engelbert of Admont) from theology. But many authors argued or suggested that even in political life virtue was impossible without charity and the Christian faith, while according to many others the political virtues only represented a first stage on the road to contemplation. Christian tradition, which viewed the active life in religious terms, and the Neoplatonic model of Macrobius, to whom the Middle Ages owed the concept of political virtue in the first place, encouraged medieval authors to establish a connection between the political and the religious aspects of the virtues and thus to take a step beyond the Aristotelian system.

Late medieval moral thought is perhaps best viewed as a continuous series of intrinsically fallible attempts to reconcile the human and the divine dimension of goodness and virtue. Taking up the Aristotelian challenge, theologians recognized the acquisition of virtue as a human endeavour without abandoning their basic conviction that virtue had its prime origin and its ultimate end in God. A similar approach prevails in many commentaries on Aristotle's *Ethics*, while pastoral moral literature often displays a reconciling tendency, too. Despite their evaluating the cardinal virtues from a religious perspective, many pastoral authors adduced examples and quotations from acknowledged ancient sources—up to the thirteenth century, most religious authors rather silenced classical sources if using them at all—thereby suggesting that the virtues were held in esteem even before the days of Christendom. Judged from a religious perspective, the authors undermined their message by pointing to the pre-Christian past of the cardinal virtues: if the pagans observed them, the four virtues were apparently not specific to Christian morality. But pastoral authors seem rather to have thought that the importance of the cardinal virtues was enhanced by the fact that they were already honoured in antiquity. Their writings implicitly confirm the view of contemporary theologians that divine grace directed the morality even of unbelievers who embraced the cardinal virtues.

As a consequence of its reconciling tendencies, late medieval moral thought often makes an ambiguous impression. A consistent virtue ethic was only found at its extreme left, in radical Aristotelianism, and at its extreme right, in rigorist fideism. Both currents pulled philosophical ethics and moral theology apart and ignored either the divine or the human dimension of virtue. Both currents had their adherents, but neither gained the upper hand during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The attempts of the majority of theologians and philosophers in this period to recognize naturally acquired virtues while saving their

religious significance may be valued as a prolonged effect of twelfth-century humanism.³⁵⁰ The circumstance that the cardinal virtues usually dwelled between earth and heaven may actually explain their lasting success in medieval moral thought. Relating to the secular as well as the spiritual concerns of man, they indeed formed the hinge around which human morality revolved.

³⁵⁰ Southern, "Medieval Humanism", defines medieval humanism (as it arose in the 12th century) as displaying a sense of the dignity of human nature and of nature itself, and a sense that the order of the universe is understandable to human reason—not to the exclusion of God, but enabling human "collaboration with God" (p. 40). Accordingly, Otten, *From Paradise to Paradigm*, views medieval humanism as an all-embracing discourse in which the human and the divine interact on equal terms.

CHAPTER FOUR

FALLEN MAN IN SEARCH OF VIRTUE

Virtue and the Fall

The first three chapters of this study have examined in detail the position and significance of the cardinal virtues in the moral thought of Western Christendom from the late fourth to the late fourteenth century. The universal acceptance of the classical scheme in the Middle Ages and its integration into widely diverse genres of moral literature suggest that ancient and medieval conceptions of virtue were, up to a point at least, compatible—especially from the twelfth century onward, with commentators of classical moral philosophy emphasizing the agreement between ancient and Christian moral thought, theologians and philosophers labouring to give naturally acquired virtues a place in the framework of Christian morality, and even pastoral writers often taking a welcoming attitude to classical sources and ideas.

Yet despite these manifest affinities, the anthropology underlying medieval moral thought is different from what we find in the ethical systems of antiquity. Essential to the medieval idea of virtue and morality is the notion of fallen human nature. For medieval authors, virtue is not just a realization of the potential goodness innate to the human soul, as most classical philosophers would say, but a victory over the defects which attach to human nature since the Fall. Due to the absence of the notion of fallen human nature in antiquity, classical and medieval conceptions of virtue do not normally centre around the same moral subject. The aim of the present chapter is to explore the consequences of this different anthropology for medieval moral thought—not so much on the level of formal doctrine as with regard to some of the basic assumptions which guided medieval authors in their reflections on the virtues.

The idea that the account of the Fall gives medieval moral thought a character of its own is not new. Several scholars have notably pointed out that in the Christian perception, heavily determined by Augustine, virtue is attained in a perpetual struggle of the human individual with his lower fears and desires. As a consequence of fallen human nature, virtue

is easily lost through sin and only regained at great cost. In Aristotle's view, by contrast, virtues are gradually acquired at a youthful age and later form steadfast habits which provide internal harmony and enable human individuals to act easily and with pleasure in accordance with their moral insights. Alasdair MacIntyre even believes that Thomas Aquinas shows Aristotle's account of human nature to be defective by insisting that the virtues continually fall victim to vice, the only remedy being divine grace.¹ It is clear from the previous chapter, however, that thirteenth-century authors actually managed to reconcile Aristotelian and Christian notions on this point by supposing that the virtues could continually lose and recuperate their gratuitous state while remaining intact as acquired habits.

Even so, there can be no doubt that virtue is intimately connected in medieval moral thought with the suppression of sin. Exploring this connection in relation to the cardinal virtues in particular is my aim in the first half of this chapter. To what extent were the four virtues assigned the function of combating sin or, more specifically, healing the principal vices (capital or other)? My analysis will show that two different ways of constructing the opposition between the virtues and the vices coexisted in medieval moral thought, which each involve a particular approach to the moral subject. In the second half of the chapter I will explore some further consequences of the account of the Fall for medieval moral thought. I will argue that the Christian conception of the moral subject set a number of specific limits to the medieval receptivity to Aristotelian virtue theory in particular.

The Cardinal Virtues and the Vices

"The life of man upon earth is a warfare", as the Book of Job warns us (7:1). Medieval moral authors generally associate the phrase with the struggle of the human individual against his proneness to evil.² Many theologians accordingly teach that virtue is wrought in inner strife,³ while

¹ MacIntyre, *Whose Justice?*, 205.

² See, e.g., *De origine virtutum et vitiorum*, p. 144; John Bromyard, *Summa predicantium*, lemma *Virtus*, art. 2.

³ See, e.g., Hugh of Saint Victor, *De archa Noe* 1.5, CCCM 176: 31: "uirtutes non otio et securitate, sed iugi sudore et contritione spiritus acquiramus"; Peter Abelard, *Ethica* 1.2 and 1.7, CCCM 190: 2, 7–8; id., *Collationes*, pp. 128–130; id., *Expositio in Hexaemeron* (on Gen. 2:17), p. 175; *Sententie Parisienses*, pp. 54–55. Scholastic theologians disagree as to whether virtue requires inner strife; see Graf, *De subiecto psychico* 2: 265–266.

representations of a moral warfare in the form of a battle between the virtues and vices abound in medieval art and literature. What position do the four cardinal virtues occupy in medieval reflections on, and representations of, the human war against vice?

The Capital Vices and the Virtues

The growing attention for the cardinal and other virtues in later medieval moral thought kept pace with an expanding interest in the moral defects of man. The scheme of the capital vices, which originated as an octad in ancient monasticism and was reduced to a heptad by Gregory the Great, actually found a much wider diffusion in pastoral and popularizing literature than any set of virtues.

Numerous medieval moral treatises discuss the capital vices together with a set of virtues (actually, the connection between the sections on the virtues and on the vices is often rather loose),⁴ but not always with the cardinal quartet. The idea that the cardinal virtues repel all sin was commonplace from an early date,⁵ but other virtues had a similar function. The *Psychomachia* of Prudentius, written in 405, and the immensely popular *De conflictu vitiorum et virtutum* of Ambrosius Autpertus (†784) stage a battle and a dispute, respectively, between the capital and other vices and a number of contrasting virtues usually called “contrary” or “remedial” in scholarship; the cardinal virtues do not figure among them.⁶

⁴ As a result, sections on the virtues and vices from single works sometimes figure as separate treatises in modern catalogues. See, e.g., Bloomfield 4056 and 5857 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4056 and 5857 (edited in Bejczy and Verweij, “An Early Medieval Treatise”); Bloomfield 0321 and 2671 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 0321 and 2671 (Guido Faba, *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus*); Bloomfield 1482 and 5480 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1482 and 5480 (edited in Bejczy and Newhauser, “Two Newly Discovered Abbreviations”); Bloomfield 2126 and 2221 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2126 and 2221. I am still unsure whether *De quatuor principalibus virtutibus*, which I edited as a separate treatise from MS Cambridge, St. John’s E.8 (111), forms a unity with the preceding text in the MS titled *De octo criminalibus vitiis* (ff. 59^r–62^v); see Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 0015, 4223a.

⁵ See above, pp. 29 (Claudian Mamertus), 30 (Julian Pomerius), 38 (Halitgar of Cambrai, Hrabanus Maurus), 59 (Remigius of Auxerre).

⁶ For the influence of these works on medieval literature and art, see Katzenelenbogen, *Allegories of the Virtues and Vices*, esp. 1–26, 75–81; Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues*, 161–163; Schmidt, “*I conflictus*”, esp. 162–163; Quinto, “The *Conflictus vitiorum et virtutum*”. For the concept of the remedial virtues, see Wenzel’s introduction to *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, p. 8. Newhauser, “Preaching the Contrary Virtues”, introduces the alternative term “contrary virtues”. Lists of remedial

Nevertheless, Bede refers to the cardinal virtues as the four leaders of the *turma virtutum* which besieges the vices;⁷ Alcuin does likewise and opposes the four virtues to the eight capital vices in particular, as also happens in two other Carolingian texts.⁸ Although similar examples are known from the twelfth century,⁹ the device of contrasting the vices with the cardinal virtues alone remained exceptional in medieval moral writing. Not even Alan of Lille's *De virtutibus et de vitiis*, which classifies all virtues under the cardinal quartet and all vices under the seven deadly sins, presents the four virtues as the chief adversaries of the vices. The treatise ends with an exposition of the gifts of the Holy Ghost which (as in several other twelfth-century writings) explicitly figure as the capital vices' antidotes.¹⁰ Only those later compositions which contrast Alan's definitions and subdivisions of the four virtues (which were copied in an impressive number of late medieval texts)¹¹ with the capital vices

or contrary virtues may vary from author to author. John of Aragon, *Tractatus brevis*, MS Vienna, ÖNB 4745, f. 181^v, exceptionally subsumes the remedial under the cardinal virtues: "que quedam virtutes septem ad quatuor reducuntur que cardinales vocantur".

⁷ Bede, *In primam partem Samuhelis* 2 (on 4:2–3), CCSL 119: 41.

⁸ See Alcuin, *De vitiis et virtutibus* 34, PL 101: 637A; Hrabanus Maurus, *De ecclesiastica disciplina* 3, PL 112: 1240B–C; Bejczy and Verweij, "An Early Medieval Treatise".

⁹ See *Accessus ad auctores* (12th century), p. 19 (discussing the *Psychomachia*, the author points out that the four principal virtues are fortitude, justice, temperance, and prudence: "Quibus virtutibus unaquaeque anima fidelis spirituali professione munita contra omnes spirituales nequicias pugnatura divina gratia prevalere poterit"); Irimbert of Admont, *In librum Iudicum* 1 (on 5:14–15) and 2 (on 20:1–2, 20:17, and 21:12), pp. 211–212, 415, 422, 429; Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermones de oneribus* 6, PL 195: 385A–B; Peter of Celle, *De panibus* 13, PL 202: 988D–989A.

¹⁰ Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et vitiis* 3.1, p. 89. Similarly, the *Summa Breves dies* and Anders Sunesen's *Hexaameron*, likewise written in Peter the Chanter's environment, oppose the gifts to the capital vices despite their attention for the seven principal virtues. See *Summa Breves dies*, MS Oxford, Bodleian Laud. misc. 80, f. 197^{va}: "His breuiter prelibatis uidendum est qualiter occurrendum sit in spiritualibus moribus contra quos datur nobis a Deo spiritus septiformis, hoc est vii dona Spiritus sancti ... Hec autem dantur homini ad septem petitiones que continentur in oratione dominica et opponuntur contra vii uitia capitalia"; Anders Sunesen, *Hexaameron* 7, ll. 4267–249, pp. 212–218 (also involving the petitions of the Lord's Prayer and the beatitudes). Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues*, 118, discusses an early example of a text juxtaposing the vices to the gifts, written ca. 812. Hugh of Saint Victor's *De quinque septenis* contrasts the capital vices with the petitions, the gifts, the macarisms (the mental preparations for the beatitudes: poorness of spirit, meekness etc., identified by Hugh as the *septem virtutes*), and the beatitudes themselves. See also id., *De sacramentis* 2.13.2, PL 176: 526D–527A on the macarisms as *antidota* or *sanitates* opposed to the vices.

¹¹ See, apart from the texts mentioned in the next note: [Exegetical compendium], MS Oxford, Bodleian Rawl. C 504, ff. 50^r–58^v (see below, n. 36); Pseudo-Celestinus V, *Opus-*

while ignoring his observations on the gifts can be said to give the cardinal quartet a prominent position in the battle against sin.¹² The most important of those texts is the largely diffused *Summa poenitentiae* of the Dominican friar Paulus Hungarus (1219/21), which ends with chapters on the principal vices, the cardinal virtues (copied from Alan), and confession.¹³ Also, the cardinal virtues appear as the vices' counterparts in the *Speculum doctrinale* of Vincent of Beauvais¹⁴ as well as in a few minor, anonymous texts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.¹⁵

Medieval moral authors more often contrast the capital vices with the theological and cardinal virtues taken together. Halitgar of Cambrai devoted the first book of his penitential to the eight capital vices and

cula de virtutibus et vitiis 1.5, pp. 787–788; Pseudo-Bonaventure, *De quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus*, f. 235^{ra-rb}; Bloomfield 4308 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4308, 4453b. For Albertanus of Brescia, see above, p. 146 n. 38.

¹² See Bloomfield 4454, 6041, 6485 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4454, 6041, 6485 (Alan's definitions of the virtues and vices), discussed in Quinto, "Stephen Langton: Theology and Literature", 314–322; [Treatise on the capital vices and cardinal virtues], MS Oxford, Bodleian, Greaves 53, ff. 138^r–169^v (13th century; Bloomfield 4432 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4432), combining Pseudo-Grosseteste, *Summa de vitiis* (Bloomfield 5905 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 5905), with Alan's definitions of the virtues; *Tractatus de virtutibus et vitiis*, MS Stuttgart, WLB HB.III.27, ff. 137^{rb}–150^{vb} (ca. 1300; Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4453b), combining Alan's section on the virtues with a text on the eight capital vices (Bloomfield 2221) which is usually complemented with Bloomfield 2126; *De vitiis et virtutibus*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 4100, ff. 42^r–45^v (15th century; Bloomfield 3973 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 3973), combining a discussion of the capital vices with Alan's definitions of the virtues.

¹³ See Paulus Hungarus, *Summa poenitentiae*, pp. 210–214. Paulus's definition of fortitude ("immobilis inter adversa animi labor et periculorum susceptio", p. 213) is taken from Conrad of Hirsau, *De fructibus carnis et spiritus* 14, PL 176: 1003B; moreover, *ratio* is missing under prudence and *largitas* under temperance.

¹⁴ Book 4 of Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum doctrinale*, is mainly devoted to the virtues and vices. The part on the virtues comprises ch. 6 to 105; ch. 18 to 105 discuss the cardinal virtues and their species. The theological virtues are absent.

¹⁵ See *De uiciis et uirtutibus*, MS London, BL Add. 18334, ff. 109^{ra}–128^{vb} (ca. 1300; Bloomfield 1617 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1617): anthology, mainly of classical authors; [Graphic scheme of the virtues and vices], MS Erfurt, SB CA 2^o 173, f. 18^r (14th century; Bloomfield 4619 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4619): the virtues and vices appear in concentric circles; the innermost circles confront the four cardinal virtues with *superbia*; the other virtues and vices emanate from the cardinal virtues and *superbia*, respectively; *Collatio de septem vitiis et quatuor virtutibus*, MS Oxford, Magdalen 109, ff. 61^{vb}–63^{ra} (ca. 1400; Bloomfield 4010 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4010): the vices are opposed to the remedial virtues, then the cardinal virtues are introduced as the vices' antidotes, following Alcuin, *De virtutibus et vitiis* 35. See also above, n. 4 (end), for another possible example. For a minor 15th-century example, see Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 6480a.

their remedies (contrary virtues and admonitions), the second to the seven virtues—an arrangement which suggests that he did not actually think of the seven virtues as the chief opponents of the vices. From the twelfth century, however, an increasing number of texts and miniatures specifically contrast the seven capital vices and their subspecies with the seven principal virtues from which all other virtues derive. The tradition set in by the late 1130s, when “Conrad of Hirsau” composed *De fructibus carnis et spiritus* and possibly the *Speculum virginum* as well.¹⁶ Both works present a symmetrical pair of trees of the vices and virtues. *Superbia* and *humilitas* lay at the roots of the respective trees, which each have seven main branches representing the principal vices and virtues; the twigs or leaves on each branch stand for their subspecies. The trees were much more often copied in the Middle Ages than scholars have thus far acknowledged,¹⁷ while the accompanying definitions were frequently transmitted on their own.¹⁸ A well-known instance of their influence is found in the *Hortus deliciarum*, composed between 1178 and 1191 in the Alsatian abbey of Hohenbourg under the direction of Abbess Herrad of Landsberg. The work includes a cycle of miniatures depicting a *psychomachia* in the style of Prudentius. However, under Conrad’s influence the remedial virtues are replaced with the theological and cardinal virtues as the principal adversaries of the vices.¹⁹

Although some scholars believe that confronting the seven capital vices with the seven principal virtues became the typical stratagem of moral literature from the late twelfth century,²⁰ later medieval treatises

¹⁶ For the authorship of, and relation between these works, see Seyfahrt’s introduction to *Speculum virginum*, CCCM 5, and Mews, “Virginité, Théologie, and Pédagogie”; for the trees, see Newhauser, *The Treatise*, 160–161.

¹⁷ See Bloomfield 2993, 3909, 5942, 5949 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 0475a, 1164, 2451a, 2993, 3909, 5942 5949; *New Haven, Beinecke MS 416 (ca. 1300; see <http://beinecke.library.yale.edu/speculum/>).

¹⁸ Definitions of *De fructibus*: see Bloomfield 1644 (misidentified by Diem, “Virtues and Vices in Early Texts”, 211 n. 79), 2084, 2248, 2449, 2681, 2682 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1644, 2084, 2258, 2449, 2449b, 2682. Definitions of the *Speculum virginum*: see Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2449a, discussed by Quinto, *Doctor nominatissimus*, 71–75.

¹⁹ The cycle appeared on ff. 199^v–204^r of the original MS burnt in 1871. See the reproductions in Herrad of Hohenbourg, *Hortus deliciarum* 2, nos. 258–285, and Green, “Catalogue of Miniatures”, 190–196. Griffiths, “Herrad of Hohenbourg”, esp. 233–234, affirms that the *psychomachia* in the *Hortus* was influenced by *De fructibus* rather than the *Speculum virginum*.

²⁰ See Newhauser, *The Treatise*, 118–119, 122–124; Casagrande and Vecchio, *Histoire des péchés capitaux*, 294–296, 303.

exclusively concentrating on both septenaries are actually quite rare. Good specimens are the *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* of Guido Faba, a moral florilegium sometimes attributed to Conrad of Halberstadt († after 1355), and Jordan of Quedlinburg's *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum*,²¹ but treatises elaborating upon the seven virtues and seven vices usually involve other schemes as well. Thus, the *Summa de virtutibus* of William Peraldus treats the gifts and the beatitudes in addition to the seven virtues, while his *Summa de vitiis* discusses eight vices, adding the sins of the tongue to Gregory's heptad. Following this example, Raymond Lull's *De virtutibus et peccatis* (1313) opposes eight virtues (the theological and cardinal virtues plus *sapientia*) to eight deadly sins (the capital vices plus *mendacium*, Lull's version of the sins of the tongue introduced by Peraldus);²² in his *De homine* the seven principal virtues together destroy the seven deadly sins plus *infidelitas*.²³ Other treatises display much freer arrangements. The Franciscan friar Servasanto of Faenza is the author of *De exemplis naturalibus*, a tripartite work for preachers which subsequently discusses the articles of the faith, the sacraments, and the virtues and vices.²⁴ In an introductory chapter on the last subject, Servasanto contrasts the seven virtues with the seven vices, observing, however, that one virtue usually opposes several vices, and one vice several virtues;²⁵ at the end of the chapter, he apologizes for working out a mere numeric analogy between the two septenaries and invites the reader to propose suitable alternatives.²⁶ In the remainder of his exposition he

²¹ The florilegium (Bloomfield 2124 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2124; I used MS Paris, BnF lat. 3508) arranges citations from biblical, classical, patristic, and medieval sources in one part on the theological and cardinal virtues and another part on the capital vices. For Jordan, see Bejczy, "Jordan of Quedlinburg's *Tractatus*". A minor 15th-century example is [Treatise on the theological and cardinal virtues and the capital vices], MS Klosterneuburg 1115, ff. 130^r–146^r.

²² The first two books introduce the virtues and the vices, respectively; the third to fifth books discuss all possible pairs of two virtues, two vices, and one virtue plus one vice.

²³ See Raymond Lull, *De homine* 2.2.2, CCCM 112: 235–271.

²⁴ For a survey of chapters of *De exemplis naturalibus*, see Grabmann, "Der Liber de exemplis", 98–101; for MSS, see Bloomfield 1242 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1242, 1619a. For further details see Bejczy, "Vices Mirroring the Virtues".

²⁵ *De exemplis naturalibus* 3.20, MS Vienna, ÖNB 1589, f. 49^{ra}: "Contigit enim quod una uirtus pluribus peccatis opponitur, sicut largitas et auaritie et prodigalitati contrariatur, quod et in omnibus polliticis inuenitur, in quibus uirtus media uitiiis extremis opponitur secundum philosophum ... Sed hoc tantum dixi ut ex his non esse inconueniens propendatur si unum uitium pluribus uirtutibus opponatur". Servasanto obviously alludes to Aristotle's view of virtue as situated between a pair of vices.

²⁶ Ibid. (W) f. 49^{rb}, checked against Cambridge, UL li.2.20 (C): "Dixi ista per modum cuiusdam congruencie, que si lectori non placent, uiam magis congruam cogitet per

takes a different approach, opposing the seven virtues to a series of negative derivatives: faith, hope, and charity are contrasted with *infidelitas*, *desperatio*, and *invidia*; prudence with *imprudencia*; fortitude with *audacia*, *pusillanimitas*, and *impatencia*; temperance with *luxuria*, *gula*, and *avaritia*; and justice with *iniustitia*, *immesericordia*/*duritia*/*crudelitas*, *superbia*, *immansuetudo*/*ira*/*furor*, *guerra*, and *curiositas*. In his *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis*, an adaptation of the third book of *De exemplis naturalibus*, Servasanto restructured his material altogether, inserting large portions of the double summa of Peraldus which he apparently had come to appreciate in the meantime. The seven principal virtues determine the structure of the work while the capital and other vices follow in their wake, albeit rather unevenly. Thus, temperance alone is opposed to six deadly sins (*gula*, *luxuria*, *superbia*, *avaritia*, *ira*, *accidia*), whereas fortitude and justice are not related to any deadly sin at all; conversely, the last section of the work is devoted to the sins of the tongue which are not contrasted with any virtue.²⁷

Examples of late medieval catalogues of virtues and vices which extend or upset the double heptad can be easily multiplied. The Dominican friar James of Benevent († after 1271) added twenty vices to the eight deadly sins and twenty-seven virtues to the seven principal ones in his widely circulating *Viridarium consolationis*. The *Opuscula de virtutibus et vitiis* circulating under the name of Pope Celestin V († 1296) mention

quam, si potest, hanc contrarietatem assignet". See also the opening sentence of the chapter, *ibid.*: "Accipiuntur autem hec vii capitalia peccata per quantitatem [per quantitatem C: per quando contrarietatem W] ad uirtutes et dona iam dicta"; and the lack of conviction in the passage on prudence and sloth, f. 49^{rb}: "Accidia quodammodo opponitur prudentie ... sed alii opponunt luxuriam prudentie et accidiam fortitudini".

²⁷ The *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis* comprises seventeen *distinctiones*; for a survey, see Oliger, "Servasanto da Faenza", 175–176; for MSS, see Bloomfield 6137 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 6137. Some MSS catalogued as containing the third book of *De exemplis naturalibus* may actually contain the *Liber*. Servasanto presents the *Liber* as a version of *De exemplis*; see *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis* 5.1, MS Florence, BNC Conv. soppr. E.VI.1046, f. 54^{rb}: "Descripta parte primi libri de exemplis naturalibus in qua actum est de articulis fidei christiane et determinata parte secunda ... et finita parte 3a ... restat ut uideamus de parte ultima siue quarta que erit de cardinalibus uirtutibus ...". The sections on the cardinal virtues of the *Liber* were adapted into a huge *Summa in virtutes cardinales et vitia illis contraria eorumque remedia ad partem tertiam libri de naturalibus exemplis*, printed in 1480 (Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 3985a). The title is another proof of confusion between the *Liber* and *De exemplis*; there can be no doubt that the *Summa* is based on the *Liber*. Its author draws more heavily on Peraldus than Servasanto and introduces a new arrangement by opposing prudence to *accidia*, temperance to *gula*, *luxuria*, *avaritia*, *superbia*, and *ira*, fortitude to *audacia* and *timor*, and justice to *lingua*. *Invidia* is missing.

no less than sixty-two virtues in addition to the seven principal ones, the gifts, and the beatitudes, and thirty-one vices in addition to the seven deadly sins.²⁸ In the late-thirteenth-century *Paradisus animae*, which concentrates on virtues alone, the theological and cardinal virtues appear amidst thirty-four other virtues,²⁹ while the *Liber Floretus*, a probably fourteenth-century moral poem much used in school education, appends sections on the gifts, the beatitudes, and seventeen other virtues to its treatment of the theological and cardinal virtues.³⁰ Late medieval theological compendia likewise combine the septenaries with other schemes, such as the gifts, the beatitudes (often reduced to seven on behalf of numerical symmetry), the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments. Abridgements of such compendia which concentrate on the virtues and vices do exist, but even these usually include additional schemes.³¹ Other genres in which the seven principal virtues and vices frequently appear in connection with other items are moral florilegia³² and moral concordances to the Bible. A prominent example of the

²⁸ The first book deals with the beatitudes, gifts, theological, cardinal, and other virtues; the second with the capital and other vices; the third to eleventh books with miracles, sacraments, the Ten Commandments, etc. The chapters on the cardinal virtues depend for the most part on Alan of Lille's *De virtutibus et de vitiis*. For the authorship of the work, see Mols, "Célestin V", 98: "Si le saint fut pour quelque chose dans la production de ces opuscules, il y déploya surtout un travail de copiste et d'abrégiateur".

²⁹ The first two chapters discuss charity, chapters 8 to 11 the cardinal virtues, chapters 20 and 21 faith and hope.

³⁰ *Liber Floretus* 5, pp. 25–50.

³¹ For two abbreviations of Simon Hinton's *Summa iuniorum*, see Bejczy and Newhauser, "Two Newly Discovered Abbreviations". Both abbreviations include the gifts and the beatitudes; one of them largely ignores the theological virtues. The *Diaeta salutis* of William of Lanicea survives in an abbreviated version (Bloomfield 6493 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 6493) which comprises nine additional virtues and the beatitudes; the chapters on the cardinal virtues correspond nearly word for word with the printed text of the *Diaeta*. I used MSS London, BL Royal 8.D.ii, and Oxford, Balliol 50.

³² Three examples: *De vitiis et virtutibus*, MS Paris, BnF lat. 16356, ff. 166^{ra}–182^{va} (13th century; Bloomfield 1456 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 1456), a florilegium of classical and patristic authors, groups the capital sins together with many other vices (ff. 166^{ra}–173^{vb}); the theological (ff. 176^{rb}–178^{va}) and cardinal virtues (ff. 178^{va}–179^{ra}) appear among numerous other virtues. The *Pharetra*, a collection of patristic quotations composed before 1261 by an unknown Franciscan, discusses the capital vices and the principal virtues in its second book (pp. 65–124), while the other books treat other moral concepts. The *Auctoritates sanctorum de virtutibus et vitiis*, MS London, BL Add. 38820, ff. 167^r–218^r (late 13th century; Bloomfield 4969 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4969) arranges sayings from patristic authors up to Bernard of Clairvaux and occasionally from the classics. It has separate sections on the virtues and the vices, but the principal virtues and vices appear apart from each other amidst numerous others.

latter genre is John Peckham's *De virtutibus et vitiis* (ca. 1270). The first of the work's five parts is devoted to the capital vices, while the fourth discusses the remedial, theological, and cardinal virtues, the works of mercy, the gifts, the beatitudes, etcetera.³³ In alphabetically arranged florilegia (for instance, Thomas of Ireland's *Manipulus florum*, Conrad of Halberstadt's *Tripartitus moralium*) and concordances (for instance, those of [Pseudo-?] Mauritius Hibernicus, Nicholas of Biard, and Nicholas of Gorran), the virtues and vices appear individually, classified by the first letter of their names, so that the septenaries are no longer recognizable as such.³⁴

The opposition between the virtues and the vices to which these works allude despite the frequent inclusion of other schemes may seem unproblematic at first sight. The virtues and the vices seem to mirror each other as positive and negative moral attitudes, so that medieval authors, with their keen predilection for parallels and oppositions, could conveniently set them against each other. In effect, Conrad of Hirsau's trees of the virtues and vices constitute perfect counterparts which only render their meaning when seen and studied together. Yet artistic representations such as Conrad's trees are misleading in that they establish oppositions between the principal virtues and the capital vices which are based on mere juxtaposition.³⁵ As to content, the two schemes do not match each other. The capital vices of lust and avarice, for instance, contrast with the remedial virtues of chastity and generosity, respectively, rather than with any theological or cardinal virtue; conversely, the virtues of hope and prudence are opposed to despair and foolishness rather than to any deadly

³³ John Peckham, *De virtutibus et vitiis* (Bloomfield 4071 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4071); I used MS London, BL Add. 38820. See Kleinhans, "De concordantiis biblicis", 310–312, for a survey of contents.

³⁴ See, however, Nicholas of Gorran, *Distinctiones ad praedicandum*, MS Paris, Mazarine 1020, ff. 128^{vb}–129^{ra} (lemma *Fortitudo*): "Fortitudinem in edificio spirituali sicut in corporali faciunt multa specialiter vij virtutes. Primo fides ad resistendum erroribus ... Secundo spes ad operandum ... Tercio caritas ad sustinendum ... Quarto prudencia ad eligendum ... Quinto iusticia ad gubernandum ... Sexto temperancia ad continendum ... Septimo fortitudo ad perseuerandum ...". Also, the [Moral concordance on the Bible], MS Paris, BnF lat. 16424, ff. 84^{ra}–131^{vb} (13th century; Bloomfield 2384 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2384) is alphabetically arranged but contains a section on the cardinal virtues at ff. 113^{ra}–115^{vb}. The lemma *Virtus* of the *Distinctiones* attributed to Mauritius Hibernicus contains a discussion of the species of virtue which starts with the theological virtues, but does not continue with other schemes (MSS Paris, BnF lat. 15944, f. 195^{ra}; Paris, Mazarine 1019, f. 274^{va-vb}).

³⁵ The point is raised by Casagrande and Vecchio, "La classificazione dei peccati", 344–345.

sin. Medieval moral authors were well aware of the fact. Actually, the capital vices are more often contrasted with the remedial or contrary virtues in medieval moral literature than with the principal virtues, while the principal virtues are frequently accompanied by a set of mirroring vices rather than by the seven deadly sins. Even medieval authors who give full attention to the theological and cardinal virtues occasionally propose the remedial virtues as the specific counterparts of the capital vices.³⁶ Alan of Lille even designates the remedial virtues as the seven *principales virtutes* in his *De arte praedicatoria*; in a similar vein, Jacques Legrand calls them *virtutes capitales* in his *Sophologium*.³⁷

The opposition between the capital vices and the remedial virtues is notably articulated in pastoral literature. Manuals of confession, for instance, usually analyze the sinful state of man according to the scheme of the capital vices and often introduce the remedial virtues as their antidotes, although a number of them assign a remedial function to the theological and cardinal virtues (for example, Thomas of Chobham's *Summa confessorum*) or, in rare instances, to the four cardinal virtues in particular (for example, the already mentioned *Summa poenitentiae* of Paulus Hungarus).³⁸ The *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*

³⁶ See William of Doncaster, *Explicatio aphorismatum*, discussing the cardinal virtues (pp. 18–30) and the seven sins (pp. 31–33) but continuing with other vices and the remedial virtues; Alan of Lille, *Dicta alia*, PL 210: 262A–B, adding the remedial to the theological and cardinal virtues. In Robert Grosseteste, *Templum Dei* 6.5, p. 38, the remedial virtues appear as the *medicinae* of the seven sins, the theological and cardinal virtues as their *sanitates*. The [Exegetical compendium], MS Oxford, Bodleian Rawl. C 504, ff. 50^r–58^v (13th century; Bloomfield 2309, 4074 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2309, 4074) discusses from f. 53^v hope, the cardinal virtues and their parts (with definitions adapted from the *Moralium dogma* and Alan of Lille), the capital vices, and the remedial virtues as antidotes of the vices. The *Tractatus de virtutibus* surviving in MSS Paris, BnF lat. 3528, ff. 73^r–74^v (15th century) and lat. 3534, ff. 27^v–30^v (14th century; Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4779a) consists of the following chapters: *Quid est virtus*, *De virtutibus contrariis septem peccatis* (remedial virtues: *humilitas*, *largitas*, *castitas*, *dilectio*, *abstinencia*, *paciencia*, *diligencia*), *De fide*, *De spe*, *De vera caritate*, *De prima virtute cardinali* (justice), *De prudentia*, *De fortitudine*, *De temperantia*; the second MS continues with three more chapters on the theological virtues.

³⁷ Alan of Lille, *De arte praedicatoria* 32, PL 210: 174B. Book 2 of Jacques Legrand's *Sophologium* is divided into four parts: the first is titled *De inducentibus ad amorem virtutum*, the others discuss the theological, cardinal, and remedial virtues ("virtutes capitales"), respectively. Cf. also William of La Mare, *Quaestiones in tertium librum Sententiarum* 33.2.2, p. 118, for the suggestion that one could imagine the existence of seven cardinal virtues paralleling the seven capital vices.

³⁸ See Thomas of Chobham, *Summa confessorum* 3.1.9 and 3.1.13, pp. 31–32, 44; Paulus Hungarus, *Summa poenitentiae*, p. 210: "Post tractatum principalium vitiorum

compromises between both possibilities: its first chapter introduces the seven principal virtues, but the remaining eight chapters discuss humility, charity, meekness/patience, obedience, fortitude, mercy/pity, abstinence, and continence as specific remedies of the deadly sins. Likewise, the *Fasciculus morum* concentrates on the deadly sins and the remedial virtues, but the section on sloth presents the theological and cardinal virtues (except justice) as arms for battling our three main enemies: the world, the flesh, and the devil.³⁹ William of Pagula's *Oculus sacerdotis* introduces a variant of this idea: the three main enemies are all countered by fortitude, which by its nature consists *in resistendis viciis*; moreover, we need justice *contra nequiciam seculi*, prudence *contra temptamenta diaboli*, temperance *contra insidia carnis*.⁴⁰ Other pastoral authors, however, ignore the theological and cardinal virtues altogether and exclusively concentrate on the remedial virtues instead. One of them is the Franciscan David of Augsburg († 1272), who goes so far as to claim in his highly influential *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione* that virtue is nothing more than the absence of vice—a statement which turns the orthodox view on the subject upside down:

Many other artificial divisions of the virtues exist, according to which some are called theological, such as faith, hope, and love; others cardinal, such as prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance; still others political virtues, purgatorial virtues, virtues of the purged mind, and exemplary virtues. As a simple soul speaking to simple souls, I will ignore all this and only follow the scheme which opposes the virtues to the seven capital sins, since virtue in this sense is nothing but the absence of vices.⁴¹

ordine congruo et competenti tractandum est de cardinalibus virtutibus ... ut que amissimus per vitia, recuperemus per virtutes, et quod abstulit vitium, restituat virtus".

³⁹ *Fasciculus morum* 5.27 ff., pp. 556 ff. Faith and prudence fight against the world, hope and temperance against the flesh, charity and fortitude against the devil.

⁴⁰ See William of Pagula, *Oculus sacerdotis* 2.6, MS Cambridge, UL li.2.7, f. 57^{ra}. MS Dublin, Trinity College 332 (C.4.23), f. 88^{r-v} (late 13th century), contains a similar observation which appears amidst a series of short texts on virtues, vices, sin, and confession. William's chapter recurs almost word for word in the *Speculum christiani* (late 14th century), pp. 47–49, and was expanded by John de Burgh in his *Pupilla oculi* 10.3, ff. 127^v–128^r. For the view that fortitude fights the three enemies, see also Robert Grosseteste, *Templum Dei*, p. 49.

⁴¹ David of Augsburg, *De exterioris et interioris hominis compositione* 3.28.3, p. 217: "Multae sunt aliae virtutum artificiales divisiones, secundum quod aliae dicuntur theologicae, ut fides, spes, caritas; aliae cardinales, ut prudentia, iustitia, fortitudo, temperantia; item, aliae politicae, aliae purgatoriae, aliae animi purgati, aliae exemplares, quas, sicut rudis rudibus loquens, praetereo; solum illum ordinem sequar, quo virtutes principalibus septem vitiis opponuntur, cum virtus secundum hunc sensum non aliud sit quam vitiorum carentia".

Another striking example is the *Moniloquium*, a preaching aid composed by John of Wales. Although John's *Breviloquium de virtutibus* is the most widely diffused treatise on the cardinal virtues of the thirteenth century, his *Moniloquium* is confined to the capital vices (Part One) and the remedial virtues (Part Two). In the preface of Part Two, John explains why he discusses the remedial rather than the theological and cardinal virtues. His intention is not to elaborate on whatever virtues exist, but only on those virtues which offer a cure to the illness of the vices—in other words: the theological and cardinal virtues have no direct remedial function.⁴²

It is essential to note that in these pastoral texts the moral subject is primarily conceived as a sufferer from vices. The virtues come in later in order to replace the vices, the initial faults of the human being giving way to subsequent goodness.⁴³ One must indeed first destroy the vices before virtue comes in view, as several authors affirm in reference to Ps. 36:27 (“Decline from evil and do the good”).⁴⁴ From a strictly religious perspective, virtues are not even necessary to remove the stains of sin. Confession and penance are sufficient to this end and moreover constitute institutionalized practices with a sacramental status. Every believer can be sure of divine forgiveness after doing penance, whereas nobody can be sure of possessing any virtue; such certainty was rather considered a sign of pride, the mother of all vices. Consciousness of virtue means the end of virtue, as numerous medieval authors varying from Peter Abelard to Francis Petrarch repeat after each other,⁴⁵ while

⁴² John of Wales, *Moniloquium*, MS Paris, Arsenal 529, f. 190^{va}: “hic est intencio non de uirtutibus quibuslibet sed de uirtutibus oppositis supradictis uiciis. Suppositis ergo diffinicionibus uirtutis in communi necnon et diuisionibus eiusdem in uirtutes theologicas et cardinales ... hic persequendum est de uirtutibus prout sunt medicine spirituales opposite uiciis que sunt corrupciones et egritudines anime”.

⁴³ Cf. Wenzel's introduction to *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, p. 7: “The primary object of moral theology, thus, was sinful man who must struggle against his innate evil inclinations. Attention to these inclinations or ‘vices,’ therefore, must and did come first”.

⁴⁴ See, e.g., Otloh of Saint Emmeran, cited *ibid.*; Peter Abelard, *Ethica* 2.1, CCCM 190: 85; incipit of a moral florilegium (14th century?; Bloomfield 4258 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4258): “Prius vitia exstirpenda sunt in homine, deinde inserende virtutes”; Dionysius the Carthusian, *Summa de vitiis et virtutibus* 1.1, p. 15: “primo oportet a malo recedere et vitia (si insunt) ejicere, deinde ad bonum accedere virtutumque opera exercere”. Cf. Godfrey of Babion, *Sermo* 34, PL 171: 506C: “Duo quippe sunt necessaria ad perfectionem salutis, vitiorum eradicatio, et virtutum aedificatio”.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Onulph of Speyer, *Colores rhetorici* 1.16, p. 376; Marbod of Rennes, *Sermo in vitam Florentii* 2.18, PL 171: 1587A–B; Hildebert of Lavardin, *Ep.* 1.10, PL 171: 165C–166A, repeated by Peter the Chanter, *Verbum abbreviatum* 119, PL 205: 308C–D; Godfrey of Admont, *Homiliae dominicales* 12, PL 174: 83C; Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana*

several religious writers claim that humility in a state of sin is better than taking pride in virtue.⁴⁶ Accordingly, many pastoral writings explore the vices and encourage sinners to have remorse, confess, and do penance, but meanwhile disregard the virtues. Preachers in particular sometimes considered deterring their flocks from vices a more effective method than propagating virtue,⁴⁷ even if medieval homiletic handbooks usually call for an even treatment of the virtues and vices.⁴⁸ Seen from the practical need to save people's souls, expelling sin and guilt

3.21, CCCM 12: 204–205; id., *Collationes*, p. 208; Hugh of Saint Victor, *De archa Noe* 3.2, CCCM 176: 56; id., *Annotationes in Threnos* (on 2:20), PL 175: 315C; Richard of Saint Victor, *Beniamin maior* 5.13, p. 138; id., *Expositio cantici Habacuc*, PL 196: 403D–404D; Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* 57, PL 40: 822; Gerhoh of Reichersberg, *Commentarius in Psalmos* (on 14:4), PL 193: 825B; Herman of Reun, *Sermones festuales* 86.3, CCCM 64: 391; Garnier of Langres, *Sermo* 22, PL 205: 721C; Petrarch, *De remediis utriusque fortunae* 1.10 (*De virtute*), 1: 29–31.

⁴⁶ See Goscelin of Saint Bertin, *Liber confertatorius* 4 (written 1082/83), p. 99; Hugh of Saint Victor, *De arrha animae* 21, PL 176: 976A (repeated by Pseudo-Augustine, *De diligendo Deo* 8, PL 40: 854); Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sententiae* 3.126.2, *Opera* 6.2: 242; Thomas of Froidmont, *De modo bene vivendi* 22, PL 184: 1240A; Adam Scot, *Sermo* 38.15, PL 198: 350D (“Quam multos novimus, quibus plus nocuit quod virtutes habuerint quam si eis caruissent”); Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Opus postillarum* sermo 376A (see Saak, “Quilibet christianus”, 331–332).

⁴⁷ One of the reasons for John of Wales to give more attention to the vices than to the virtues in his *Moniloquium* is that “sacra predicacio uehemencius et multiplicius inuehitur contra uicia” (MS Paris, Arsenal 529, f. 190^{va}). See also Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl, *Tractatus de vitiis et virtutibus* (ca. 1421), sermon 5, cited in Madre, *Nikolaus von Dinkelsbühl*, 192: “Inveniuntur nonnulli, qui a vitiis magis absterrentur timore, quam ad virtutes alliciantur amore”. In effect, the vices are prior to the virtues in Nicholas’s sermon cycle; cf. the incipit of sermon 2, with which the cycle opens in many MSS: “Nunc dicendum est de vitiis et aliquibus virtutibus eis oppositis” (cited *ibid.*, 192; see *ibid.* 192–199 for the absence of the seven principal virtues; only the last sermon [no. 17] is devoted to temperance).

⁴⁸ See Guibert of Nogent, *Quo ordine sermo fieri debeat*, CCCM 127: 54–55; Thomas of Chobham, *Summa de arte praedicandi* 6, CCCM 82: 141 ff. (with special attention for the theological and cardinal virtues); for later examples, see Roth, *Die mittelalterliche Predigttheorie*, 49–50 (William of Auvergne); 69, 74–75 (Bonaventure?); 84 (John of Wales); 89, 98–101 (James of Fusignano, with special attention for the theological and cardinal virtues). Late medieval sermon cycles which discuss the virtues on an equal footing with the vices do exist; see, e.g., Jordan of Quedlinburg, *Tractatus virtutum et vitiorum*. Another example, unexplored in scholarship, is the homiletic work of Hugh of Prato; see Kaeppli, *Scriptores*, no. 1981 (*Sermones communes, Sermones de virtutibus, de VII vitiis, Sermones super credo, Pater noster, Sermones de decalogo praeceptorum*). Silvana Vecchio kindly informed me that MS Florence, BNC N. Acq. 1131, ff. 17^v–47^v, contains 21 *sermones de virtutibus* composed by Hugh, subdivided as follows: *de virtutibus in communi* (2 sermons), *de fide* (2), *de spe* (2), *de caritate* (4), *de prudentia* (2), *de temperantia* (2), *de fortitudine* (1), *de patientia* (1), *de iustitia* (3), *de humilitate* (2; humility appears as a subspecies of temperance, but is at the same time the foundation of all virtue). See also Hodge, “The Virtue of Vice”, for Remigio dei Girolami.

was the essential thing to do; developing good habits was less urgent and might actually lead to pride.

Even learned theologians sometimes adopted a similar attitude. In the final part of his *Ethica* Peter Abelard argues that virtue is different from the will to obey God by which believers earn salvation. Developing one's good will into steadfast habits, and thus into virtues, is too much to ask from the common run of believers, admits Abelard. In order to enter heaven, however, surrendering to God on one's deathbed is sufficient. Salvation thus extends not only to the virtuous minority, but also to the mediocre who never acquire any virtue at all, even if the truly virtuous enjoy God's presence in the afterlife more fully than others.⁴⁹ Notwithstanding his conviction that virtue is rewarded with the eternal life, Abelard thus concedes in his *Ethica* that virtue is not necessary for salvation; sincerely repenting from sin is enough. Two centuries after Abelard, the English Dominican John Bromyard set forth a strikingly similar argument in his *Summa praedicatorum*, adding, however, that earning salvation through virtue constitutes a safer way to heaven than trusting in the privilege of God's mercy on one's deathbed.⁵⁰ As we have seen, Bromyard's contemporary and confrere Pierre de la Palud would not even admit that much,⁵¹ while other theologians had a hard time rescuing the relevance of moral virtue in the salvation economy. However much the views of these theologians differ from those of pastoral writers who stick to a religious notion of virtue, they lead to a similar consequence: in matters of salvation, virtue has a secondary role at best.

In sum, medieval authors whose prime aim is to save the souls of ordinary believers have relatively little use for virtue, let alone for the cardinal virtues. Developing virtue was not necessary for salvation, whereas

⁴⁹ *Ethica* 2.2–4, CCCM 190: 85–86; likewise *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 92: “Itaque multi sine virtute salvantur”. The *Commentarius cantabrigiensis in epistolas Pauli* (on Rom. 7:19), 1: 98–99, written in the 1140s by a follower of Abelard, explains that it is the worst believers who are thus saved: they give their love to God for a short while only, “veluti meretrices”. At *Collationes*, p. 122, Abelard distinguishes various degrees of virtue, merit, and reward; at p. 162 ff., he distinguishes various corresponding degrees of blessedness in the hereafter.

⁵⁰ John Bromyard, *Summa praedicatorum*, lemma *Virtus*, art. 4: moral virtues are “ab vsu, actu et consuetudine quantum ad perfectionem ... Ex quibus patet quod illi qui in extremis se ad deum conuertunt, non poterunt perfecte virtutibus perfici, quia non possunt habere consuetudinem bene operandi”. Those who say that such conversion nevertheless brings salvation should note that “via virtutis est via iuris communi eundi ad celum, alia autem est specialis privilegii”, the first alternative being easier and safer.

⁵¹ See above, p. 206.

recognizing sin was a first and essential step in the process of repentance and confession. The capital vices therefore usually occupy a central position in pastoral moral literature. If the virtues appear in these texts, they serve as remedies of the deadly sins, a function that was much better fulfilled by the remedial or contrary than by the theological and cardinal virtues. Yet the medieval conception of fallen human nature permitted a different perspective as well. Alongside a concern with suppressing sin, we find a belief in the possibility of restoring fallen human nature to its potential goodness.

The Principal Virtues and the Vices

Numerous moral writings from the Middle Ages adopt a logic contrary to the one prevalent in pastoral genres. The authors take their point of departure in the human capacity for goodness and virtue rather than the evil inclinations caused by the Fall. For these authors, the virtues function as primary concepts. In effect, vice is merely the lack of virtue, as many theologians argue; only virtue really exists, while vice is the name given to its absence. Likewise, sin is nothing (*peccatum nichil est*), as numerous medieval authors repeat after Augustine.⁵² The virtues and the vices relate to each other like light and shadow, with shadow being the mere absence of light.

The denial of the real existence of the vices, which entered from the work of Augustine into Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*,⁵³ coheres with the idea, fundamental to Christian metaphysics, that evil does not exist in its own right. Existence depends on God's creation, and God's creation is essentially good. What humans conceive as evil is merely the corruption

⁵² Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium* 1.13 (on 1:3), CCSL 36: 7; for 12th-century quotations, see, e.g., Laborans, *De iustitia et iusto* 1.21, p. 17; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II.37.1.1 and III.37.2.2, 1: 543, 2: 208; Bartholomew of Exeter, *Contra fatalitatis errorem* 145.1, CCCM 157: 137; Frowinus of Engelberg, *Explanatio dominicae orationis* 2.2, CCCM 134: 89; *Summa Breves dies*, MS Oxford, Bodleian Laud. misc. 80, ff. 165^{vb}–166^{ra}; Aelfred of Rievaulx, *Dialogus de anima* 2.48, CCCM 1: 724. For later echoes, see, e.g., Thomas of Chobham, *Summa de arte predicandi* 6, CCCM 82: 147; id., *Sermo* 5, CCCM 82A: 55; Stephen of Bourbon, *Tractatus de diversis materiis praedicabilibus* 1.3.2, CCCM 124: 55 (wrongly referring to *Glossa ordinaria* 4: 224 [Ioh. 1:3]); Margareta Porete, *Speculum simplicium animarum* 11, CCCM 69: 39; Raymond Lull, *Ars generalis ultima* 9.9.2.2 and 9.9.2.9, CCCM 75: 297, 315; id., *Liber de voluntate* 2.1.18, CCCM 113: 265.

⁵³ Augustine, *De natura et gratia* 20.22, CSEL 60: 248: "non est substantia peccatum", repeated in Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II.35.4.1, 1: 535; see also *Sententiae* IV.16.2.2, 2: 338: "omnis uirtus patitur detrimentum ab uno uitio" (= Pseudo-Augustine, *De vera et falsa poenitentia* 16, PL 40: 1125; *Decretum Gratiani*, "De paenitentia" 5.1).

or the absence of the good, as the Lombard insists precisely in relation to the idea of vice and sin.⁵⁴ Accordingly, vice is not a bad quality, but the absence of a good quality (even though it can feel as an overwhelming reality, as William of Saint Thierry concedes).⁵⁵ Not all medieval theologians and philosophers fully endorse these views. Many of them argue that vice is no mere *privatio virtutis*, but a positive defect or *habitus malus* which moves the moral agent in a way contrary to virtue.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, theologians usually give vice a position inferior to virtue in their metaphysical system and are followed in this respect by other moral authors.⁵⁷ The late twelfth-century *Summa Breves dies* may serve as an example. According to the unknown author, the seven principal virtues, fixed in number, assist each other and naturally tend to unity, while the vices “do not follow any order, number, or destination, but distract the miserable soul to various things and cause divisions under the reign of the

⁵⁴ Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II.34.4.2, 1: 526–527.

⁵⁵ See William of Saint Thierry, *Epistola ad fratres* 222, CCCM 88: 274: “Vitium uero, cum nichil aliud esse credatur quam priuatio uirtutis, tamen uastitas eius et enormitas tanta nonnumquam quasi sentitur, ut obruat et opprimat; foeditas tanta ut inquinat et inficiat; adhaesio tam pertinax consuetudinis, ut uix eam a se excutiat natura”.

⁵⁶ See Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 4.1: 115–116, 119, 121–123, 134–139, 142–143, 147. Alan of Lille, *De uirtutibus* 2.2, pp. 76–79, and *Theologicae regulae* 89, PL 210: 668C, rejects the opinion (defended, e.g., by Simon of Tournai, *Disputationes* 32.1, p. 96) that vice always consists in *privatio virtutis*; vice may consist in an active *motus* and then “sumitur positive”, even though it is no *qualitas*. Hubertus considers vice a *privatio*, but also a bad *habitus*; see Heinzmann, *Die Summe “Colligite Fragmenta”*, 211–212. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.71.3, *Opera* 7: 5–6, refers to vices as *habitus mali*; at II.II.53.1, *Opera* 8: 387, he stresses that *imprudencia* can be taken *privative*, but also *contrarie* “secundum quod ratio contrario modo movetur vel agit prudentiae”. Cf. Radulphus Brito, *Questiones super Ethicam* 2 q. 56, p. 309, and *Anonymi Questiones super Librum Ethicorum* 2 q. 50, pp. 217–218: vices are opposed *privative* to the virtues in as far as they are considered as evil, but *contrarie* in as far as they are considered as *habitus* (Brito) or operative principles (Anonymus). On vices as *habitus mali* see also, e.g., Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.2, f. 272^{ra}.

⁵⁷ See, e.g., Honorius Augustodunensis, *De anima et Deo*, p. 139: vices “non sunt substantie, cum sint mala, omnis autem substantia probata sit bona, sed sunt priuatio uirtutum et deformitas animarum”; Servasanto of Faenza, *De exemplis naturalibus* 3.20, MS Vienna, ÖNB 1589, f. 49^{va}: “Non enim uirtutes et uicia opponuntur contrarie sed potius priuatiue, quamuis communis usus loquendi habeat quod opponuntur contrarie”; Raymond Lull, *Ars compendiosa Dei* 30.1.24, CCCM 39: 287: “Virtus dicit positionem, et uitium priuationem”; cf. id., *Ars generalis ultima* 8.1.16, CCCM 75: 145; Coluccio Salutati, *Ep.* 11.5, *Epistolario* 3: 346: “considera vitia non opponi uirtutibus contrarie, sed *privative* ... nichil enim vitia sunt nisi deformitates nec habent efficientem causam, sed deficientem; nec sunt aliquid positive ... sicut ergo malum nichil est nisi *privatio boni*, sic vitium atque peccatum nichil est nisi *privatio bonitatis actus uirtutis*”.

devil”.⁵⁸ The latter observation is contradicted by the author’s acknowledgment of the scheme of the seven capital vices (he even derives their number from the number of principal virtues),⁵⁹ but the argument reveals that in the author’s logic the virtues represent the proper order of the human mind, whereas the vices are their negative counterparts standing for everything the virtues are not.

Other medieval moral authors who take their point of departure in the seven principal virtues do not even mention the capital vices at all. When opposing the theological and cardinal virtues to a set of vices, they often ignore the seven deadly sins in much the same way as many pastoral authors disregard the seven principal virtues, and for much the same reason: both septenaries are not congruent with each other. Alternative vices which more specifically contrast with the theological and cardinal virtues were therefore devised and made their way into moral literature.⁶⁰

The work of Thomas Aquinas offers a famous example. In his commentary on Peter Lombard’s *Sententiae*, in his *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*, and even in one passage from his *Summa theologiae* Aquinas subscribes to the idea that Gregory’s heptad of vices covers the entire realm of sin. But in the *Secunda secundae* the scheme of the capital vices does not play any recognizable role. All vices introduced in the work appear as negative reflections of the theological and cardinal virtues and their various parts.⁶¹ Aquinas actually denies in his *Summa* that there exists any necessary correspondence between the seven principal virtues and the capital vices, as both have different origins in the human mind.⁶² The work of John Duns Scotus even contains an outright attack at the scheme

⁵⁸ *Summa Breves dies*, MS Oxford, Bodleian Laud. misc. 80, f. 143^{rb-va}: “Dicimus quod ... uirtutes sibi cooperantur et suffraganeae sunt inuicem et naturaliter ad unitatem tendunt et subiecto et definito numero continentur. Secus autem est de uitiiis, quae cum inordinata sint, nullum seruant ordinem, numerum uel terminum, sed miseram animam distrahunt ad diuersa et scisma faciunt in regno diaboli”.

⁵⁹ Ibid. f. 166^{ra}: “Cum autem tres sint principales uirtutes, fides, spes, caritas, et quatuor cardinales, scilicet iustitia, temperantia, fortitudo, prudentia, e regione constat septem uitia esse capitalia per septem populos terre promissionis designata. Hec autem sunt inanis gloria, inuidia, quae sunt species superbie, ira, accidia siue tristitia, auaritia, gula, luxuria”.

⁶⁰ Casagrande and Vecchio, *Histoire des péchés capitaux*, 314–331, study the declining interest in the capital vices in late medieval theology. Bloomfield, *The Seven Deadly Sins*, ignores the problem; Wenzel, “The Seven Deadly Sins”, briefly mentions it.

⁶¹ See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.105, 107, and 110–113: discussing the *partes* of justice, Thomas opposes *obedientia* to *inobedientia*, *gratia/gratitudo* to *ingratitude*, and *veritas* to *mendacium*, *simulatio/hypocrisis*, *iactantia*, and *ironia*.

⁶² Ibid. I.II.84.4 ad 1, *Opera* 7: 109.

of the capital vices. In his questions on the *Sententiae*, Scotus argues that the vices should be subdivided in accordance with either the theological and cardinal virtues or the Ten Commandments. In the latter case, one should postulate the existence of ten principal vices; in the former case, there are seven, but not the seven accepted ones, as the septenary of Gregory the Great does not contain disbelief (the opposite of faith) and despair (the opposite of hope). In either case, the current scheme of the capital vices is deficient.⁶³ Scotus's argument obviously depends on his preconceived idea that vices are the mere negatives of either the virtues or the Commandments.

Even pastoral authors sometimes display little interest in the capital vices. Robert Grosseteste, for instance, wrote two works on confession in which the seven principal virtues figure as central concepts. In both works he contrasts the theological and cardinal virtues with seven "offenses": *infidelitas*, *desperacio*, *odium*, *debilitas* (the opposite of fortitude), *imprudencia*, *iniusticia*, and *intemperantia*. Only by distinguishing seven subspecies of charity and contrasting these with the capital vices, Grosseteste is able to save Gregory's heptad. In his arrangement, however, each capital vice merely constitutes one of a pair of vices opposed to the individual subspecies of charity, in accordance with the Aristotelian conception of virtue as a middle way between two moral defects.⁶⁴

The examples of Aquinas, Scotus, and Grosseteste are known to specialists,⁶⁵ but other examples can be added. Servasanto of Faenza's *De exemplis naturalibus* has already been discussed above. Raymond Lull in his *Ars generalis ultima* opposes nine virtues (the cardinal and theological virtues, piety, and patience) to nine contrasting vices: *iniuria*, *imprudencia*, *debilitas cordis*, *intemperantia*, *infidelitas*, *desperatio*, *crudelitas*, *impatiencia*, *impietas*.⁶⁶ Another example is *Virtutum vitiorumque exempla*, a preaching aid written by the Dominican friar Nicholas of Hanappes. Nicholas classifies biblical passages in 134 chapters which bear for the most part on moral themes. At first sight, his work seems to lack a clear structure. However, half of the chapters can be divided into seven groups

⁶³ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II.6.2, *Opera* (Vatican ed.) 8: 63.

⁶⁴ Robert Grosseteste, *Templum Dei* 6.5, p. 38; *Deus est*, pp. 249–250. Cf. id., *Notule* 2.6, MS Oxford, All Souls 84, f. 48^v marg. inf.: "Licet virtus sit medietas, ut dictum est, est tamen extremitas secundum optimum et bene. Virtus enim simpliciter opponitur malitie simpliciter ...".

⁶⁵ See Casagrande and Vecchio, "La classificazione dei peccati", 344–346 (also mentioning William of Auvergne); ead., *Histoire des péchés capitaux*, 325.

⁶⁶ Raymond Lull, *Ars generalis ultima* 9.9, CCCM 75: 263–315.

which each deal with one of the theological and cardinal virtues, their subspecies, and the vices derived from them.⁶⁷ Possibly, the *Secunda secundae* of Aquinas served Nicholas as a main source.

Even in the visual arts were the vices sometimes deduced from the seven principal virtues. The archivolt of the north porch of the cathedral of Chartres (early thirteenth century) presents eight opposing pairs of virtues and vices: *fides*—*idolatria*, *spes*—*desperatio*, *caritas*—*avaritia*, *prudentia*—*stultitia*, *iustitia*—*iniustitia*, *fortitudo*—*ignavia*, *temperantia*—*intemperantia*, *humilitas*—*superbia*.⁶⁸ Although the artist followed Conrad of Hirsau in adding humility to the principal virtues (he obviously needed an even number of virtues and vices in order to arrange his statues symmetrically), he ignored the scheme of the deadly sins and instead sculpted those vices which best mirrored the virtues. Another, particularly famous, example are Giotto's frescoes of the virtues and vices which decorate the dado of the Scrovegni or Arena Chapel in Padua. The theological and cardinal virtues on the right wall are faced by seven contrasting vices on the left wall: prudence is opposed to stupidity, fortitude to inconstancy, temperance to anger, justice to injustice, faith to infidelity, charity to jealousy, and hope to despair. Giotto manifestly avoided using the scheme of the deadly sins, even though he was technically bound to depict seven vices and might thus have conveniently fallen back on Gregory's heptad. I have argued elsewhere that Giotto's selection may have been inspired by the moral treatises of Servasanto of Faenza.⁶⁹ In any case, both Giotto and Servasanto put the seven principal virtues in the centre of their interest and added a series of vices chiefly in order to bring the virtues into relief. As Servasanto argues, the goodness of the virtues shines out all the better in comparison to the evil inherent to the vices opposing them; in the same way, people appreciate health better when confronted with illness, or good weather after a rain shower.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ See Nicholas of Hanappes, *Virtutum vitiorumque exempla*, ch. 33–36 (faith), 37–39 (hope), 40–52 (charity), 53–58 (prudence), 59–76 (justice), 77–86 (fortitude), 87–99 (temperance). For MSS and editions, see Kaeppli, *Scriptores*, no. 3094.

⁶⁸ Katzenellenbogen, *Allegories of the Virtues and Vices*, 80 n. 1. Joseph Goering kindly drew my attention to this arrangement.

⁶⁹ See Bejczy, "Vices Mirroring the Virtues".

⁷⁰ Servasanto of Faenza, *De exemplis naturalibus* 3 Prol., MS Vienna, ÖNB 1589, f. 37^{vb}: "semper iuxta uirtutis bonum ponetur uicium illi contrarium ut fiat magis omnibus clarum quid ualeat bonum dum malo opposito illi fuerit comparatum. Clarius enim elucescunt opposita dum iuxta se fuerint collocata".

In contrast, then, to pastoral authors who in their writings reduced morality to a battle against sin, most learned theologians of the Later Middle Ages conceived of man's moral task as an attempt to embrace God's goodness. Their reflections consequently centred around virtue rather than vice, the more so as Christian metaphysics tended to discount the ontological status of evil. Engaging in systematic discussions on virtue, they usually employed the scheme of the seven principal virtues and tended to contrast these virtues with a series of negatively derived vices rather than with the deadly sins which dominated the harmatology of pastoral literature. Evoking the vices in this manner not only served as a warning against sin, but also helped to highlight the theological and cardinal virtues by which fallen human nature could be restored.

The fact that the seven deadly sins do not conveniently mirror the seven principal virtues might better explain why the scheme of the capital vices was less accepted in academic moral theology than the scheme's internal incoherencies or its lack of scriptural authority.⁷¹ After all, theologians usually set store by the cardinal virtues, which likewise lack a Biblical origin (except for their occurrence at Sap. 8:7) and do not constitute a very coherent scheme either, at least from an Aristotelian point of view, since it combines one of the intellectual with three of the moral virtues.

Cardinal Virtues and Cardinal Vices

Some medieval moral treatises display a special arrangement in that they reduce all moral evil not to seven or eight deadly sins, but to four vices which directly mirror the cardinal virtues and are sometimes actually called "cardinal vices". The idea of deriving four cardinal vices from the four cardinal virtues is in fact so natural that its repeated occurrence in medieval moral literature should not come as a surprise. If the cardinal virtues cover together the realm of moral goodness, as many medieval authors believe, then one can easily imagine the existence of four opposing vices comprising all moral evil.

Antiquity set two different examples for construing a scheme of four cardinal vices. First, Stoic philosophers contrasted the cardinal virtues with the four passions or affects—desire or hope, fear, sadness, and joy—

⁷¹ As suggest Casagrande and Vecchio, *Histoire des péchés capitaux*, 314–331. At p. 325, however, they observe that taking one's starting point in the virtues, as Thomas Aquinas does in the *Summa theologiae*, leaves little room for introducing the capital vices.

which they considered the roots of moral decay. Like the Greek fathers, Ambrose and Jerome occasionally sustained this view, which moreover finds support in a number of writings from the Early and High Middle Ages.⁷² Yet Lactantius, Augustine, Julian Pomerius, and Isidore of Seville rejected it, claiming instead that the four passions are morally neutral and can be transformed into either virtues or vices.⁷³ This line of thought prevailed in the Middle Ages.⁷⁴ The most toilsome medieval elaboration known to me appears in the commentary on the *Canticle of Godfrey of Auxerre*, third abbot of Clairvaux. The commentary contains an exposition on the virtues and the vices which fills twenty pages in modern print and centres around two complicated diagrams: the *Diadema virtutum* and the *Torques vitiorum*. The diagrams display symmetrical oppositions between the cardinal virtues and four contrary vices. The *Diadema* situates each of the cardinal virtues between two passions, and vice versa:

Prudence is situated between sorrow and fear, because it is prudent to fear the future out of present sorrow and, better still, to grieve with fear ... Temperance is located between fear and joy which temper each other, because she takes her origin in fear and is chiefly experienced in joy ... Justice is put between joy and desire, because she makes people really long for her and leads them to real pleasure ... Fortitude is situated between

⁷² For the Greek fathers, see Solignac, "Passions et vie spirituelle", 342–345; for Ambrose and Jerome, see above, pp. 14, 18. For the medieval tradition, see Hrabanus Maurus, *Commentarii in Ezechielem* 1 (on 1:6), PL 110: 509C–D; Paschasius Radbertus, *Expositio in Lamentationes Hieremiae* 4 Prol., CCCM 85: 240; Haymo of Auxerre, *Enarratio in Zachariam* (on 1:20–21), PL 117: 226D; Honorius Augustodunensis, *Speculum ecclesiae*, PL 172: 911A; Rupert of Deutz, *De sancta Trinitate* 42, *De operibus Spiritus sancti* 9.5, CCCM 24: 2104; Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sententiae* 3.120, *Opera* 6.2: 222: the cardinal virtues contrast with *timor*, *spes*, *ira*, and *gaudium* which produce *minae*, *blandimentorum attractio*, *imprudencia*, and *malum sapor*, respectively; Bartholomew of Recanato (early 13th century), gloss to the *Moralium dogma*, p. 80: "Isti iv affectus errant, nisi quatuor virtutibus adiungantur. Fortitudo ergo est necessaria contra dolorem, temperantia contra gaudium, prudentia contra timorem, iustitia contra spem".

⁷³ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 14.9, CCSL 48: 425–430 (the claim remains implicit; see also Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 207–209, 221–225, and Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue*, 98–111); Julian Pomerius, *De vita contemplativa* 3.31.1–2, PL 59: 514A–515C (see also Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 241–243); Isidore of Seville, *De differentiis* 2.40.159–160, PL 83: 95C–96A. For Lactantius, see Solignac, "Passions et vie spirituelle", 345–346; Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 45–46.

⁷⁴ See above, pp. 52 and 110, for examples in hagiography and in Cistercian writing. See also, e.g., Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, pp. 748–749 (following Isaac of Stella); Robert Grosseteste, *Dicta* 119, MS Oxford, Bodleian Bodley 798, f. 98^{ra–rb}; "Omnis autem creatura rationalis ex naturali condicione sua habet in se naturaliter quattuor affectiones, que a quibusdam sic nominantur: timor et dolor, cupiditas et leticia, que in bene utentibus sunt quattuor virtutes cardinales, in male utentibus sunt vicia".

desire and sorrow, because she is observed with either affection, albeit in different ways, as people must sustain what oppresses them until it goes away, and sustain what they long for until it arrives.⁷⁵

These relations are mirrored in the *Torques vitiorum*, which groups together the four passions and the four principal vices *imprudentia*, *intemperantia*, *iniustitia*, and *pusillanimitas*:

Imprudence is situated between fear and joy, for imprudence brings forth a stream of intemperate pleasure, and in the same way as just fear is the beginning of wisdom, unjust fear is the beginning of imprudence ... Intemperance is located between joy and sorrow, for immoral people are unable either to be satisfied or to suffer want ... Narrow-mindedness is put between sorrow and desire, for not only impatience in sorrow but also unworthy desires are some of her unmistakable signs. After all, it is evident that narrow-mindedness stems from avidity and is confirmed in sorrow ... Injustice finds her place between fear and desire, occupying those affections in particular by which man can be justified most.⁷⁶

Nobody before or after Godfrey made identical arrangements, but his basic idea perfectly accords with the accepted view that well-ordered passions lead to virtues, while immoderate or wrongly used passions lead to vices.

A second classical model for construing a quartet of cardinal vices was offered by those authors who opposed the cardinal virtues to four specific vices. The *Epitome divinarum institutionum* of Lactantius not only mentions the cardinal virtues for the first time in Latin Christian

⁷⁵ Godfrey of Auxerre, *Expositio in Cantica* 2, pp. 168–170: “Prudentia inter tristitiam et timorem ponitur, quia ex occasione praesentis tristitiae timere futuram et melius timore tristari, prudentia est ... Temperantia timorem et laetitiam ex se invicem temperans interponitur. Quin etiam ex timore oritur et in laetitia maxime exercetur ... Iustitia inter laetitiam et desiderium constituitur, quod per eam quisque vere illam desiderat, ad veram laetitiam perducatur ... Fortitudo inter desiderium et tristitiam ponitur, quod in utraque affectione, licet dissimiliter, exerceatur. Fortiter enim sustinendum homini et quod eum molestat et quod optat, illud donec transeat, hoc donec veniat”.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 176–178: “Imprudentia inter timorem et laetitiam statuitur, quod effusio illa laetitiae intemperantis ex imprudentia generetur, et sicut timor iustus initium sapientiae, sic iniustus imprudentiae ... intemperantia inter laetitiam et tristitiam ponitur, quod nec abundare sciant reprobi nec penuriam pati ... Pusillanimitas inter tristitiam et desiderium ponitur, quod non modo tristitiae impatentia, sed indigna etiam desideria certa quaedam sint pusillanimitatis indicia. Evidentius tamen ex concupiscentia pusillanimitas oritur en in tristitia probatur ... Iniustitia inter timorem et desiderium sese ingerit, illos magis occupans affectus per quos potissimum posset homo iustificari”. The four anti-virtues also appear in id., *Super Apocalypsim* 1 (on 1:3), p. 65; *Mariale*, Sermo 1 in assumptione Mariae, p. 234.

literature, but also contains the first reference to a set of four contrasting vices, adopted from the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus: *iniustitia*, *ignavia*, *intemperantia*, *imprudencia*.⁷⁷ In like manner, Cicero's *In Catilinam* contrasts the four virtues with *iniquitas*, *luxuria*, *ignavia*, and *temeritas*.⁷⁸ Cicero's list was copied by several medieval authors⁷⁹ and adapted by Jerome, who introduced the scheme *stultitia*, *iniquitas*, *luxuria*, and (as fortitude's opposite) *formido*, *timor*, or *temeritas*;⁸⁰ similar lists can be found in a number of early medieval writings.⁸¹ Also, the four literal negatives of the cardinal virtues (*imprudencia*, *iniustitia*, etc.) occasionally appear in Augustine's work.⁸²

In the twelfth century, references to the opposition between the cardinal virtues and their four counterparts became frequent in moral literature. Various lists of four vices opposing the cardinal virtues appear in such different genres as preaching, exegesis, and historiography, as well as in John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*.⁸³ Not all of these instances neces-

⁷⁷ See above, p. 12.

⁷⁸ See Cicero, *In Catilinam* 2.25, p. 22.

⁷⁹ See Isidore of Sevilla, *Etymologiae* 2.21.5; Hugh of Bologna, *Rationes dictandi prosaice*, p. 59 (with *lascivia* replacing *luxuria*); Transmundus, *Introductiones dictandi* 16.3, p. 80 (idem); Jean Gerson, *Claro eruditioni*, p. 206 (with *ignavia* and *temeritas* both opposing fortitude and *malitia* opposing prudence).

⁸⁰ See above, p. 21.

⁸¹ See Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* 2.49.76, CCSL 143: 105–106 (*ignavia*, *amor suus*, *timor*, *delectio*; similarly Hugh of Fouillois, *De claustris animae* 2.20 and 3.15, PL 176: 1074B–C, 1116B–C); John Scot Eriugena, *De divina praedestinatione* 10.3, CCCM 50: 64 (*imprudencia*, *iniustitia*, *ignavia*, *cupiditas/metus/tristitia/iactantia*). See also Cassiodorus, *De anima* 7, cited above, p. 57.

⁸² See Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 2.15, CCSL 29: 264; *De duabus animabus* 5, CSEL 25: 55–56; *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 39.9, CCSL 38: 432 (with *luxuria* and *ignavia* opposing prudence and fortitude, perhaps under Cicero's influence); *Ep.* 167.5, CSEL 44: 592–593. Cf. Julian Pomerius, *De vita contemplativa* 3.18.1, PL 59: 501B: Christians agree with “philosophorum illa sententia, qua quattuor virtutes, velut quosdam virtutum omnium fontes, vitia quoque quattuor, velut quosdam origines malorum omnium definiunt”; Remigius of Auxerre, *Commentum in Martianum Capellam* (7.369.21), 2: 187: “Quattuor vitia sunt contraria quattuor virtutibus” (without specifying the four vices; cf. Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae* 7.734, p. 264: “hominum etiam quattuor aetates, quattuor vitia quattuorque virtutes”).

⁸³ See *Glossa ordinaria* (Gen. 14:1), PL 113: 119A (unspecified); Godfrey of Babion, *Enarrationes in Matthaeum* 9, PL 162: 1328B (unspecified); Peter Lombard (Pseudo-Hildegard of Lavardin), *Sermo* 4, PL 171: 355C–D (*libido*, *inana gloria*, *gastrimargia*, *ira*, referring to Joel 1:4), cf. *ibid.* 58, 625C; *ibid.* 23, 446D (*laetitia mundialis*, *immoderata tristitia*, *hypocrisis*, *superbia*); Wolbero of Sankt Pantaleon, *Commentaria in Canticum*, PL 195: 1226A–B (*stultitia*, *iniquitas*, *luxuria*, *formido*); John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* 4.12, CCCM 118: 273 (*iniuria*, *iniustitia*, *contumelia*, *dolus*); Martin of León, *Expositio Apocalypsis* (on 7:1), PL 209: 340B: (*injustitia*, *imprudencia*, *debilitas*, *intemperantia*);

sarily imply the view that all moral evil can be reduced to four main vices; sometimes, the cardinal virtues are contrasted with four specific evils which do not appear to comprise every possible sin. Alan of Lille, for example, mentions four vices opposing the cardinal virtues in *De virtutibus et de vitiis* as well as in his *Theologicae regulae*, but devotes much more attention in both works to the seven capital vices.⁸⁴ The same thing happens in a small but popular fourteenth-century moral treatise titled *De doctrina virtutum et fuga vitiorum*.⁸⁵ According to Alan's colleague Hubertus (fl. 1194/1200), however, *imprudencia*, *iniustitia*, *infortitudo*, and *intemperantia* constitute the four *generalissima vitia* which engender all other vices in the same way as the cardinal virtues give birth to all virtues.⁸⁶ In a similar vein, Praepositinus of Cremona views the cardinal virtues as shields against all four possible forms of sin: in thought, speech, deed, and habit.⁸⁷ One generation later, Philip the Chancellor

Henry of Huntingdon, *Historia Anglorum* Prol., pp. 1–2: in Homer's work, Ulysses incorporates prudence, Agamemnon fortitude, Nestor temperance, Menelaos justice, Ajax imprudence, Priamus *debilitas*, Achilles intemperance, Paris injustice, while the Bible assigns justice to Abraham, fortitude to Moses, temperance to Jacob, prudence to Joseph, injustice to Achab, *invalidudo* to Ozias, intemperance to Manasse, imprudence to Roboam; Absalon of Springiersbach, *Sermo* 28, PL 211: 166C–167A: the cardinal virtues protect the Church against *ignorantia boni*, *immoderata delectatio seculi*, *timor adversitatis*, and *affectus inordinatae dilectionis*. For examples from Cistercian writing, see above, pp. 105–106, nn. 172–173, and p. 109.

⁸⁴ Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis* 2.2, p. 76 (four literal negatives); *Theologicae regulae* 89, PL 210: 668C (*intemperantia*, *imprudencia*, *iniustitia*, *infidelitas*, *desperatio*). Cf. id., sermon cited in Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires* 1: 327 with 2: 246 n. 13: the cardinal virtues fight against four *rotae mundi*: changing fortune, *vilitas humana*, *varietas mundana*, *vanitas diabolica*.

⁸⁵ *De doctrina virtutum et fuga vitiorum*, MS Troyes, BM 1987, f. 54^{va} (15th century; Bloomfield 4313, 4449 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4313, 4449): “*Virtutum lesio*. Quatuor sunt que prudenciam, fortitudinem, temperanciam, et iusticiam ledunt, scilicet amor ineptus, odium, timor seruilis, et compendium lucra”; the text expands on the deadly sins at ff. 54^{vb}–55^{ra}. The work survives in some dozen 15th-century MSS; it is sometimes ascribed to Francesco d'Ascoli or della Marca († after 1334) and to an otherwise unknown Petrobono of Mantua. Francesco's authorship seems improbable; for a survey of his writings, see Schneider, *Die Kosmologie*, 26–34. Parts of the work are inserted in Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas, *De vitiis et virtutibus* (Bloomfield 4455 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4455), with which it is often confounded.

⁸⁶ Heinzmann, *Die Summe “Colligite Fragmenta”*, 213–214. In fact, the *generalissima vitia* each produce two *generalia vitia* between which the cardinal virtues are situated, and from which all *specialia vitia* take their origin.

⁸⁷ Praepositinus of Cremona, *Tractatus de officiis* 1.08, p. 69: by the four virtues “defleamus IIIor. mala que fecimus, scilicet peccatum cogitationis, locutionis, operis, consuetudinis, et vitemus quatuor ieiunia que non curat Dominus, scilicet ieiumum avari, ieiumum parietis dealbati, ieiumum infirmi, ieiumum fastiditi”.

presented the cardinal virtues as confining the entire realm of moral evil: prudence counters *bonum apparens*, temperance *bonum superfluum*, justice *malum peruersum* or *malum culpa*, and fortitude *malum aduersum* or *malum poenae*. Philip's arrangement recurs in thirteenth-century theology as well as in several fourteenth-century catechetical writings.⁸⁸ A comprehensive understanding of the cardinal vices is also apparent from Bongiovanni of Messina's *Quadripartitus figurarum moralium*. The work consists of moral fables arranged in four books, each of which is devoted to one of the four *magna vitia* opposing the cardinal virtues: *imprudencia* (also called *dementia* in the prologue), *superbia* (opposed to *magnanimitas*, used here instead of fortitude), *avaritia* (opposed to justice), and *luxuria* (also called *intemperantia* in the prologue). All fables included in Bongiovanni's collection warn against particular aspects of these four main vices, which the reader should fight with Christ's help.

Many twelfth-century authors invented their own designations for the four vices, but two particular catalogues recur with some regularity. I know of three twelfth-century texts which introduce *ignorantia*, *infirmetas*, *impietas*, and *cupiditas* as the four principal vices to be healed by the cardinal virtues, with prudence producing good counsel, justice compliance, fortitude support, and temperance medicine.⁸⁹ This arrangement may be a variant of the much better known series of the four evils resulting from original sin (*ignorantia*, *impotentia* or *infirmetas*, *malitia*, *concupiscentia*) which the cardinal virtues should cure, a motif which originated in twelfth-century Cistercian preaching,⁹⁰ made its way into Franciscan theology and preaching from the

⁸⁸ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, pp. 747–748; cf. John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione* 3.2.13, p. 164; Richard Fishacre, *In tertium librum Sententiarum* 33, p. 122; Albert the Great, *Summa de bono* 1.6.1, p. 79; *De septem virtutibus*, MS Cambridge, Corpus Christi 63, f. 131^v (ca. 1300; Bloomfield 2247 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2247); [Catechetical compendium], MS Oxford, Merton 144, f. 135^{ib} (14th century; Bloomfield 2748 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 2748).

⁸⁹ *De quatuor principalibus uirtutibus*, MS Vendôme, BM 148, f. 93^{r-v} (12th century; Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 4442a; edited in Appendix II); *Commentarius in Nahum* 19, PL 96: 716C–717A (written by an unknown Victorine author); Thomas the Cistercian, *Commentaria in Cantica canticorum* 1, PL 206: 70D–71A.

⁹⁰ Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermo de voluntate divina* 1, *Opera* 6.1: 37–39; id., *Sermones de diversis* 117, *ibid.* 395; cf. id., *Sententiae* 3.121, *Opera* 6.2: 229; Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermo* 55.20–25, CCCM 2B: 86–88; id., *De spiritali amicitia* 2.49, CCCM 1: 311. Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermo de diversis* 72.2, *Opera* 6.1: 308, exhorting those who are tempted by impiety to arm themselves with fortitude, while temperance suits those who are attracted, prudence those who do not know better, and justice those who follow temptations; cf. id., *Sententiae* 3.21, *Opera* 6.2: 77. This arrangement recurs in

thirteenth century,⁹¹ and from there percolated to such various works as the *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, the *Summa de virtutibus* of William Peraldus (and hence to Stephen of Bourbon's *De materiis praedicabilibus*, Álvaro Pelayo's *Speculum regum*, etcetera), an anonymous moral compendium written about 1300, and Gerald of Odo's commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*⁹²—a beautiful example of how ideas about the virtues could move back and forth between monastic, academic, pastoral, and educational genres. Thirteenth-century sources commonly attribute the scheme to Bede, but in fact it first appeared in two sermons of Bernard of Clairvaux.⁹³

A number of texts from the Later Middle Ages present the cardinal virtues and four contrary vices as being engaged in an armed struggle, in obvious analogy to the *Psychomachia*. This development seems likewise to have originated in the twelfth century.⁹⁴ One of the first to

Pseudo-Augustinus Belgicus, *Sermones*, p. 217, and [Notes on the virtues and vices], MS Paris, BnF lat. 585, f. 120^{vb} (ca. 1300; Bloomfield 5948 with Newhauser and Bejczy, *A Supplement* 5948).

⁹¹ See Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in libros Sententiarum* (version L) III.33, 3: 403; John of La Rochelle, *De divisione animae* 3.1.2 and 3.2.13, pp. 139, 165 (connecting, moreover, each evil to one mental faculty); id., *Sermones de adventu* 1, p. 73; Odo Rigaldi, cited in Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 160, 163; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* III.33.4, *Opera* 3: 720; Peter of Aquila, *Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum* III.33; Pierre de la Palud, cited in Graf, *De subiecto virtutum cardinalium* 2: 226.

⁹² See *Summa virtutum de remediis anime*, p. 57; William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.1.2, p. 282b; Álvaro Pelayo, *Speculum regum*, 1: 432; Stephen of Bourbon, *De septem donis* 5.6, MS Paris, BnF lat. 15970, f. 545^{va}; *De septem virtutibus*, MS Cambridge, Corpus Christi 63, f. 130^r; Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 3 q. 25, f. 55^{ra}. For slightly different arrangements, see Innocent III, *Sermo de sanctis* 24, PL 217: 563B–C (*impotentia/fragilitas*—fortitude, *ignorantia/simplicitas*—prudence, *industria/malignitas*—justice, *negligentia/securitas*—temperance); Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum* 4.12, p. 203 (*ignorantia*—prudence, *malitia*—justice, *impotentia*—fortitude; temperance serves *ad moderandum delectabilia*).

⁹³ For the attribution to Bede, see previous notes (Alexander, Gerald, *Summa virtutum*, Peraldus, Álvaro, Stephen) and John of La Rochelle, *De divisione animae* 3.2.2, p. 139. The scheme of the four evils is likewise ascribed to Bede (but not contrasted with the cardinal virtues) in Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in libros Sententiarum* II.33, 2: 322; id., *Summa theologiae* I (129) arg. 2, 1: 198; II (502) arg. 1, 2: 716–717; III (26–32), 3: 40–47; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* II.22 dub. 2, *Opera* 2: 528; id., *Hexaëmeron* 1.4.6, p. 102.

⁹⁴ See, e.g., Hugh of Rouen (of Reading), *Dialogi (Quaestiones theologiae)* 7.1, PL 192: 1231A: the cardinal virtues subdue imprudence, injustice, *debilitas*, and intemperance in a constant war; Helinand of Froidmont, *Sermo* 26, PL 212: 699C–700A (cf. *ibid.* 3, 500C–D): the cardinal virtues constitute the four divisions of the army which assails the devil; prudence forms the vanguard and struggles with ignorance and error; fortitude (which deals with hardship and adversity) and temperance (which deals with carnal

stage a battle between the cardinal virtues and four opposing vices—and possibly also the first to call these vices *vitia cardinalia*—was the Benedictine abbot Godfrey of Admont. Preaching to his monks on the first vision of Daniel (Dan. 7), Godfrey interprets the four beasts arising from the great sea as the cardinal vices *imprudencia*, *intemperantia*, *incontinentia*, and *iniustitia*, which wage war upon the cardinal virtues in the human heart.⁹⁵ In another sermon, Godfrey confirms that all moral goodness and all moral evil flow from the cardinal virtues and cardinal vices, respectively.⁹⁶ Another remarkable example is *De origine virtutum et vitiorum*, written in the early thirteenth century by an anonymous English author. The treatise opens with the statement that human beings are created in order to know, love, obey, and enjoy the Creator. To fulfil these four obligations, humans dispose of reason (*ratio*), will (*voluntas*), a capacity or willingness to act (*facultas*), and joy (*alacritas*), respectively. These are the four natural potencies of the mind (not to be confounded with the four passions) which humans can transform into virtues thanks to divine grace. Faith and prudence are founded in reason, charity and justice in the will, fortitude and temperance in *facultas*, hope in joy. As a result of the Fall, however, the four potencies of the mind stand under pressure from four *petulantiae* of the flesh: *sensus*, *affectus*, *impetus*, and *libido*. When the *petulantiae* succeed in perverting the potencies of the mind, reason turns into *fatuitas*, the will into *iniquitas*, *facultas* into *impetus sensualitatis* and *imbecillitas rationalitatis*, *alacritas* into *libido*. Together, *fatuitas*, *iniquitas*, *imbecillitas*, and *impetus* constitute the four cardinal vices which militate against prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, respectively. Their leader is *superbia*, the *vitium generalissimum* which counteracts the *virtus generalissima*, humility (an arrangement which reminds one of Godfrey of Auxerre, who likewise made pride and humility the commanders of the cardinal virtues and the cardinal vices).⁹⁷ To put these relations into a table:

and worldly enticements) occupy the left and right wings, respectively, while justice fights vainglory in the rear; John of Abbeville († 1237/38), interpolations in Thomas the Cistercian, *Commentaria in Cantica*, PL 206: 117C (“Curus Pharaonis, malitiae sunt Satanae, qui contra fideles animas velut in quatuor rotis militat, in quatuor vitiis quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus oppositis”), 415D–416A. See also above, n. 83 (Alan of Lille).

⁹⁵ Godfrey of Admont, *Homiliae in Scripturam* 15, PL 174:1119D–1120B. Godfrey also mentions the different parts of the cardinal vices and connects each of them with the age at which humans are prone to them.

⁹⁶ Id., *Homiliae dominicales* 77, PL 174: 544A. Yet the vices attack four essential human goods in particular: humility, charity, chastity, and perseverance.

⁹⁷ See Godfrey of Auxerre, *Expositio in Cantica* 6 sermo 3, p. 516.

<i>potentiae animi</i>	<i>virtutes</i>	<i>petulantiae carnis</i>	<i>vitia</i>
rationalitas	fides prudentia	sensus	fatuitas
voluntas	caritas iustitia	affectus	iniquitas
facultas	fortitudo temperantia	impetus	imbecillitas rationalitatis impetus sensualitatis
alacritas	spes	libido	libido

As the table shows, the potencies of the mind produce seven virtues, the *petulantiae* of the flesh five moral defects; however, the author singles out the four cardinal virtues and opposes them to four corresponding defects which he calls the cardinal vices. He even defines vice as a corruption of the cardinal virtues in particular.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the capital vices appear later in the treatise as chieftains in the army of vices which assault human nature.

In view of these many examples, is quite ironical that Durand of Saint Pourçain in his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* should have used the absence of a scheme of cardinal vices in moral thought as a possible argument against the validity of the scheme of the cardinal virtues.⁹⁹ Schemes of four cardinal vices were actually construed time and again in the late medieval period, albeit much more often in pastoral than in academic sources. The only theologian known to me who refers to the scheme in a commentary on the *Sententiae* is Robert Kilwardby. Asking himself why the cardinal virtues are needed if charity is the fullness of the law (Rom. 13:11), Kilwardby argues that these virtues are necessary to combat the four vices (*iniustitia*, *intemperantia*, etcetera) opposed to them.¹⁰⁰ The relative absence of the cardinal vices in academic theology is indeed remarkable, the more so as deriving the main vices from the scheme of the cardinal virtues agrees with the theological understanding of vice as virtue's negative.

⁹⁸ *De origine virtutum*, p. 141: "Est autem vitium depravatio illarum predictarum quatuor virtutum cardinalium ex prima prevaricatione contracta"; cf. *ibid.*: "Porro vitium proprie dicitur corruptio virtutis sive detrimentum".

⁹⁹ Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.5 arg. 2, f. 273^{ra}.

¹⁰⁰ Robert Kilwardby, *Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 25, p. 87. At q. 31, pp. 118–119, he declares that the four virtues prevent every possible sin.

Subverting Aristotle

The above sections have shown that medieval moral literature displays two conflicting ways of opposing the virtues to the vices that transcend mere juxtaposition. In what is probably the majority of cases, the vices figure as dominant concepts on which the construction of the virtues depends. Usually, the authors employ the scheme of the capital vices. Sometimes these vices are contrasted with the theological and cardinal virtues, but more often with other concepts, in particular with the contrary or remedial virtues which directly mirror the vices. When, by contrast, the virtues are dominant, the theological and cardinal virtues normally come to the foreground. Sometimes these virtues are contrasted with the capital vices, but more often with other vices conceived as specific counterparts of the seven principal virtues. From the twelfth century, numerous texts notably oppose the cardinal virtues to four principal vices, sometimes likewise called “cardinal” and believed to comprise all moral evil.

This phenomenon is easily observed at the surface of medieval moral treatises. Beneath it lay two different approaches of the moral subject: one focusing on man’s inclination to evil, the other on man’s desire for goodness. Although both approaches emerge in the same genres of moral writing, taking the vices as a point of departure appears to be typical of pastoral literature. The professional concern of pastoral authors with saving souls led many of them to represent the human condition as a struggle against sin, the realm of which was conveniently covered by the scheme of the capital vices. By contrast, learned theologians habitually conceived the human being as potentially good, and therefore capable of living in accordance with the seven principal virtues.

The tendency of medieval theologians in particular to evaluate human morality in terms of man’s capacity for virtue agrees much better with classical moral philosophy than the preoccupation with man’s sinful tendencies as it is found in pastoral literature. Yet I believe that the idea of fallen human nature limited the receptivity to the ethical theories of antiquity of even those medieval authors who concentrated on the advancement of virtue. In the remainder of this chapter I attempt to validate this belief by investigating the presence in medieval virtue theory of three assumptions contingent upon the account of the Fall and the ensuing need of redemption. First of all, the account of the Fall entails the idea that morality, goodness, and virtue depend primarily on the human will. The first man did not sin out of ignorance but by a wil-

ful act, and it is only by directing his will to the good that postlapsarian man can hope to live in virtue. Second, the Fall affects all human beings in the same degree: every man and woman is involved in the struggle between good and evil, must make the same sort of choices, and will face the same sort of consequences. Morality and virtue hence concern all human beings alike. A third assumption is that moral strife concerns the individual good: what is at stake in the human struggle between good and evil is the salvation or damnation of individual human souls. The voluntarism (and accompanying intentionalism), egalitarianism, and individualism inherent in medieval moral thought upset some basic premises of Aristotelian ethics in particular. Yet these notions survived even in the context of philosophical virtue theory and caused numerous masters to mould Aristotle's thought into Christian shape.

Voluntarism and Intentionalism

Classical moral philosophy never distinguished the will as a separate psychological reality, let alone as the mental foundation of virtue. According to Plato's famous allegory, the chariot of the soul is steered by reason and pulled by emotion and desire. Reason holds the reins in this allegory, while the will is absent. Medieval moral authors placed the will in the role of Plato's charioteer, so to speak, with reason sitting next to her in order to read the map and look out for the road signs—making correct observations all the time, but never being sure of the will's readiness to listen, like a bad couple on a holiday ride.

The formal recognition of the will as a fourth power the soul is the work of Thomas Aquinas, but the Christian conception of the will as the seedbed of virtue obviously goes back to Augustine and is easily explained if one considers the notion of virtue as a gift of God which secures salvation. Salvation is understood as a reward and thus requires merit on the part of the human being. And merit is only conceivable in the Christian conception as depending on free choice, and hence on the will. The gratuitous character of virtue does not change anything in this respect, for the freedom of the will lies precisely in its capacity to either accept or refuse the gifts offered by divine grace. In order to illustrate this last doctrine, some twelfth-century theologians compare the moral subject to a patient in need of medical care: although it is the physician (God), not the patient, who accomplishes the healing (an effect of grace), there would be no healing without the patient's decision to see his doctor

(an act of free will involving merit).¹⁰¹ Thirteenth-century theologians and pastoral authors introduced a different metaphor: even if it is the sun (God) which gives light, houses would remain dark if the inhabitants would not freely decide to open the shutters and let the sunshine in.¹⁰²

The idea that virtue resides in the will, reaffirmed in moral thought from the twelfth century, receives increasing emphasis in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholasticism, as has been argued in the previous chapter. Even if late medieval masters disagree as to which virtues relate in which ways to which powers of the soul, they generally hold that virtue is voluntary in nature. Ulrich of Strasbourg, for instance, considers the will as the cause of all moral and even intellectual virtues,¹⁰³ while William of Ockham argues that only habits of the will can be intrinsically virtuous; indeed, moral virtue is a *habitus virtuosus voluntatis*.¹⁰⁴ Similar claims are found in the work of lay authors and early humanists. John of Legnano holds that all moral virtues reside in the will and are the products of wilful acts regulated by right reason;¹⁰⁵ Francis Petrarch insists that willing the good is the root and the foremost part of virtue;¹⁰⁶ Coluccio Salutati characterizes virtue as “something voluntary, which is achieved by the will alone”.¹⁰⁷ To be sure, not every late medieval author adheres to voluntarism in the strict sense, that is, the view that the will can

¹⁰¹ See Laborans, *De iustitia et iusto* 2.9, p. 31; Peter Abelard, *Commentaria in Ad Romanos* 4 (on 9:21), CCCM 11: 240; id., *Sententiae Abaelardi* 34, PL 178: 1755D; *Sententiae Parisienses*, p. 60; *Commentarius cantabrigiensis in epistolas Pauli* (on Rom. 7:19), 1: 98.

¹⁰² See, e.g., William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 3.11.1, p. 174; William of Auvergne, *De virtutibus* 12, p. 161a; William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 1.3, p. 21.

¹⁰³ See Ulrich of Strasbourg, *De summo bono* 6.2.1, p. 266.

¹⁰⁴ See William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta* 3.15 and 3.18, *Opera theologica* 9: 253–257, 273; *Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum* q. 11, *Opera theologica* 6: 358, 363 ff.; see also King, “Ockham’s Ethical Theory”, 240.

¹⁰⁵ John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 168^{ra}: “conclusum est omnes virtutes morales existere in appetitu voluntatis et ipsas produci ex actibus interioribus voluntatis, scilicet ex electionibus rectis et recta ratione regulatis”. Yet John sustains Aquinas’s idea that each cardinal virtue resides in one mental faculty; see above, p. 161 n. 103.

¹⁰⁶ See Petrarch, *De remediis* 1.119 and 2.104, 1: 320, 3: 252. For Petrarch’s voluntarism, see also Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness*, 47–48.

¹⁰⁷ Coluccio Salutati, *Ep.* 12.4, *Epistolario* 3: 462: “virtus autem sic voluntarium quidam est, quod ipsa voluntate sola perficitur”; trans. “A Letter to Francesco Zarabella”, p. 181. Cf. *ibid.*: “quod virtus sit vel virtuosus a sola provenit voluntate”. For Salutati’s voluntarism, see also Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness*, 63 ff., 84 ff.

always move independently from, and even contrary to, rational insight. Yet it is no exaggeration to say that late medieval virtue theory is permeated with a voluntarist outlook. The will was considered the seat of charity (since patristic times) as well as justice (since Thomas Aquinas, with many antecedents). Justice is the most important moral virtue in Aristotle's system and coincides, as legal or general justice, with all virtue. In the Christian system, charity likewise comprises every other virtue (although this view met with opposition from the late thirteenth century) and in any case underlies all virtuous acts by which humans earn merit. The will thus inevitably emerges as the central element of any philosophical or theological account of virtue. I do not know of late medieval authors who, like Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Abelard in the twelfth century, identify the right will with virtue itself, although such an identification is suggested by the definition *virtus est bona voluntas* (invariably attributed to Augustine's *De civitate Dei* but in fact spurious) which occurs in a number of thirteenth-century scholastic and pastoral writings.¹⁰⁸

The voluntarism inherent in medieval moral thought controverts the Aristotelian premise that rational insight into the good leads to moral behaviour and the subsequent formation of virtue. Although a number of later medieval masters at least partly subscribe to Aristotle's view¹⁰⁹—as we have seen, most commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* accept the idea that the intellectual virtue of prudence entails the moral virtues—many others not only endorse voluntarist ideas but even retroproject those ideas on Aristotle's system. The partial twelfth-century translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* known as the *Ethica vetus* contains the phrases *virtus est habitus voluntarius* and *virtutes autem voluntates quedam, vel non sine voluntate*. Thirteenth-century authors regularly quote these phrases, sometimes in a form which reinforces their voluntarist aspect such as *nulla virtus est sine voluntate*.¹¹⁰ Although Grosseteste in his

¹⁰⁸ Introduced by Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 525, 533, the definition recurs, e.g., in John of La Rochelle, *De divisione animae* 3.2.4, p. 149; Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in libros Sententiarum* II.27.9–10, pp. 259–260; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* II.27 dub. 3, *Opera* 2: 672; Giovanni Marchesini (?), *Centiloquium* 3.36, p. 405.

¹⁰⁹ See Graf, *De subiecto virtutum cardinalium* 2: 156–167 (Godfrey of Fontaines), 203–214 (John of Pouilly, Guido Terreni).

¹¹⁰ See Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea* (*Ethica vetus*) 2.6 (1106b36) and 2.4 (1106a3–4), pp. 14, 12; Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, pp. 590, 596 (second phrase); Albert the Great, *De bono* 1.5.1, pp. 67, 74–75 (both phrases; see also Müller, *Natürliche*

translation replaced *voluntas* and *voluntativus* with *electio* and *electivus*, respectively,¹¹¹ commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* continued to use both phrases in order to connect virtue with the will and with intention.¹¹² Indeed, Grosseteste himself states in the notes accompanying his translation that moral virtue, according to Aristotle, centres *circa voluntates et tristicias*, even if Aristotle's actual formula is, in Grosseteste's own translation, *circa delectaciones et tristicias*.¹¹³ Later medieval commentators moreover infer from a passage in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.3 that *velle* is one of virtue's requirements, next to *scire* and *immutabiliter operari*.¹¹⁴ Influential masters such as Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, John Buridan, and others go so far as to claim that Aristotle locates all moral virtues in the will,¹¹⁵ while the commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* active at the Parisian arts faculty around 1300 credit Aristotle with Aquinas's view that justice is the virtue which regulates the will; moreover, these commentators argue, again under Aquinas's influence, that Aristotle's notion of justice agrees with its definition in Roman law as a

Moral, 182–193, for an assessment of the will in Albert's theory of virtue); Bonaventure, *Commentaria in libros Sententiarum* II.27 dub. 3, *Opera* 2: 672 (first phrase); John of La Rochelle, *De divisione animae* 3.2.4, p. 149 (second phrase); Peter of Tarantaise, cited in Graf, *De subiecto virtutum cardinalium* 2: 122 ("nulla virtus est sine voluntate"). Jüssen, "Die Tugend und der gute Wille", argues that on account of these phrases William of Auvergne attributes to Aristotle a close connection of the will and morality.

¹¹¹ *Ethica nicomachea* (recensio pura) 2.6 (1106b36) and 2.4 (1106a3–4), pp. 171, 169; cf. Robert Grosseteste, *Notule* 3.4, MS Oxford, All Souls 84, f. 55^v marg. inf.: "Ostendit quod electio et voluntarium non sunt idem, sed voluntarium in plus ...".

¹¹² See, e.g., Radulphus Brito, *Questiones super Ethicam* 6 q. 138 arg. 1, p. 485: "omnis virtus est habitus electivus; modo electio ad voluntatem pertinet; ideo omnis virtus est habitus voluntarius"; *ibid.* ad 1, p. 487: "omnis virtus sit habitus voluntarius, id est dependens aliquo modo ex voluntate"; Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 2 q. 20, f. 34^{rb}: "in electione includitur appetitus finis qui est intentio".

¹¹³ Robert Grosseteste, *Notule* 2.3, MS Oxford, All Souls 84, f. 45^v marg. inf.: "Conatur probare quod circa voluntates et tristicias est moralis uirtus per hoc quod uirtutes morales sunt circa passiones et actus"; cf. Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea* (recensio recognita) 2.2, p. 399. Cf. Robert Grosseteste, *Dictum* 43, MS Oxford, Bodleian Bodley 798, ff. 31^{vb}–32^{ra}, designating the cardinal and their subordinate virtues as *voluntates*.

¹¹⁴ See, e.g., Radulphus Brito, *Questiones in Ethicam* 5 q. 108, p. 422; cf. Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea* (recensio recognita) 2.3 (1105a31–34), p. 400: "primum quidem si sciens, deinde si eligens, et eligens propter hec, tertium autem et si firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur". See also above, pp. 156–157 nn. 79, 84 for the association of these requirements with the cardinal virtues by Philip the Chancellor, Bonaventure, and Engelbert of Admont.

¹¹⁵ See Graf, *De subiecto virtutum cardinalium* 2: 129–130; John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 1 q. 22, ff. 20^{va}–21^{vb}.

constans et perpetua voluntas.¹¹⁶ In his *Bellum spirituale de conflictu vitiorum et virtutum*, Jean Tigart even attributes this definition to Aristotle himself.¹¹⁷

The retroprojection of medieval voluntarism on the *Nicomachean Ethics* reveals a tendency among the scholastics to conceal the differences between their and Aristotle's understanding of the moral subject. Few masters overtly criticize Aristotle for having insufficient attention for the human will and its autonomy from reason. Even in the case of Scotus and Ockham, who argue on behalf of the freedom of the will that prudence can exist without the moral virtues, such criticism remains implicit. Petrarch's *De ignorantia*, however, contains an outright attack on Aristotle's intellectualism. Petrarch blames Aristotle for failing to meet the goal which he set at the beginning of his *Ethics*, that is, not to impart knowledge but to make people better. Aristotle's excellent analysis of the concept of virtue made Petrarch, following his own words, much more knowledgeable, but meanwhile left his soul untouched, for "it is one thing to know, another thing to love; one thing to understand, another thing to will"; while the object of the will is goodness, the object of the intellect is the truth. Petrarch even claims that it is better to will the good than to know the truth, since we will only reach heaven by the virtues if we love them.¹¹⁸

The voluntarism and intentionalism of medieval moral thought has important consequences for the understanding of virtue as a *habitus*. Before the reception of the *Nicomachean Ethics* set in, medieval authors were already familiar with Aristotle's notion of *habitus* as it was transmitted through his logical works as well as through Roman authors.¹¹⁹ The term *habitus* appears in the two definitions of virtue most frequently

¹¹⁶ See Radulphus Brito, *Questiones super Ethicam* 5 qq. 108, 110, pp. 423, 427; Giles of Orléans, *Questiones in Ethicam* 5 q. 95, MS Paris, BnF lat. 16089, f. 214^{ra}; Anonymi *Questiones super Librum Ethicorum* 5 q. 102, pp. 295–297; *Questiones in Ethicam* 5 q. 93, MS Erlangen, UB 213, f. 64^{vb}; *Questiones in Ethicam* 5 q. 88, MS Erfurt, SB Amplon. F 13, f. 104^{vb}; *Questiones in Ethicam* 5 q. 7, MS Paris, BnF lat. 16110, f. 261^{ra}. I owe these references to Iacopo Costa. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.58.1, *Opera* 9: 9–10, for the agreement between Aristotle and Roman law.

¹¹⁷ Jean Tigart, *Bellum spirituale de conflictu vitiorum et virtutum* 43, MS Paris, BnF lat. 16437, f. 141^v: "vnde philosophus v. ethicorum dicit quod iusticia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum vnicuique tribuens".

¹¹⁸ See Petrarch, *De ignorantia* 4, pp. 314, 318.

¹¹⁹ See Nederman, "Nature, Ethics"; id., "Aristotelian Ethics". An additional early source is Pseudo-Augustine, *Categoriae decem* 12, PL 32: 1433: "Habitus affectio est animi longo tempore perseverans: ut est virtus et disciplina ...".

quoted in the twelfth century, those of Boethius (*habitus mentis bene constitutae*) and Cicero (*animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus*); some authors actually merge both definitions into a single formula.¹²⁰ Even in twelfth-century monastic literature the conception of *habitus* is widely present. In fact, Aristotle's idea of acquiring virtue through industrious application accords well with the monastic principle that assiduously disciplining one's thought and behaviour is the road to virtue.¹²¹ In thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholasticism, the notion of *habitus*, now directly known from Aristotle's *Ethics*, found general acceptance.

But does this mean that medieval authors had a genuinely Aristotelian view of *habitus*? Marcia Colish has argued that in the late twelfth century this was not the case. In her view, even such thinkers as Alan of Lille and Simon of Tournai believe that true virtue requires grace and moreover hold that virtue is conferred *in habitu* by baptism, which is inconsistent with Aristotle's idea of acquiring virtue through application.¹²² Although some Parisian masters including Alan of Lille actually reject Peter Lombard's opinion that baptism confers virtue,¹²³ it is indeed from the late twelfth century that the notion of *habitus* and the notion of acquired virtue, which in Aristotle's conception go together, became detached from each other. Theologians applied the notion of *habitus* not only to the acquired virtues, but also to the virtues infused by grace, even though this practice aroused some opposition around 1200.¹²⁴ Many scholastics

¹²⁰ See William of Conches, *Glosae super Macrobius* (1.8.3): "Est autem haec diffinitio: Virtus est habitus mentis bene constitutae in modum naturae ratione consentanea"; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, p. 74: "Tunc enim bene est constituta mens nostra, cum modum nature sectatur"; cf. John of Salisbury, *Historia pontificalis* 13, p. 34: "in ethicis proprium dicitur esse uirtutis, ut habitum animi bene componat et in modum nature rationem faciat esse conformem".

¹²¹ See Laemers, "Clastrum animae".

¹²² Colish, "Habitus Revisited".

¹²³ See Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis* 1.4, pp. 61–62; Peter the Chanter, *Summa de sacramentis* 7, 24, and 359, pp. 32, 69–81, 520–522; Martinus, *Summa theologica*, MS Paris, BnF lat. 14556, II ff. 352^{vb}–353^{ra}. See also Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 125–142.

¹²⁴ See Stephen Langton, *Summa quaestionum theologiae* CAMB/212 (ed. Ebbesen and Mortensen), p. 164: "quaedam virtutes sunt habitus, sed non omnes ... Sed quid dicemus de virtutibus theologicis, sub qua specie qualitatis comprehenduntur? Magister Petrus dicit quod sub habitu, quia adveniunt adulto per applicationem animi, puero per applicationem baptismi ... Hoc mirum est, cum Apostolus dicat quod virtutes infunduntur in nobis sine nobis, quomodo magister dicat quod veniunt per applicationem". Cf. Roland of Cremona, *Summae liber tercius* 297, p. 834: Boethius's definition of virtue as *habitus mentis bene constitutus* only applies to "politicis habitibus, qui fiunt ex multiplici agere et ex consuetudine"; yet at 299, p. 839, Roland speaks of *habitus infusi*.

call the infused virtues *habitus infusi*¹²⁵ and moreover believe that the acquired virtues can be informed by grace without losing their character of *habitus*.

Even in relation to the acquired virtues, however, the Aristotelian notion of *habitus* raised difficulties for medieval authors, and it is here that their voluntarism and intentionalism came into play. First, Aristotle's idea of acquiring the virtues through repeated action posed a problem. If the intention of the human agent is decisive for the moral quality of his acts, as moral authors generally believed from the twelfth century, how can outer acts of virtue produce a virtuous inner mind? Balancing Aristotle's view with medieval intentionalism, John Buridan admits in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* that outer actions cannot in themselves produce a good disposition. In his view, virtuous habits are not so much generated through repeated virtuous actions as through repeated instances of willing the good.¹²⁶ Solutions like Buridan's may explain how good intentions can be transformed into steadfast habits, but not how human beings can have good intentions in the first place. In fact, Aristotle provides such an explanation by assuming that human beings have an inborn aptitude for the good which they are able to follow and develop through their own effort, a view to which Aristotle's medieval readers generally subscribe.¹²⁷ Yet from a religious perspective, human beings are only capable of embracing the good by accepting divine grace. Thus seen, having good intentions results from

¹²⁵ Cf. John of Saint Edmund (?), *De virtutibus et claustris animae* 2.15, MS Cambridge, Sidney Sussex 85, f. 140^v: "virtus enim est habitus mentis quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur" (replacing *qualitas* with *habitus* in Peter Lombard's definition of virtue).

¹²⁶ See Lines, *Aristotle's Ethics*, 122–123, referring to John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 2 qq. 4–6. Luscombe, "Ethics in the Early Thirteenth Century", 669, attributes a similar opinion to William of Auvergne. Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum* Prol. 4 qq. 1–2 ad 3, *Opera* (Vatican ed.) 16: 59: "electio est primus actus elicited a virtute morali; igitur erit generativus virtutis moralis".

¹²⁷ See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (recensio pura) 2.1, p. 5: "Neque igitur natura neque preter naturam, fiunt virtutes. Set innatis quidem nobis suscipere eas, perfectis autem per assuetudinem"; cf., e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 2.1, p. 77; *Summa theologiae* II.II.108.2, *Opera* 9: 405: "sicut Philosophus dicit, in ii Ethic., aptitudo ad virtutem inest nobis a natura, licet complementum virtutis sit per assuetudinem vel per aliquam aliam causam" (the *alia causa* doubtless refers to grace); Radulphus Brito, *Questiones in Ethicam* 2 q. 45, pp. 285–286; Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de virtutibus* 1, ff. 101^{vb}–102^{va} (notwithstanding their *pronitas ad viciu*m, humans have a natural aptitude for virtue; all depends on free choice); Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.1, f. 271^{rb}–^{vb}; John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 2 q. 1, ff. 21^{vb}–22^{vb}; John Bromyard, *Summa predicantium*, lemma *Virtus*, art. 4 (cited above, p. 203 n. 280).

(infused) virtue, notably from charity, rather than the other way around, as some early-thirteenth-century theologians point out.¹²⁸ Trying to save the Aristotelian and the Christian view on the subject, Hugh Ripelin explains in his *Compendium theologiae veritatis* that performing moral acts enables humans to acquire moral virtues (thus, *actus generant habitus*), whereas the infused virtues allow humans to do good and meritorious works (*habitus generant actus*).¹²⁹ Hugh's opinion, which recurs in the Dominican *Summa rudium*,¹³⁰ implies a recognition that the philosophical and the theological conceptions of virtue are irreconcilable on this point.

A second aspect of the concept of *habitus* which entailed difficulties for medieval thinkers is its steadfast nature. According to the Book of Proverbs, the just man falls seven times a day (Prov. 24:16). Following Aristotle, this would mean that the just man is too little steadfast to be actually considered just and virtuous. Although Abelard, in apparent agreement with Aristotle, indeed excludes any mental attitude susceptible to change from the range of virtue, late medieval theologians propose more moderate views. We have seen that according to Hugh Ripelin and others, believers are capable through sin of losing the gratuitous state of their virtues, which nevertheless subsist as acquired habits. Ironically, the requirement of steadfastness thus only applies to the acquired virtues, while informed virtue (the highest form of virtue from a theological perspective) is considered volatile. Moreover, the twelfth-century distinction between *habitus* on the one hand and *usus* or *actus* on the other allowed medieval masters to claim that virtuous habits remain intact as interior attitudes even if they are apparently contradicted by a moral agent's outer conduct.¹³¹ Accordingly, Aquinas in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* does not follow Aristotle's idea that moral dispositions determine one's actions, but argues instead that virtuous persons always

¹²⁸ Luscombe, "Ethics in the Early Thirteenth Century", 669, ascribes this opinion to Richard Fishacre. See also Gunther of Pairis, *De oratione, jejunio et elemosyna* 13.3, PL 212: 218B: "Habitum hic dicimus qualitatem mentis, quam contrahit ex hoc quod charitate informatur; actum vero opus ipsius virtutis"; Odo Rigaldi, cited by Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 3: 184 n. 3: "non concordant sancti et theologi philosophis, quia non dicunt ex actibus relinqui habitus uirtutum sicut dicebant philosophi; immo dicunt habitus uirtutum esse ex infusione et ex eis elici actus".

¹²⁹ Hugh Ripelin, *Compendium* 5.17, p. 166.

¹³⁰ *Summa rudium* 25, sig. h5^{vb}.

¹³¹ Thus, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.52.3 and 71.4, *Opera* 6: 336, 7: 6-7.

can (but do not have to) act virtuously, while vicious persons can stop being vicious with great effort.¹³² The will has thus an autonomy not only from rational insight, but also from virtuous and vicious habits.

From the late thirteenth century, the steadfast character of Aristotelian *habitus* gave rise to serious concerns. If human behaviour is regulated by permanent virtuous habits, how can the will still be said to act freely and, hence, morally? In reaction to this challenge, masters such as Henry of Ghent, Scotus, and Buridan argue that the will does not really need habits to act virtuously, but that habits make moral acts easier and more pleasant, more perfect, or more “intensely” virtuous.¹³³ Other fourteenth-century masters doubt the added value of habits for moral acts,¹³⁴ or even deny it. Thus, William of Ockham and Adam Wodeham († 1358) claim that acts coming from the free will earn far more merit with God than any virtuous habit.¹³⁵ In like manner, but in a philosophical rather than theological context, John of Legnano declares good acts performed through the free will alone, before the formation of any virtue, more praiseworthy than good acts which more or less automatically result from steadfast virtuous habits.¹³⁶ Following this line of reasoning, virtuous habits make it so easy for the will to do the good that they actually diminish its moral achievement. The Carmelite theologian Robert of Walsingham († ca. 1313), a follower of Henry of Ghent, even refuses to locate virtue in the will because virtue, as a steadfast habit, would annul the will’s liberty.¹³⁷ Despite, then, their apparent approval of Aristotle’s view that good acts generate virtuous habits which make permanent moral conduct possible, numerous medieval moral authors tend to think that the good will is all

¹³² Id., *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 1.16 and 3.12, pp. 58, 154.

¹³³ See Kent, “Rethinking Moral Dispositions”, 361; ead., *Virtues of the Will*, esp. 224–254. For John Duns Scotus, see *Ordinatio* I.17.1.1–2, *Opera* (Vatican ed.) 5: 154: “absolute non indiget habitu ad operandum; tamen minus perfecte operatur sine habitu quam cum habitu”; see also Ingham, “*Ea quae sunt ad finem*”, 190–191. See also Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de virtutibus* 2 ad 22, f. 104^{vb}: although we are capable of moral acts before the acquisition of virtue, “actus tamen post habitum acquisitum sunt magis intensi”. In contrast to these masters, Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 2 q. 8, f. 31^{va}, holds that a virtuous choice is impossible without both moral virtue and prudence.

¹³⁴ See Francis of Meyronnes, *In quatuor libros Sententiarum* III.33–37 q. 2.10, f. 174^{va}: habits make one act *prompte, facilliter, delectabiliter*, and *perfecte*, but acts preceding the formation of habits may be more perfect and intense than acts resulting from them; cf. Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* II.23.2, ff. 252^{va}–253^{rb}: the intensity of acts is only magnified *per accidens* by moral habits.

¹³⁵ See Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, 189, 198, 248.

¹³⁶ See John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 128^{vb}.

¹³⁷ See Graf, *De subiecto virtutum cardinalium* 2: 214–216.

that really matters—a good will which may generate from other factors than good acts, which may come and go at any moment, and which even if present does not guarantee actual moral behaviour.

Egalitarianism

From Aristotle's point of view, "anyone who wishes to become virtuous would do well to be a citizen (free, Greek, and male) of a suitably well-organized community", as Bonnie Kent has observed with good humour, adding that even under these conditions disadvantages of birth can make the acquisition of virtues impossible.¹³⁸ In effect, Aristotle's virtue of magnificence, which consists in spending large sums of money for the common good, is only found among the social elite; ordinary people who try to become magnificent make themselves ridiculous, as Aristotle says in so many words.¹³⁹ The virtue of magnanimity, which involves the aspiration after greatness by men of great distinction, is by its very nature not accessible to ordinary people either. The common run of men are thus excluded in Aristotle's system from developing some of the moral virtues and hence from all of them, given Aristotle's doctrine that the moral virtues cannot exist apart from each other.¹⁴⁰ The moral subject of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is in fact a self-conscious gentleman who gains merit (not with God, but in his own esteem) through his operations in the public atmosphere. Virtues are not innate according to Aristotle, but only born male aristocrats are capable of acquiring them.

In comparison to Aristotle's elitism, medieval moral thought strikes one as being radically egalitarian. The need to propagate the cardinal virtues among the common people was stressed time and again from the Early Middle Ages, while hagiographers attributed the cardinal virtues to male as well as female saints, and to prelates and political leaders as well as to hermits and simple virgins. Admittedly, numerous monastic authors boasted that a truly virtuous life is only possible in the cloister,

¹³⁸ Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 115.

¹³⁹ Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea* 4.5 (recensio pura), p. 210: "Propter quod inops quidem, non erit magnificus ... Temptans autem, insipiens".

¹⁴⁰ See *Ethica nicomachea* 6.13. The problem has been the object of scholarly debate: are all virtues really connected in Aristotle's system, or do magnificence and magnanimity stand apart? See Irwin, "Disunity in the Aristotelian Virtues"; Kraut, "Comments on 'Disunity in the Aristotelian Virtues'"; Irwin, "Disunity in the Aristotelian Virtues: A Reply"; Gardiner, "Aristotle's Basic and Non-Basic Virtues". See also Hoffmann, "Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on Magnanimity", 121–122.

but then entering the cloistered life was not restricted in the Middle Ages to a born elite of males. Far from being conceived as a prerequisite to virtue, material wealth counted as an obstacle to entering the kingdom of heaven, while poverty (either spiritual or material) was traditionally praised as a virtue. Many patristic and early medieval authors considered greed as one of the most serious deadly sins and tended to associate it with the rich, notwithstanding Augustine's efforts to interpret greed as a mental state independent of one's actual possessions.¹⁴¹ This attitude persisted in later centuries, notwithstanding the massive growth of a money economy. An impressive number of high medieval authors—not only monastic hardliners but also intellectuals as Peter Abelard, John of Salisbury, and Peter Comestor—distrust all riches as seedbeds of vice,¹⁴² even though some of their contemporaries claim that a responsible use of temporal goods may result in virtue.¹⁴³ As late as the mid-fourteenth century, Petrarch could still affirm that “poverty is the best wet nurse for the virtues; opulence, the best for the vices.”¹⁴⁴

The numerous references in medieval moral literature to women who possess the cardinal virtues suggests that virtue, in the medieval conception, not only extends to all social classes but also to both sexes. Indeed, the cardinal virtues were regularly attributed to female moral subjects from the fourth century. We have seen that Jerome (who once wrote “we judge the virtues by somebody's state of mind, not by his sex”)¹⁴⁵ associated the cardinal virtues with his female followers Paula, Eustochium, and Paulina. In a homily which survives in Jerome's Latin translation, Origen ascribed the four virtues to the Virgin Mary;¹⁴⁶ from the late eleventh century, associations of Mary with the four virtues became a common phenomenon.¹⁴⁷ Especially celebrated is the view of Bernard of

¹⁴¹ See Newhauser, *The Early History of Greed*.

¹⁴² See Peter Abelard, *Sermo* 33, PL 178: 594B; John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* 5.9, 5.17, 6.24 etc. (ed. Webb) 1: 322, 358; 2: 71; Peter Comestor, *Sermo* 14, PL 198: 1763D. See also *Carmina burana* 1.3 (*Manus ferens munera*), 1.1: 1, on the incompatibility of money and justice.

¹⁴³ See *Moralium dogma* 5, p. 69: any responsible use of temporal goods (*utile*) is *honestum*. Hildebert of Lavardin, *Epp.* 1.10 and 1.12, PL 171: 163A, 176C–D, condemns striving for riches as dangerous to virtue, but states *ibid.* 1.7 and 1.12, 154B–C, 184A–B, that all gifts of God, including material wealth, are either virtues or sources for virtue.

¹⁴⁴ Petrarch, *De remediis utriusque fortunae* 1.100, 1: 272.

¹⁴⁵ Jerome, *Ep.* 127.5, CSEL 56: 149: “uirtutes non sexu sed animo iudicamus”; see also Colish, *The Stoic Tradition* 2: 90, who presents here and elsewhere the equality of the sexes, especially with regard to virtue, as a Stoic doctrine.

¹⁴⁶ Origen, *Homiliae in Lucam* 8.4, p. 168.

¹⁴⁷ The first Latin author to have associated the virtues with Mary appears to be Fulbert

Clairvaux that Mary displayed the cardinal virtues during the Annunciation: her silence after the angel's greeting proceeded from temperance, her astonishment from prudence, and her devotion to God from justice, while she preserved her virginity with fortitude; in sum, she was *fortis in proposito, temperans in silentio, prudens in interrogatione, iusta in confessione*.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, from the seventh century hagiographers attributed the cardinal virtues to male as well as female saints;¹⁴⁹ in the twelfth century, Rupert of Deutz and Donizo of Canossa praised the biblical queen Esther and Countess Mathilda of Tuscany, respectively, for observing the four virtues,¹⁵⁰ while Marbod of Rennes, Hildebert of Lavardin, and Conrad of Hirsau upheld the quartet—described by Marbod in accordance with Martin of Braga's *Formula vitae honestae*, a text addressed to a male audience—in their writings for religious women.¹⁵¹ Some popularizing works of morality from the later Middle Ages contain exempla about specific virtues expressly related to both sexes.¹⁵² Finally, several female

of Chartres, *Sermones ad populum* 4, PL 141: 322C–D = *Sermones mariales*, p. 59. For 12th-century examples, see Honorius Augustodunensis, *Sigillum Mariae* 1, PL 172: 502A; William of Malmesbury, *De laudibus et miraculis Sanctae Mariae* Prol., PL 159: 579D–586D; Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sententiae* 3.111, *Opera* 6.2: 189–190; Godfrey of Auxerre, *Expositio in Cantica canticorum* 6, *Sermo in annuntiatione Mariae*, p. 584; Peter of Celle, *Sermones* 26 and 28, PL 202: 718A–719A, 724D; Helinand of Froidmont, *Sermo* 22, PL 212: 663D; Pseudo-Hildepheusus of Toletto, *De corona Virginis*, PL 96: 295A–B. See also above, p. 127 n. 273 (Alan of Lille, Odo of Ourscamp) and next note. For the late medieval period, see, e.g., Robert Grosseteste, *Sermo* 4, MS Oxford, Magdalen 202, f. 129^{rb–va}; Raymond Lull, *Liber de Sancta Maria* 7, CCCM 182: 102; Robert Holcot, *Super Sapientiam* 108 (on 8:7), sig. r1^{rb} (quoted above, p. 217 n. 345). A prominent 15th-century example is the sermon cycle *Mariale* of the Franciscan friar Bernardino of Busti.

¹⁴⁸ Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones de diversis* 52.3–4, *Opera* 6.1: 275–276. Similar formulas recur in Godfrey of Admont, *Homiliae festivales* 63, PL 175: 957C; Godfrey of Auxerre, *Mariale*, *Sermo* 5 in assumptione Mariae, p. 248; Peter of Poitiers, cited in Longère, *Oeuvres oratoires* 2: 172 n. 39; anonymous sermon, cited *ibid.*; cf. Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermones* 39.9–19, CCCM 2A: 314–317.

¹⁴⁹ From the 7th to the 10th centuries, 36 vitae mention the cardinal virtues, 7 of which concern female saints (19.45%); from the 11th and 12th centuries, I found 54 vitae, 8 of which concern women (14.81%); from the 13th to the 15th centuries, I found 31 vitae, 9 of which concern women (29.03%). See Bejczy, “Les vertus cardinales dans l’hagiographie” and above, p. 52.

¹⁵⁰ For Rupert, see above, p. 97; for Donizo of Canossa, see *Vita Mathildis* Prol. ll. 41–48, p. 353.

¹⁵¹ See above, pp. 77–78 (Marbod), 78–79 (Hildebert); for Conrad, see his *Speculum virginum*. See also the texts of Marbod, Abelard, and others in *Woman Defamed and Woman Defended*, 223–277.

¹⁵² John of Wales, *Breviloquium* 3.1, ff. 249^{va}–252^{va}, gives examples of sexual continence regarding men as well as women; adapting John's text, Álvaro Pelayo, *Speculum regum*, 1: 364, adds the observation “Et non solum continentia praedicta uiguit in uiris, sed etiam in

writers personally wrote about the cardinal and other virtues, including the Carolingian noblewoman Dhuoda, Hrotsvitha of Gandesheim, Hildegard of Bingen, and Herrad of Landsberg (and, of course, Christine de Pizan, who as a fifteenth-century vernacular author falls outside the scope of this study).¹⁵³

The apparent gender-neutral character of virtue in Latin Christian literature from the fourth century is a consequence of the religious understanding of virtue as a salvific gift of God. While the religious notion of virtue excludes non-Christians from the range of morality, it does include both sexes, as the prospect of salvation pertains to male as well as female believers. It is when they closely followed classical models that medieval moralists sometimes fell back on the male chauvinism of antiquity. Thus, Martin of Braga's *Formula*, which probably goes back to a lost work of Seneca, proposes moral rules for men;¹⁵⁴ the same thing happens in the Stoically inspired *Moralium dogma philosophorum*.¹⁵⁵ Occasionally, however, sexual bias is apparent from religious and theological sources, too. Ambrose once characterized chastity, patience, and the cardinal virtues as masculine qualities which are subverted by feminine vices,¹⁵⁶ while Cicero's circumscription of fortitude as *viriliter* bearing adversity was frequently quoted in the Middle Ages;¹⁵⁷ moreover, several medieval authors explain that the term *virtus* derives from *vir*.¹⁵⁸

mulieribus." The subject index of Arnold of Liège's *Alphabetum narrationum* (ca. 1300) has an entry "Virtus animi eciam in mulieribus inuenitur" referring to ch. 529 (*Mulier virtuosa*) and 541 (*Mulieris nobilis virtus quandoque apparet in morte*); see *An Alphabet of Tales*, 517.

¹⁵³ For Dhuoda, see her *Liber manualis*; for Hrotsvitha, see esp. her *Gesta Ottonis*; see also above, pp. 108 (Hildegard), 228 (Herrad). For Christine's moral defence of women in relation to medieval discussions on female virtue, see Bejczy, "Female Virtue".

¹⁵⁴ See Martin of Braga, *Formula vitae honestae* 1, p. 237: "honestum et bene moratum virum efficiunt"; 5, p. 246: "te iustum virum appellabunt omnes"; 6, p. 247: "perfectum te facient virum".

¹⁵⁵ See notably *Moralium dogma*, p. 73 (conclusive chapter): "His ergo prescriptis uir amator honestatis crebrum et assiduum adhibeat usum".

¹⁵⁶ Ambrose, *De Cain et Abel* 1.10.47, CSEL 32.1: 377.

¹⁵⁷ See Cicero, *De officiis* 1.27.94, p. 32; cf., e.g., Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermo de conversione* 21, *Opera* 4: 93; Thomas of Chobham, *Summa de commendatione virtutum* 4.2.4, CCCM 82B: 198; Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum in Sententias* III.9.1.1.1 ad 3, 3: 302; Raymond Lull, *Ars brevis* 9.9, CCCM 38: 229; *Summa rudium* 25, sig. h5^{vb}. Cf. Borromeo of Bologna, *Liber de quattuor virtutibus* 4.3, MS Milan, BN Braidense AD.IX.42, ff. 37^v–38^v (*de proprietatibus viri fortis*).

¹⁵⁸ See Augustine, *Ep.* 167.10, CSEL 44: 596; Isidore of Sevilla, *Etymologiae* 11.2.17; id., *De differentiis* 2.21.82, PL 83: 82B ("Vir itaque nuncupatus, ut ait Lactantius, quia major in eo vis sit quam in feminis, et hinc virtus nomen accipit"); Gunther of Pairis, *De oratione*,

Usually, however, *vis* is proposed as the proper etymological root of *virtus*,¹⁵⁹ while notably some twelfth-century authors praise the weaker sex for being able to develop virtuous strength, in allusion to Prov. 31:10 (*Mulierem fortem quis inveniet?*).¹⁶⁰ All in all, attributing the cardinal and other virtues to women was a normal procedure in the Middle Ages, at least in a context of religious morality.

From the twelfth century, however, medieval masters accepted the existence of virtue as a humanly acquired *habitus* which from the thirteenth century was identified with the concept of virtue found in the works of Aristotle. To what point was humanly acquired virtue likewise considered gender-neutral?

The opinions of Aristotle's medieval readers differ. On the one hand, the radical Aristotelian Engelbert of Admont argues in his *De regimine principum* that the three moral cardinal virtues do not apply to all people in the same degree: justice is necessary for everyone, but fortitude (understood as military courage) pertains to men rather than women, whereas temperance is useful for women and young people in particular, prone as they are to sensual pleasure.¹⁶¹ On the other hand, John Buridan defends the female capacity to embrace all four cardinal virtues in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In order to illustrate his idea that the cardinal virtues offer protection against mortal sin, Buri-

jejunio et eleemosyna 4.1, PL 212: 133A–B (*virtus* may derive from *viror*, *vires*, or *virilitas*); William of Auvergne, *De virtutibus* 4, p. 113b (*virtus* derives from *vis* or, according to some, from *vir*); William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 1.2, p. 18 (virtue may derive either from *vis* or from *vir* status or *virilitas*; yet, “*proprie virtuosus dicitur qui sibi vim facit*”), copied by, e.g., (Pseudo-?) Mauritius Hibernicus, *Distinctiones*, lemma *Virtus*, MS Paris, Mazarine 1019, f. 274^{va}; Giovanni Balbi, *Catholicon*, lemma *Virtus*, f. 305^{rb}: “*Virtus a vir dicitur ... quia virorum et proborum sit, vel dicitur a vireo res ... Item virtus dicitur virum tuens*”; Thomas of Cleves, *Liber de sacramentis* 24, Vienna, Schottenstift 286 (290), f. 116^{vb}: *virtus* derives from *viror nitens*, *virum tuens*, or *virium status*. See also Peter of Celle, *Commentaria in Ruth* 2, CCCM 54: 100: “*Virtutes enim uirum faciunt, uitia molliem femineam semper pariunt*”; see, however, *ibid.*, pp. 109 (on the women mentioned in Ruth 1:19 as “*naturalia uirtutum seminaria*”), 156–157 (on Ruth 3:11 which calls Ruth “*mulier uirtutis*”).

¹⁵⁹ See previous note and, e.g., Boethius, *Philosophiae consolatio* 4 prosa 7.19, CCSL 94: 86; Hrabanus Maurus, *De anima* 6, PL 110: 1115B; Pseudo-Bede, *De mundi constitutione*, p. 60; Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis* 1, p. 50; Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, 869–870, 1109; Hervaeus Natalis, *Tractatus de virtutibus* 5, f. 110^{ra}; Pierre Bersuire, *Dictionarium morale*, lemma *Virtus*, p. 1283b; Jacques Legrand, *Sophologium* 2.3.14.

¹⁶⁰ See Pseudo-Peter Damian, *Passio Florae et Lucillae* Prol., PL 144: 1025A–1026A; Peter Abelard, *Ep.* 6, p. 269; *id.*, *Hymni sanctorum* 126, in *Hymnarius Paraclitensis* 2: 259–262; Gilbert of Hoyland, *Sermones in Canticum* 26.1, PL 184: 133C.

¹⁶¹ Engelbert of Admont, *De regimine principum* 4.1, p. 126.

dan gives two examples, one relating to women, the other to men. If a woman is tempted to commit adultery, says Buridan, she must use temperance against flattery and wantonness, fortitude against fear of her suitors, justice in order to reject promises and gifts, and prudence against false excuses. If a man is tempted to avoid a danger he should confront, he needs fortitude to protect him against fear, temperance against his attachment to bodily comfort, and, likewise, justice and prudence against promises, gifts, and false excuses.¹⁶² While in Aristotle's system the moral virtues are qualities of a male ruling elite, Buridan thinks the cardinal virtues necessary for, and accessible to, every man and woman who aspires to a life of moral uprightness.

Some more statements on the female capacity for virtue were elicited by Aristotle's *Politics*, as in this work Aristotle argues that the virtues of women constitute a species different from, and inferior to, the virtues of men. In Aristotle's view, women have a weaker physical constitution and are more easily governed by their passions. As a consequence, reason is not authoritative in women (they have a *consilium invalidum*, in William of Moerbeke's translation of the work), which strongly suggests that they cannot fully develop the intellectual virtue of prudence.¹⁶³ As for the moral virtues—in particular temperance, fortitude, and justice—women do have them, but only as menial qualities (*virtutes ministrative*) which help them execute their subservient tasks, while male moral virtues are assets of domestic and political leadership (*virtutes principative*).¹⁶⁴ Aristotle observes, moreover, that women should develop some specific virtues becoming to their subordinate state, such as silence.¹⁶⁵

In the literal commentaries on the *Politics* written by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle's views are neutrally rendered, although Aquinas adds that silence is also required of women in Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 14:34–35), thus reinforcing Aristotle's views with apostolic authority.¹⁶⁶ Personal stands on Aristotle's views are found

¹⁶² John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 3 q. 20, f. 57^{va}.

¹⁶³ The suggestion is confirmed, e.g., by John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 2 q. 2, f. 28^{rb}; id., *Questions on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (1.24).

¹⁶⁴ The opposition between *virtutes ministrative* and *principative* was introduced by Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Politicorum* 1.10, *Opera* 48: A115, on the basis of Aristotle's opposition between female *fortitudo subministrativa* and male *fortitudo principativa*.

¹⁶⁵ Aristotle, *Politics* 1.13 (1260a2–37). For the concentration on justice, fortitude, and temperance, see *Politics* 1.13 (1260a22), reading in William of Moerbeke's translation: "non est eadem temperantia mulieris et uiri, neque fortitudo et iustitia" (quoted from Aquinas, *Sententia libri Politicorum* 1.10, *Opera* 48: A112).

¹⁶⁶ Albert the Great, *Commentarii in octo libros Politicorum* 1.9, *Opera* (ed. Borgnet)

rather in some commentaries written in the form of questions. Peter of Auvergne, the most influential thirteenth-century author of a question commentary, agrees with Aristotle that women have a *consilium invalidum*, but remains silent on their capacity for moral virtue.¹⁶⁷ In contrast, the fourteenth-century commentator Nicholas of Vaudémont argues at length that women are incapable of fully developing either intellectual or moral virtues, so that women should not be allowed to carry political or civil responsibility.¹⁶⁸ Similar statements occur in two anonymous fourteenth-century commentaries¹⁶⁹ as well as in John of Jandun's commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.¹⁷⁰ Even John Buridan declares in his commentary on the *Rhetoric* that the moral virtues only pertain secondarily to women, in accordance with their subservient tasks; only temperance fully applies to them, as this virtue helps them to check their sensual natures and thus to better please their husbands. If women manage to develop virtue on an equal level with men (at least, Buridan recognizes the possibility), they should be praised all the more for it, as it is more difficult for them to reach moral perfection.¹⁷¹ Moreover, Aristotle's account of gendered virtue occasioned Giles of Rome in *De regimine principum* to consider what moral qualities and defects are particular to women. According to Giles, women are naturally disposed to modesty (*verecundia*), reverence (*pietas*), and compassion (*misericordia*), as a result of their weak hearts; however, this very weakness also makes them intemperate, talkative, and unstable. Women should therefore be educated by their spouses to the opposing virtues of temperance, silence, and stability. Temperance is specified by Giles as consisting of chastity (*castitas*); honourableness (*honestas*) or demureness

8: 79–80; Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Politicorum* 1.10, *Opera* 48: A115–116. For the medieval tradition of commentaries on Aristotle's *Politics*, see Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation*.

¹⁶⁷ Peter of Auvergne, *Questiones supra libros Politicorum* 1 q. 7/8, ed. in Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation* 1: 177, 179. Marco Toste prepares an edition of Peter's commentary; see also Toste, "Virtue and the City".

¹⁶⁸ Nicholas of Vaudémont, *Quaestiones super libros Politicorum* 3 q. 5, 3 q. 26 and 4 q. 5, ff. 35^{ra}–^{va}, 48^{vb}–49^{vb}, 54^{ra}–^{rb}. For Nicholas's authorship, see Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation* 1: 132–168.

¹⁶⁹ See the commentaries in MSS Milan, Ambrosiana A 100 inf., 1 q. 22, ed. Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation* 1: 250 (the virtues of women and children are inferior to those of men in the same way as the virtues of slaves are inferior to those of their masters) and Brussels, KBR 863–69, 1 q. 17, ff. 422^{rb}–424^{vb} (women lack the capacity of perfectly developing the four cardinal virtues).

¹⁷⁰ John of Jandun, *Questions on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (1.43).

¹⁷¹ John Buridan, *Questions on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (1.24) and (1.59).

(*pudicitia*), understood as refraining from sexually provocative speech and gestures; and moderation in food (*abstinentia*) and drink (*sobrietas*), as excessive food and drink lead to sexual arousal. Moreover, Giles argues that the silence of women brings honour to their husbands and assures their love, while by their stability they will gain their husbands' confidence.¹⁷² On the basis of Aristotle's *Politics*, Giles thus develops a programme of moral education for women which reduces female virtue to being a good and decent housewife, in particular through checking the sexual appetite.

Even in scholastic circles, however, Aristotle's account of gendered virtue occasionally encountered opposition. As far as I know, the only master to have rejected it is Godfrey of Fontaines, who maintains in a theological question that the cardinal virtues exist in equal degree in men and women as well as in masters and servants. Although Godfrey does not refer to the *Politics*, it is impossible not to take his statement as a comment on Aristotle's work.¹⁷³ Moreover, the question of whether male and female virtues differ was regularly addressed in commentaries on Pseudo-Aristotle's *Economics* (taken in the Middle Ages as an authentic work of Aristotle).¹⁷⁴ Bartholomew of Bruges, in his question commentary composed in 1309, accepts the theoretical possibility that men and women possess different virtues. He avoids saying, however, that these virtues are different in kind, and even concedes that men and women may well acquire identical virtues in practice.¹⁷⁵ Outside the scholastic tradition, the moral equality of the sexes was notably defended in Giovanni Boccaccio's *De mulieribus claris*—a work modelled on Plutarch's *Virtues of Women*, which serves precisely to question Aristotle's belief that women only possess the (cardinal) virtues in a way

¹⁷² Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 2.1.18–19, pp. 269–275. At *ibid.* 2.1.23, pp. 283–284, Giles confirms Aristotle's theory that women have a *consilium invalidum*. Giles's account influenced the anonymous Brussels commentary on the *Politics* cited in n. 169.

¹⁷³ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quaestiones ordinariae* 3.5, pp. 135–136. Curiously, Godfrey sustains his statement with a spurious reference to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Cf. Coluccio Salutati's attack at *Politics* 1.13, cited below, p. 272.

¹⁷⁴ See Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation* 2: 168–183. The question was occasioned by a passage in *Economics* 1.3.4 (1343b27–1344a8) on the different talents and domestic tasks of men and women.

¹⁷⁵ Bartholomew of Bruges, *Quaestiones circa libros Yconomice* 1.9. Pavel Blažek kindly sent me his unpublished edition of this question. For a study in depth of Bartholomew's commentary, see Blažek, *Die mittelalterliche Rezeption der aristotelischen Philosophie der Ehe*, 199–384.

of subordination. It has been argued, however, that many of Boccaccio's portrayals of virtuous women contain satirical elements that cast doubt on their moral exemplarity.¹⁷⁶

By the fifteenth century, then, two widely diverging traditions regarding the female capacity of virtue co-existed in medieval culture. In theology and religious moral writing, one can observe a steady tradition of attributing the virtues (in particular the cardinal virtues) to both sexes, despite occasional associations of virtue with masculinity. Conversely, Aristotelian-inspired moral and political philosophy displays a tendency to deny that women can fully develop virtues (in particular the cardinal virtues), despite occasional defences of the moral equality of women and men. Although it is sometimes believed that medieval Christendom and Aristotelianism reinforced each other in portraying women as morally inferior,¹⁷⁷ Christendom actually introduced the idea of the moral equality of the sexes in the West, as a result of its understanding of virtue as gift extending to male as well as female believers. The recovery of Aristotelian moral and political thought in the thirteenth century implied a setback in medieval culture for the recognition of women as moral subjects on a par with men. Yet the tradition of recognizing virtuous women was strong enough for some scholastics to uphold the female capacity for virtue even in an Aristotelian context, while in religious moral literature the association of virtue with women continued without difficulty.

Elitist perspectives likewise occasionally appear in medieval moral writing, before the rediscovery of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as after it. Although the idea that virtue confers nobility regularly occurs in high medieval literature,¹⁷⁸ some twelfth-century moral writers take an opposite view and present nobility as a favourable, or even necessary, condition for virtue. Notable examples are Walter Map, who considers people of low birth unable to acquire steadfast virtues,¹⁷⁹ and Giles

¹⁷⁶ See Jordan, "Boccaccio's In-Famous Women".

¹⁷⁷ See, e.g., Brown-Grant, "Christine de Pizan as a Defender of Women".

¹⁷⁸ See, e.g., Wipo, *Gesta Chuonradi II imperatoris* Prol. (1040/46), p. 4: "Ut enim virtus plerosque vulgares nobilitat, sic nobilitas sine virtutibus multos nobiles degenerat"; *Carmina burana* 7 (*Postquam nobilitas servilia cepit amare*) and 224.3 (*Artifex, qui condidit*), 1.1: 8–10, 1.3: 83 ("Qui virtutes faciunt, nobiles appello"); Alan of Lille, *Anticlaudianus* 5 ll. 66–67, p. 125: "uirtus animi, constancia mentis/Factaque nobilitas, non nata, sed insita menti". See also above, p. 61, for Rather of Verona's view that a peasant who has the cardinal virtues may be called a king.

¹⁷⁹ See Weiler, "Royal Justice", 334–336.

of Paris, who connects virtuous government with Carolingian blood. The cardinal virtues appear in his *Karolinus* as potencies innate to the French royal dynasty which should be developed through education into effective qualities.¹⁸⁰

A similar diversity of opinion is found in late medieval sources. On the one hand, William Peraldus in his *De eruditione principum* ridicules the belief that nobility has anything to do with pedigree. All human beings descend from Adam and Eve and thus have the same ancestry, argues Peraldus; nobility is purely to be conceived as a mental quality resulting from virtue.¹⁸¹ On the other hand, Engelbert of Admont dedicated his *Speculum virtutum* to two German princes who, in Engelbert's words, possess the moral virtues "as the natural offshoots of their royal roots". Later on in his work, Engelbert explains that aristocrats are predisposed to develop the virtues, which they possess as innate qualities. However, nobles who neglect them will degenerate, whereas men of lower rank can ennoble themselves through virtue, since virtue is the principal cause of nobility.¹⁸² Accordingly, Engelbert emphasizes in his *De regimine principum* the need for kings to develop the cardinal virtues into royal virtues of grand and noble stature which confer *serenitas*, a special form of majestic honour.¹⁸³ A more radical elitism is apparent from John of Legnano's *De pace*. Virtues such as magnificence and magnanimity are typical of nobles, affirms John; indeed, the combination of tradition, wealth, and political responsibilities guarantees the moral probity of the aristocracy, while ordinary people who have suddenly become rich are to be distrusted for their parvenu attitude.¹⁸⁴ The discussion on true nobility also animated the courts of late medieval France and Burgundy, where literary debates took place on the necessity to complete, or even supplant, the nobility of blood with nobility acquired through the cardinal and other virtues.¹⁸⁵ For most medieval authors, then, it is virtue which leads

¹⁸⁰ See Billot-Vilandrau, "Charlemagne and the Young Prince", 351–354.

¹⁸¹ William Peraldus, *De eruditione principum* 1.4–5, p. 91; see also Verweij, "Princely Virtues or Virtues for Princes?", 59–60.

¹⁸² See Engelbert of Admont, *Speculum virtutum* Praef. and 2.14, pp. 93 ("ex regum radice vobis tanquam ramis naturalibus innatas"), 141–143.

¹⁸³ Id., *De regimine principum* 7, pp. 190–248.

¹⁸⁴ John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, ff. 177^{rb}–178^{rb}. John also mentions *docilitas* and *affabilitas* as noble qualities; moreover, he argues that the powerful are more inclined to study and more temperate than the (merely) rich.

¹⁸⁵ See Contamine, *La noblesse au royaume de France*, 298–303; Vanderjagt, *Qui sa vertu anoblist*.

to nobility rather than the reverse; even authors who connect noble birth with virtue usually think that nobility constitutes an encouragement for virtue rather than a sufficient ground.

The medieval disinclination to restrict virtue to the upper classes of society is also apparent from the notion of political virtue. In his *Politics*, Aristotle not only excludes women from the capacity to develop perfect virtue, but also slaves, who likewise only require virtues of an inferior kind proper to their subservient tasks. Although Aristotle's view found some support in commentaries on the *Politics*,¹⁸⁶ we have seen that several late medieval moral writers recognized the virtues of subjects on a par with princely virtues, even if the virtues of subjects chiefly reside in obedience to the ruler and sociable behaviour. Indeed, John Buridan insists in his commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* that princely prudence and the prudence of the subjects aim at the same goal and are therefore essentially identical, since fortune does not affect the state of virtue¹⁸⁷ (strikingly, Buridan's follower John of Legnano contradicts this view in *De pace*),¹⁸⁸ while Coluccio Salutati explicitly takes Aristotle to task, arguing at length that real nobility based on virtue is equally attainable for slaves and patricians, paupers and kings.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, in political literature Aristotle's notion of citizenship was frequently extended to include ordinary people like craftsmen.¹⁹⁰ Commentators of the *Politics* argued accordingly that craftsmen were able to develop virtues (as human beings and as citizens, not as craftsmen).¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁶ See, e.g., Peter of Auvergne, *Questiones supra libros Politicorum* 1 q. 30/28, ed. Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation* 1: 209–211; commentary in MS Milan, Ambrosiana A 100 inf., 1 q. 22, ed. *ibid.*, 245–251.

¹⁸⁷ John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 6 q. 15, ff. 130^{rb}–131^{ra}, esp. f. 130^{vb}: “Sortes eadem prudentia erit bonus homo si fuerit princeps et si fuerit subditus et si dives et si pauper et si coriarius et si nauta et si carpentator et universaliter ad quemcumque statum pervenerit sed bonum”. See also Lambertini, “Political Prudence”, 244. Cf. an anonymous discipline of Godfrey of Fontaines, cited in Graf, *De subiecto virtutum cardinalium* 2: 125*: “perfectio subiectorum in civitate est virtus civilis et non solum perfectio principis, licet ista principaliter”.

¹⁸⁸ John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 180^{ra-rb}: prudence for the private good and for the common good are different species; subjects and slaves only possess some prudence in as far as they participate in the political community; in rulers, prudence exists “ad modum artis architectonice”, in subjects “ad modum artis operantis”.

¹⁸⁹ Coluccio Salutati, *Epp.* 13.13–14, *Epistolario* 3: 644–653.

¹⁹⁰ See Nederman, “Mechanics and Citizens”.

¹⁹¹ See, e.g., Peter of Auvergne, *Questiones supra libros Politicorum* 1 q. 31/29, ed. Flüeler, *Rezeption und Interpretation* 1: 211–213; commentary in MS Milan, Ambrosiana A 100 inf., 1 q. 23, ed. *ibid.*, 252–255.

A particularly eloquent manifestation of the egalitarian character of medieval moral thought resides in the attempts of scholastic masters to refute Aristotle's elitist conception of magnificence and magnanimity. As only few people, in Aristotle's view, have sufficient financial means and honourable qualities to develop these two particular virtues, one must either recognize that ordinary people do not have any moral virtues at all, or give up Aristotle's idea of the necessary connection of the virtues. Faced with this dilemma, theologians and commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* insist from the late thirteenth century that the poor are capable of developing a magnificent (and sometimes also a magnanimous) attitude by performing imaginary acts in accordance with these virtues.¹⁹² Thomas Aquinas defends this view not only in his *Summa theologiae* but even in his commentary on the *Ethics*, which normally expositis Aristotle's thought rather faithfully.¹⁹³ His solution, which found quite some following in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, not only defies the notion that the poor cannot be magnificent, but also upsets Aristotle's view that virtue results from constant practice; again, it is the inner intention of the moral agent which outweighs his actual behaviour. On their part, Gerald of Odo and John Buridan propose a

¹⁹² Theologians: see Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.134.3 ad 4, *Opera* 10: 93 (followed, e.g., by Thomas of Sutton, *Quodlibeta* 1.19, pp. 133–135; Robert Holcot, *Super Sapientiam* 108 [on 8:7], sig. r1^{vb}); John Duns Scotus, *Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum* Prol. 4 qq. 1–2 ad 3, *Opera omnia* (Vatican ed.) 16: 59: "Non enim requiritur in omni liberali quod habeat actus sequentes electionem quibus communicet, quia non habens pecunias potest esse liberalis communicando in corde per actus imaginatos" (I owe the reference to Bonnie Kent). Commentators of the *Ethics*: see Albert the Great, *Super Ethica* 4.5 (282), p. 244 (magnificence); Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 1.5, *Opera* 47: 20 (quoted by Albert of Saxony independently from Walter Burley; see Heidingsfelder, *Albert von Sachsen*, 97); John of Tytynsdale, *Questiones in Ethicam* 4 qq. 11 and 16, MS Durham, Cathedral Library C.IV.20, ff. 248^{ra} (magnificence), 249^{vb}–250^{ra} (magnanimity); Gauthier, "Trois commentaires averroïstes", 299. See also John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 133^{rb}: "virtus sit ex bona voluntatis electione, sed hoc est possibile sine opere exteriori si operari non potest. Tolle exemplum: multi sunt qui eligunt dare liberaliter, sed propter paupertatem impediuntur"; John Bromyard, *Summa predicantium*, lemma *Virtus*, art. 1: the connection of the virtues does not apply in case of a virtuous person who lacks the means to spend magnificent sums. Peter of Corveheda, *Sententia super librum Ethicorum* 4.3, MS Vatican City, BAV Urb. lat. 222, f. 244^{ra–va}, simply accepts that the poor cannot be magnificent, despite his tendency to follow the *Sententia* of Aquinas.

¹⁹³ Aquinas also proposes another solution: the virtuous poor will become magnificent as soon as they have sufficient financial means. See *Summa theologiae* I.II.65.1 ad 1, *Opera* 6: 419; *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 6.11, *Opera* 47: 377; Hoffmann, "Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on Magnanimity", 122–124.

different solution in their *Ethics* commentaries. They recognize that the poor are unable to acquire the virtue of magnificence (neither can married men acquire the virtue of virginity, as both add),¹⁹⁴ but at the same time they deny the connection of the moral virtues. Only the cardinal virtues cannot exist apart from each other; these virtues comprise the essence of moral goodness and are accessible to all human beings. The other moral virtues, including magnificence and magnanimity, cannot be acquired by everyone, but then these virtues are accidental to moral goodness. The absence of magnificence does therefore not detract in any essential way from the moral goodness of the poor.¹⁹⁵ Strikingly, the solutions of Aquinas and of Gerald and Buridan both rebut Aristotle's system: in the case of Aquinas, the idea that the poor cannot be magnificent is denied while the connection of the moral virtues is saved; in the case of Gerald and Buridan, it is the other way round. What both solutions have in common is the firm conviction that morality extends to all classes of society. In his discussion of magnificence, Buridan accordingly rejects the idea that a poor man cannot be fully virtuous as an absurdity (even though simple people hardly care about virtue, as he grudgingly concedes).¹⁹⁶

The fact that virtue was originally conceived in Latin Christendom as a gift of grace by which believers could restore the lost union with God accounts, in my view, for its egalitarian character in late medieval moral thought. God distributes his gifts, including the virtues, without social or sexual discrimination. Having internalized this idea as a matter of course, late medieval moral authors extended even the naturally acquired virtues, which entered the medieval stage by the twelfth century, to all

¹⁹⁴ Gerald of Odo, *Sententia super libros Ethicorum* 6 q. 17, f. 138^{rb}: "nulla virtus electiva est possibilis alicui circa cuius materiam non potest eligere. Sed pauper prolem habens non potest eligere circa materiam virginitatis et magnificentie quia nullus potest eligere impossibilia". See also *ibid.* 4 q. 22, f. 76^{ra}: a poor man who never possessed any riches cannot have developed a virtuous attitude in spending large sums; however, a magnificent man whose riches are suddenly taken away will conserve a magnificent *habitus*, since *habitus* are steadfast by nature. Walsh, "Buridan on the Connection of the Virtues," 465–466, argues that Buridan recognizes the virtuousness of imaginary acts; yet at *Super libros Ethicorum* 4 q. 7, ff. 76^{rb}–77^{va}, Buridan argues that the superlative virtues (see above, p. 180), including magnificence, are only accessible to few people.

¹⁹⁵ See above, pp. 177–179.

¹⁹⁶ John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 4 q. 7, f. 76^{rb}: "absurdum esset dicere nullum pauperem esse probum virum"; 1 q. 10, f. 11^{va}–vb: "Et iam ego vidi populares rusticos hoc concedere quod scilicet operatio sit eligibilior virtute. Petii enim quid plus vellent, vel absque habitu cognoscere omnia que vellent, vel habitum habere et nihil vnquam actu cognoscere. Responderunt se de habitu non curare".

social classes and to both sexes, despite the elitist and sexist bias of the classical sources from which they borrowed the conception of these virtues. The survival of religiously motivated structures of moral thought outside a religious context—a phenomenon commonly associated with modern times—thus already started in the late medieval period, when the distinctly Christian principles of voluntarism and egalitarianism were retained in attempts to construe an apparently secular morality on the basis of Aristotle's ethic.

Individualism

From the perspective of Christian religion, virtues are given by God to his believers in order to redeem their souls. As redemption is an individual affair, it follows that virtue primarily regards the individual good: virtue does not so much consist in helping others (quite in contrast with the modern tendency to equate morality with altruism) as in helping oneself, in securing one's salvation. In a sense, medieval religious morality is highly egocentric.¹⁹⁷ Naturally acquired virtues were conceived from the twelfth century along parallel lines and implied a recognition of the potential goodness of all human individuals, regardless, in this case, even of their religion.

Although Aristotle's ethical system is doubtless preoccupied with the individual honour of noble souls, it is not individualist in the same sense as medieval moral thought. The fact that the *Nicomachean Ethics* addresses itself to a particular social class rather than to individual human beings regardless of their sex and rank already gives it a communal aspect. More important, Aristotle's account of the virtues is intimately connected with his view of man as a member of the political community. As Thomas Aquinas observes, "the Philosopher intended to deal with the virtues in as far as they order toward the civil life".¹⁹⁸ Strikingly, thirteenth-century commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* tend to play down the political dimension of the work and highlight the virtues' importance for the individual instead. A recent study has

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Kitchen, "Bernard of Clairvaux's *De gradibus*", 107: "the Bernardian conception of ethics is actually a stage on the journey to personal salvation ... [and] may be said to serve the monk's ultimate self-interest".

¹⁹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.161.1 ad 5, *Opera* 10: 293: "philosophus intendebat agere de virtutibus secundum quod ordinantur ad vitam civilem". See also above, p. 208.

demonstrated that most commentators active before 1250 disregard the social or civil dimension of the moral virtues. In their view, the moral virtues operate in relation to the individual body, the intellectual virtues in relation to the individual soul. Their exaltation of the contemplative life goes together with a devaluation of man's sociability; as in contemporary theology, the moral subject of the commentaries is the human individual whose aim is to achieve union with God.¹⁹⁹ Another recent study shows that the Parisian commentators of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries do not attach the same importance to friendship as Aristotle. Contemplation, the end of the philosophical life, is not regarded by them as being accomplished through a dialogue between one's equals, but as consisting in individual speculation.²⁰⁰

In agreement with its political outlook, the ethical system of Aristotle primarily measures the value of moral actions according to their public utility. A virtuous deed which brings profit to the community is superior for Aristotle to a virtuous deed which is profitable only to the moral agent himself. Hence the emphasis in Aristotelian ethics on virtues involving public action like justice (concerned with the common good), magnificence (spending large sums for the public benefit), and fortitude (courage in war on behalf of one's country). Following Aristotle's system, *virtutes politicae* aiming at the common good are superior to *virtutes monasticae* which regard the individual good. The more a virtue secures the common good, the better it is, so that political virtues are the most valuable of all. This idea found support among many scholastic masters, despite their strong concern with the individual good,²⁰¹ and moreover determined the hierarchy of the cardinal virtues established by Thomas Aquinas and others. In this hierarchy, justice occupies the highest place because it has the common good as its proper object, while temperance, which regards the well-being of the individual, comes last; fortitude, which concerns wars fought for the common good, is

¹⁹⁹ See Zavattero, "Moral and Intellectual Virtues".

²⁰⁰ See Toste, "*Utrum felix indigeat amicis*".

²⁰¹ See Kempshall, *The Common Good*, pp. 46 (Albert the Great), 116 (Thomas Aquinas), 233–234 (Godfrey of Fontaines). Still, "Aquinas was also able to draw from book IX of the Ethics the principle that the individual good of virtue has greater priority in the intention of a virtuous individual than the benefit to the community which his virtuous action will produce" (ibid., 128). Generally, scholastics had "a strong sense of the value of the individual human being" and "retained their insistence on the importance of the individual good as, and when, it was felt to be under threat" (ibid., 362).

situated between the two.²⁰² Even some learned preachers active in Tuscany in the early fourteenth century placed the *bonum commune* before the individual good in their statements on virtue, despite their concern with saving individual souls.²⁰³ Yet the *Moralium dogma* ranks in one passage temperance above justice and fortitude precisely because it concerns one's own good rather than the good of others; for the same reason, William Peraldus discusses temperance in his *Summa de virtutibus* before fortitude and justice.²⁰⁴ Moreover, Aquinas in his *Summa theologiae* defends the idea that martyrdom—explicitly conceived as a personal war on behalf of God²⁰⁵—is the primary act of fortitude, even if it has no relation to promoting the common good. Aquinas's idea recurs not only in moral treatises dependent on his *Summa*, but also in a number of commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*.²⁰⁶ We have seen, moreover, that numerous late medieval authors, including Aquinas, endorsed the view inferred from Macrobius that political virtues are only a first step toward virtues of a contemplative nature which pertain to the spiritual development of individual believers. According to this view, the cardinal virtues do not increase in value as they bring profit to a greater number of people, but as they better guarantee the beatitude of human individuals.

²⁰² Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.141.8, *Opera* 10: 131, followed by, e.g., Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* 1.2.15, p. 90. For the view that justice comes first among the cardinal or moral virtues because it secures the common good, see also, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.58.12, *Opera* 9: 19; Henry of Ghent, quoted by Kempshall, *The Common Good*, 181–182; John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, f. 138^{va} (but see ff. 197^{vb}–180^{ra}: legal justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence pertain both to the private and the common good).

²⁰³ See Panella, “Dal bene comune”; Iannella, *Giordano da Pisa*, 84ff.; ead., “Civic Virtues”.

²⁰⁴ See *Moralium dogma* 2, p. 53: “preferenda est temperancia reliquis duabus. Temperancia enim regit homo se ipsum, fortitudine et iusticia familiam et ciuitatem”; William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 3.3.1, p. 322a: “Item temperantia regit homo seipsum, fortitudine et iustitia alios. Prius uero & homini utilius est regere se, quam regere alios”. Cf. William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* 3.21, 3: 395–396: “Dicto de prudentia sequitur de temperantia, priusquam tractemus de iusticia, hac ratione, quia prius est habere pacem secum, postea cum proximo”.

²⁰⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.123.5 ad 1, *Opera* 10: 12: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod martyres sustinent personales impugnationes propter summum bonum, quod est Deus. Ideo eorum fortitudo praecipue commendatur. Nec est extra genus fortitudinis quae est circa bellica”.

²⁰⁶ See Peter of Corveheda, *Sententia super librum Ethicorum* 3.8, MS Vatican City, BAV Urb. lat. 222, ff. 241^{vb}–242^{ra}; John Buridan, *Super libros Ethicorum* 3 q. 20, f. 57^{va}. Cf. John of Legnano, *De pace*, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 2639, ff. 145^{va}–146^{ra} (“catholice loquendo non est dubium, sed etiam moraliter loquendo probari potest”, f. 145^{va}).

The theory of Macrobius challenged Aristotle's system in one other important respect. Aristotle denies that virtues can exist in the gods (*Nicomachean Ethics* 10.8), but Macrobius locates exemplary models of the four cardinal virtues in the divine mind. Macrobius's view agrees with biblical vocabulary—the Vulgate regularly calls God just, wise, and strong, thus suggesting that God possesses three of the four cardinal virtues—while the view that the virtues make humans similar to God is endorsed in patristic and high medieval sources.²⁰⁷ In the later medieval period, the view of Macrobius found broad support. Henry of Ghent upheld it against Aristotle's view that the gods have no virtues, while Bonaventure famously chastized Aristotle for denying the existence of exemplary virtues which “noble” pagan philosophers acknowledged.²⁰⁸ Yet medieval masters felt uneasy about associating God with what appeared to be human virtue. Quite in accordance with Plotinus's views as summarized by Macrobius, they emphasized that in God the virtues are no contingent qualities, but aspects of the divine essence.²⁰⁹ Moreover, the cardinal virtues were much more frequently associated with Christ in the Later Middle Ages (especially in Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* and the commentaries on this work) than with “God,”²¹⁰ and never, as far as I

²⁰⁷ See above, pp. 18–19 (Jerome), 43 (Guibert of Nogent), 200–201 (William of Auxerre); for the 12th century, see, e.g., Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* 5: 251: “ad similitudinem Dei factus est homo per virtutes” (from the School of Laon); Hugh of Saint Victor, *Didascalicon* 1.8, p. 15: *virtutis exercitium* restores the human *similitudo* with God; id. (?), *Quaestiones* (1959), p. 196: humans receive the cardinal virtues *ad imaginem Dei*; Laborans, *De iustitia et iusto* 1.16, p. 15: humans possess the moral virtues as *imago Dei*, while using them is an *imitatio Dei* which will lead to *similitudo Dei*. See also Avardus of Saint Victor, *De unitate Dei* 2.3, p. 144 with an editorial note on John of Ripa's use of Avardus's view.

²⁰⁸ See Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariam* 46.2, 2: ff. 20^v–23^r; Bonaventure, *Hexaemeron* 6.10, *Opera* 5: 362. For Bonaventure's view, see also Cutini, *Ritorno a Dio*, 149–181; Synan, “Cardinal Virtues in the Cosmos of Saint Bonaventure”; Emery, “Reading the World Rightly”.

²⁰⁹ See above, pp. 19 (Augustine), 94 (Honorius); *Glossa ordinaria* (1 Ioh. 4:8), PL 114: 701C; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 1.8.5, p. 100 (citing Augustine); Alan of Lille, *Summa Quoniam hominis* 9, pp. 140–141; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.61.5 and 62.1 ad 2, *Opera* 6: 398–399, 401; Peter Aureoli, *Commentarii in libros Sententiarum* I.46.1.3, 1: 1088–1089. See also Peter Abelard, *Theologia christiana* 4.77, CCCM 12: 301, attacking an Angevin master for carelessly transferring human virtues to God.

²¹⁰ See above, p. 94 n. 112 (Honorius); Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III.33.2 (*Quod hae virtutes in Christo fuerint*), 2: 188. But see *ibid.* IV.46.3 §5, 2: 534, referring to God's *sapientia*, *fortitudo*, *iustitia*, *sanctitas*, and *prudentia* in a quotation of Origen, *Homilia in Ieremiam* 8.2, mediated through *Glossa ordinaria* (Ier. 10:12), 3: 117. See also I.19.5.3, 1: 164, referring to *bonitas*, *sapientia*, *clementia*, and *potentia* as parts of the divine virtue (= Augustine, *Contra Maximinum* 2.10, PL 42: 766). Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 7.7, *Opera*

know, with the Father or the Holy Spirit in particular. The obvious reason is that Christ is both God and man, so that human qualities could safely be attributed to him. From the twelfth century, moral authors related the virtues to Christ's human rather than his divine nature,²¹¹ while some late medieval theologians went so far as to distinguish the virtues of God from those of Christ. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, reserves the exemplary virtues for God while attributing the moral virtues to Christ,²¹² inferring from *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.8 that God does not have any moral virtues since he lacks the appetites which it is the task of virtuous habits to check.²¹³ This last view is shared by John Duns Scotus²¹⁴ but modified by Francis of Meyronnes, according to whom God possesses justice, mercy, and some other Aristotelian virtues (liberality, magnificence, magnanimity), but no fortitude and temperance, since these two virtues pertain to emotion and desire, respectively. Christ, by contrast, possesses all moral virtues according to Meyronnes, since his human nature involves the sensitive appetites as well.²¹⁵

The fact that in Christ the virtues appear as human qualities had important practical consequences. The exemplary virtues in God's mind are hardly imitable for human beings. They provide an explanation for the virtues' origin, but remain beyond human reach. By contrast, Christ sets a living example for every moral virtue, as William Peraldus

5: 289, replaces *bonitas* with *iustitia*, thus suggesting an even closer parallel with the cardinal virtues; for Michael of Prague's use of Bonaventure's arrangement, see above, p. 215.

²¹¹ See, e.g., Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis* 2.1.6, PL 176: 383A–389B; id. (?), *De trinitate*; Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sententiae* 3.111, *Opera* 6.2: 190; Peter Comestor, *Sermo* 19, PL 198: 1775A; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* III.18.2 §1 and III.18.4 §2, 2: 113, 116 (following Hugh's *De sacramentis*). Cf. Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias commentaria* III.33.4, f. 273^{ra}: "Christus secundum corpus ... fuit uiator ... propter quod debuit habere uirtutes morales perficientes sensitiuum appetitum uel aliquid maius talibus uirtutibus mediante quo posset in actus talium uirtutum".

²¹² See Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum in Sententias* III.33.1.4 s.c. and ad 5, 3: 1040–1041 (moral virtues "plenissime fuerunt in Christo", exemplary virtues in God and the angels); *Summa theologiae* I.II.61.5, *Opera* 10: 398 (exemplary virtues in God). For the related view of Robert Holcot, see above, p. 217 n. 345.

²¹³ See Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum* 10.12, *Opera* 47: 591–592.

²¹⁴ John Duns Scotus, *Reportatio parisiensis* III.33, *Opera* (Paris ed.) 23: 517: "in Deo non sunt virtutes morales, quia non habet passiones domandas"; but see id., *Ordinatio* III.33, *Opera* (Vatican ed.) 10: 166, conceding that "posset poni in Deo esse rationem virtutum moralium".

²¹⁵ Francis of Meyronnes, *In quatuor libros Sententiarum* III.33–37 qq. 2.6 and 2.8, ff. 173^{vb}–174^{ra}.

observes, so that every virtue can be illustrated with lessons drawn from his human experience.²¹⁶ Through Christ's own example, the virtues appeal to all human individuals, in accordance with the universal mission of Christianity.

A Quodlibetal Question of Thomas of Sutton

One late medieval master who discussed the problem of whether magnificence and magnanimity necessarily cohere with the other moral virtues is the Oxford Dominican Thomas of Sutton († ca. 1315). Sutton is known as a follower of Thomas Aquinas, and the Thomistic inspiration of the discussion which Sutton sets forth in his *Quodlibeta* is manifest. The particular thing about this discussion is that it provides a forceful example of how voluntarism, intentionalism, egalitarianism, and individualism may go together in late medieval virtue ethics in such a way as to nearly completely subvert Aristotle's views.

Like Aquinas, Sutton assumes that poor people who have some other moral virtue possess magnificence, too, that is to say: they have the inner resolution to spend their fortune for good ends even in the absence of such fortune. According to Sutton, it is in this interior resolution that virtue—and even the principal act of virtue—essentially resides.²¹⁷ Virtuous paupers thus have the *habitus* of magnificence, but lack its outer acts. At his point, Sutton raises the objection that according to Aristotle, habits result from constant practice, whereas the poor have no practice of spending large sums of money for the common good. Sutton counters this objection by stating that the poor can nevertheless develop the habit of magnificence by spending small sums of money, by observing and approving the magnificence of others, and by criticizing rich people who keep their money for themselves.²¹⁸ Sutton concludes his exposition with an example taken from personal experience:

²¹⁶ See William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus* 1.12, p. 34a–b: Christ showed meekness, humility, prudence, sobriety and charity; “Caeterae uirtutes similiter docet, sicut patebit, cum de singulis uirtutibus tractabitur. Addiscere etiam eos [*lege eas*] uoluit per experientiam”.

²¹⁷ Thomas of Sutton, *Quodlibeta* 1.19, p. 134: “Principalis enim actus virtutis est electio interior et talis electio potest haberi sine exteriori fortuna”; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* II.II.134.3 ad 4, *Opera* 10: 93. See also John Duns Scotus, *Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum* Prol. 4 qq. 1–2 ad 3, *Opera* (Vatican ed.) 16: 59: “electio est primus actus elicited a virtute morali; igitur erit generativus virtutis moralis ... habitus moralis practicus non necessario extenditur ad obiecta extra”.

²¹⁸ Ibid.: “Et ita potest habere habitum magnificentiae per essentiam, licet non exteri-

A poor man who had no money and no hope to have money in the future told me that he had thought a lot about certain great works which he would perform if he had money. In his heart he decided that he would hire at his expense a large number of good scholars in this *studium* here as well as a large number of excellent singers in his church. And he often pondered about these things in his heart, night and day, thinking of what magnificent things would happen. This man appears to possess the habit of magnificence even though he lacks exterior fortune.²¹⁹

Although Sutton's argument seemingly follows Aristotelian patterns of moral thought, it would doubtless have horrified Aristotle himself. To begin with, Aristotle might not have seen why the connection of magnificence and magnanimity with the other virtues should be problematic in the first place. For him, the consequence that the poor cannot develop moral virtues was probably just as natural as it was absurd for his medieval commentators. The idea that the poor can successfully acquire the virtue of magnificence is actually absurd from Aristotle's point of view, since he qualifies a pauper trying to become magnificent (in Grosseteste's translation) as *insipiens*. Moreover, by freely spending small sums of money one may develop the virtue of liberality according to Aristotle, but not of magnificence. The difference between these two virtues resides precisely in the fact that magnificence involves lavish spending. Also, observing the magnificence, or the lack of it, in others will bear no fruit in Aristotle's view as long as one does not follow other men's examples in practice.²²⁰ Finally, Sutton's distinction between the essential inner act of virtue and its contingent outer acts unsettles Aristotle's basic idea of virtue as a habit underlying moral practice. For Aristotle, the poor man who in Sutton's view possesses the habit of magnificence, but not its acts, would be a silly dreamer at best. It may not be without

orem actum, et istum habitum sibi acquisivit per exercitium modicarum rerum, quae habuit et liberaliter communicavit. Et considerando aliorum magnificentiam et eam approbando et quorundam parvificentiam reprobando, illorum scilicet qui abundantiam pecuniarum habent et parva opera faciunt".

²¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 134–135: "Audivi quendam pauperem, qui nec pecuniam habebat nec habere sperabat in futuro, dicentem quod multum fuit cogitatus circa quaedam magna opera, quae faceret, si haberet pecuniam, et disposuit in corde suo quod haberet ad sumptos suos hic in studio isto magnum numerum bonorum scholarium et magnum numerum excellentium cantorum in ecclesia sua. Et frequenter ista versavit in corde nocte et die, quomodo magnifice fierent. Iste videtur habitum magnificentiae habere, quamvis exteriorem fortunam non habuit".

²²⁰ Cf. Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones morales* 2, p. 100: "Frequenter audire loqui de virtutibus et earum actibus non sufficit ad generandum virtutem, nisi homo manum apponat ad opus".

purpose that Sutton, like Aquinas,²²¹ keeps silent in his conclusion about the virtue of magnanimity, which he likewise believes accessible to everyone who possesses other virtues. We might perhaps assume that a decent poor man would spend his money well if he were rich—but how are we to imagine somebody becoming magnanimous by dreaming of a greatness of which he is unworthy in reality?

What is at stake in Sutton's question is a multiple conflict between Aristotelian and Christian premises of moral thought. The suppression of Aristotle's elitism in favour of Christian egalitarianism is manifest. Also, the conception of virtue as an intention to do good which may or may not lead to outer deeds clearly prevails over the Aristotelian idea of virtue as an attitude formed in practice and guaranteeing moral conduct. It is actually by defining the principal act of virtue as a matter of inner resolution that Sutton is able to argue that even the poor can be magnificent; his intentionalism and egalitarianism thus reinforce each other. Finally, the pauper staged by Sutton has not ridiculed but ennobled himself by aspiring after magnificence. The fact that the community does not profit from his virtue is irrelevant from Sutton's perspective; the individual moral perfection of the poor man is all that counts. If the poor man's motives sprang from charity, we may even assume that his magnificence helped him to save his soul—just as in Peter Abelard's example of the virtuous poor who have perfect charity but not the means to give alms.²²²

What Sutton's discussion of poverty and magnificence makes all the more clear is that it is not only the religious conception of virtue itself which set boundaries to the medieval acceptance of Aristotelian ethics, but also, and perhaps more notably, the religiously inspired notion of virtue as depending on the will and accessible to all human individuals striving honestly for inner perfection. In medieval moral thought, the will generally prevails over the intellect, the intention over the act, individual happiness over the common good, and the equality of all over the honour of the happy few. These preferences, which ensued from the Christian

²²¹ Cf. Hoffmann, "Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on Magnanimity", 124: "Unfortunately, Thomas does not spell out how his comments on magnificence apply to magnanimity ... Aquinas attributes to Aristotle the view that magnanimity requires the goods of fortune, referring to a passage where the Stagirite seems merely to report a popular opinion. Possibly Thomas takes the Philosopher to hold that, like the change from generosity to magnificence, the change from moderation to magnanimity requires certain external conditions, among which is the attainment of goods of fortune".

²²² See Peter Abelard, *Ethica* 1.17 and 1.32, CCCM 190: 18, 32.

understanding of the account of the Fall, survived into the Later Middle Ages when the *Nicomachean Ethics* came to dominate moral debate. Rather than being superseded by Aristotle's contrary premises, the voluntarism, intentionalism, egalitarianism, and individualism of medieval moral thought had an unsettling effect upon the Aristotelian system even in the writings of masters who seemingly adhered to it. Petrarch's complaint that notably in virtue ethics the scholastics often turn Aristotle's statements upside down is not entirely without a basis in fact.²²³

Conclusion

The religious conception of virtue—either as a divine gift, as a product of nature informed by grace, or as a human source of actions directed by grace to man's supernatural destination—obviously makes medieval moral thought different from the ethical systems of antiquity. But it is not the only difference between medieval and ancient morality, and perhaps not even the most important one. The Parisian theologians of the late twelfth century were well aware of the doctrinal problems inherent to the introduction of political alongside Catholic virtues and hence carefully defined the relations between the two. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, many theologians and others continued these efforts and tried to bring acquired and gratuitous virtues together in one comprising system. Thanks to these efforts, classical and Christian views of virtue could coexist in medieval moral thought, if not in harmony, at least in truce. Yet the anthropology underlying medieval morality, formed by the biblical account of the Fall, remained at variance with classical traditions and had important consequences for medieval virtue ethics.

This chapter has examined some of these consequences. First of all, virtue had a function in the permanent human struggle against vice. Numerous pastoral authors primarily approached the human being as a sinful creature in need of redemption. Concentrating on the process of conversion and penance, they gave the virtues a secondary role at best, as remedies against the vices. Their relative disregard of the virtues, inspired by their practical concern of saving souls, agrees with the view of a number of late medieval theologians that the moral virtues are not indispensable for salvation, or even interfere with the freedom of the will which lies at the base of all moral as well as meritorious acts.

²²³ Petrarch, *De ignorantia* 4, p. 320.

Other authors focused on the human capacity for moral goodness and virtue, in apparent concordance with classical moral philosophy. Yet even these authors were deeply affected by the idea of fallen human nature. Postlapsarian anthropology entangled a set of notions—voluntarism and intentionalism, egalitarianism, and individualism—contrary to the basic premises of Aristotelian ethics in particular and influencing, often in a surreptitious manner, the medieval reception of Aristotle's ethical thought. According to Aristotle, good acts produce virtuous habits which guarantee moral conduct. According to most medieval authors, morality resides in the good will which antecedes good acts rather than being produced by them, which needs not be firmed up into a habit and may even lose its moral character when it is, and which may never result into actual moral behaviour. In Aristotle's view, virtues belong to a male elite; wealth and social prominence are prerequisites for acquiring some virtues, and hence for acquiring all of them, given their necessary connection. In the medieval view, virtues are accessible to both sexes and all social classes; wealth usually counts as an impediment to virtue, while nobility is considered the effect of virtue rather than its cause. For Aristotle, virtues are purely human qualities which secure the common good; for medieval authors, the virtues have an exemplary model in God and a living model in Christ, and primarily secure individual happiness.

Medieval voluntarism, intentionalism, egalitarianism, and individualism thus effectuated a Christian subversion of Aristotle's ethical system in particular. Detached from their religious origins, these notions left a marked imprint on the formation of what appears to be a secular morality based on Aristotelian ideas, fit for the entire human race. Not only the religious moral thought of the Western world has thus medieval antecedents, but also the process of Christian morality gaining, in secularized form, a universal range of application. Today, the notions of voluntarism, intentionalism, egalitarianism, and individualism subsist in Western moral consciousness as self-explaining standards. Few if any of us would be capable of putting acts above their underlying intentions, values of particular groups above virtues common to humankind, or collective interests above individual happiness without experiencing in themselves a loss of morality. The Middle Ages changed Western moral consciousness for good, and perhaps even for the better.

CONCLUSION

The history of the cardinal virtues in the Middle Ages that has been written in the previous chapters allows two negative conclusions which are worth stating before proceeding with a more positive evaluation of the presented material.

First, medieval moral thought did not progressively develop toward a Thomastic synthesis of faith and reason which gradually disintegrated near the end of the Middle Ages—a view inspired by a neo-scholastic outlook on medieval intellectual history which colours many older as well as a number of more recent studies on medieval virtue ethics.¹ True enough, the history of the cardinal virtues involves elements upon which such a view can be construed. After many centuries in which the religious conception of virtue and morality was taken for granted, the reviving study of the classics in the twelfth century precipitated the introduction of alternative, philosophical conceptions, which led to a dissolution of the prevailing union of religion and morality. A further challenge to religious moral thought was posed by the recovery of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, which came to dominate academic moral debate from the mid-thirteenth century. Taking up the Aristotelian challenge, the great scholastics of the second half of the century took efforts to integrate Aristotelian ethics with moral theology in their laboured expositions on the cardinal and other virtues. Among these expositions, Thomas Aquinas's *Secunda secundae* doubtless ranks first due to its size, its comprehensive character, its level of excogitation, and its influence on late medieval academic, pastoral, and educational moral writing. It is true, moreover, that from the last decades of the thirteenth century moral theology and Aristotelian philosophy were recurrently detached from each other. While some philosophers and theologians adhered to a purely philosophical conception of moral virtue, others attempted to restore the Augustinian unity of virtue, grace, and merit, so that polarization took the place in moral debate of earlier attempts to achieve harmony.

¹ For some recent works, see the account of Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 19–24.

Propounding such a neo-scholastic view of the history of medieval moral thought nevertheless strikes me as inadequate. As I see it, a synthesis of faith and reason in matters of virtue ethics was reached in the late twelfth century by the theologians grouped around Peter the Chanter who recognized naturally acquired alongside supernaturally informed or infused virtues, clearly distinguished the properties of both, but also brought both together in a single system of moral economy. Thirteenth-century moral theology owes its harmonious character to its continuation of this twelfth-century tradition. Meanwhile, the predominance of Aristotelian ethics, which conflicted in several ways with Christian as well as with Platonic and Stoic traditions of moral thought, made it difficult for thirteenth-century scholastics to achieve a full integration of philosophy and theology in their discussions of virtue. The solutions they proposed often make a heterogeneous impression, as some scholars have observed.² Notably Aquinas's treatment of the cardinal virtues in the *Secunda secundae* suffers from a double ambiguity: the virtues figure as acquired (Aristotelian) but also as infused (Christian) qualities, and as general (Stoic) but also as specific (Aristotelian) virtues. The polarization of moral debate in the late medieval period may not so much have destroyed a Thomastic synthesis of faith and reason as have ensued from the failure of thirteenth-century thinkers to synthesize the two in a durable and satisfactory way. At the same time, the majority of late medieval moral authors—philosophers and theologians as well as pastoral and educational writers—continued to compromise between religious and philosophical conceptions of virtue, being ready to recognize virtue outside the faith on the one hand, but unwilling to dissolve the ties between moral goodness and religion on the other.

Second, the history of medieval moral thought is not to be seen as a steady process of secularization boosted by an expanding lay culture—a traditional, liberally inspired view which in current scholarship on medieval virtue ethics may take the moderated form of the search for philosophy's gradual emancipation from theology. Again, the history of the cardinal virtues in the Middle Ages contains elements which seem to allow the construction of a similar view. After their appropriation by the Latin Church fathers, the cardinal virtues were firmly assimilated to Christianity in the early medieval period. In the twelfth century, the

² See *ibid.* 34, 254; see also Müller, *Natürliche Ethik*, 220–221 (judging Albert the Great's philosophy, not his theology).

patristic union of religion and morality was broken under the influence of classical moral philosophy, despite the strenuous efforts of monastic authors to deepen virtue's religious understanding. As a result, naturally acquired virtues were formally recognized near 1200, albeit as inferior to the virtues infused, or informed, by grace. In the thirteenth century, the philosophical notion of virtue was fully explored due to the recovery of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Although the great scholastics attempted to keep acquired and gratuitous virtues together in one system, philosophical and religious ethics took separate paths by 1300, when the notion of infused moral virtue was called into question. Even in theology, moral virtue was henceforth increasingly understood in purely philosophical terms, as a human quality produced through human effort and enabling a life of moral uprightness in the here and now rather than providing a staircase to heaven.

Still, such a liberally inspired view of the history of medieval moral thought involves major shortcomings, too. First, the decisive steps toward the secularization of virtue were all taken by theologians. The recognition of acquired virtue near 1200 was brought about by Peter the Chanter and his colleagues; likewise, the rejection of infused moral virtue was a theological affair, and so was the ensuing restriction of moral virtue to its philosophical understanding. Second, late medieval virtue ethics displays anything but a linear development toward secularization. Opposition against the notion of acquired virtue never extinguished after 1200 and even strongly rekindled from the mid-fourteenth century, not only in theological circles sensitive to the "Augustinian revival", but also in early Italian humanism, while the production of religious moral treatises steadily persisted in this period. Third, most late medieval moral authors continued to combine philosophical and religious conceptions of virtue in their work, while even authors who primarily based themselves on the *Nicomachean Ethics* tended to mould Aristotle's thought, either consciously or not, into the shape of Christian anthropology. Rather than by ongoing secularization, late medieval moral thought is characterized by a continuous groping for workable compromises between widely diverging traditions of classical and Christian origin.

In my view, the achievement of medieval moral thought lies precisely in its readiness to accept a philosophical understanding of virtue without betraying its fundamentally Christian character. The recognition of naturally acquired virtue in twelfth-century Parisian theology is not only to be valued for the fact that it acknowledges the moral goodness of those who do not accept the prime standard of goodness available to Christians, that

is, God, even though this acknowledgment is highly impressive in itself. It is also to be valued for its attempt to give naturally acquired virtue its proper place in God's moral universe. Admitting a philosophical understanding of virtue in an overall religious framework of morality involves an enrichment of the moral consciousness of Christendom itself. Virtue is provided with a new dynamic; it is no longer seen as an autonomous manifestation of divine grace, but as taking its origin in the human aspiration for goodness which finds its fulfilment in God. Late medieval moral thought appears to be motivated for a great part by a desire to preserve this dynamic. It sets itself the task of imagining a moral continuum in which man, once having recognized his capacity for virtue, can take the necessary steps toward God's ultimate goodness. Grace accompanies man all the way long—even acquired virtue has its first origin and final end in God, as theologians and philosophers affirm—up to the point where God takes over control of man's journey. Aristotelian ethics provided a suitable analysis of the human effort involved in the process, while recognizing the work of grace depended on a proper understanding of the revealed truth. Obviously, philosophical analysis and religious interpretation did not easily match. Hence the frequent ambiguities in moral theology and philosophy as well as the occasional contradictions in pastoral literature; hence the wish of philosophers and religious writers to limit their focus to either the natural or the supernatural dimension of morality; hence also the attempts of some theologians to achieve a clear picture by either ruling out grace from the realm of morality or confining virtue to divinely infused qualities. Yet the majority of theologians and other moral writers continued to approach virtue as a sphere where the human could meet with the divine, even if this approach detracted from the consistency of their thought.

Medieval moral literature centred in nearly all its forms around the human being conceived as a fallen creature in search of redemption. Healing from sin through penance and confession was one aspect of the redemptive process, and certainly its most important aspect from the point of view taken by pastoral writers concerned with saving the souls of the mass of believers. Sin and vice are consequently the predominant moral concepts in most genres of pastoral literature; virtues are often relegated to a secondary position, as antidotes of the vices. Theologians usually took a different perspective and concentrated on the human capacity for virtue, in accordance with their fundamental belief that existence, depending on God's creation, is essentially good. In moral theology, the virtues therefore normally come first, with the vices appearing as their

negative derivatives. The theological concentration on virtue and goodness agrees with the basic orientation of classical moral philosophy, while the idea that the seeds of virtue are implanted in every human individual and need human effort in order to grow concords with Aristotelian ethics in particular, even if grace and charity are needed in the theological view to achieve the process. Theology and philosophy, then, had much common ground to explore. In exploring this common ground, theologians as well as philosophers were guided by a set of assumptions contingent on the Christian understanding of fallen human nature, as I have argued in the fourth chapter of this study. What they elaborated was not a genuine Aristotelian conception of human morality which was left to God to fulfil with grace, but a conception of human morality of religious inspiration, marked by the essentially Christian notions of voluntarism, intentionalism, egalitarianism, and individualism. The Christian character of the medieval idea of virtue not only resides in its emphasis on the divine aspects of virtue itself, but also in its construction of a distinctly religious framework in which human virtue was conceived. As in the case of political theory, one might argue that the most radical texts in medieval virtue ethics were not provided by Aristotle, but by Augustine and the Bible.³

This study started with expressing a wish to tell the positive story of medieval moral thought, relating to its efforts to make the best of human life. What we have seen is that from patristic times, Latin Christian authors explored the human capacity not only to flee from evil but to embrace the good; we have also seen that from the twelfth century, the field of morality and virtue was opened to the entire human race without becoming detached from God. In dealing with the cardinal virtues in particular, the Middle Ages established confidence in the human attempt to reach moral goodness under divine guidance—not by denying the cumbersome aspects of the human condition, but by offering a virtuous way out. The idea that the human self can be brought to moral perfection through the combined efforts of man and his Creator is a medieval legacy. The twelfth century meant more for the breakthrough of this idea than the Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, or indeed any other post-medieval development.

In the recent past, the concentration on human sinfulness with which Christian morality is usually associated has done much to discredit its tradition, as it seemingly implies a depreciation of human nature. This

³ The claim for political theory is made by Kempshall, *The Common Good*, 362.

study has shown that the tradition of Christian morality also offers the perspective of every human being capable of gaining virtue and shredding off his vices which, as negative reflections of the virtues, do not even really exist. If approached from this perspective, the history of medieval moral thought unveils a succouring potential. Under grace, virtue is within our reach. We can only become more human when we grasp for it.

APPENDIX I

SOME CURRENT CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE MORAL VIRTUES

I.1. *Prudence and the Moral Virtues* *According to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*

φρόνησις	prudentia
ἀνδρεία	fortitudo
σωφροσύνη	temperantia
ἐλευθέρτης	liberalitas
μεγαλόπρεπειᾶ	magnificentia
μεγαλόψυχία	magnanimitas
(unnamed)	honoris amativa (<i>Giles of Rome</i>), philotimia
πρᾶότης	mansuetudo
φιλία	affabilitas, amicitia, amicitia
ἀλήθειᾶ	veritas, apertio
εὐτράπελία	eutrapelia, iocunditas
δικαιοσύνη	iustitia

I.2. *The Subdivisions of the Cardinal Virtues* *According to Some Classical and Medieval Writings*

Cicero, *De inventione*

Cicero divides justice into *naturae ius*, *cosuetudine ius*, and *lege ius*. The parts of justice mentioned below pertain to *naturae ius*. These, however, are usually quoted in the Middle Ages as the parts of justice *tout court*.

prudentia	memoria, intelligentia, providentia
iustitia	religio, pietas, gratia, vindicatio, observantia, veritas
fortitudo	magnificentia, fidentia, patientia, perseverantia
temperantia	continentia, clementia, modestia

Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*

These subdivisions pertain to the cardinal virtues as political virtues.

prudentia	ratio, intellectus, circumspectio, providentia, docilitas, cautio
fortitudo	magnanimitas, fiducia, securitas, magnificentia, constantia, tolerantia, firmitas
temperantia	modestia, verecundia, abstinencia, castitas, honestas, moderatio, parcitas, sobrietas, pudicitia

iustitia	innocentia, amicitia, concordia, pietas, religio, affectus, humanitas
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Moralium dogma philosophorum

prudentia	providentia, circumspectio, cautio, docilitas
iustitia	severitas, liberalitas/benignitas (<i>includes</i> religio, pietas, innocentia, amicitia, reverentia, concordia, misericordia)
fortitudo	magnanimitas, fiducia, securitas, magnificentia, constantia, patientia
temperantia	modestia, verecundia, abstinencia, honestas, moderantia, parcitas, sobrietas, pudicitia

Ysagoge in theologiam

[prudentia]	[intellectus, ratio, providentia, circumspectio, docilitas, cautio] (<i>interpolated into the text</i>)
iustitia	religio, pietas, innocentia, amicitia, reverentia, concordia, misericordia
fortitudo	magnanimitas, fiducia, securitas, magnificentia, constantia, firmitas (<i>includes</i> humilitas, patientia)
temperantia	modestia, verecundia, abstinencia, honestas, moderantia, parcitas, sobrietas, continentia (<i>includes</i> pudicitia, castitas)

Alan of Lille, *De virtutibus et de vitiis et de donis Spiritus sancti*

prudentia	intellectus, ratio, providentia, circumspectio, docilitas, cautio
iustitia	religio (<i>includes</i> fides, spes, caritas), pietas, [severitas, vindicta] (<i>virtues of doubtful character</i>), innocentia, gratia, reverentia (<i>includes</i> veneratio, obedientia), misericordia, concordia
fortitudo	magnanimitas, fiducia, securitas, magnificentia, constantia, firmitas, patientia, perseverantia, longanimitas, humilitas, mansuetudo
temperantia	continentia, castitas, pudicitia, sobrietas, parcitas, largitas, moderantia, honestas, abstinencia, verecundia, modestia

William Peraldus, *Summa de virtutibus*

prudentia	fides, donum intellectus, donum sapientiae (<i>as</i> virtus cognitiva divinorum) prudentia nomine stricte, donum consilii (<i>as</i> virtus cognitiva humanorum) <i>also quotes the subdivisions of Cicero, "Seneca" (Martin of Braga) and the Moraliu dogma philosophorum</i>
temperantia	sobrietas (secundum gustum), continentia (secundum tactum; <i>consists of</i> continentia vidualis, continentia virginalis,

	continentia coniugal), temperantia secundum visum, temperantia secundum auditum, temperantia secundum olfactum
fortitudo	also quotes the subdivision of Cicero magnanimitas, fiducia, securitas, patientia, constantia, magnificentia (combining the subdivisions of Cicero and Macrobius; in fact, identical with the subdivision proposed in the <i>Moralium dogma philosophorum</i> , possibly transmitted through Philip the Chancellor)
iustitia	omnibus: dilectio, veritas, fides/fidelitas superiori: latría/religio (for God), dulia/reverentia (for humans), oratio (accompanies both), gratia (to God), obedientia (to God and humans) inferiori: disciplina pari: aequitas/aequalitas specialiter: pietas (parentis, patriae, benevolis), gratia (his qui beneficia conferunt), vindicatio (his qui mala inferunt), misericordia (his qui mala ferunt)

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*

Partes integrales are components of the virtue in question, *partes subiectivae* its kinds, while *partes potentiales* are secondary or “annexed” virtues.

prudentia	<i>partes integrales</i> : memoria, ratio, intellectus, docilitas, solertia, providentia, circumspectio, cautio <i>partes subiectivae</i> : prudentia oeconomica, prudentia regnativa, prudentia politica, prudentia militaris <i>partes potentiales</i> : eubulia, synesis, gnome
iustitia	<i>partes potentiales</i> : religio, pietas, observantia, veritas, gratia, vindicatio, affabilitas, liberalitas, epieikeia
fortitudo	<i>partes potentiales</i> : magnanimitas (= fiducia), magnificentia, patientia, perseverantia; also mentioned: constantia, securitas
temperantia	<i>partes integrales</i> : verecundia, honestas <i>partes subiectivae</i> : abstinencia, sobrietas, castitas (to a perfect degree: virginitas), pudicitia <i>partes potentiales</i> : continentia, clementia, modestia (includes humilitas), studiositas, modestia in exterioribus corporis motibus (includes eutrapelia), modestia in exteriora apparatus; also mentioned: mansuetudo, parcitas

I.3. *The Classification of the Moral Virtues According to Giles of Rome, Gerald of Odo, and John Buridan*

Following Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome teaches in *De regimine principum* that prudence controls the intellect, justice the *operationes*. The ten other moral

virtues listed by Aristotle control the *passiones* which proceed from the irascible and the concupiscent appetites. Fortitude is the main virtue of the irascible appetite, temperance of the concupiscent appetite; the remaining moral virtues are “annexed” to them. On this basis, Giles proposes the following classification:

intellectus

prudentia

operationes

iustitia

passiones: irascibilis

fortitudo (*circa passiones ortas ex malis futuris*)

mansuetudo (*ex malis praesentibus*)

magnanimitas (*circa magna bona honesta*)

magnificentia (*circa magna bona utilia*)

passiones: concupiscibilis

secundum bonum hominis in se:

temperantia (*circa delectabilia*)

liberalitas (*circa utilia*)

honoris amatiua (*circa honesta*)

secundum bonum in ordine ad alium:

veritas (*ad manifestationem*)

affabilitas (*ad vitam*)

eutrapelia (*ad ludum*)

Henry of Friemar and Walter Burley accept Giles’s classification in their commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Gerald of Odo’s commentary contains two more classifications of the moral virtues which may have been partly inspired by Giles, too. The first one is based on the idea that the moral virtues, situated in the will, regulate the concupiscent and irascible appetites:

appetitus concupiscibilis

circa materiam delectabilem

circa receptionem

secundum tactum: castitas (*species temperantiae*)

subspecies: virginitas, castitas, vidualis pudicitia, coniugalitatis fides

secundum gustum: sobrietas (*species temperantiae*)

subspecies: sobrietas cibi, sobrietas potus

secundum auditum: euphronia (*annexa temperantiae*)

secundum visum: compositio (*annexa temperantiae*)

circa materiam utilem

penes dare et expendere

mediocrae expenses: liberalitas

magnae expenses: magnificentia

penes reddere: iustitia (*and its many species*)

appetitus irascibilis

circa materiam honestam

circa bonum arduum et difficile

ratione magnitudinis: magnanimitas

ratione dilationis: longanimitas (annexa magnanimitati)

ratione varietatis accentuum: aequanimitas (annexa magnanimitati)

ratione sublimitatis et pronitatis ad casum: humilitas (magnanimitatis conservativa)

circa malum imminens

potest repelli

a causa humana: fortitudo

a fortuna: sicura fidentia (attribuitur fortitudini)

non potest repelli: tolerantia (attribuitur fortitudini)

circa malum iam illatum

a causa non humana: patientia

a causa humana: mansuetudo

Gerald's second classification is based on the triple division of the good into *utile*, *delectabile*, and *honestum*. Each of these three comprise essential as well as accidental aspects of moral goodness. The essential aspects are regulated by the cardinal virtues of justice, temperance, and fortitude:

utile

dare, expendere: liberalitas, magnificentia (accidental)

reddere: iustitia (cardinal)

delectabile

largiendo: eutrapelia, amicitia (accidental)

recipiendo: temperantia (cardinal)

honestum

honor: magnanimitas (accidental)

virtus: fortitudo (cardinal)

John Buridan extends Gerald's second scheme in his commentary so as to include all moral and intellectual virtues figuring in Aristotle's work:

utile

consumendo seu distribuendo

dando, expendendo: liberalitas, magnificentia

reddendo: iustitia

aggrediendo seu accipiendo

quod suum est: liberalitas, magnificentia

quod alterius est: iustitia

retinendo seu servando

alienum: iustitia

suum: liberalitas, magnificentia

*delectabile**largiendo*: amicitia/affabilitas, eutrapelia*recipiendo*: temperantia*tristabile**inducens timorem*: fortitudo*commovens ad iram*: mansuetudo*honestum**pertinens ad virtutem cognoscitivam*: prudentia, ars, scientia, sapientia, intellectus*pertinens ad virtutem interpretativam*: veritas*pertinens ad virtutem appetitivum*: magnanimitas, philotimia*pertinens ad virtutem propter imminens periculum non perdendam sed retinendam*: fortitudo

John of Legnano copies Buridan's classification in his *De pace*.

APPENDIX II

SOME UNEDITED MEDIEVAL TEXTS ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES

In all texts edited below the punctuation and use of capitals have been adapted.

II.1. De quatuor principalibus uirtutibus et diffinitionibus

The text edited here is taken from MS Vendôme, Bibliothèque municipale 148, ff. 75^v–76^r (12th century). This manuscript contains numerous short texts on moral subjects which for a great part also appear in MS *Bruges, Grootseminarie 406 (12th century); in this MS, our text is on ff. 129^r–130^r.¹ The text is a good, though modest, example of the beginning confrontation of ancient and Christian ideas of the virtues. The first paragraph of the text chiefly paraphrases Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53.160–2.54.164. The subdivision of justice is remarkable: instead of following Cicero's subdivision of *naturae ius*, as usually happens in medieval treatises on the virtues, the unknown author makes a distinction between *ius naturale*, *ius consuetudinarium*, and *ius posituum*—paralleling Cicero's division into *naturae ius*, *consuetudine ius*, and *lege ius* in a vocabulary conforming to twelfth-century legal studies. In the last phrase of the first paragraph, the author refers to his own work *De tribus ascensionibus* for a further discussion of the virtues. A twelfth-century text under this title is known from three French manuscripts.² In the second paragraph, the perspective changes from ancient moral philosophy to Christian theology. Theologians conceive of the virtues as flowing from the fountain of charity, argues our author, a statement which he substantiates with a long quotation from Augustine, *De moribus ecclesiae* 1, PL 32: 1321–1322. The first sentence attributed to Augustine, however (“Malum diligere peccatum ...”), is spurious. The third paragraph discusses the question of whether the cardinal virtues survive in the afterlife. The author does not mention his source, but essentially paraphrases Augustine, *De Trinitate* 14.9, CCSL 50A: 438–440, except for the final clause “uirtutes uero eodem ad integrum possidebuntur”.

¹ See Pattin, “Un manuscrit du XIIe siècle”, 87. I owe thanks to Father Kurt Priem of the Grootseminarie who checked the MS for me.

² See MSS *Paris, BnF lat. 2594, f. 63^v (12th/13th century; *De tribus ascensionibus Christi*, inc. Tres sunt ascensiones Christi in actu); *Troyes, BM 1761, f. 116^v (13th century; inc. *Ascendens Christus in altum*, etc. [Eph. 4:8]. Tres sunt ascensiones Christi in actu. Primo enim ascendit in montem deinde in crucem); cf. *Troyes, BM 518, f. 116^v (12th century; *Sententiae diversae*, inc. Tres sunt ascensiones Christi in actu).

De quatuor principalibus uirtutibus et diffinitionibus

76^r Hęc quoque iiijor sunt: prudentia scilicet, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia. Hęc uero iuxta Tullium sic diffiniuntur. Prudentia est enim rerum bonarum et malorum scientia, id est discretio boni appetendi et mali detestandi. Eius partes sunt tres: memoria, intelligentia, prouidentia. Temperantia est rationis in libidine atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata determinatio. Huius quoque partes sunt tres: continentia, clementia, modestia. Fortitudo est rerum magnarum et excelsarum appetitio et humilium contemptio et laboris cum utilitate rationis perpassio. Eius partes sunt iiijor: magnificentia, fiducia, patientia, perseuerantia. Iusticia est uis equitatis unicuique rei suam tribuens dignitatem. Huius partes sunt tres: ius naturale, ius consuetudinarium, ius positium. De his

uero omnibus plura loqui proponimus, | quia de eis in tractatu quem de tribus Christi et nostri ascensionibus fecimus, sufficienter disseruimus.

Theologi uero has aliter diffiniunt, quas prodere ex fonte dilectionis dicunt [dicunt *interl. manu posteriore*]. Augustinus de his in libro De moribus ecclesię ita: “Malum”, inquit, “diligere peccatum ad mortem est, diligere magis bonum quam optimum uicium est, amare optimum uirtus sanissima est, inherere optimo beatissimum est. Nichil uero est optimum hominis cui herere beatissimum sit nisi Dominus, cui certe herere non ualemus nisi dilectione. Namque illud quod quadripartita uirtus dicitur, ex ipsius amoris uario quodam affectu ducitur. Quare diffinire licet ut temperantiam dicamus esse amorem Deo sese integrum incorruptumque seruantem, fortitudinem omnia propter Deum facile tolerantem, iusticiam Deo tantum seruientem et ob hoc bene cunctis quę homini subiecta sunt imperent(em), prudentiam ea quibus adiuuatur in Deum ab his quibus impediri potest bene discernentem. Si enim Deus summum bonum hominis est, quod negari non potest, sequitur quoniam summum bonum appetere est bene uiuere, ut nichil aliud sit bene uiuere quam Deum toto corde, tota mente, tota anima diligere. A quo existit ut incorruptus in eo amor atque integer custodiatur, quod est temperantię; nullis frangatur incommodis, quod est fortitudinis; nulli alii principaliter seruiat, quod est iusticię; uigilet in discernendis rebus ne fallacia paulatim dolus subripiat, quod est prudentię”. Hęc uenerabilis pater de iiijor ait uirtutibus.

76^v Queritur autem an istę uirtutes quibus in hac mortalitate bene uiuitur, quia et ipsę in animo posteriores tamen eo esse incipiunt, cum ad externa perduxerint esse desierunt. Quibusdam enim uisum est desituras et bonos animos sola cogitatione et scientia beatos, hoc est contemplatione diuinę naturę, quia nichil melius est uel eşque bonum, nichil amabilius uel eşque amabile ea natura quę creauit omnes ceteras instituitque naturas, cui regenti esse subditum iusticia est et omnino immortalis iusticia. Hęc in illa beatitudine esse desinet, sed talis ac tanta erit ut perfectior et maior esse non possit. Fortassis et alię tres uirtutes—prudentia sine periculo erroris, fortitudo sine molestia tolerandorum malorum, temperantia sine repugnantia libidinum—erunt in illa felicitate, ut prudentię sit nullum bonum Deo preponere uel equare, fortitudinis ei firmissime coherere, temperantię nullo defectu nouo [*sic for* noxio] delectari. Nunc autem quod agit iusticia in subueniendo miseris, quod prudentia in precauendis | insidiis, quod fortitudo in perferendis molestiis, quod temperantia in coercendis

delectationibus prauis, non erit ibi ubi omnino mali nichil erit. Ac per hoc ista uirtutum opera quę huic uite mortali sunt necessaria, sicut fides ad quam referenda sunt, in preteritis habebuntur; uirtutes uero eędem ad integrum possidebuntur.

II.2. De quatuor principalibus uirtutibus

This short text from the same Vendôme manuscript, ff. 93^{r-v}, has no parallel in MS Bruges, Grootseminarie 406. It presents the cardinal virtues as remedies against four principal evils. Apart from the first three sentences, which construe the opposition between the virtues and the evils, the text parallels *Commentarius in Nahum* 19, PL 96: 716C–717A, written by an unknown Victorine author. Less literal parallels exist with Thomas the Cistercian, *Commentaria in Cantica canticorum* 1, PL 206: 70D–71A.

De quatuor principalibus uirtutibus

Quatuor sunt humane uite uicia, quibus opponuntur quatuor uirtutum remedia. Vicia sunt ignorantia, infirmitas, impietas, cupiditas. Uirtutum remedia prudentia, fortitudo, iusticia, temperantia. | De prudentia nascuntur consilia, de iusticia obsequia, de fortitudine subsidia, de temperantia remedia. Hec sunt quę animam erudiunt et ornant, amplificanc et roborant. Consilia namque illuminant cecos, obsequia reddunt deuotos, subsidia roborant inualidos, remedia sanant egrotos. Consilia expellunt ignorantiam, obsequia inuidiam, subsidia infirmitatem, remedia cupiditatem. Consilia sapientię faciunt doctores, obsequia iusticię amatores, subsidia ueritatis defensores, remedia felicitatis dilectores. Felix ergo ciuitas quę nec eget consilio, nec caret obsequio, nec subsidii imbecillitate iacet, nec remedii egestate sordet. Hęc Christus eo glorificato et spiritu Patris atque suo dato ecclesię suę contulit. Hęc ipse prior in ea ad ipsius gloriam protulit. Siquidem consilia dedit uite, obsequia iusticię, subsidia constantię, remedia penitentię. Consilia homines docendo, obsequia turbas pascendo, subsidia uiduę, pupilli et aduenę causas iudicando, remedia pertranseundo et ones oppressos a diabolo sanando. Consilia igitur dedit in monte, obsequia iuxta mare, in cenaculo subsidia, in cruce remedia.

93^v

II.3. *Peter the Chanter, Summa Abel, lemma Virtus*

Peter the Chanter's *Summa Abel*, a lexicon of theological terms, remains unedited except for some individual lemmata.³ The textual variation of the manuscripts is considerable. The lemma *Virtus* is edited here from one of the earliest known manuscripts: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France lat. 10633, ff. 133^v–134^r

³ See Quinto, "Die Quaestiones des Stephan Langton", 104–105 (lemma *Timor*); id., *Scholastica*, 167 (lemma *Clerici*); id., "Giubileo e attesa escatologica", 83–86 (lemmata *Numeri*, *Septenarius*); id., "Stephen Langton", 352 n. 135 (lemma *Theologia*). Stephen Barney prepares an edition of the whole work.

(*P*, composed shortly after 1200). In a few cases, the text has been corrected against MS Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale 1704, f. 203^{r-v} (*T*, 13th century) which contains numerous variant readings. In fact, *P* and *T* seem to represent two different branches of transmission of the Chanter's text.

The lemma consists of three sections which each have an interest in itself. The first distinguishes political, Catholic, and gratuitous virtues, and explains how these virtues are connected. The Chanter equates the cardinal with the political and the Catholic with the theological virtues, something which his colleagues usually avoided; the gratuitous virtues are the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The second section, which lists various meanings of the word *virtus* in Christian discourse, is a specimen of lexicography. *T* has some additions in comparison to *P* ("Quandoque septem dona Spiritus Sancti"; "Quandoque Christus, unde appellatur Dei sapientia et Dei uirtus"). The third section presents the cardinal virtues as being each accompanied by a pair of "collateral" virtues. The source of this section is Peter Comestor, *Sermo* 36, PL 198: 1808D–1809A. The opening phrase of the Chanter in *P* ("Virtutes cardinales sive principales, id est collaterales, quarum quolibet alias duas secum habet, sunt hee iiiior", wrongly equating the cardinal with the collateral virtues) appears to be a corruption of the Comestor's statement "Quaelibet harum duas secum habet collaterales virtutes"; *T* merely reads: "Virtutes principales sunt". Also, *P* mistakably connects temperance with three instead of two collateral virtues, while the reading *tam sepe* in the final sentence (shared by the Comestor and *T*) is absent. The religious character of the third section seems little consistent with the equation of the cardinal with the political virtues in the first section. The Chanter even suppresses the only classical reference—a quotation from Terence, *Eunuchus* 732 ("Sine Cerere et Baccho friget Venus")—which appears in the Comestor's text.

P 134^r Uirtutes alie cardinales siue politice uel philosophice scilicet hee quatuor: prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iusticia. Alie catholice scilicet hee tres: fides, spes, caritas. De hiis tribus dicitur: virtus est qualitas mentis qua recte uiuitur, qua nemo male utitur, qua Deus in homine sine homine operatur.⁴ Alie gratuite ut scilicet vii dona Spiritus Sancti. Et secundum hanc triplicem distinctionem intelligitur illa opinio sanctorum quam scilicet qui habet unam uirtutem, habet omnes, scilicet cardinales; uel scilicet qui habet unam catholicam scilicet caritatem, habet omnes; uel qui habet unam gratuitam, habet omnes scilicet gratuitas; uel sic: qui habet unam | in habitu uel usu, habet omnes, scilicet in habitu, non in actu uel usu. Similiter de uitiis: qui habet unum scilicet in usu, habet omnia scilicet in habitu uel effectui, quod idem est, id est: habilis est ad omnia. Ita dicitur quod omnes uirtutes sunt equales quantum scilicet ad habitum, non quantum ad usum. Sicut enim ait auctoritas: latera ciuitatis sunt equalia,⁵ id est: uirtutes sunt equales, scilicet, ut dictum est, quantum ad habitum, non quantum ad usum [Sicut enim ... usum *marginis* *P*].

⁴ Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* II.27.1 § 1, 1: 480; see above, p. 120.

⁵ See *Glossa ordinaria*, PL 114: 747C (Apoc. 21:16).

Virtutes dicuntur quandoque iste tres: fides, spes, caritas sine quibus non est salus. Quandoque iiiiior: prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iusticia. Iste iiiiior coronant caput anime, quod in corona dictum est.⁶ Quandoque dona gratuita, scilicet que Deus operatur in nobis sine nobis, unde: *ibunt de uirtute in uirtutem*.⁷ Quandoque angeli, unde: *quis est iste rex glorie dominus uirtutum* etc.,⁸ et quidam ordo angelorum uirtutes appellatur. Quandoque miracula, unde: *Domine nonne in nomine tuo demonia eiecimus et uirtutes multas fecimus?*⁹ Quandoque princeps dicitur uirtus, ut in Actibus apostolorum de Symone Mago dicitur quod sit uirtus [uirtus T: princeps P].¹⁰ Quandoque euangelium quod uere dicitur uirtus, quia uirtus eius predicatio est quia per fidem euangelii fit remissio peccatorum.

Virtutes cardinales siue principales, id est collaterales quarum quelibet alias duas secum habet, sunt hee iiiiior. Iusticia que unicuique reddit quod suum est, Deo, sibi et proximo. Huic assistunt misericordia et ueritas. Nisi enim misericordia obuiet ueritati, iam non est misericordia sed miseria; et nisi ueritas obuiet misericordie, iam non est ueritas sed seueritas.¹¹ Prudentia in precauendis peccatis et molestiis. Huic assistunt carnis mortificatio et obedientia. Quid autem ualidius arcet nos ab illicitis quam carnis mortificatio et uotum obedientie? Temperantia que est in prosperis. Huic assistunt uirginitas [largitas *add. P*] et humilitas. In prosperis enim necesse est humilem esse et benignum proximis erogando. Fortitudo in aduersis. Huic assistunt spes uite et mundi contemptus. Nisi Laurentius hanc fortitudinem cum spe uite habuisset, inter incendia quasi [*lacuna P cum add. T*] ioco non ita protulisset: "Assatum est, iam uersa et manduca".¹² Vnde putas sanctum Iob inter tot corporis ulcera et rerum detrimenta sepe et constanter Deum benedixisse, ubi hec omnia arbitrabatur uelut stercora?

II.4. *Hugh of Saint Cher, Commentary on Peter Lombard, Sententiae III.33*

Hugh of Saint Cher is the first Dominican author to have written a full commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*. In his commentary on distinction III.33, he discusses the "political" virtues *secundum quod ad speculationem theologi pertinet*, which might seem a contradictory statement; however, Hugh considers the political virtues as products of the cooperation of man and God, as he explains in his commentary on distinction II.27. Hugh's discussion mainly consists of an evaluation of the functions of each virtue in the present life and in heaven, under reference to patristic as well as classical authors, including "Seneca" (Martin of

⁶ Perhaps an allusion to Cant. 4:8.

⁷ Ps. 83:3.

⁸ Ps. 23:10.

⁹ Matt. 7:22.

¹⁰ Act. 8:10.

¹¹ Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sententiae* 3.23, *Opera* 3: 81.

¹² See Ambrose, *De officiis* 1.41.207, CCSL 15: 78.

Braga). At the end, he adds some observations on the virtues in general, strikingly declaring that the cardinal virtues comprise the theological virtues as well as the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The text is taken from MS Padua, Biblioteca Universitaria 853, ff. 105^{va}–106^{vb} (13th century).

Post predictam de iiii uirtutes. Post uirtutes theologicas agit magister breuiter de politicis secundum quod ad speculationem theologi pertinet, distinguens usus earum in presenti et in futuro. Vnde secundum tenorem processus duo breuiter queruntur hic: primo quid sit usus prudentie in presenti et in futuro, et de aliis tribus similiter; secundo de qualibet per se, quid sit et quomodo et secundum quid differat ab aliis.

Ad primum sic. Magistri sic describant usum prudentie: prudentie, inquiunt, est cuncta ad normam rationis dirigere et humanis actibus quasi diuinis prouidere.¹³ Et sumitur a Macrobio qui sic describit eam: prudentia est mundum istum et omnia que in mundo sunt diuinorum contemplatione despicere omnemque animi cogitationi in sola diuina dirigere.¹⁴ Huius autem .vi. sunt species, scilicet ratio, intellectus, circumspectio, prouidencia, docibilitas et cautela.¹⁵ Vsus uero prudentie in presenti est, ut dicit Augustinus, precauere insidias, in futuro uero nullum bonum Deo preponere uel equare.¹⁶ Sed cum usus isti sunt diuersi secundum speciem, uidetur quod habitus qui [qui *addidi*] eliciuntur sunt diuersi secundum speciem, et ita prudentia non est una uirtus. Item alia difficultas est in hoc quod est nullum bonum preponere Deo. Ergo uirtutes que sunt adhuc facile facienda sunt diuerse. Item cuilibet dictat natura nichil Deo esse preponendum, ergo nullum bonum preponere Deo nature est, non uirtutis, ergo non est usus prudentie.

105^{vb}

Solutio. Duplex est usus uirtutis, unus principalis et alius secundarius. Principalis semper unus est, secundarius potest esse multiplex. Verbi gratia: principalis usus caritatis est | uelle ei qui diligitur summum bonum, secundarius uero multiplex est, scilicet uelle ei seruire, uelle ei sanitatem et huius [?] quibus uenitur ad summum bonum. Ad primum ergo obiectum dicimus quod principalis usus prudentie est discernere siue iudicare siue eligere, postmodum Deum esse omnibus preponendum. Et ex hoc consequenter imperat ea que magis ad hoc faciunt preponenda esse, ea uero que impediunt esse postponenda et cauenda. Et hoc dicit Cassiodorus aperte: si quis prudentiam sequi desiderat, tunc per rationem bene recteque uiuet, si omnia prius estimet et perpendat et dignitatem rebus non ex opinione multorum sed ex eadem natura constituat,¹⁷ id est secundum quod uidet magis ordinata ad Deum habendum preponit, et secundum quod magis impediencia, magis cauet et fugit. Ad id quod obicitur quod usus prudentie sunt diuersi et ideo habitus diuersi, non sequitur, quia illi usus non sunt equales, sed ordinatur unus ad alium, ut iam dictum est. Ad secun-

¹³ Macrobius, *Commentarii* 1.8.7, p. 38.

¹⁴ Ibid. 1.8.4, p. 37.

¹⁵ Ibid. 1.8.7, p. 38 (reading *cautio* for *cautela*).

¹⁶ Augustine, *De Trinitate* 14.9, CSSL 50A: 439.

¹⁷ In fact Martin of Braga, *Formula vitae honestae* 2, p. 238.

dum similiter dicimus quod sicut usus sequitur usum, ita difficultas difficultatem, unde sicut est unus usus principalis, ita una principalis difficultas quam explicat uirtus una.

Sequitur de usu temperancie que sic describitur a magistris: temperancia est uirtus qua desideria carnalia constringimus et superflua resecamus.¹⁸ Et sumitur a Seneca qui continenciam sumens pro temperancia sic describit eam: continenciam si diligis circumcide superflua et in arctum desideria tua constringere; considera quantum natura poscat, non quantum concupiscat expecta.¹⁹ Macrobius sic: temperancia est omnia derelinquere quantum natura patitur, que corporis usus requirit.²⁰ Huius autem ix. sunt species: modestia, uerecundia, abstinentia, castitas, honestas, moderacio, pietas, sobrietas, pudicia.²¹ Vsus temperancie ut dicit Augustinus est in presenti delectationes prauas cohercere, in futuro nullo motu noxio delectari.²² Sed obicitur: praua delectatio est in quolibet peccato, ergo prauas delectationes cohercere non est unius uirtutis sed omnium, ergo non est temperancie. Item nullo motu noxio delectari pura priuatio est, ergo non est alicuius uirtutis usus. Si dicat quod illa priuatio debet resolui in hanc positionem, id est omnem motum illicitum detestari, contra: usus et uirtus in eadem ui, sed detestatio uicii est in irascibili, temperancia uero in concupiscibili, ergo detestari uicium non est usus temperancie. Preterea ille usus, scilicet detestari motus illicitos, non erit in patria, ergo non est usus temperancie.

Solutio. Principalis usus temperancie est omnes motus carnis illicitos uelle abesse, et ex hoc sequitur uelle restringere omnia desideria carnis superflua, quod est solius temperancie. Ad id uero quod primo obicitur, dicimus quod Augustinus appellat | prauas delectationes carnis delectationes, quia intensior est carnis delectatio et magis attrahit hominem, ut dicunt sancti. Vnde sic debet intelligi uerbum Augustini: usus temperancie est cohercere prauas delectationes, id est carnales. Ad secundum dicimus quod nullo motu noxio delectari est pura priuatio, immo posicio intelligitur enim sic: usus temperancie est nullo motu noxio delectari, id est delectari super hoc quod nullum noxium appetit, et hoc fere idem quod omnem motum carnis illicitum detestari. Sed notandum quod delectari tripliciter sumitur a sanctis. Vno modo detestari motus noxios idem est quod iudicare motus noxios; sic est temperancie et erit in futuro. Alio modo idem quod insurgere contra motus noxios, et sic erit in irascibili nec erit in patria, et est zeli motus siue ire per zelum. Tercio modo idem est quod fugere motus noxios, et sic est cuiuslibet uirtutis; contrahitur secundum diuersitatem materie, unde fugere siue detestari propriam excellentiam humilitatis est, fugere delectationes carnis temperancie est, et sic de aliis.

106^{ra}

¹⁸ Not found; cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, *De consideratione* 1.9, *Opera* 3: 404: "Non est ergo temperantia in solis resecandis superfluis".

¹⁹ Martin of Braga, *Formula vitae honestae* 4, p. 242.

²⁰ Macrobius, *Commentarii* 1.8.4, p. 37.

²¹ Ibid. 1.8.7, p. 38 (reading *parcitas* for *pietas*).

²² Augustine, *De Trinitate* 14.9, CSSL 50A: 439.

Sequitur de usu fortitudinis. Vsus fortitudinis in presenti est perferre molestias, in futuro autem Deo firmiter adherere.²³ A magistris sic describitur: fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum firma perpensio.²⁴ Sed hec diffinitio fortitudinis secundum partem est, quia tantum secundum statum aduersitatis est, unde et aliter describitur sic: fortitudo est supra pericula metum agere nichilque nisi turpe timere, tolerare firmiter aduersa uel prospera.²⁵ Sed iterum hec descriptio tantum secundum presentem statum. Non enim fortitudini [fortitudini *scripsi*: fortituade *MS*] conuenit ante peccatum. Vbi nullus metus, nulla aduersitas. Vnde sic describitur ab aliis: fortitudo est non terreri animam a corpore quodam ductu philosophie recedente nec altitudinem perfecte ad summa ascensionis horrere.²⁶ Prima pars tangit usum fortitudinis in presenti, secunda usum eius in futuro qui est principalis, alius secundarius. Huius autem .vi. sunt species: magnanimitas, fiducia, securitas, constancia, tolerancia, firmitas.²⁷ Sed de usibus eius quos assignat Augustinus obicitur: cum enim diuersi sint secundum speciem, necesse est quod habitus a quibus eliciuntur sint diuersa secundum speciem, et ita fortitudo non est habitus unus sed multi. Propterea sicut scientia euacuatur quoad usum, quia alius est usus scientie in uia, alius in patria, et usus fortitudinis alius est in uia, alius in patria, et ita fortitudo euacuabitur quoad usum, non tamen dicit magister. Item uidetur quod Deo adherere firmiter sit usus caritatis, non fortitudinis, aut idem erit usus duarum uirtutum. Dicit enim Augustinus quod frui est amore inherere alicui propter se et super omnia,²⁸ ex quo oportet quod Deo firmiter adherere caritatis est siue amoris. Male igitur assignatur ab Augustino pro usu fortitudinis. Item caritas est uinculum perfectionis quo perfecte uniuntur diligentes ad inuicem. Ergo quicumque diligit Deum ex caritate, perfecte unitur Deo. Sed uniri Deo idem est quod adherere Deo, ergo firmiter adherere Deo est usus caritatis. Item cum paciencia sit species fortitudinis, queritur si paciencia et usus eius sint in patria. Videtur quod sic, eo quod species est fortitudinis que est in patria. Sed contra uidetur esse quod super istum psalmum *paciencia pauperum non peribit in finem*²⁹ dicit Augustinus quod scilicet fructus et premium eius non euacuabuntur,³⁰ ex quo uidetur innuere quod ipsa et usus eius euacuabuntur. Propterea ibi nulla erit uel esse poterit molestia, ergo non est ibi opus paciencie. Et nichil est ibi inutile, ergo non erit ibi paciencia. Forte dicit quod paciencia est in patria non ad usum exercendum sed ad decorem anime, eadem ratione posset dici de fide et spe quod uterque est decor anime.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53.163, p. 149.

²⁵ Macrobius, *Commentarii* 1.8.7, p. 38.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* 1.4.4, CCSL 32: 8.

²⁹ Ps. 9:19.

³⁰ Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 14.9, CCSL 48: 429.

Solutio. Principalis usus fortitudinis est firmiter adherere Deo, et hic usus conuenit ei tam in uia quam in patria, sed in uia imperfecte, in patria perfecte. Sed quia iste usus minime apparet in uia, ideo Augustinus apponit alium usum cum eo qui est secundarius, in quo magis exercetur homo dum est in uia, qui est perferre molestias. Et licet isti usus sint diuersi, tamen quia non sunt eque principales, sed unus sub alio, ideo non oportet quod sint diuersi habitus. Et quod Deo firmiter adherere sit usus fortitudinis, patet per Senecam dicentem magnanimitas, que fortitudo dicitur, si insit anime tue cum fiducia, uiues liber et intrepidus.³¹ Sed notandum quod duplex est adhesio. Vna per modum amplexantis. Sic adheret caritas summo bono, fides summo uero, unde Can.ii.: *leua eius sub capite meo*,³² id est intellectus sub capite est, quia intellectu non capitur nisi ualde paruus [?], *et dextera eius amplexabitur me*,³³ id est affectus totus diligitur Deus. Alia adhesio est per modum detinentis. Sic adheret fortitudo quasi detinens Deum ne auferatur aut prosperis aut aduersis. Et adhesio ista nichil aliud est quam fiducia quedam mentis cui opposita est accidia, qua homo diffidit habere posse quod uellet, cui annexa est tristitia. Est igitur fortitudo uirtus qua homo adheret Deo detinens eum ne auferatur prosperis uel aduersis, quia manifestum est per illud Ysa.xxviii. *iustus quasi leo confidens*,³⁴ ibi glossa: qui non est fortis etiam si nullus persequatur eum, sponte fidem deserit.³⁵ Et hoc deserere pusillanimitatis est. Quod igitur obicitur de caritate, soluitur per distinctionem adhesionis, quia caritas adheret per modum amplexionis, fortitudo per modum detentionis. Vel potest dici quod adhesio proprie est fortitudinis, sed inhesio caritatis, sicut diximus supra in primo libro, unde dicendum est frui est inherere amore, non dicitur adherere [adherere *scripsi*: inherere MS]. Ad id quod queritur de paciencia si erit in patria, dicimus quod sic quoad essenciam, sed quoad usum euacuabitur. Erit enim anima | uel homo habilis ad sustinendum omnia propter Deum. Quod uero dicit Augustinus, scilicet quod paciencia erit in patria [in patria *scripsi*: impaciencia MS] quoad fructum et premium, et hoc dixit ad differenciam et paciencie et aliarum uirtutum. Paciencia enim nullum habebit usum ibi sicut cetere. Si queras ad quid igitur est ibi, dicimus ad decorem. Si tu obicias eadem ratione et fides et spes, non est uerum, quia aperta Dei uisio habitum fidei et spei necessario excludit, ut supra dictum est, sed non habitum paciencie.

106^{va}

Sequitur de usu iusticie. Describitur autem a magistris sic: iusticia est tacita nature conuencio in multorum adiutorium inuenta.³⁶ Et uidetur sumptum a Macrobio, qui dicit: iusticia est seruare unicuique quod suum est.³⁷ Quod est si facis aliis quod tibi uis fieri, et non facis quod tibi non uis fieri, id est uis

³¹ Martin of Braga, *Formula vitae honestae* 3, p. 241.

³² Cant. 2:6.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ In fact Prov. 28:1.

³⁵ *Glossa ordinaria* (Prov. 28:1), PL 113: 1111A.

³⁶ Martin of Braga, *Formula vitae honestae* 5, p. 246.

³⁷ Macrobius, *Commentarii* 1.8.7, p. 38.

non fieri.³⁸ Et hoc est quod dicitur tacita nature conuencio in nos naturaliter ordinata a Deo.³⁹ Iusticie autem .vii. sunt species, scilicet innocencia, amicitia, concordia, pietas, religio, affectus, humilitas.⁴⁰ Vsus iusticie, ut dicit Augustinus, est miseris subuenire.⁴¹ Sed obicitur: in patria nulla est miseria, ergo non erit ibi usus iusticie, ergo euacuabitur, quod est contra Augustinum, qui dicit quod remanebit. Item unam solam miseriam intuetur, ut dicit Bernardus.⁴² Sed ibi nulla est miseria, ergo nulla misericordia. Sed misericordia species est iusticie, ergo iusticia non erit ibi quoad omnes suas species. Item dicit Augustinus quod usus iusticie est Deo regenti subditum esse.⁴³ Sed uidetur quod hoc sit prudencie, quia usus prudencie est nullum bonum preponere Deo, id est Deum omnibus preponere, ut supra dictum est. Ex hoc sequitur quod usus prudencie est omnia Deo subicere, et ita prudencie usus est se Deo subicere siue Deo subditum esse. Item uidetur quod usus cuiuslibet uirtutis sit usus iusticie. Dicit enim Macrobius quod iusticie est uniuscuiusque uirtutis obsequium,⁴⁴ id est opus.

Solutio. Ad primum dicimus quod subuenire miseris non est principalis usus iusticie sed secundarius, unde nec erit in patria. Ad secundum dicimus quod sicut dictum est de paciencia, quod scilicet misericordia erit in patria et hoc quoad essenciam et non quoad usum. Ad tertium [tercium *scripsi*: secundum MS] dicimus quod duplex est postpositio et duplex prepositio. Vna subiectionis et dominii, et hec est iusticie, alia appreciationis, et hec est prudencie. Dicimus ergo quod proprius usus iusticie qui ei conuenit tam in uia quam in patria est se Deo postponere, sumpta postpositione primo tam in Deo quam in suis, id est ipsi Deo et eciam suis. Ex hoc autem quod sic uolo me supponere Deo, uolo ei reddere quod suum est tam in se quam in suis. Vnde patet quod reddere unicuique quod suum est, id est Deo, sibi et proximo, non est proprius usus iusticie sed sequitur ad illud, et ex hoc eciam patet quod non teneor in aliquo proximo in quantum est hoc uel illud, sed in quantum est creatura Dei cui proprie teneor subici. Et ex hoc teneor creature siue quod suum est reddere; suum, dico, in quantum creatura Dei, non in quantum homo. Item | teneor me subicere sacerdoti et prelato in quantum est minister Dei sic constitutus a Deo. Ad ultimum concedimus quod omne opus cuiusque uirtutis est opus iusticie in quantum consideratur ut debitum Deo.

Cardinales uocantur a cardine per similitudinem, quia sicut hostium per quod intratur in domum circa cardinem uertitur, ita rota huius temporis circa usus istarum .iiii. or uirtutum consistit per quos intratur in domum Domini. Vnde in libro Sap.viii. dicitur quod illis nichil est utilius in hac uita.⁴⁵ Omnes enim

³⁸ Cf. Tob. 4:16, Matt. 7:12.

³⁹ Cf. Martin of Braga, *Formula vite honeste* 5, p. 246: "Quid est autem iustitia nisi nature tacita conventio in adiutorium multorum inventa?"

⁴⁰ Macrobius, *Commentarii* 1.8.7, p. 38.

⁴¹ Augustine, *De Trinitate* 14.9, CSSL 50A: 439.

⁴² Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, *Ep.* 12, *Opera* 7: 61: "Iustitia meritum quaerit; misericordia miseriam intuetur".

⁴³ Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 14.9, CSSL 50A: 439.

⁴⁴ Macrobius, *Commentarii* 1.8.4, p. 37.

⁴⁵ Sap. 8:7.

uirtutes theologicæ sub hiis continentur et eciam .vii. dona Spiritus sanctus. *In subueniendo miseris*, unde dicendum *dispersit dedit pauperibus*.⁴⁶ In libro Sapientie .viii. *Et quosdam eciam uie* [uie scripsi: t MS; forsā terre?]: usus iusticie quibus subueniebat et fortitudinis quibus sustinebat molestias. *Iusticia enim immortalis est*, Sap.viii. et est sumpta de psalmo: *iusticia enim manet in seculum seculi*.⁴⁷ *Sicut fides ad quam referenda* quia iste .iiii. or uirtutes fidei quasi fundamento innituntur. *In praeteritis habebuntur*, id est euacuabuntur sicut fides. *Assigna rationibus*⁴⁸ unitatis.

II.5. Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus

This short, anonymous treatise, preserved in MS Cambridge, Jesus College Q.G.18 (66), ff. 73^{ra}–74^{ra} (13th century), discusses the problem of the connection of the virtues “on behalf of some who do not properly understand the purport of this question”. The author introduces the problem with sayings attributed to Bernard of Clairvaux and to Socrates and explains the difference between the cardinal virtues *circa operationes generales* and Aristotle’s twelve virtues *circa speciales*. Thereupon, the author confines himself to the cardinal virtues and develops three rationales for their interconnection. The first rationale is based on the doctrine of the cardinal virtues as *modi* of every moral virtue, which is found in the commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics* of John of Tytynsale and Henry of Friemar. Some quotations in the text may have been transmitted by the work of Thomas Aquinas. The treatise is a specimen of scholarly instruction in virtue ethics just below the level of academic speculation.

Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus

Sicut dicit beatus Bernardus, suauissimum est animaduertere contentum et amplexum uirtutum et mutuam earum ad inuicem dependenciam.⁴⁹ Dicit eciam Bernardus se super hoc disputasse: qui habet vnam uirtutem, habet omnes.⁵⁰ Et Socrates de eo hanc eandem introducit questionem.⁵¹ Super questione morali quantum me suppetit facultati rationes in contrarie non pigeat deducere. Premittatur autem diuisio uirtutis propter quosdam non bene intelligentes huius questionis tenorem.

Est autem virtus diuina et uirtus humana. Virtus uero humana diuiditur in eam que est circa generales operationes et in eam que est circa speciales. Virtus autem humana que est circa generales dicitur cardinalis et secundum hoc dicuntur virtutes humane, et de officiis harum agit Tullius. Est eciam uirtus que est circa specialem operationem et dicitur specialis et pars uirtutis. Et secundum

⁴⁶ Ps. 111:9, 2 Cor. 9:9.

⁴⁷ Ps. 111:9.

⁴⁸ This passage does not appear in *Sententiae* III.33.

⁴⁹ Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, *De consideratione* 1.9, *Opera* 3: 404.

⁵⁰ Cf. *ibid.* 1.9–11, pp. 404–407.

⁵¹ No source found.

hoc sunt duodecim species uirtutis siue difference per modum secundum quem agit Aristotiles in morali philosophi(a) de partibus uirtutis consuetudinalis hac facta diuisione uirtutis. Manifestum est secundum quem modum uirtutis intelligenda est hec questio prout est philosophica [philosophica *scripsi*: phisica MS], uidelicet de quatuor uirtutibus cardinalibus prudentia, iusticia, fortitudine et temperancia. Vt autem rationes pateant, premittenda est diffinicio harum [harum *scripsi*: horum MS] uniuscuiusque.

73^{rb} Est autem prudentia uirtus discretiua bonorum et malorum et utrorumque cum | [cum *iter*. MS] adherencia ad bonum et preeminencia melioris et detestatione mali. Iusticia uero est uirtus qua distribuitur unicuique quod suum est. Temperancia uero est uirtus modum retinens superflui et diminuti in moribus. Fortitudo est uirtus in aggressionem bonorum difficilium siue difficiliorum consistens et perseverancia in eis.

Hiis diffinitionibus positis ex complemento uirtutum arguitur. Qui vnam istarum habet, habet omnes. Non habetur perfecte prudentia nisi habeatur habitus immediate discretionis bonorum et malorum et utrorumque. Bonum autem et malum vniuersaliter se habeant ad ea que sunt in singularum uirtutum operibus et ad opposita hiis, cum ergo non dicatur habere uirtutem qui alicubi bene se habet et alicubi non, sed qui in omni non habebitur prudentia sine recta discretionem bonorum et malorum et utrorumque in singulis operibus uirtutum cum adherencia ad bonum et preeminencia melioris et detestatione mali. Sed hoc existente est vnaqueque uirtutum. Si enim scit tribuere unicuique quod suum est et uult et incommutabiliter perseverat in habendo iusticiam, uirtus est. Et similiter intelligendum est de aliis uirtutibus. Ergo qui habet prudentiam perfecte, habet omnes.

73^{va} Hoc sic ostenditur de iusticia. Est enim iusticia, sicut prius habitum est, uirtus qua distribuitur unicuique quod suum est. Ergo qui habet | iusticiam, distribuit unicuique quod suum—secundum habitum dico, non secundum actum. Sub hac autem distributione comprehenditur et ipse et inferior et superior et par. Nam qualiter est iustus aliis si sibi est iniustus? Dicitur autem sibi ipsi [ipsi *iter*. MS] iustus, quando unicuique quod est in ipso distribuit quod suum est. Si ergo habet iusticiam, habet uirtutem qua distribuit unicuique parti que est in ipso quod sibi debetur. Si ergo concupiscibilis potencia bene se habeat in suo actu, tenetur ei distribuere rectam rationem actus et similiter intelligendum est de aliis potenciis. Sed hoc non potest fieri nisi secundum proprium habitum que debetur unicuique potencie que est uirtus. Igitur qui habet iusticiam, habet omnes virtutes.

Similiter potest ostendi de fortitudine. Cum enim fortitudo sit uis consistens in aggressionem difficilium, cum bonum et difficile sit opus uniuscuiusque uirtutis, erit in opere uniuscuiusque uirtutis et similiter perseverancia. Virtute autem existente qua hoc fiat, erit uirtus vnaqueque. Ergo qui habet fortitudinem, habet omnes.

73^{vb} Similiter temperancia est uirtus modum retinens superflui et diminuti. Cum ergo modus superflui et diminuti sit uniuscuiusque uirtutis, erit uirtus secundum quam detinetur | modus superflui et diminuti necessitas ad omnes uirtutes. Ergo qui habet temperanciam, habet omnes. Oportet enim quod sufficienter disponat recte cum amore boni discreti et fuga mali, quod est prudentie. Opor-

tet etiam quod aggrediatur opus difficile perseuerando in eo, quod est fortitudinis. Oportet etiam quod modum habeat superflui et diminuti in opere, quod est temperantie. Hec autem omnia oportet propriis uirtutibus distribuere recte ut non assumat vis concupiscibilis quod est ipsius irascibilis nec e contrario, uel rationalis nec e contrario, et similiter de aliis, quod est iusticie. Hiis autem existentibus est uirtus. Ergo qui unam quamlibet habet, 〈habet〉 omnes.

Idem ostenditur adhuc sumpta hac diffinitione: uirtus est ultimum potencie de re,⁵² siue hac: uirtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum.⁵³ Et dicitur ultimum potencie ultra quod non potest, ut si potest facere decem et potest facere centum, neutrum posse illorum erit uirtus si plus potest. Similiter que est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, nisi cum est in necessitate consequendi optimum, quod inest in se. Si ergo aliquis habeat proprietatem que est affectio recta erga afflictiones et non habeat alias partes iusticie, | non habebit dispositionem perfecti ad optimum hominis nec ultimum potencie rationalis in quam nata est recipere omnibus potenciis humanis. Sed qui non habet hoc, non habet uirtutem que est iusticia. Ad hoc ergo quod habeatur uirtus que est iusticia, oportet habere omnes partes iusticie. Similiter si habet aliquis iusticiam et non habet prudentiam uel aliam quamlibet uirtutem, non habet ultimum potencie rationalis, ut iam determinatum est. Ad hoc ergo quod habeat ultimum potencie rationalis, oportet habere iusticiam cum omnibus aliis. Erit ergo unaqueque uirtus ex associatione ad unamquamque. Ergo qui habet unam uirtutem, habet omnes.

74^{va}

Hoc idem etiam ostenditur et sic. Sicut dicit beatus Dionisius in tractatu de bono, bonum est ex una sola re et tota, malum est ex pluribus particularibus defectibus.⁵⁴ Bonum ergo et malum sic se habebunt. Cum ergo malum humanum sit quocumque defectu particulariter existente, defectus autem particularis existat quacumque illarum deficiente, malum humanum erit quacumque illarum deficiente. Cum ergo malum non compaciatur secum bonum in eodem subiecto, quacumque illarum deficiente non erit bonum humanum, secundum quod bonus est aliquis et bonum reddit opus suum. Ergo non erit uirtus quauis illarum deficiente. Ergo qui habet unam, habet omnes. Explicit. Amen.

II.6. Robert Holcot, Super Sapientiam Salomonis, *lectio* 108 (on Sap. 8:7)

Robert Holcot's commentary on the Book of Wisdom, which survives in several hundreds of manuscripts, is a specimen of learned exegesis. His *lectio* on Sap. 8:7 constitutes a small treatise on the cardinal virtues in itself. Holcot first explains the verse in terms of Aristotle's distinction between *iustitia legalis* or

⁵² See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum in Sententias* II.27.1.1 ad 1, 1: 696, referring to Aristotle, *De caelo et mundo* 1.11 (281a). William of Moerbeke's translation reads "Virtus est excellentie", quoted by Aquinas as "virtus autem est excellentie semper" in *In De caelo et mundo expositio* 25 (249), p. 121; Aquinas claims, however, to have read *ultimum potentiae* "in alia translatione".

⁵³ Likewise *Auctoritates Aristotelis* 2.186; cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 7.3 (246b).

⁵⁴ See Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, *De divinis nominibus* 4.30.237, quoted in this form by Thomas Aquinas, *In librum Dionysii de divinis nominibus* 22, p. 211; *Scriptum in Sententias* I.39.2.2 ad 4, 1: 935 etc.; *Summa theologiae* I.19.12 arg. 4, *Opera* 4: 250.

generalis and *iustitia particularis*. Thereupon he elaborates an interpretation of the cardinal virtues as general moral virtues which depends on Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*. Next, he explains Macrobius's theory of the four degrees of the cardinal virtues, associating the first three degrees with the *boni*, *meliores*, and *perfectissimi*, respectively, following thirteenth-century models. Also, he claims (like Hugh of Saint Cher in the text edited above) that the cardinal virtues comprise the theological virtues. The final section of the *lectio*, which discusses the connection of the four virtues, closely follows Aquinas's views as expressed in the *Summa theologiae* and the *Scriptum super Sententiae*. The text presented here is taken from *Super Sapientiam Salomonis* (Basel: Johann Amerbach, 1489), sig. q8^{vb}–r1^{vb} (B). The text has been corrected in a few cases against two fourteenth-century manuscripts which both actually contain a much inferior text: Oxford, Balliol College 27, ff. 164^{va}–166^{ra}, and Oxford, Bodleian Library Laud. misc. 562, ff. 101^{va}–102^{va}.

*Et si iusticiam quis diligit, labores huius magnas habent virtutes. Sobrietatem enim et prudentiam docet et iusticiam et virtutem, quibus vtilius [vtilius MSS: vtilibus B] nihil est in vita hominibus.*⁵⁵ Postquam Salomon declarauit quinque prerogatiuas sapientie sponse sue, in hac parte prosequitur de sexta. Dictum est enim quod ipsa habet nobilitatem propagationis, celebritatem bone opinionis, curialitatem educationis et opulentiam in diuitiis et experientiam in artificiis. Sexto habet sincerum moderamen in moralibus, et septimo verum examen in scientialibus. Est ergo intentio huius lectionis commendare istam sponsam siue amicam preelectam a bonis moribus. Et circa hec duo facit, quia primo commendat eam generaliter et summatim a iusticia legali, secundo singulariter et singulatim a qualibet virtute cardinali. Secunda pars ibi: *Sobrietatem enim*.

Circa primum est aduertendum quod sicut dicit Aristoteles v. Eth. ca. i., duplex distinguitur iusticia: generalis que vocatur iusticia legalis, et particularis iusticia. Inter quas talis est differentia quod iusticia legalis non est pars virtutis, sed est tota virtus. Et vocatur iusticia legis quia secundum eam fit homo totius legis obseruator secundum singulas operationes virtutum. Vocatur autem iusticia generalis non quod sit communis ad omnem virtutem, sed quia vna est virtus particularis directiua tamen cuiuslibet virtutis in actum suum secundum Aristotelem, secundum quod expedit ad bonum communis siue bono communi. Vnde iusticia legalis intendit dirigere omnem virtutem in actum suum sicut expedit ad bonum communis. Iusticia vero particularis est illa cui contrariatur auaricia, et est in commutationibus et distributionibus que fiunt ad singulares personas. Et hec est que connumeratur inter quattuor virtutes cardinales, que sunt prudentia, iusticia, fortitudo, et temperantia.

Primo ergo commendat Salomon sponsam suam a iusticia legali et secundo a iusticia cardinali, vt dictum est. Quantum ad primum dicit sic: *Et si iusticiam quis diligit* etc. Secundum varietatem consuetudinum et complexionum sunt in hominibus varie inclinationes, tam ad vitia quam ad virtutes. Vnde quidam homines naturaliter inclinantur ad opera iusticie et eorum exercitio delectantur.

⁵⁵ Sap. 8:7.

Et de tali homine loquens dicit: *Et si iusticiam quis diligit naturaliter vel ex electione, et hoc loquendo de iusticia generali. Labores huius*, id est exercitationes difficiles sapientie, *magnas habent virtutes*, id est vires ad acquisitionem. Vel *labores huius magnas habent virtutes*, id est per exercitationem sapientie magne acquiruntur virtutes. *Labores* dicit propter difficultatem que est superannexa operi virtuoso. Virtus enim consistit circa difficile, et sicut dicit quidam: nulla est non ardua virtus.⁵⁶

Secundo commendat ex quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus singillatim dicens: *Sobrietatem et prudentiam, iusticiam et virtutem*. Prudentiam et iusticiam specificat nominibus suis, sed temperantiam vocat sobrietatem et fortitudinem vocat | virtutem. Sicut enim dicit Tullius De officiis: Nomen virtutis antiquitus fuit solius fortitudinis.⁵⁷ Iste autem quattuor virtutes dicuntur generales, principales et cardinales. Sicut enim in artibus est subordinationem dare qua vna precipit, dominatur, et principatur, alia subseruit et exequitur, ita est in virtutibus moralibus. Sic ars militaris precipit equestri et equestris frenefactiue. Similiter ars gubernatoria naui est architectonica, id est principalis et preceptiua respectu remigatiue et nauifactiue et huiusmodi. Finis enim superioris artis est intentus ab inferiori, sicut frenefactiua intendit bonitatem ad hoc quod homo bene equitet, et bene equitare ordinatur ad bonam militiam. Et ideo ars militaris habet precipere tam equestri quam frenefactiue et multis aliis subseruientibus arti militari. Eodem modo est in virtutibus moralibus: vna precipit alteri, puta superior inferiori. Verbi gratia: in passionibus concupiscibilibus delectationes secundum tactum sunt difficiliore ad regendum, et ideo indigemus vna virtute qua rationaliter regamur in huiusmodi delectationibus generaliter, et ista vocatur temperantia. Sub ista sunt alie virtutes circa materias speciales delectabilium. Est enim delectatio secundum tactum multiplex: alia circa gustum, alia circa venerea, alia circa ludos. In delectationibus circa gustum indigemus virtute que potest vocari sobrietas. In delectationibus venereorum indigent coniugati, quibus solis venereis licet uti, vna virtute que vocatur continentia vel castitas. In delectationibus que fiunt circa ludos indigemus virtute seruante medium inter superabundantiam et defectum que vocatur eutropelia, sicut docet Aristoteles iii. Ethic.⁵⁸ Modo quia omnes iste virtutes sunt circa materiam magis particularem quam temperantia, quia temperantia habet fieri circa delectationes secundum tactum generaliter subintelligendo gustum sub tactu, quia gustus est quidam tactus, sicut dicitur ii. *De anima*,⁵⁹ ideo temperantia vocatur temperantia generalis et eutropelia est species temperantie. Et similiter castitas coniugalitatis et sobrietas in cibo et potu sunt species temperantie. Et quia superior virtus precipit inferiori, ideo temperantia vocatur principalis respectu eutropelie vel sobrietatis. Quia vero sic quasi omnis materia moralis reducit ad quattuor, videlicet ad passiones concupiscibiles [ad passiones concupiscibiles MSS: om. B], ad passiones irascibiles, ad electionem rationis, et ad operationem circa res victui necessarias, ideo si

r1^{ra}

⁵⁶ See Ovid, *Ars amatoria* 2.535: "nulla, nisi ardua, uirtus".

⁵⁷ Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 2.18.43.

⁵⁸ Aristotle, *Ethica nicomachea* 4.14.

⁵⁹ Id., *De anima* 2.9 (421a).

r1^{rb} in istis quattuor bene regulemur, perfecte erimus virtuosī. Et ideo secundum istas quattuor virtutes dicuntur quattuor principales siue cardinales, nam temperantia facit tenere medium secundum rectam rationem circa passiones concupiscibiles, fortitudo circa passiones irascibiles, prudentia circa electiones in operabilibus et iusticia circa communicationem in rebus exterioribus. Dicuntur autem iste virtutes metaphorice cardinales. Cardo enim secundum Papiam et Hugonem [?] est pars ostii que vertitur in quodam foramine ligneo vel lapideo per quod ostium vertitur quando clauditur et aperitur.⁶⁰ Et aliquid quando vocatur cardo ipsum foramen. Et dicitur a *cardian* grece quod est *cor* latine, quia sicut cor hominis regit corpus in motu, ita lignum illud regit et mouet ianuam, quia ergo operationes humane reguntur determinate ab istis virtutibus secundum rectam rationem, sicut ianua per suum cardinem. Vnde ab antiquis cardinales eas placuit appellari. Vel forte melius dicuntur cardinales quasi cardiales, id est cardiales, a *cardian* grece quod est *cor* latine. Et dicuntur cardiales ad differentiam virtutum corporalium, sicut sunt robur et agilitas corporis. Iste vero sunt in corde, id est in anima, et ideo forsitan cardinales vel cardiales primitus dicebantur. Ex his patet quare sunt quattuor virtutes principales et quare dicuntur cardinales.

Est autem ulterius aduertendum quod iste quattuor virtutes secundum Plotinum et Macrobiū super librum primum De somn(i)o Scipionis quadrupliciter variantur. Sunt enim virtutes exemplares, virtutes purgati animi, virtutes purgatorie [purgatorie MSS: purgatorii B] et virtutes politice. Iste virtutes secundum quod sunt in Deo quodammodo vocantur exemplares, vt dicatur iusticia Dei observatio legis eterne in administratione, fortitudo potentia gubernandi, temperantia conformitas voluntatis sue ad rectam rationem, prudentia sapientia Dei infinita. Sic ergo iste virtutes secundum quod in Deo ponuntur, vocantur exemplares virtutes, quia diuine virtutes exemplares debent esse humane virtutis. Deum enim sicut summam regulam bonitatis imitari debemus. Considerando istas virtutes prout ab hominis haberi possunt, sic differunt secundum gradus perfectionis et imperfectionis: inueniuntur in bonis, in melioribus, in optimis. In bonis vocantur politice, id est ciuiles, quia secundum eas homo aptus efficitur ad bene viuendum in communi ciuilitate. In melioribus et perfectioribus qui transcendunt primos et tendunt quodammodo ad diuinam similitudinem, vt imitentur et effigient virtutes exemplares in Deo, vocantur iste virtutes purgatorie, quia purgant a vitiis passionum ita quod iste virtutes sunt in hominibus qui habent frequentiam passionum et tamen eis dominantur virtuose, et ideo dicuntur in eis purgatorie. Sed in hominibus perfectissimis, qui totaliter diuinis adherent, dicuntur iste virtutes esse virtutes purgati animi. In quibus prudentia sola diuina intuetur, temperantia terrenas cupiditates nescit, fortitudo passiones ignorat, iusticia cum diuina lege perpetuo federe sociatur. Et sic sunt in valde bonis, id est beatis, vel forte in quibusdam paucis electissimis in hac vita. Et specialiter fuerunt in Christi humanitate et virgine gloriosa.

⁶⁰ Cf. Papias, *Vocabularius*, 51: "Cardo una pars ostii ubi uertitur". I have not been able to identify the second source cited by Holcot, unless it should refer to Hugh of Saint Cher's text edited above.

His visis patet littera quod *sapientia docet sobrietatem*, id est temperantiam, i. Pet. v.: *Sobrii estote et vigilate* etc.⁶¹ *Docet etiam prudentiam*, Math. x.: *Estote prudentes sicut serpentes et simplices sicut columbe*.⁶² *Docet etiam iustitiam et virtutem*, id est fortitudinem, *quibus vtilius nihil est in vita hominibus*. Sed contra hoc videtur quod virtutes theologice sunt meliores ad promerendam [promerendam MSS: promerendum B] vitam, quia *sine fide impossibile est | placere Deo*, Ad Heb. xi.;⁶³ et si homo caritatem non habeat, nihil est, i. Cor. xiii [13 MSS: iii B].⁶⁴ Dicendum est quod sub istis quattuor comprehenduntur virtutes theologice, scilicet fides sub prudentia, spes sub fortitudine, caritas sub iusticia, et sic verum est quod istis *nihil est vtilius in vita hominibus*.

r1^{va}

Hic potest breuiter dubitari an virtutes morales sint connexe sic quod nullus possit habere vnam nisi omnes habeat.⁶⁵ Et videtur quod non, quia Augustinus dicit ad Hieronymum in quadam epistula in qua dicitur: *Non est diuina sententia qua dicitur "qui habet vnam, habet omnes"*; sed omnis vera sententia est diuina, quia secundum Ambrosium omne verum, a quocunque dicatur, a Spiritu sancto est; ergo non est vera sententia.⁶⁶ Pre[p]terea virtutes morales generantur ex exercitio actuum virtutum, sicut patet ii. Eth. Sed contingit aliquem exercere se in actibus vnus virtutis et non in actibus alterius, sicut aliquis potest se dare actibus liberalitatis, licet non det se actibus continentie sicut patet, ergo talis acquirit liberalitatem et tamen non est continens.

Ad oppositum est Philosophus vi. Eth. duobus vltimis capitulis, vbi probat quod nullus potest habere prudentiam nisi habeat omnes virtutes morales; nec potest quis habere virtutes morales nisi habeat prudentiam.

Ad questionem dicendum quod virtus moralis potest accipi dupliciter: perfecta et imperfecta. Virtus moralis imperfecta potest haberi etiam si alia non habeatur, perfecta autem non potest. Virtus imperfecta vocatur inclinatio naturalis ad virtutem, sicut aliqui naturaliter inclinantur ad castitatem, aliqui ad liberalitatem. Perfecta vero virtus est habitus inclinans ad opus bonum bene agendum. Huius connexionis ratio apud Aristotelem talis est, quia nullus potest esse prudens nisi sit virtuosus. Virtus enim moraliter facit eligere bene ea que sunt ad finem et bene iudicare de fine. Sic per oppositum malitia facit male sentire de fine. Vnicuique enim bonum apparet illud ad quod dicitur amicus, et ideo si non habeat rectam estimationem de fine, nunquam bene eligit media, quod est opus prudentie. Et corruptus habitus per vitiosos actus habet falsam estimationem de fine, et per consequens erronee eligit. Et ideo prudentia que est recta electio vel recta ratio agibilium non est in tali. Quod autem virtus moralis non possit esse sine prudentia sic ostenditur. Inclinatio in actum virtutis est ab habitu virtutis,

⁶¹ 1 Pet. 5:8.

⁶² Matt. 10:16.

⁶³ Heb. 11:6.

⁶⁴ Cf. 1 Cor. 13:2.

⁶⁵ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.65.1; *Scriptum in Sententias* III.36.1.1.

⁶⁶ This sentence is taken from Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum in Sententias* III.36.1 arg. 6, 3: 1215. The references are to Augustine, *Ep.* 167.10, CSEL 44: 597, and Ambrosiaster, *In Epistulas ad Corinthios* (on 1 Cor. 12:3), CSEL 81.2: 132.

modo sicut inclinatio corporis si est nimia [et non sit secundum rectam rationem *add. B om. MSS*] corpus impingit in aliud et leditur, ita inclinatio virtutis si est nimia non sit secundum rectam rationem. Et ideo ad hoc quod operatio sit virtuosa requiritur non solum habitus inclinans, sed prudentia dirigens et moderans operationem. Et ideo virtus moralis non potest esse sine prudentia.⁶⁷

r1^{vb} Ad primum dicendum quod intentio Augustini est quod illa sententia expresse non docetur in Sacra Scriptura. Ad secundum dicendum quod qui assuefacit se in operibus vnius virtutis et non omnium, talis non habebit prudentiam nec acquirat aliquam virtutem moralem perfectam. Acquirat tamen vnum habitum iuxta materiam circa quam se exercet, sed ille habitus non habebit rationem virtutis perfecte propter defectum prudentie. Et ideo ad hoc quod aliqua virtus acquiratur, oportet quod homo se habeat circa omnia que in vsu vite veniunt, non tamen oportet quod simul exerceat se in | actibus omnium virtutum, sed requiritur quod se habeat virtuose circa materiam alicuius actus virtutis. Sunt tamen quedam virtutes conuenientes homini secundum statum eminentem, sicut magnanimitas et magnificentia. Et istas virtutes acquirat homo exercendo se in actibus liberalitatis, sic quod liberalitate habeat eas in potentia propinqua. Si enim liberali superueniat [superueniat *MSS*: subseruiat *B*] abundantia sumptuum et pecuniarum, exercebit actus magnificentie de facili propter vsum liberalitatis in donationibus mediocribus vsitatum.

⁶⁷ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I.II.58.4 ad 3, *Opera* 6: 375.

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Abbreviations of Series

- CCCM Corpus christianorum, Continuatio mediaevalis (Turnhout, 1966–).
CCSL Corpus christianorum, Series latina (Turnhout, 1953–).
CSEL Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum (Vienna, 1866–).
MGH Monumenta Germaniae Historica.
SC Sources chrétiennes (Paris, 1941–).

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INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS

ASSISI			CAMBRIDGE		
Biblioteca comunale			Jesus College		
323	141		Q.G.18 (66)	141, 171, 307–	
				309	
AVRANCHES			CAMBRIDGE		
Bibliothèque municipale			St. John's College		
109	33		E.8 (111)	225	
BASEL			CAMBRIDGE		
Universitätsbibliothek			Sidney Sussex College		
F.I.14	162, 165–166,		85	149, 259	
	175–176				
BOLOGNA			CAMBRIDGE		
Biblioteca Universitaria			University Library		
1625	176		Ii.1.3	214	
			Ii.2.7	147, 234	
BRUGES			Ii.2.20	191, 229–230	
Grootseminarie			Mm.5.37	91, 142	
406	297, 299				
BRUGES			DUBLIN		
Stadsbibliotheek			Trinity College		
226	161, 163, 167,		332 (C.4.23)	137, 234	
	174, 217–218				
503	145		DURHAM		
508	145		Cathedral Library		
			C.IV.20	175, 273	
BRUSSELS			ERFURT		
Koninklijke Bibliotheek/Bibliothèque			Stadtbibliothek		
Royale			Amplon. F 13	175–176, 257	
863–69	268		CA 2 ^o 173	169, 227	
CAMBRIDGE			ERLANGEN		
Gonville and Caius College			Universitätsbibliothek		
211 (226)	137, 184		213	154, 175–176,	
				257	
CAMBRIDGE			FLORENCE		
Corpus Christi College			Bibliotheca Medicea Laurentiana		
63	169, 248–249		Plut. 33.31	137	

- FLORENCE
Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale
Conv. soppr.
E.VI.1046 209, 230
N. Acqu. 1131 236
- FREIBURG IM BREISGAU
Universitätsbibliothek
392a 37
- GRAZ
Universitätsbibliothek
676 142
- HALLE
Universitätsbibliothek/Landesbibliothek
Qu.Cod. 215 142
- KLOSTERNEUBURG
Stiftsbibliothek
1115 229
- KREMSMÜNSTER
Stiftsbibliothek
293 49
- LONDON
British Library
Add. 18334 227
Add. 38820 231-232
Cotton Cleo.
C.XI 91
Harley 362 140
Harley 3038 91
Royal 8.D.ii 231
Royal 10.A.xii 91
Royal 11.B.xiv 72
- MILAN
Biblioteca Ambrosiana
A 100 inf. 268, 272
- MILAN
Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense
AD.IX.42 139-140, 169-
170, 215, 265
- MUNICH
Universitätsbibliothek
2° 568a 181
- NEW HAVEN
Beinecke Library
416 228
- OXFORD
All Souls College
84 164, 172-173,
241, 256
- OXFORD
Balliol College
27 310-314
50 231
117 161, 162, 165
- OXFORD
Bodleian Library
Bodley 798 190, 244, 256
Can. misc. 304 176
Greaves 53 227
Laud. misc. 80 120, 130, 131,
135, 226, 238,
240
Laud. misc. 562 310-314
Lyell 8 92
Rawl. C 504 226, 233
- OXFORD
Corpus Christi College
18 140
- OXFORD
Magdalen College
109 37, 227
202 190, 264
- OXFORD
Merton College
144 183, 248
- PADUA
Biblioteca Antoniana
II.50 142

PADUA		lat. 16437	150, 257
Biblioteca Universitaria		lat. 17903	72
853	169, 183, 199, 209, 302–307	n.a. lat. 1544	23
PARIS		ROUEN	
Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal		Bibliothèque municipale	
529	235–236	26 (A 292)	37
857	191–192	671	91
PARIS		SANKT PÖLTEN	
Bibliothèque Mazarine		Diözesanbibliothek	
709	123	83	37
1019	232, 266	STUTTGART	
1020	232	Württembergische Landesbibliothek	
1050	204	HB.III.27	227
PARIS		TOULOUSE	
Bibliothèque nationale de France		Bibliothèque municipale	
lat. 242	37	369	153
lat. 585	249	TRIER	
lat. 2594	297	Stadtbibliothek	
lat. 3150	159, 161, 169, 210, 217	535	137, 209
lat. 3228	176, 185, 195, 203	TROYES	
lat. 3508	229	Bibliothèque municipale	
lat. 3528	233	518	297
lat. 3534	147, 233	1704	300–301
lat. 3732	152	1750	128, 137, 149
lat. 4841	58	1761	297
lat. 5822	137	1959	145
lat. 10633	120, 124, 299– 301	1987	247
lat. 12417	141	VATICAN CITY	
lat. 14556	127, 258	Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana	
lat. 14886	129	Ross. 162	165–166, 199
lat. 15900	143	Urb. lat. 222	161, 166, 212, 273, 277
lat. 15901	143	Vat. lat. 2639	149, 155, 161– 162, 164–167, 170, 181, 186, 200, 207, 254, 261, 271–273, 277
lat. 15944	161, 232		
lat. 15970	193–194, 209, 249	Vat. lat. 4100	227
lat. 16079	71		
lat. 16089	175–176, 257		
lat. 16110	175, 257		
lat. 16356	231		
lat. 16424	232		

INDEX OF ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL AUTHORS AND MAJOR ANONYMOUS WORKS

This index does not cover the footnotes

- Adam Scot 117–118
Adam Wodeham 189, 206, 261
Aelred of Rievaulx 106, 108–109,
112–113
Alan of Lille 69, 91, 124, 126–128,
130–131, 135, 142, 156, 168, 210,
226–227, 233, 247, 258, 292
Albert the Great 138, 143–144,
147, 149, 160, 164, 170, 173–175,
177, 179–180, 194, 199, 209, 212–
213, 218, 267
Albert of Saxony 176
Albertanus of Brescia 8, 145–146
Alcuin 34–40, 53, 58, 64, 140, 142,
226
Alexander of Hales 121, 194, 197
Álvaro Pelayo 140, 149, 249
Ambrose of Milan 4, 11–22, 27–
29, 44, 46–47, 50, 57, 62, 65, 244,
265, 313
Ambrosius Autpertus 225
Anders Sunesen 122
Andronicus of Rhodes (Pseudo-), *De*
passionibus 211
Angelomus of Luxeuil 48
Anselm of Canterbury 2, 88, 92–
93, 102–103, 160–161, 255
Anselm of Laon 78, 84–85, 87
Aristotle 5–6, 27, 29, 41, 70, 79,
87–90, 94, 102, 123, 135–221
passim, 224, 241, 243, 252–284
passim, 285–289, 291, 294–295,
307–311, 313
Aristotle (Pseudo-), *Economics* 269
Augustine of Hippo 4, 12–13, 19,
21–32, 34–35, 38–40, 44, 47–49,
55, 64–65, 70, 73, 78–79, 81, 85,
88–90, 92, 101, 109–110, 119,
121–123, 133, 142, 151, 157, 159–
160, 166–167, 188–192, 223, 238,
244, 246, 253, 255, 263, 289, 297–
298, 302–306, 313–314
Augustine (Pseudo-), *Categoriae*
29, 63
Augustine (Pseudo-), *De spiritu et*
anima 110, 186
Augustinus (Pseudo-) Belgicus 129
Bartholomew of Bruges 269
Bede 33–34, 36, 38, 47–48, 50, 53,
85, 121, 226, 249
Benedict of Nursia 95, 101
Bernard of Clairvaux 8, 45, 70–
71, 105–106, 108–114, 141, 147,
149, 151, 156, 160, 249, 263–264,
306–307
Bernardus Silvestris 74
Boethius 49, 54–55, 57–58, 63, 67,
70, 72, 82, 84, 87, 135, 141, 258
Bonaventure 194, 198, 200, 215–
217, 278
Bonaventure (Pseudo-), *Opusculum*
de quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus
141
Bonaventure (Pseudo-), *Pharetra*
151–152
Bonaventure (Pseudo-), *Summa de*
gradibus virtutum 150
Bongiovanni of Messina 182,
248
Borromeo of Bologna 139–140,
215
Bruno of Segni 95–96
Cassiodorus 55, 57, 61, 302
Celestin V (Pseudo-), *Opuscula de*
virtutibus et vitiis 230
Christian of Lilienfeld 209

- Christine de Pizan 265
 Chrysippus 12, 246
 Cicero 12, 16, 26–27, 35, 55, 57, 61, 63–64, 69, 71–74, 76–77, 82, 84, 104, 135, 141–142, 150–151, 156, 171, 173, 192, 246, 258, 265, 291–293, 297–298, 307, 311
 Claudian Mamertus 28
 Clement of Alexandria 11, 27
 Coluccio Salutati 158, 192, 254, 272
 Conrad of Halberstadt 152, 229, 232
 Conrad of Hirsau 100, 121, 228, 232, 242, 264
Contra philosophos 29
Corpus iuris civilis 82
- David of Augsburg 190, 234
De doctrina virtutum et fuga vitiorum 247
De origine virtutum et vitiorum 110, 250–251
De quatuor principalibus uirtutibus (12th century) 299
De quatuor principalibus uirtutibus et diffinitionibus (12th century) 297–299
Decretum Gratiani, see Gratian
 Dhuoda 265
 Dionysius (Pseudo-) the Areopagite 141, 309
 Dionysius Exiguus 53
Disticha Catonis 72, 141
 Donizo of Canossa 264
 Durand of Saint Pourçain 198, 206–207, 251
- Edmund of Abingdon 182
 Ekbert of Schönau 117
 Engelbert of Admont 8, 138–139, 155, 162, 170–171, 207–208, 212–213, 219–220, 266, 271
 Ermenrich of Ellwangen 40
 Eustratius of Nicaea 164–165, 170, 172, 217
- Fasciculus morum* 150, 234
 Francis of Meyronnes 143, 167–168, 279
 Francis Petrarch 140–141, 145, 192, 235, 254, 257, 263, 283
- Garnier of Langres 110
 Gerald of Odo 144, 166, 172, 176–181, 199, 205, 249, 273–274, 294–295
 Gerald of Wales 118
 Gerard of Csanád 45
 Gerhoh of Reichersberg 98–99
 Gilbert Foliot 96
 Gilbert of Hoyland 113
 Gilbert the Universal 85–86
 Giles of Paris 118, 270–271
 Giles of Rome 139, 158, 162, 181, 188–189, 212, 214–216, 218, 268–269, 293–294
 Giovanni Balbi 186, 201, 209
 Giovanni Boccaccio 269–270
Glossa ordinaria (Bible) 13, 85–86, 151, 305
 Godfrey of Admont 99–100, 250
 Godfrey of Auxerre 106, 110, 112–113, 244–245, 250
 Godfrey of Fontaines 185, 201, 207, 210, 269
 Godfrey of Poitiers 127
 Goswin of Liège 64–65
 Gratian, *Decretum Gratiani* 81
 Gregory the Great 4, 13, 31–34, 36, 39, 43, 47, 49, 65, 70, 81, 85, 101, 141, 225, 229, 240–241
 Gregory of Rimini 189, 205–206
 Guibert of Nogent 43, 51, 96
 Guido Faba 150, 229
 Guido Terreni 176
 Guido Vernani 176
 Gunther of Pairis 122
- Halitgar of Cambrai 37–38, 142, 227
 Haymo of Auxerre 49
 Heinrich Seuse 7
 Heiric of Auxerre 49

- Helinand of Froidmont 107
 Henry of Friemar 162, 165, 175–176, 294, 307
 Henry of Ghent 170, 185, 206, 209, 256, 261, 278
 Henry of Langenstein 203
 Henry of Marcy 112
 Henry of Rimini 138–139, 154, 214–215
 Herrad of Landsberg 228, 265
 Hervaeus Natalis (Hervé de Nédellec) 198, 206
 Hildebert of Lavardin 77–79, 99, 130, 264
 Hildegard of Bingen 108, 265
 Honoratus of Marseille 29
 Honorius Augustodunensis 93–95, 106
 Horace 74
 Hrabanus Maurus 38–39, 48–49, 60–61, 67
 Hrotsvitha of Gandersheim 265
 Hubertus 247
 Hugh of Angoulême 52
 Hugh of Flavigny 96
 Hugh of Fleury 118
 Hugh of Fouillooy 115
 Hugh Ripelin 142, 147–148, 160, 193, 196–197, 260
 Hugh of Saint Cher 183, 209, 301–307, 310, 312 (?)
 Hugh of Saint Victor 91, 101–104, 110, 119, 121, 124, 161
 Hugolin of Orvieto 189

 Iohannes Homo Dei 45–46
 Irnerius of Bologna 82
 Isaac of Stella 110
 Isidore of Seville 33, 45, 52, 57–58, 63, 142, 244

 Jacobus de Cessolis 140
 Jacques Legrand (Jacobus Magni) 152, 233
 James of Benevent 151, 230
 James of Vitry 128
 Jean Rigaud 147–148

 Jean Tigart 150, 257
 Jeremy of Montagnone 145–146
 Jerome 4, 12, 18–22, 27–29, 44, 47, 65, 82, 109, 127, 190, 244, 246, 263, 313
 John Bromyard 191, 203, 237
 John de Burgh 151
 John Buridan 144–146, 165–166, 172, 179–181, 205, 207, 256, 259, 261, 266–268, 272–274, 295–296
 John Cassian 29
 John Dedecus 162, 165
 John Duns Scotus 143, 167, 185, 187, 189, 194–195, 206, 240–241, 256–257, 261, 279
 John of Fécamp 44
 John of Jandun 162, 268
 John of La Rochelle 194, 202
 John of Legnano 8, 145–146, 155, 162, 185, 199, 207, 254, 261, 271–272, 296
 John Peckham 152, 232
 John of Pouilly 143, 202, 205, 207
 John of Salisbury 70, 77, 79–81, 86–87, 216, 246, 263
 John Scot Eriugena 49, 54, 58
 John of Tytynsale 175, 307
 John of Wales 139–140, 191, 214, 235
 Jordan of Quedlinburg 149, 162, 170, 229
 Jotsald of Saint-Claude 61–62
 Julian Pomerius 4, 30–32, 36–39, 65, 121, 142, 244

 Lactantius 12, 21, 244–245
Liber Floretus 231
 Luke (apostle) 14

 Macrobius 62, 69, 72, 74–75, 82–83, 87, 104, 111, 124, 141–142, 150–151, 216–218, 220, 277–278, 291, 293, 302–303, 305–306, 310, 312
 Marbod of Rennes 77–79, 88, 264
 Marsilius of Inghen 201
 Martianus Capella 49, 59, 74, 91

- Martin of Braga 8, 55–57, 67, 77,
 81, 140–142, 151, 171, 264–265,
 292, 301–302
 Martin Gosia 82–83
 Maurice of Sully 121
 Mauritius Hibernicus (Maurice of
 Provins) (Pseudo-?) 232
 Michael of Massa 191
 Michael of Prague 138–139, 185,
 215
Moralium dogma philosophorum
 72–73, 91, 139, 145, 155, 181,
 265, 277, 292–293

 Nicholas of Biard 152, 232
 Nicholas of Gorran 232
 Nicholas of Hanappes 153, 241–
 242
 Nicholas of Vaudémont 268

 Odo (*Ysagoge in theologiam*) 74–
 76, 91–92, 142, 167, 292
 Odo of Châteauroux 141
 Odo of Ourscamp 128
 Odo of Tournai 41
 Ogerius of Locedio 108
 Onulph of Speyer 64
 Origen 11, 18–19, 22, 263
 Otto of Freising 118

 Paschasius Radbertus 48, 59–60
 Papias 63, 312
Paradisus animae 149, 190, 231
 Paul (apostle) 13, 19, 53, 120, 189,
 267
 Paulus Hungarus 227, 233
 Peter Abelard 69–71, 73, 77, 83,
 87–91, 101, 103–104, 121, 154–
 155, 160–162, 166–167, 235, 237,
 255, 260, 263, 282
 Peter Aureoli 168, 171, 188
 Peter of Auvergne 268
 Peter the Chanter 119, 123–126,
 128–130, 132–133, 135, 184, 186,
 192, 209, 286–287, 299–301
 Peter Comestor 128–129, 263,
 300

 Peter of Corveheda 176
 Peter Damian 41–44
 Peter Lombard 7, 24, 70, 86, 119–
 124, 126, 128, 130, 132, 138, 143,
 161, 185–186, 192, 198, 204, 219,
 238–239, 240, 251, 258, 278, 301
 Peter of Naples 52
 Peter of Poitiers 128
 Philip the Chancellor 138, 143,
 156–158, 160, 162–163, 170, 172,
 181, 183, 186, 188, 194, 201–202,
 247–248, 293
 Philippus Presbyter 29
 Philo of Alexandria 11, 13
 Pierre Bersuire 152, 191
 Pierre de la Palud 206, 237
 Placentius 91
 Plato 1, 94, 122, 159–160, 192,
 217–218, 253
 Plotinus 82, 278, 312
 Plutarch 269
 Porphyry 55
 Praepositinus of Cremona 87, 126,
 128, 131, 247
 Proclus of Constantinople 53
 Prudentius (*Psychomachia*) 225,
 228, 249

Quid suum virtutis 63–64

 Radulfus Ardens 122–123
 Rainerius of Pisa 152
 Ralph of Laon 87, 127
 Raoul Glaber 51
 Rather of Verona 40, 61
 Raymond Lull 198, 202, 209, 229,
 241
 Remigius of Auxerre 49, 54, 58
 Richard Fishacre 147, 188
 Richard Kilvington 145
 Richard of Mediavilla 144, 170,
 194, 202
 Richard of Saint Victor 103
 Robert Grosseteste 144, 164, 172–
 173, 185, 189–190, 211, 241, 255–
 256, 281
 Robert Holcot 309–314

- Robert Kilwardby 157, 164, 171,
197, 216, 251
Robert of Walsingham 261
Roger Bacon 152, 197, 216
Roger of Waltham 214
Roland of Cremona 201, 215–216
Rosarium theologiae 152, 204
Rupert of Deutz 96–98, 264
- Seneca 56, 71, 141, 151, 171, 173,
265, 292, 301, 303, 305
Servasanto of Faenza 190, 209,
229–230, 241–242
Simon Hinton 147
Simon of Tournai 129, 258
Speculum christiani (14th century)
147
Stephen of Bourbon 148, 193, 209,
249
Stephen Langton 87, 126–127, 129,
131, 135, 159–160
Summa Breves dies 135, 239
Summa rudium 147–148, 155, 260
Summa sententiarum (12th century)
121
Summa virtutum de remediis anime
154–155, 193, 198, 233, 249
- Tabula fidei christiani* (14th century)
147
Terence 300
Thierry of Chartres 73
Thomas Aquinas 7, 138–139, 143–
146, 149, 151–155, 157–158, 160–
162, 164–166, 170, 173–177, 180,
184–187, 194, 198, 200, 206, 211,
217, 224, 240–242, 253, 255–256,
260, 267, 273–277, 279–280, 282,
285–286, 293, 307, 310
Thomas Bradwardine 189
Thomas of Chobham 201, 233
Thomas the Cistercian 299
- Thomas of Ireland 151, 232
Thomas of Sutton 280–282
*Tractatus de quatuor virtutibus
cardinalibus* (13th century) 141,
171, 307–309
Ulpian 82–83
Ulrich of Strasbourg 143, 197, 254
- Victricius of Rouen 28
Vincent of Beauvais 144, 152, 227
Vincent of Beauvais (Pseudo-),
Speculum morale 144
Virgil 74
- Walter Burley 162, 172–173, 176,
294
Walter Map 270
Wibold of Cambrai 40
William of Auvergne 7, 183, 210
William of Auxerre 159, 193, 200–
201, 209
William of Cahors 146
William of Conches 74–75
William of Doncaster 72
William Durand 188, 209
William de La Mare 170
William of Lanicea 147–148, 190
William of Malmesbury 118
William of Moerbeke 267
William of Ockham 167, 189, 195–
196, 206, 254, 257, 261
William of Pagula 147, 151, 234
William Peraldus 140, 147–149,
160, 170, 181–183, 209, 229–230,
249, 271, 277, 279, 292
William of Saint Thierry 109, 114–
115, 239
Wolbero of Sankt Pantaleon 101
- Ysagoge in theologiam*, see Odo